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bpy No.
THE REVERSAL OF THE DOCTORS' PLOT AND
ITS IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH
of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THS REVESSAI, OF Ttjg npCTORSPLOT and
ITS LWEDTfiTE flFTErnfflTfl
IMPLTCATTCWE OF RCTKpJU|f
pril, the much publicisedlot vas repudiated In8 tart lint* public reversal. Pravda reported that an invest igetior. committee especially set up for the purpose by the newly-merged USSR Ministry of Internal Affaire (MVD) under L. P. Beria bad found that officials of the ex-Ministry of State Security (MGB) had used "illegal methods* to extract false confessions from the accused doctors.
Tbe announcement cameime when the vigilance campaign, which the doctors' plot had touched off, bad groundalt in tbe wake of tha sweeping amnesty decree promulgated by the new regime onarch, andime when tbe Communist propaganda machine was engaged in an all-out peace offensive. Tbe arrested doctors were said to have been incorrectly accused "without any legal basesnd hence they had been "released and completely exonerated. The guilty police officials of the investigations section of the former MGB had been arrested. econd brief anouncement made by the Presidium of tbe Supreme Soviet on the same day stated that the decree ofanuary awarding the Order of Lenin to Lydia Tlassbuk, the informer in tbe doctors', plot, had been repealed as Incorrect.
The Pravda announcement contained several extremoly interesting points. The number of accused doctors bad been Increased from the nine named in January to fifteen; and, of the six names added, none were Jewish, clearly Implying that tbe original doctors' plot expose had carried anil-Semitic overtones. Furthermore, the announcement came so suddenly that an article in tbe March issue of Young Communist, which was distributed on the very day of tbe reversal, stronglyforeign espionage, especially American, and called foragainst foreign penetration in the same violent language that bad bean character la tie of the vigilance campaign; it praised Lydia Tinaeb.uk as an outstanding example of revolutionary vigilance. It la interesting to note that the listing of the releaaed doctors did not Include two of the original nine, U. B. Began and Y.tinger. Kogan was believed to have died1 and hence had probably never been arrested, while Etinger, according to tbe US Embassy in Moscow, was rumored to have died during Incarceration.
The announcement, of course, centered attention on Beria. It was made under the auspices of the Ministry (MVD) he had so reoently
inherited. Furthermore, Pravda'a main editorial on tbe reversal, in an almost exact repetitiontatement contained In Berla's funeial speech, promised that thr government would respect tha constitutional rights of Soviet citizens. This statement In Berla's speech is the only known allusion in ths recent past to the Government's regard for tha constitutional rights of itsact that ls_ particularly interesting, since Soviet domestic propaganda generally avolda all reference to tbe individual and bla rights and generally treats tbe constitutionymbol of the power of the Stateuarantee of material benefits. Thus, the Pravda editorial appeared to indicate that Beria hadrime motivating force In the release of tbe doctors, and to imply that be bad been considering this move at the time of the funeral.erla's role in the reversal wasP dispatch cleared by the Moscow censorspriltbe release of the doctors "to tbe personal intervention of Deputy. Beria as soon as he took over tbe nevly-comblned Ministry of State Security and Internal Affairs."
Tbe American Embassy in Moscow commented that tha reversalconcrete evidence of the new regime's break with the old, since Stalin had either fully approved of, or personally engineered, ths "revelation" of the plot. The embassy added that this disclosurethat son high-level controversy existed or had recently been
concluded in the Soviet Union, but suggested that recent events Indi-
OS ted Malenkov and Beria wars operating harmoniously. 1
pril Pravdaritical attack against S. D. Ignatiev, identifying blm aa being the responsible MOB minister at tbe time of the arrest of tbe doctors. On the following day tbe Central Committee met in plenary session and removed Ignatiev from his post as Party Secretary, in which be bad been confirmed as recently asarch, when tbe results of tbe Central Committee meetingarch (which had rearranged the Secretariat) were finally published. Be waa thusless than three weeks after he was publicly confirmed in the post.
alenkov, on the other hand, in his funeral speech mentioned the necessity of continuing the vigilance campaign maintaining that it was necessary to train the Soviet people inpirit of high political vigilance" to be directed against "internal and external enemies.0
The OS Embassy in Moscow commented thatpril meeting-Ignatiev may have afforded an opportunity to Central Committee members, possibly for the first time; to diecnas the background of the plot affair. The embassy further observed that Beria, asinority race himself, might presumably be identified with the policy-of racial equality whioh began with the reversal of the charges against the.doctors. In the embassy's opinion, this new policy might haveeflection on Malenkov, who was rumored to be personally anti-Semitic (Malenkov'a alleged anti-Semitiem, often rumored, remains unconfirmed).
Onpril IgvesYia promised its readers that persons found guilty of falsely accusing the fifteen Soviet doctors and attempting to foment raoial prejudice in the Soviet Onion would be Justly This had its conclusion onay when N. N. Vasilev, Minister of State Control of the RSFSR, stated thai the Soviet Government had punished such guilty officials as Ryumin, the former Deputy Minister of State Security, who was accused of helping to fabricate the' plot. The nature of the punishment was not revealed. This announcement was extremely unusual. In that it was made not by the Security Ministry itself butepublican minister of tbe Ministry of State Control.
On the same day, the Soviet press criticised officials of the Georgian Republic and, in what appeared toeiled attack on Stalin, sharply criticized those who resort to "one-man rale" as opposed to "internal partyt added that no man possessed the knowledge and capabilities of collective leadership. ay the leading editorial of the Georgian newspaper, Zarva Vontoka. .linked Ryumin withormer Georgian MGB Minister who was currently being accused of fabricating thenurges in Georgia. The editorial charged that Ryumin, as well as Rukhadze, had fabricated the evidence against the Georgian leaders in this earlier purge, and accused Rukhadze of "trying to arouseamong the Soviet peoples- and of attempting to "stir upof racial hatred."
The doctors' plot reversal also served, at least temporarily, to bring what was left of the vigilance campaignlose: the-
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noted that, at the beginning of April, theand Zionism carried on by the Soviet pressStalin's death suddenly stopped. The doctors* plot reversal also suggested that Soviet relations with Israel might be improved, probably to the extent of again exchanging ambassadors. Anthat the Soviet Union would seek to extract whatever benefit
In summary, then, the whole reversal procedure lookedid on the part of Beria and at least boos of tbe other Soviet leaders to ingratiate themselves vith tbe Soviet people. In addition, Beria vas probably anxious to reaove tbe dread stigma attached to bis name throughout the Soviet Union by virtue of bis connections vith the police. The reversal may likewise haveomplete house-cleaning of any old HOB leaders vbo might have switched allegiance from Beria to Ignatiev when the latter moved Into the HOB in1 under the direction of Stalin and probably Malenkov aa vail.
GOVKRJWEKTALT ION IN REGIONAL REPUBLICS
Tbe exoneration of the Moscow doctors was followed shortlyomplete reorganisation of tbe Georgian Party and Government apparatus, which reversed tbe purge that had occurred in that area1 When tbe new Chairman of tbe Council of Minis tera in Georgia, V. M. Bakradze, presented the new government, be stated that all its members were from tbe Georgian Partyformerly led by "the best son of Georgia, tbe intelligent pupil of Lenin, the comrade of Stalin, tbe Illustrious official of tbe Communist Party in tbe great Soviet GovernmentComrade Beria." Be declared that three of the new members of the Georgian Council of Ministers had been falsely charged and arrested in the fall1 in the case fabricated by tbe former MOB Chief in Georgia, Bukhadze. Two former First Secretaries of the Georgian Party, Charkvlanl and Hgeladze, bad not only failed critically to examine Bukhadze's fabrications, but had even abetted them. Bakradze indicated that directives from "All-Union" organs had freed tbe three Innocent officials aa well as others who bad been Implicated and, as
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appointment again appeared to reflect the hand of berla.
the georgian political leadership had been
publicly criticized for corruption and for encouraging local rather than national patriotism. beria himself had attended the georgian party meetinghich had marked the high point of toe purges and whloh had replaced among others the top partyhm*eeto reflect on the position of beria. who had long been considered to have, along withersonal interest and responsibility for georgian affairs.
the undoing of the earlier georgian purgeurther reason for questioning malenkovole: if he, under stalin (as is thoughtart in these earlier developments in georgia, then the current exoneration of berla's men was another indication of malenkov's lack of control. the picture, however, was rar from complete. some top georgian party officials who, by virtue of their biographic profiles would appear to be long-time beriawere still numbered among the ranks of those oureed. further, the georgian party congress originally scheduled foray had not been held as of early july. its convocation hadpril at the time of the georgian party and government reorganization and presumably it was scheduled to confirm the changes which had taken place in the party apparatus. in spite of thesehowever, it fpptarad certain that beria hadMjor role in the reversal, particularly since bakradze hadrred only to him in his discussion of the government reorganization and had notalenkov once. this pattern, with one curious exception when malenkov was singled out for attention, was to be followed in the georgian press, which extolled beria in extremely flowery terms.
The pettem of Beria worship Is the Trans Caucasus was far frees complete, however. An opposite colt was noted In Azerbaijan where bagirov, the newly-named Premier, told the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet that the people would rally arouna Malenkov, "the closest oomrede of Stalin." Bagirov's procedure in assuming tbe Azerbaijan Premiership resembled that followed by Malenkov in the central government in that Bagirov also relinquished hie position on the Party SecreTarlat upon assuming tbe office of Premier. This unusual procedure of two new regional premiers picking two different Soviet leaders as their patrons added to the TBonnting indications that the Soviet leadership wascollegial in form. It Indicated that the regional participants were either choosing the leader they would like moat to be Identified with at that time or standing by their previous patrons on the grounds that it would be foolhardy to abandon them at this late date.
Bagirov, who had aligned himself with Malenkov, had bad an earlier association with Beria and in fact at one time had bean Beria'a superior in police affairs in Azerbaijan. In him history of Transcaucasian Party affairs, however, be had failed to glorify Barie, subrenting that his relations with him were not too faverabls. Bagirov bad been accorded unusual recognition In thearch when he was moved ahead of twenty-two members of the ex-Party Presidium to become an alternate member of the new Party Presidium. Bagirov had also longocal advocate of Stalin's Russlficatlon policy, which at tbe time of hie appointment aaPremier appeared to have been at least temporarily shelved.
INTERNAL MEASURES TO EASE TENSION
While the regional re public* were setting their bouses in order in reorganizations patterned after tbe All-Onion model, tbe Central Government was enacting me aa urea designed to ease internal tensions and to popularize itself with the Soviet people:
Onarch the amnesty decree waa issued.
pril the annual decree on price cuta announced the largest reductions made in four years.
3- April and May meaeagea provided indications thatof consumer goods waa being Increased.
*. 3 announcement of tbestate loan was delayed until late June and the loan itself was only half as large as those1
i pXacodin Moscow
th0 Baise day in an unprecedented step, the
Governmentargain clearance sale with twenty-fivecent price cuts for the remainder of Kay and Juneree!
The African EBbassy In Moscow noted that the local woulation
ptoTre^crsal ElhnV*aoct:^.
doyo' contrasted sharply with previous
emphasis on the need for Internal
uctloOB vhlch went into effectpril
were the most extensive since thosear 1QSO
'Bber^-ture^lte^'on^^
Scentarfl' atent howeverthrifty percent reduction In the price of fresh fruits and vegx-tahKe.
"TDf^SfeGREI
hcould, of course, be accomplished
trim?roductlon of armaments and majorppeared ^Pravda's an-nouncementune that the USSR had adopted "special measures" to exceed the3 planned production oHonsumer goSu!
lateannouncement of3 State loan was not
The announcement, wTien
r)Jy-nW as large as those1 This suggested that the regime had gone even further than previously indicated in shifting resources from heavy industry production to consumer goods, since the loan is aseans of lamitlng consumer purchasing pover as of obtaining funds for "develop-or the national economy,
^
on* surprise and that the proc-
an amnesty for certain categories of prisoners vas totally unexpected. The release of the "Moscow Jews" and the arrest of thT^ accused police hadrofound impression and had resulted in long Queues forming at the newspaper stands.
anticipating the possibility tbat the retail price cuts
B-ght signify the end of the farmers'ravda editorial of ZJSfrX^i ^rea8Bured Russia's-peas-antry that such lft^lX. thenumerous writers were jolely or mainly preoccupied with the transitiononeyless economic system based on the exchange of products and for
fts present
^whlchin theory
is wrong and in practice harmful, of the enormous role trade playseconomy " The Government and Party would "in theperiod" continue to develophat Is to say,is of further significance in Sat
those criticized were, after all, only elaborating the propositions offered by Stalin ln the Economic Problems of Socialism.
The policy of reducing ten*Ion at hone had lt* counterpart in tbe field of foreign affair*. After Stalin'* death, the two plane incident* ofhh of March hodonsiderable increase in international tension. Onarch case tbe first indication that the propaganda line had switched. On this date, Soviet media resumed normal coverage of internal and external news, understandably lacking In tbe period following Stalin's death. When this occurred, it was noted that articles on foreign affairs resumed anti-OS charges, but withrestraint. 1 March commentary on the possibility of peaceful coexistence of capitalism and sociallam recalled the "vigorous_ of the US, UK and USSR during World War IT and the "splendidof that cooperation in the common victory over the enemy. Soviet propaganda bad insisted that tbe Red Army had von the World War IT victory singlehanded.
Another Instance of what wa* tooncerted Sovietreduce international tension was seen onarch when tbevisas to ten US newspaper andradio editors to visitone week.
arch the Chinese accepted General Clark's offero exchange sick and wounded POW's and suggested resumption of the truce talks. Two days later Cbou En-lal proposed the repatriation of all prisoners desiring to be released, with tbe disposition of theto be decided by neutral states. The same day tbe senior Soviet
Secretariat member took tbe Initiative to inform'
that Cbou's statementoorepatriatlon was "the real
;oo
Vyshlnsky expressed hope in the Security Council that the current US session would promote further useful results which could strengthen friendly relation* with all nations.
These late March moves were followederies of Soviet effort* to get on friendlier term* with tbe West, which appeared to occur in discernible phases. From late March until late April, Soviet policy was characterised principally by an attempt to ease tensions with the West at the least possible cost to tbe USSR. This Involved improved personal relations with Western diplomats, some relaxation of the previouslyinternal Soviet security measurea, Moderation of language In Soviet epeechea and official statements, and release of some Western civilian* Interned In Korea. These changes reflectedelaxation In
the previously extreme Soviet behavior In these matters, rather than any sort of basic change In Soviet foreign policy and, as manyobservers vere to remark, it seemed as though Soviet leaders had decided to reduce the international tension by "ten degrees" or so. Tbe quantitative scope of these demonstrations of friendliness suggestedormal directive bad gone out, presumably through foreignchannels.
In mld-iprll the foreign policyative passed to the United States with President Eisenhower'spril speech. The extremely favorable reception with which tbe vorId greeted this US policy declaration had the effect of throwing the burden for further peace moves on the Soviet Union Onpril Soviet leaders answered the President's speechravda article, which did not actually reveal any basic change in Soviet foreign policy. Both Ambassador Bohlen and tbe British foreign Office noted that the replyertain amount of indecision and uncertainty on the part of its authors. Bohlen also noted that the article's length and its rather unsettled reasoning precluded its becoming an effective propaganda vehicle. Analysis of subsequent Soviet propaganda revealed that, whileeply vas widely broadcast within tbe USSR, it waa not treated as an instrument of propaganda.
The first positive, coordinated Inter-Orbit move designed to recarture the propaganda Initiative for tbe USSR was Molotov's response to tht. Five Power Peace Pact proposal made by the Parle Commission of the MFC onpril. On the same day, the Bulgarian Presidium endorsed the proposal, as did Chinese Foreign Minister Chou Kn-lai onh. This waa followed by general Satellite approval. Curiously enough, the full meeting of the WPC, which occurred in aid-Juno In Budapest, played down tbe Five Power Peace Pact theme. Pierre Cot, In one of the last siw-eches at the Congress, explained this action by saying that the Five Power Peace Pact bad not been abandoned, but that the Congress did not want to place obstacles in the way of any negotiations among any group of powers.
Beginning in late April, Soviet tactics began tohift toward the use of diplomacy as the principal means of lowering the international temperature. In relations with individual countries that had previously been targets of propaganda, vilification and diplomatic threats, the USSR began toore conciliatory attitude. This was followed eventuallyetreat on the diplomatic level from some long standing Soviet positions. Two examples which might be used to portray this dev-lopment are Yugoslavia and Turkey. Onpril, for tbe first timeoreign Minister Molotov received tbeCharge in Moscow. une Molotov told the charge that the USSR intended to raise the status of Its diplomatic representation in Belgrade
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to ambassadorial level end hoped that Yugoslavia would reciprocate. This overture oa Molotov's part was subsequently realized. Another example of the new tactic was theay Soviet note to Turkey, In which the USSR expressed optimism over the possibility ofutually acceptable solution to the Dardanelles question andIts "territorial claims against Turkey."
The record of such recent developments ln Soviet foreign policy has been widely covered elsewhere and it is not thought advlGoble to record these events chronologically in this paper. The decision to reduce international tension was undoubtedly approved by tbeoviet leaders before being put into operation by Molotov in his role as custodian of Soviet foreign affairs. He had bee- publiclywith this approachpril,when be endorsed Cuouai's POW concession, although at that time Molotov insisted that the CojaBunist stand on repatriation was still firm. While Stalin's Bolshevik article had contained the necessary theoretical justification for theseand while various foreign Communista attributed them to tbetheir timing made it difficult to escape the conclusion that they had been brought aboutesult of Stalin's death.
The USSR, up to Stalin's death and In the period immediately following, had lapsedigidort of go-it-alone policy with regard to international relations In which the atmosphere of compromise, reconciliation and negotiation was completely absent. Thus, in addition to the conclusion that these preliminary moves were made to keep the international situation fluid and toeriod of international relaxation while problems of Soviet leadership were thrashed out at home, tbey suggest tbat with Stalin'sore realistic and perhaps more effective Soviet foreign policy was to come into play. olicy may well have been in the minds of tbeof Soviet leaders, but ruled out by Stalin in the last years of his life.
Korea has been tbe only real concession to date. The compromise agreement at PanmunjomuneomraunlBt retreatosition which had been proclaimed domestically andas final. The relevance of this compromise to the policy change in the USSR was, of course, obscured by Chinese involvenent in the issue and the problem of Sino-Soviet relatione in the period following' Stalin's death.
In summary, there have been no outward signs that the newof detente was unacceptableortion of the Sovietor that it had in fact enteredtruggle for leadership. The reduction of international tension would seem toolicyto all Soviet contenders in their bids for Internal power.
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la the background, of course, the possibility always remained that some leader would use the International arena to Bolidify hiswith the Soviet masses. In this respect, Molotov would appear to have the advantage.
The foreign policy problem, however, wasater date to become much more acute with respect to the delicate question of Germany. At this point, over-all Soviet foreign policy, policy toward the Satellites, Jurisdictional control in Germany, and individual personalitiesthe control were to merge in the first big test of the new regime. Meanwhile, however, there were more internal developments affecting the general pattern of the Soviet leadership.
MAY DAY SLOGANS AS BAROMETKR OF POLICY
The May Day slogans published onpril represented achange from those issued for2 anniversary. There was increased emphasis on "peaceful coexistence." In addition, Soviet workers were called on to strengthen the "fraternal friendship among peoples of our country" and "increasingly to strengthen the unity of the great Soviet many-peopledn what appeared to be anto the doctors' plot reversal. One novel slogair affirmed that the rights of Soviet cltixens, guaranteed by our Constitution, are unshakable and are defended as sacred by the Soviet Government." This was another repetition of Berla's remarks on this subject at Stalin's funeral. Another slogan admonished employees of State institutions strictly to observe "socialist legality andensitive attitude towards workers* inquiries." Finally, tbe de-emphasis of Stalin was continued. His name occurred only twice in tbe slogans.
The constitution was referred to as the Soviet Constitution rather than the Stalin Constitution and the Komsomol, instead of being the Lenln-Stallnas now called the "All-Union Lenin Communist Union of Youth. This was in contrast to the pattern in Czechoslovakia, for example, where one slogan used the name of the recently-deceased Gottwald ten times, referring to the "Oottvald Five-Yearnd so on.
Malenkov, unlike Zapotocky in Czechoslovakia, was not mentioned in the slogans, nor for that matter were Beria and Molotov. However, quotations from both Beria and Malenkov were employed. The avoidance of names of both past and present -leaders, together with the newon unity of the people, the Party and the Government, reinforced the current Soviet propaganda line that the USSR was experiencing rule of the Party by its leaders acting Jointly rather than rule of an Individual.
German and Czech slogans, which were Issued before Soviet slogans, greeted Malenkov bv name as did slogans In Albania, Viet Baa and North Korea. In Rumania, one of the slogansirect quotation from Malenkov's funeral speech. Tbe Hungarian and Polish slogans. Issued after the USSR's, failed to mention Malenkov and, in Poland, thedealing with tbe constitution appeared to be modified in conformity with Berla's statement on the subject.
In tbe Satellites in general, and Poland and Hungary inMalenkov received no unusual prominence. In Warsaw pictures of Prime Minister Blerut predominated, with those of Stalin in second place Ia Budapest the usual triumvirate of Lenin, Stalin and Rakosi was played up and Malenkov's picture vas actually seen on only three buildings.
bwujo. vere urgea to cheer Mao
the ung and no one else, and that images of Mao were particularly prominent, whereas portraits of Malenkov were featured only In the company of other foreign Coanmlst leaders and were generally given second rank behind tbe Chinese. Thelogans Issued by Pelplng for use on May Day did not mention the Soviet Premier, and Mao Tee-tung replaced Stalin in tbe place of honor in Chinese propaganda.
The key address in the Soviet Unionay, which was mode by Bulganin, was in the vein of tbe Pravda reply to President Elsenhower. While the language was far less bellicose than usual, Bulganin asked for Western "deeds" to match the "peaceful statements" of Its leaders. In published listings of the Presidium, Malenkov was in first place, followed by Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin,Mlkoyan, Saburov and Pervukhin.
READJUSTMENTS REFLECTING PECULIAR NATURE OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP
eries of disconnected and in some casea Inexplicable developments occurred, which were of lntereat because of their bearing on tbe Soviet leadership and tbe policy of that leadership. Cumulatively, they suggestedelicate balance was being maintained as tbemoved their human chess players across the board.
1. Onpril, G. M. Orlov was awarded the Order of Lenin onh anniversary. Tbe practice of making this award to deserving Soviet leaders at this stage in their careers la not
unusual.
ZTL%reca!ued surprise which his retention In, the new Soviet Government as Minister of tbe Timber and Paperhad caused. Orlov,|had been one of the most
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contested Individuals In the former Council of Ministers and,February, hadew wave of criticism forhla ministry. Orlovormer NKVD official who had atheaded its Chief Directorate of Industrial Construction. that he hadlose associate of Beria. His receiptOrder of Lenin suggested that Berla had brought lt about. |
pril, Soviet newspapers announced thoFirst Deputy Foreign Minister Y. A. Malik as SovietGreat Britain. In effect, be changed places withncumbent ambassador ln Loudon, who Duvirstof Foreign Affairs. The significance of this shiftbut It was an unusual one since lt evidently wasthose appointments not contemplated at the time of the 6 It suggested tbat second echelon personnelto be moved around In connection with the Intricaciesleadership, and that the original reorganisation ofwas far from final as the components of theto solidify their positions.
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5- Onpril, the appointment of I. A. Benedlktov ox Soviet Ambassador to India vas announced. Benedlktov had little back' ground ln foreign affairs, his experience having been almostin the field of agriculture. He had served agriculture ln various positionsben he had been appointed People's Commissar of Collective Farms. 6 he had been appointed Minister of Agriculture. Duringh Party Congress, when he vasull member of the Central Committee, he vasto some criticism for various failures by bis ministry. In March he had lost his ministerial appointment vben tbe nevly-merged Ministry of Agriculture and Procurement had been placed under the leadership of the relatively obscure central apparatus functionary, A. I. Kozlov. The Benedlktov ambassadorial appointment vas the second examplean vlth no foreign office experience receiving an important diplomatic poet. The first had been V. V. Kuznetsov (appointed ambaoeador to China onarch) vho, by virtue of certain aspects of his career and primarily his WFTU connections, vas thought to be connected with Malenkov. Benedtkuw's association inmust have thrown him Into association with Malenkov also, but perhaps this may not haveleasant one due to tbe peculiar role of tbe Party in agricultural affairs. Benedlktov had also been associated with A. A. Andreev as bis first assistant during the war. Lastly and perhaps most curiously, Benedlktov, who various sources agreedood administrator,[
6. ay Bulganln reviewed the May Day parade. This coupled with tbe fact that he had represented the Soviet Union at Gottwald'e funeral suggested tbat he was being used as arepresentative of the Soviet leadership.
7- ravda editorial entitled "Improve the Economic Indices in tbe Work of Enterprises" stated that "tbe reorganization of administrative machinery and particularly tbe enlargement of ministries and the considerable enlargement of ministers' powers are helping to raise the level of guidance of all economicnd to institute more flexible and effective planning of production." Although the editorial went on to depict tberole of the Party in focusing its attention on improving the economic activity of various enterprises. It clearly implied tbat the powero of Government officials had been strengthened. An
to be parti cTixaroy rriendly-witbT
TOr-SEGR&Lf
earlier pravda article ofpril also bad pointed out that the wider authority of tbe ministers waa aimed atloser rapprochement between tbe state apparatus and the people.
oviet regional broadcast announced that the
i0- une the british ambassador to the ussr held ato mark the queen's coronation. all tbe leading soviet leaders including malenkov had been invited to attend. molotov, however, vas the only-nan of presidium rank to put in an this was in keeping with tbe trend noted earlier atne given by the east germans and czechs, which only molotov and Mlkoyan attended.
11. une, the us embassy in moscowumor that p. k. ponomarenko had been appointed central committeeary to fill the vacancy created by ignatiev's dismissal. i |
arc*nov, the former ussr minister of higher educationponoiarenko's place as minister of
asreviously,-was ukauuii
to be in the malenkov camp, if tula were true and if ponomarenko had not been bought off in the interim, bis return to thewhich be had vacatedarch, would seem to reflect favorably on malenkov. curiously enough, the example of tbe ussr cabinet, where former party secretary ponomarenko bad taken over the ministry of culture, had been followed at least in the ukrainian, Moldavian and karelo-finnish cabinets. in each of these, the new minister of culture was drawn directly from the party secretariat or had formerly been associated with it. this procedure was par-
kara* republic publishing bouse had issued in kazakh the second edition of the brochure on berla's address ath tartyof tbe communist party and stated0 copies had already been published. this is the only known soviet broadcast referring to this type of subject since stalin's death.
tlcularly noteworthy because it occurred despite the fact that
y^SA'rGVetkov'Moldavian and Karelo-
Finnioh officials, bad been criticised Inhile the status of K. Z. Lltvio, the new Uk-alnian Minister of Culture, had apparently been declining
13. On 23 May, the Soviet pressurious article by the controversial economist, Varga, which appeared on theto be, like tbe Stalin Bolshevik article, purely propagmndla-tic in tone. In effect, it represented another recantation on Varga'8 part of7 position that in times of crisis the State could and would act contrary to tbe desires of thefor maximim profits and in tbe interests of the bourgeoisie. Varga revised this stand and accepted Stalin's view that the monopolies had taken, control of the State. Varga, however, was able to maintain at least by Inference7 theory that theost-war crisis wouldemporary one and that the serious cyclical crisis of capitalism would come perhaps ten years after the war. He did this in his statement regarding the coming market crisis, particularly as accentuated by the re-entry of Japan and Germany into world markets. This view, of course, vas In complete conformity with Stalin's position. Westernhad been waiting for some clue as to tbe possibility of change in Soviet economic policy. let Varga's article restated tbe general estimate set forth by Stalin. Itid for the relaxation of COCOK controls, but this vas certainly not unusual.
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Original document.
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