BALANCE OF POWER8 to0
Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE BALANCE OF POWER: 6 TO0
Following the death of Andrei Zhdanov, Malenkov rapidlyrominent position in the Soviet hierarchy and apparently was allowed to re-establish control over the Party apparatus by carryingurge of important Zhdanov adherents. In this process Nikolai Toanesensky, Chairman of Gosplanember of tbesince onlyisappeared. There was no subsequent reference to him untilhen an article published by M. A. Suslov attacked the so-called Voznesensky deviation.
Concurrently with tbe Party purge in February andeveral changes were made in governmental appointments. Voznesen-sky's case has already been mentioned. Inolotov, Bulganin and Mlkoyan all surrendered their respective ministerial portfolios of Foreign Affaire, Armed Forces, and Foreign Trade.
Through this8 tohere were two significant changes in the order of listing of the Politburo members. First, Malenkov moved up to fourth position in Politburo listings Inafter Molotov and Beria) and then moved to thrid position (after Molotov) in Second, Bulganin rose markedly In Politburo listings innd A. A. Andreev dropped markedly at the same time. However, neither Andreev nor Bulganin were at that8mong the Big Five.
Despite the Party purge and the ministerial changes, however, the basic balance In the distribution of power among the top five members of the Politburo probably remained substantially unchanged.
Molotov, even though be experienced some reduction In prominence, held his post as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and presumably remained largelyfor foreign affairs.
Halenkov, while resuming control over personnel matters and widening bis Interests toide variety of problems, maintained his previous interest in agriculture.
Beria remained in charge of tbe security function, forced labor, atomic energy, and transport. inor change in Berla's responsibilities occurred in0 when timber industry matters were transferred to Pervukhin.
Kaganovich remained responsible for building materials, endvao Chief of tbe Statefor Mate rial-Technlcal Supply (Gossnab). This cosmlttee vas responsible for tbe planning and allocation of material for the Soviet economy.
Mikoyan vas In charge of tbe fish, meat, dairy aSd food Industries, and presumably also retained responsibility for Internal and foreign trade. He vas identified In foreign trade matters Ino.
On tho second level of tbe Politburo,umber of changes took place in the distribution of power:
Andreev retained his interest in agriculture and his post as Chairman of the Council for Collective Farm Affairs, but vas publicly rebukedravda article of0 for pursuing an Incorrect line on agricultural labor questions.
Voanesensky disappeared innd vas replaced as Chairman ofGosplan by M. Z.eported Malenkov adherent.
Khrushchev vas transferred from tbe Ukrainian Partyat Ice to replace C. M. Popov as All-Onion Secretary and as Secretary of tbe Important Moscow Oblast Committee. Khrushchev also became the Politburo spokesman onpolicy, following Andreev's humiliation.
ftad KoByslD both apparently retained their responsibilities for national defense and light Industry respectively; Suslov,olitburo member, became the leading Soviet functionary vho most often represented the USSR at Satellite political ceremonies. Other newcomers to sub-Politburo level were Ponomarenko and Bhklryatov.
Aside from the political events mentioned ln the above paragraphs, tbe chief events and developments of tbe period under review were the following:
The adoption by the USSR, sometime lnearmaments program. This program was apparently scheduled for completion
The withdrawal of the USSR from its exposed position inhe liquidation of the Berlin blockade
and the Greek Civil War.
he Internal consolidation of the East European Satellites, and the initiation of programs calculated to integrate their economies with that of the USSR.
triumph of the Chinese Communists on theand the proclamation of the Peoples
attack on South Korea by tbe north Koreanonhe subsequent intervention ofand tbe commitment of the Chinese Communist
MALKKKOV'S RISE
The clearest indication of Malenkov's rise to prominence is found In the official listings of the Politburo members published from time to time. Prior to Zhdanov's death, Malenkov bad usuallyosition in the Politburo .varying from fifth to ninth. Inowever, he.moved to the number four position,Molotov (number two) and Beria (number three). Malenkov then changed places with Beria inut shortlydropped again to number four position. He moved back to third position land held it until the time of Stalin's death.
During this period, Malenkov's name again began to appear
Malenkov had reappearedecretary inb and, from the time of Zhdanov's death on, Joint decrees issued by Ute Government and tbe Centralwere signed by Stalin for the Council of Ministers, and by Malenkov for the Central Committee of the Party.
alenkov delivered the speech on theof the Revolution, which in previous years had been given by Molotov. Inn s, series of articles written by the various Politburo members on tbe occasion of Stalin's seventieth birthday, Malenkov's article preceded all others, including even Molotov's, io both the Pravda andversions.
"TOT-se6rex.
Tbe same trend was also evident In the propaganda treatment -ccorded Malenkov. On the occasion afh birthday lnorropaganda statement was made that Malenkov had beenaithful pupil ofn outright fabrication, of course. All this culminated in the selection of Malenkov as the person to give the keynote speech on behalf of the Central Committee at tbe long overdue Nineteenth Party Congree in
COMMuTflST PARTY CHAHOES9
A summary review of key Communist Party appointments2 demonstrates conclusivelyhift of some magnitude In the control of the Party took place This apparently involved the removal of the so-called Zhdanov clique. Important changes took place in the All-Unloa Secretariat the secretarial appointments In the Moscow and Leningrad City'and Oblast organizations and In the Ukrainian organization, and In the Chief Political Administration of the Soviet Army.
Prior9 thereertain pattern of continuity in tbe appointments of First Secretaries in the Moscow and Leningrad Party organizations. In each caseirst Secretary was promotedosition of greater influence (or, as in tbe case of Shcberbakov, vho died Inthe second ranking man In the organization took over, when these shifts took place, there were no known significant upsets ln the staffing of these Party organs. This clearly indicates continuity and stability In the political power structure through these changes.
owever, there was an abrupt change In this pattern and an abrupt end to tbe careers of A. A. Kuznetsov, All-Onion Secretary, G. M. Popov, All-Onion Secretary and Secretary of the Moscow City and Oblast organizations, and P. S. Popkov, Leningrad
1/ Shcberbakov had held, at tbe time of his death, tbe Moscow City and Oblast Secretaryship. He was also the Chief of the Array Politicalecretary of tbe Central Committee and an alternate member of the Politburo. Shcberbakov was Zhdanov's son-in law.
Oblast Secretary. Both A. A. Kuznetsov and P. s. Popkov utterly disappeared in early loAo.i/ Beginning in. M. Popov vas denoteduccession of third-orderhe disappeared H. S. Khrushchev moved up from the Ukraine to replace G. H. Popov as Secretary of the Moscow Oblast organization andember of the All-Unloo Secretariat.!/ The pattern which had previously applied to Moscow and Leningrad held true in the Ukraine following Khrushchev's departure: the Second Secretary in the Ukraine, L. G. Melnlkov, stepped into Khrushchev's former position, and thus continuity of political leadership vas maintained there.
In Leningrad, the City and Oblast First Secretary positions were takenewcomer to Leningrad, V. N. Andrianov. Andrlanov held both positions untilhen he surrendered the Cityto F. R. Kozlov, following the precedent established in Moscow when Khrushchev was moved In there. Both the Moscow and Leningrad Party organizations were completely shaken up following the displacement of the Incumbent Secretaries and the Introduction of the "outsiders" to directing positions.
The Chief Political Administration of tbe Army bad been held during the war by Shcherbakov. Upon bis death inhe position vas taken by Colonel General Shikin, who held it until olonel General P. F. Kuznetsov, who bad been the Chief of the Military Intelligence Directorateook over this position and held it, so far as is known,
and
o^ner rigures were arrested la
I [January and9 appearednusual Police activity.
. M. Popov reappeared inpon his appointment as Ambassador to Poland.
3_/ This constituted another departure from the previous pattern. Khrushchev did not assume both the Moscow City and Oblast Secretaryships, butumyantsov was appointed to Moscow City position some months later. This point does not affect the argument.
Be was last Identified In this position Ina/
Tbe coincidence of all these changes occurring$ arouses interest In the political careers and connections of the persons affected. Of tbe persons concernedA. A. Kuznetsov, P. s. Popkov, Col. Gen. Sbikin and G. M. Popovall have direct or secondary connections with Andrei Zhdanov:
A. A. Kuznetsov succeeded Zhdanov as Secretary ln tbe Leningrad Oblast organization, having held positions in Leningrad since at (For example, be was Secretary of the City Committee0)
P. S. Popkov succeeded Kuznetsov In both the City and Oblast positions, after having been Chairman of tbe Leningrad Executive Committee
Colonel General Shlkin had been Political Officer on the Leningrad Front during the war and succeeded Shcberbakov in the Army Political Administration.
G. M. Popov, Vho succeeded Sbcherbakov In the Moscow Party positions, vas, along with Molotov, A. A. Kuznetsov and Marshalpeaker at Zhdanov's funeral in
G. M. Popov and A. A. Kuznetsov both became members of the Orgburo and All-union Secretariat In Marchnd remained there throughout Zhdanov's tenure as First Secretary.
H. A. Voznesensky, who disappeared inas also associated with Zhdanov. He firstrominent position5 as Chairman of the Leningrad City Planning Commission, and later moved up to become the Chief of Gosplan. He wasember of the Politburo lnt tbe height of Zhdanov's eminence. Further aspects of the Voznesensky case will be discussed In connection with the governmental changes of.
nolonel General A. S. Zheltov was Identifiedof tbe Political Administration of tbe newlyof Defense. F. F. Kuznetsov appeared innd probably has remained as Chief of the
In March, Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov, Minister of Foreign Trade Mikoyan and Minister of War BuLganln relinquished their direct control of ministries. Tbey remained as Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers, vhlcb still left them In tbe governmental picture, and, of course, they retained their Politburo positions. Voznesensky, however, vas relieved of his positions as Chairman of Gosplan and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers at this time. Subsequently, be was not present at tbe various appearances of the Politburo, and he was not thereafter listed among tbe Politburo members. Of tbe various changes that took placehose affecting Molotov and Voznesensky are the most important and Interesting.
Molotov had been Stalin's chief lieutenant In tbe Soviet governmental apparatus since the late twenties. He bad been Primehairman of the Council of People's Commissar lata. In talin took over leadership of the Government as Prime Minister, and Molotov became Minister of Foreignosition be held through and after tbe vor.
Molotov may have been Involvedonflict concerning Soviet policy toward tbe Marshall Plan. There is Information indicating disparate views in Moscow regarding the Marshall Plan and suggesting that Molotov may have been Instrumental ln the Soviet decision to oppose the plan.
taruum ruauia ananitially accepted invitations to attend tbe July conference on tbe Marshall Plan, and later suddenly withdrew their acceptances. According to the published transcript of tbe Moscow discussions which culminated ln order to Czechoslovakia to withdraw from the July conference, Stalin stated that lt had become evident, upon receipt of information from Paris, that the purpose of the Marshall Plan was to aid tbe formationestern bloc and to Isolate the Soviet Onion. Stalin then told the Czechs that their country's participation lathe Marshall Plan would be an unfriendly act against the USSR. Molotov bad been tbe Soviet representative at tbe preliminary discussion on the Marshall Plan, held io Paris in
speech9 nay be one indication that be bad lost acme degree of Influence. At the end of the war, Molotov took over from Stalin the honor of delivering this speech; he gave it7hereafter the honor was rotated among younger Politburo members, Malenkov giving it Xt is quite possible, of course, that
gingo
longer capable of handling this speech.i/ nevertheless, hisfrom public prominence was evident and vas commented uponumber of sources. Including Russian defectors.
However, In spite of having relinquished direct control ofAffairs, Molotov remained as First Deputy Chairman to Stalin on the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, be also appeared to have suf--ered no change In formal political status, since he was listed first after Stalin In all Politburo listings up until Stalin's death. ossible explanation of tbla is suggeated by speculation current9 to the effect that Molotov was being relieved of tbe day-to-day administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that he could concentrate on broad policy-planning functionsin particular,with the Chinese Ccmmunists, who at that time were beginning to show signs that they would take over the mainland that year.
hdanov delivered the speech
t9 parade, Molotov waa present on thestand, but departed somealf hours before tbetratlona ware over. Malenkov stood next to Molotov, but.T
"essential and fundamentaln particular relations vith Communist China. She added that both Molotov and Mlkoyan vere quite busy in connection vith the forthcoming Party Congress (which, lt may be noted, did not take place until.
Furthermore, Molotov vas Identified In matters related topolicy after his release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Even though no longer Foreign Minister of tbe USSR, boonference of Foreign Ministers of tbe East European Satellites, held In Prague in late Tbe aace "VIP" plane thatthe Soviet delegation to Prague bad earlier been noted in the Soviet Far East (in the periodsuggesting that Molotov may have been in the Far East at that
THE VOZNESEKSKY CASE
The problem of explaining Voznesensky's disappearance9 has been complicated further by the appearance of bis namend in3 io connection with the so-called "Voznosenoky. his alleged deviation from Stalin's views on Marxlsmjnd the economic laws of socialism. as we have already had occasion to note, first achievedas Chairman of the City Planning Commission In Leningrad Subsequently, he went to Moscow to head the State Planning Commission and during the war he served on the State Defensethe all-powerful "war cabinet". Be was not one of the originalof the committee, having Joined It Ine disappeared from sight and his name was not mentioned in the Soviet presB until the2 attack on his views by M. A. Suslov In Pravda.
Three principal hypotheses have been advanced to explain Voxne-sensky's political demise. Tbe first hypothesis is that Voznesensky was associated with tbe so-called Zhdanov clique In Moscow, Into Malenkov, and that following Zhdanov's death8 and his apparent disgrace, Voznesensky waa purged. Tbe aecond hypothesis Is that Vozneaonsky bad made many mlstakca In Gosplan and, according to acme aourcea, bad badly advlaod Stalin and the other leaders into the Soviet economic situation and capabilities. The third hypothesis la that Voznesensky opposed Stalin either on ideological questions regarding the nature of the economic problems and tbe laws
policiesocialist state or on practical policy Batters af-rectlag the Sonet economy and the planning function.
The first hypothesis, tbat Voznesensky vas associated vltb the" Zhdanov group. Is supported by the clrcumstanclal evidence ofcareerand particularly by the fact that hiswas concurrenteries of other Important political shifts ofhlcb in turn clearly Indicated tbe unseating of a
powerful political group. During the war, i
that Voznesenskyupporter ofuci lepurxs sxaxenbe switched sides when Zhdanov returned to Moscow and tookof the Soviet Communist Party.
mrVF remesTDe-rWr, toe*zrm
mantling of German Industry, as the Berlin representative of tbe Special Committee in Moscow beaded by Malenkov. Saburov replaced Voznesensky as Chairman of Gosplan in9 and held thisuntil Stalin's death. For many years he bad been associated with Gosplan, moving In and out of it,eputy Chairman, several times. Hot all aspects of Saburov'e history are clear and It Is la-possible to say Just what bis relations with Voznesensky were. At the most, his history tends to support this first hypothesis.
There Is considerable evidence to support the secondVoznesensky had made seriousn Gosplan and hadpresented an Incorrectly optimistic picture of the Soviet
the Soviet uovernmeoteformulated itslans ana-tight! ened Its plan controls, and that there had been changes in tbeplanning structure In8 and These changes affected the organizational aspects of the planning function; certain of then had actually begun In Inhe 8tate Statistical Cemission was removed from tbe jurisdiction of Gosplan and placed under the Council of Ministers. In the beginningbe wholesale price structure was reformed: tbe prices on producers goods were Increasedovement was begun to abolish subsidies for these industries. This economy drive was accompanied by tbeof stricter controls over enterprises and their costs and Inventories; the plan fulfillment report published in April loko stated that "new additional plant capacity has come to light,"in Increased plan targets for the first quarter
Voznesensky had been removed because he bad attempted to deceive Stalin regarding the degree of the fulfillment of the Five Tear Plan. Finally, in8 andust precedingisappearance, Soviet propaganda media embarkedery short-lived campaign for the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan in four years. Tbe "five year plan in four years" theme was first voiced by Molotov in8 anniversary speech. This vas followed bypropaganda on this theme through November, December and up until tbe publicationosplan report in Io the9 speech on the anniversary of Lenin's death,the theme was not mentioned and, while there were occasional references to it in subsequent months, for all practical purposes it bad disappeared from Soviet propaganda. The cessation of thisin mid-January, taken with the above-mentioned indications of organizational and economic readjustmentends to support the hypothesis that there bad been serious mistakes In planning anderiously distorted picture of the state of the economy at the top level of the Government.
The third hypothesisthat Voznesensky was disgraced because he opposed Stalin either on theoretical questions or on practical policy decisionswasreat deal of additional weight by the2 disclosures, which have already been noted. One version of this hypothesis is that Voznesensky opposedimited rearmament program by tbe USSR in the latter half8 and instead favored tbe further development of consumer goods Industries. This hypothesis will be discussed in two parts, tbe first devoted to its theoretical and ideological aspects, and tbe second to the practical policy problem.
Tbe so-called "Voznesensky deviation" Is drawn from his book. The War Economy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War, which was published7 and whichtalin prize Inccording to this book, planning is an economic law of socialism and one of tbe chief characteristics differentiating ths socialist from the capitalist system. Capitalism, in Communist dogma, Is unable to plan and Is characterizederitable anarchy of competingInterests.!' ense, tbe assertion that planning ia an "economic law" of socialismatural one for economic planners to hold; Voznesensky appears to have been the chief exponent of this point of view. eries of articles by members of Gosplan, published
he question whether or not it is possibleapitalistto plan had been one of the major issues in the Varga dispute.
""TDF-SEGRET
In Journals, monographa and hooka, likewise explicitly stated that "planning Is an economic lav of Socialism."
This thesis was categorically denounced by Stalin In bis Economic Problems of Socialism, written ln2 as commentaryonference of economists held Inut not Stalin alsoumber of other views,the view that "the proportional development of the economy" was an econcmlc law of socialism and the view that tbe Socialist state was able "to do anything." Stalin ascribed this latter view to numerous young and inexperienced Communists who bad beeny tbe acccepliebments of the USSR. In an article writtenuslov attacked P. Fedoseev for writing articles on Stalln'n Economic Problems without admitting that he, Pedoseev, had himself been one of the persons who bad held the erroneous points of view. In his article, Suslov quoted the textentral Committee decree issued in9 which removed several leading figures fron the editorial board of Bolshevik, the theoretical Communist Party Journal, for disseminating Voznesensky's views and for "praising his book to the skies."
9 decree also mentioned D. T. Shepilov, who at tbat time was Chief of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of thoCommittee apparatus (Agitprop). Shepilov subsequently lost his job ln Agitprop, probablyesult of this decree. He too had been criticized, among other things, for "praising Voznesensky's book to the skies" and recommending It to the Party apparatus for study.
The hypothesis tbat Voznesensky vas removed for Ideologicaland heresy and for developing points of viev contrary to Stalin's appears to be unfounded. It is true that Voznesensky had argued that planning Is tbe economic lav of socialism and that tbe principle of "tbe proportional development of the economy" is another economic lav of socialism. There Is no evidence, however, to support the contention that these views were critical theoretical issues In8 or These "heresies" were expounded,ook written lnby A.rominent economic theorist of Gosplan. evised version of Kursky's book published9 was changed only to tbe extent that It was brought up to date by use of contemporary examples. Kursky'e contention tbatis an economic law of socialism was not expurgated. As one study of the development of economic theory In tbe USSR has pointed out: "Voznesensky's personal fortunes do not appear to havethe general climate of opinion." The study pointed cut, for example, that, six months after Vozneeeosky's fall, Pravda carried an editorial eulogizing tbe power of planning and
-
TOR-SEC_1ET
minimizing tbe co-called "objective- factors In tbe development of tbe Soviet economy. The editorial vent on to aay that Soviet man bad become master of his fate and that this vas the greatestof the revolution andhe lines of thought which supposedly represent the Voznesensky deviation continued to appear in Soviet theoretical Journals and In various propaganda articles1 and As late as issue No. ft of Voprosl Eko-nomlklhe "erroneous" doctrine is expounded^
It is extremely difficult to believe that if Voznesensky had been removed for theoretical, ideological deviationvould not have been Issued at that time which would havethesen other vords, it appears that the deviation of which Voznesensky vas accused was something manufacturedrather than9 This Itselfact of considerable significance and the problem will be taken up
There Is very little evidence to either support or refute the hypothesis that Voznesensky opposed Stalin or others on questions of practical policy regarding the Soviet economy and, in particular,rearmament. Itperhaps unreasonable to suppose thatwould have opposed the necessity for rearmament. There Is no reason to believe that he would have arrogated to himself the problem of evaluating the Intentions of foreign governments. Inof tbe US. Rearmament beganrobably nine months before Voznesensky disappeared; it is possible that he becamein controversy regarding tbe manner in vhicb this program should be carried out. It is also possible to read Into bis book an heretical point of view on agricultureraise of the war-timeut there Is no evidence that Voznesensky wasinontroversy. The agriculture controversy did not
oviet studies.A Political Economy in the. Miller.
be decree of9 reproving Bolshevik and Agitprop does notthis test. In this decree, praise of Voznesensky's book was only one of the many "shortcomings" critired; the reason given was that this praise was unjustified. The book Itself was not. Suslov's article in0 tbe other hand, described Voznesensky's viows ashile discussions in3 said that tbey were "anti-Marxist". Thus, the evolutiondeviation".
- 13
cone into the open untiln connection with an attackndreev for supporting small-scale collective farm ope rat ions. Thus, it came well after Voznesensky's eclipse, rather than prior to It. There are scae suggestions that Voznesensky may have been linked In sooe way with Andreev, but this cannot either be proven or dls-proven.
In summary, the third hypothesis, tbat Voznesensky was Involvedheoretical or practical policy controversy can probably be This leaves the first and the second: that Voznesensky's political fortunes changed with tbe change In Zhdanov's status, or that Voznesensky failed professionally in tbe planning and direction of the Soviet economy. There Is perhaps no necessity to attempt to decide betveen these two, for tbe evidence amply supports both and it is probable tbat bothajor role in Voznesensky's eclipse. Perhaps Voznesensky's mistakes would never have come to light or would never have occasioned his disgrace if be bad not had powerful political enemies or, conversely, if his own powerful political friends had remained In favor. Tbey did not, however, and Voznesensky, alongumber of other Important figures, disappeared from tbe
REARMAMENT lQk8?
The Soviet Government apparentlyearmament program, probably in the latter half of the year. ather large body of evidence points to the probability that this was toalf or four-year program, and that lt was to bo completed by
t may be noted in this connection thatthe down-
fall of. Popov, Secretary of the Moscow Party Committee and .of the Central Committee, to planning failures. These too would appear to Indicate tbat when Popov's protection was removed his own operations in the Moscow apparatus were revealed and used against him.
Voznesensky's further fate is unknown. Madame Kollontai said that she thought that Voznesensky's eclipse was only temporary;
thought Voznesensky had been sent to
overdlovsK to take charge of the housing program there. It may be noted that when Popov was removed from his Moscow Party and All-Union Party positions he was assigned to the Ministry of City Cotstruetloo.
- Ik -
"top-shgrei:
TOf-SEGEEX.
the end1 or
that one of the chieff the conference vas tothe consolidation andof the Satellite ecoooalea vith the Soviet econcer/. In addition he reported that Stalin bad assigned Czechoslovakia the task of completely transforming its economy to heavy Industry into contribute to tho military potential of the USSR, and that tbla program vaa to be completed in threealf years. This would place tbe target date in tbe spring This supposition on the target date of the program ia supported by the completionumber of projects and by the appearance of substantial amounts of new model equipment1
Thereev other indications suggesting that,oviet leaders became more concerned over the possibility of var vith tbe West. In8 orders were given totay-behind network In Germany, in the event that tbe Soviet Army vacated Germany, j
a ministerial decree vas xsiueuvmco eritieixea xneof Ministry of State Security (MGB) personnel for shortcomings in security administration. This decree reportedly charged security officers vith professional laxity and lack of discipline, and called for "reconstruction" of State Security operations "aimed atccording to this report, all fore ignore in the USSR vers to be placed under close obacrvatloa.
On the other band, available evidence does not indicate that the rearmament program vaa so great that all other aspects ofdevelopment vere subordinated to It. Tbe major emphasis of the Soviet economy remained on heavy industrial development, which vas long-range In nature. Thus the possibility exists that theprogram was little more than one for re-equipment of tbe Soviet armed forces vith modern weapons. Bulganin, speaking on the thirtieth anniversary of the Red Army3aid that
the amy had completed itslooee basis, and was beginning to re-equip itself with the latest weapons.
at any rate, while the exact character and scope of tbe soviet rearmament effort remains an unsolved problem, there is no reason to presume that ltighly controversial issue within the kremlin.
i
the agricultural COimtOVESSY
after vosncsensky's ouster, the only striking manifestation of possible dissension within the politburo was the criticism levied against a. a. andreev, on agricultural matters, by pravda on it nay be recalled tbat andreev,forduring the war, was made chairman of tbe council for collective farm affairs in he apparently remained tbe politburo spokesman on agricultural matters, even after halenkov's entry into agricultural problems
the pravda article, entitled "against distortions in collective farm laboras an attack on the so-called "link" or "team" system of collective farming, as opposed to tbe "brigade" the practice denounced was that of parcelling out partsollective farm to small teams, or sub-groups, of collective farmers. the team systea bad been endorsed by tbe party since atnd had been reaffirmed in decrees7 the pravdatook exception to the indiscriminate application of thisto grain farming and to areas where the kolkhoses were supplied with adequate agricultural nachlnery. it was argued that the system precluded the effective utilisation of agricultural machinery and made overall control of the farmers impossible.
the article went on to say that "the incorrect views expressed in this matter by comrade a. a. andreev cannot be overlooked." it then proceeded to document tbe history of andreev's incorrect views9 the author of tbe- article is unknown.-7
following tbe attack on andreev and bis subsequent recantation, which appeared in pravda onovement was begun by h. S. khrushchev, as chairman of tbe moscow oblast party committee, to enlarge the collective farms in the moscow oblabt by merging or
tylistic characteristics of the article tentatively suggest authorship by khrushchev.
ano.lgumti.ng the small farms. Khrushchev outlined this nowPravda on Although some observers suggestedwas an experimental program applied only in Moscowrevealed0 speechentraldecreeolkhbi amalgamation bad been Issued, aad Impliedwae_bciafi implemented throughout the USS P. Indicated that the program was already
The open censure of A. A. Andreev for his "Incorrect" policy probably represented more than an effort tocapegoathange in policy: such public censures of Politburo figures are quite rare, and there are numerous cases of dramatic reversals In Soviet policy with no effort made tocapegoat; such changes are frequently Justified on the grounds that "new conditions" require the change, while In many cases there will be complete denial that any change has been effected at all.
Andreev's humiliation would appear, therefore, to reflectpolitical controversy, sod presumably it signalised tbetriumph of one political faction over an opposing on*. Thus, after Andreev's censure, Khrushchev became the top-level spokesman for agriculture, even though Andreev remained Chairman of the Council for Collective Paras Affairs.1/
Tlie further development of the agricultural controversy tafcec us The problem will be considered further in tbe CAESAR Report covering the period from0 to
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE KOJEAK WAR
A distinct change in Soviet foreign policy took placehift In Soviet effort and attention from Western Europe to the Far East. This shift coincided with the victory of the Chi-neee Communists on tbe mainland. In Europe, the Berlin blockade and the Greek Civil War were brought to an end, and from then on, Soviet diplomatic activity In Europe wasew sporadic propagandistlc gestures. In the Eaet European
griculture wasew field of activity for Khrushchev. He was assigned to the Ukraineccording torecords, he began writing on agricultural problems and,he became known as an agricultural specialist.
letVasopposition
begun to Integrate
the Satellite economies with that of the USSR.
Some observers attribute this foreign policy shift to theof Zhdanov's Influence and the rice of Malenkov. Malenkov, it is said, saw an opportunity for major International successes In the Far East, whereas Zhdanov and Molotov reportedly had Ignored the Far East and concentrated their attention on Europe,
Jef'6of Tito alleges tbat Stalin ad-
mitted,ebruaryonference, that he and the other Soviet leaders had underestimated the future prospects of tbe Chineserevolution. In the summertalinondolence telegram to Togliattl, whereas It was Malenkov whoimilar telegram In8 to the Secretary General of tbe JapaneseParty, Tokuda.
Tbe existence oforeign policy controversy is subm ated only bvnis
and the
vBBcieariy asesult ofnything else: The Berlin blockade had not onlyailure, but bad alsotrong Irritant to the West and had created aexplosive situation. The conclusion of the Greek Civil War wasatter of time after Jugoslavia withdrew its support. The militant Communist policy in France and Italy had failed. In the Far East, however, new possibilities appeared as the Chinese Ccemrunicts neared final success.
Soviet Politburo members who regularly appeared at Chineseparties and receptions9 on were Molotov, Mikoyan and Huiganin. It will be remembered that Madame Kollontal specifically mentioned Chinese Communist affairs In discussing Molotov; further, Molotov vas tentatively Identified in the Far East In early August and In early
The Soviet Ambassador to China from8 to2 was H. V.he Soviet Political Representative in Japan,
oshchln was renamed Ambassador to the Chinese Peopleser relations with the Nationalist Government were severed Inoshchln was replaced as Ambassador to China in2 by A. S. Panyushkin, who bad formerly been Ambassador to the Unltod States. Roshchln was Identified2 as Chief of the Southeast Asia Division of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Derevyanko, was assigned to this post6 sod remained The Soviet representative in Pyongyang, ColonelT. F. Shtykov, had been the Chief of tbe Soviet delegation to the Joint Commissionorea and Comma odor of Soviet Forces in Korea6t which time he vas designated Ambassador to the North Koreanhtykov presumably remained Sovietto Korea untilt thatev Ambassador, V. N. Razuvaov, was Identified.
The above data would appear to establish that there vas no change In the Kremlin in8 oro the persons responsible for Far Eastern affairs. This conclusion tends to discount thethat there had been Important policy differences relating to the Far East and that the shift In Soviet attention to the Far Eastesult of Malenkov's rise.
Tbe nev expansive policy in tbe Far East culminated In tbe North Korean Invasion of South Korea. lucre Is little reason to believe that the proposal for the invasion would have provoked violentin ths Kremlin. There were sound military reasons for tholeaders to desire to control all of Korea. (The same military considerations apply equally well to the Chinese Communlsta.) there la convincing circumstantial evidence that the Soviet leaders did not expect UN Intervention in Korea; all evidence would appear to suggest that they expected tbe Korean invasion tohort, fast campaign which would result in the consolidation of the entire peninsula under Soviet control.
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srous press rumors andplaced Molotov in Pelplng in late July or early then in earlyust before the Chinese
^el1 haTBCDbcr cf Zhdanov's so-calledclique He hadecretary of the Leningrad Oblast Com-
* neraber the Military council of the Leningrad Front andolitical Officer there. Presumably under Colonel General Shikin. 5 he was identi-Kront enbCr *MiUtar? Council of the First Far Eastern
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Communist Interventionrea, ne was again tentatlwoly Identified In the Soviet Far East.
Despite the evidence suggesting Molotow's presence at thesepolicy conferences ln the Far East, there are no groundsthat Molotov hinself was the primary sponsor of theattack. No one person or group of persons can he so Moreover, despite tbe obvious reverse suffered by tbe USSRKorean development, and despite the obvious possibleof these developments, no readjustments or other changesIn tbe Soviet hierarchy. It thus appears that nobody onlevel was held Immediately responsible or made athe
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