DEATH OF STALIN
Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DEATH OF STALIK
LAST DAYS OF STALIH
This then was the situation ln tbe Soviet Unionarch, when Radio Moscow announced that Stalin was In critical condition astroke on the nightarch. Tbe continuing medical bulletins were couched in pessimistic terms. They carefully outlined the nature of Stalin's illness and meticulously described the measures being taken by the doctors who were treating him. These play-by-play accounts revealed concern lest listeners interpret this news, astbat either the old "doctorroup of new'ones, bad succeeded in shortening Stalin's life. The eight doctors lnunder the supervisionew Minister of Health, Tretyakov.
Stalin had been last seenon-Communist onebruary when he bad given an audience to the Indian Ambassador (who had. however, never met him previously). While lt is possible that Stalin's Illness had been carefully concealed, andouble was used for thisthis is unlikely; it is considered highly doubtfulouble would have been used for Stalin's last interview. Stalin's collapse actually followed several months of what for him was unusual activity. Work on the Party Congress had evidently kept him in Moscow throughout tbe fall; In addition to this, be had granted at least four interviews to foreigners, had.attended the anniversary ceremoniesovember and had appeared In the Bolshoi theatre onanuary. (It is true, however, that Stalin's movements had been somewhat restricted. He deliveredhort speech at tbe Party Congress, yielding the main address to Malenkov. ovember ceremonies had been much shorter than usual, probably out of deference to him.)
Tbe nature of tbe reporting on Stalin's illness suggested that his final stroke caught the Politburo off guard. There had been no advance warning. An examination of all Soviet radio propagandaarch yielded no indication prior to the public announcement of Stalin's actualhere were' no significant differences either in the nature .or in tbe number of references to Stalin, who continued to be presented during this period as the focus of power in the Soviet Union. Similarly, an examination.of all the Satellite radio propaganda material from' the time of the October Party Congress to Stalin's death revealed no attempt to build up any of hisln possible anticipation of his voluntary or involuntaryof power.
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Thle information is of course far from conclusive. Manyconcerning the circumstances of Stalin's death could be advanced to explain this lack of preparation. Furthermore, tbe West wasdependent on the Soviet radio and press for all news on this development. It is impossible therefore to determine whether Stalin bad been dead for some time, whether be was murdered, or whether he died in the way the medical bulletins said be did.
THK QIESTIOK OF STALIW'S SUCCESSOR
The announcements regarding Stalin's condition, indicating as tbey did that the Soviet Union would soon be without its leader and revealing that Stalin's disciples had waited four days beforethe people of their impending loss, immediately focused attention on Halenkov as the most likely successor. His career bad moved 'steadily forward since Zhdanov's death in. He was the senior member of the Party Secretariat, the position from which Stalin originally consolidated bis power. He vas tbe only man other than Stalin whoember of all three of tbe highest bodies of the Party and Government--the Politburo, tbe Secretariat. and tbe Collegium of the Council of Ministers (Deputy
Ignatiev's appointment1 as MOB Minister was also thought to have had the blessing and approval of Malenkov. The nature of Ignatiev'a Party career indicated that he bad prospered under, and had possibly been brought along by, Malenkov. Moreover, one curious bit of biographic information suggested that their association may have been of long standing. 0 Ignatiev,ears oldomsomol member, waa directed to the political section of the Bukhara Oblast and in tbe following year be vas transferred to the military section of the All-Bukhara Extraordinary Commission. Malenkov vas servingpolitical worker" in the military-politicalin the Bukhara region at about this time-
Malenkov had delivered the key address at the Party Congress, and subsequently, as night have been expected, it had been accorded much publicity throughout the Communist world. The replacement^ ofresidium, the composition of which apparently favoredif it favored any of the old Politburo memoers, also seemed toto his leading position. This was even more true of the enlarged Secretariat.
Thus it was commonly expected that Malenkov would attempt to fill tbe void left by Stalin. The official announcement regarding Stalin's illness, however, threw no light on the subject of his successor. It merely placed responsibility in the Central Committee of the Party and in the Council of Ministers, claiming that these two bodies would "take into account all circumstances connected with the temporary withdrawal of Stalin from leading the State's and Party's activity."
The announcement of Stalin's death camearch. It linked his name with that of Lenin in an eulogy of the Party as leader of the people. It underscored the "steel-like, monolithic unity" of Party ranks and defined its task as the "guarding ofs the "apple of our eye." Reuters at tbe time recalled that Malenkov used this phrase in his October Party Congress speech and suggested that he was the author of the document. Tbe some phrase, however, bad appeared in connection with Lenin's death. Neither Malenkov nor any otherof Stalin was mentioned ln the announcement. Malenkov had come before the public eye, however,orch Pravda editorial which quotes from the section of his Congress speech dealing with Party unity.
The announcement affirmed the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions and desire for "business-like" relations. It named the "great Chinese people" first on the list of those people witu whom tbe Soviet Union intended to develop friendship.
Khrushchev was listed as chairman of tbe Committee for organizing Stalin's funeral-. On it were Kaganovich, Shvernlk, Vasilevsky, Pegov, Artemev, the Commandant of the Moscow Military District, and Yaenov, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet. Tbe funeral rites were setarch.
arch, Moscow radio announced that in order to prevent "panic andajor reorganization of toe Party andhad been madeoint meeting of the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. This almost unprecedented method of handling business was in keeping with tbe gravity of the situation and reminiscent of the days of tbe German attack, when the Soviet leaders had metimilar joint session and formed the State Defense Council. It strongly suggested that the leaders in this moment of crisis had moved swiftly to show their unity and to gird themselves for any battle that might be coming from either inside or out.
omplete reversal of tbe organizational decisions token by the October Congress, this new decree clearly outlined the spheres of interest and power of Stalin's closest collaboratorshe members of the old Politburo. Malenkov became Premier (Chairman of the Council oferia, Kolotov, Bulganin, and Kaganovleh became first Deputy Premiers. In addition, Beria returned to direct control of the security forces by becoming Minister of Internal Affairsith which was combined the Ministry of State Securityolotov returned to direct leadership in Foreign Affairs; Bulganin took over as Minister-of War; Kaganovleh received no ministerial assignment, but presumably was to be the economic czar. The Party's Presidium was reduced to ten men, eight of whom had been members Of Stalin's Here, too, Malenkov's name came first, indicating his ascendancy. He waa followed by Beria, Kolotov, Voroshllov, Khruschev, Bulganin, Kaganovleh, Mikoyan, Saburov and Pervukhin, in that order. Saburov and Pervukhin were the only newcomers to the group as.it bad existed before October.
^Voroshllov was given the honor of titular head of state. He was "recommended" to become Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Khrushchev was "to concentrate on his work in tbe Central Committee." Mikoyan took over as head of the new Ministry of Internal and External Trade. Saburov was relieved of bis Job as head ofand became the new Minister of Machine Building. Pervukhinthe chief of tbe new Ministry of Electric Power Stations and tbe Electrical Equipment Industry.
Thus Party and Government continued to be welded together at the top. Even at this early date, however, there was at least one visible flaw io this attempt at "monolithic unity": tbe peculiar shuffling of tbe Secretariatarch suggested that the transition was experiencing difficulty.
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Ins, Stalin bad been accorded the title of Generalof the Party, and from this position he had manipulated itsto the point where lt was completely under hla control. He bad then proceeded to eliminate hla enemiea, atep by step, culminating In tbe dread purges of tbe 3ca. It la perhaps Email wonder tbat tbe Soviet leaders were sensitive over tbe Secretariat and who. should lead and control it. The Orgburo had been dissolved and tbe day-to-day control of Party affairs, as well as tbe control of Party (andpersonnel appointments, were recognized as the function of the Secretariat. Host observers had expected that Malenkov would beStalin's title as "General Secretary" but this was not the case. The new decree did not even mention Malenkov'a name ln connection with the Secretariat, nor did it mention the names of two otheruslov and Aristov. The Secretariat was reshuffled as follows:
1. Pegov was renoved from the Secretariat andof the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, whereQorkin, who became Deputy Secretary. This appeareda demotion for Pegov, an old apparatus functionary whochief of the Central Committee's lighte had been identified
Pegov's career had been climaxed by nis appointment to the Secretariat ath Party Congress.
i have taken the view that, like Vcroahilov, moved over as Secretary to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to help smooth the ratification of the reorganization Gorkin, whom Pegov replaced, was noted on the downgrade In October when he lost bia membership on the Central Committee; he was, however,ember of the Party'a Auditing
2. Ignatlev, Pospelov and Sbatalin were elected Secretaries. This was very unusual: (a) Sbatalin vas notull member of tbe Central Committee ln October, but was Hated as an alternate. Be had been elected to the Orgburo innd had presumably been elevated, at that time, from alternate to full membership on the Central Committee.' At any rate he was named only an alternatetober IS'jP. He had been identified
as Chief of the Planning, FinanciaT and Trade Organs De-
partment of the Central Committee.
rotege of Malenkov and had been personally chosen by him for service in the apparatus. Shatalin had served as
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The Central Committee meeting on lk March was to reduce thostill further, and eventually it vas toour-man group. For the moment, however, there vas uncertainty. The only things clear were that four of the Secretariat membors had beenthree had been added and no successor for 3talin's position as First Secretary had been selected.
Be turning to the decree itself, there were several other points worthy of note:
Top control of the Government was centered, at least formally, ln Malenkov, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and his four deputies. Mo other deputy chairmen were listed. Tbe decree, however, indicated that two organs bad existed in tbe former Council of MinistersBuro"resumably the new Presidium was composed of most of the members of tbe oldhile tbe old Presidium probably numbered among its ranks the remaining former deputy chairmen who were not In the old "Buro". Bow long these groups bad existed is It was also revealed tbat an Identical setup had existed In tbe Party'sl, that it had been composedresumably including most of the members of theresidium, probably composed of tbe new blood taken on In October. In effect,revious centralisation was publicly displayed for the first time.
Shvemik, whose replacement by Voroahilov as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet wasas In turn "recommended" as chairman of the Council of Tradeosition he had held ln tbe. V. Kuxnetsov, thechief of the Trade Unions, vas relieved andeputy Foreign Minister, while vyBhinsky and Malik were named FirstForeign Ministers under Molotov. Vyshinsky, ln addition, was appointed permanent USSR delegate to tbe UN.
arshals Vasllevsky and Zbukov were named as Bulgaria's deputies in the War Ministry. Vasllevsky bad been War Minister prior to Bulganln, while Zhukov had been ln seal-obscurityervingilitary district commandant. Els return to this position had been ascribed toesire to restore this key general to an authoritative position ln time of stress,lan onart to secure the support or at least the
l/ This play on words was necessary on legalistic grounds; tbe Supreme Soviet is supposed to choose the chairman of its own Presidium
neutrality of the professional military, (c) the needounteresire to reduce the panic of the people.
*. I. G. Kabanov was appointed Mlkoyan's First Deputyin the Ministry of Domestic and Foreignnd Kumykln and Zhavoronkov, Deputies. The latter two had been theIncumbents of the merged trade ministries. Kabanov bad been identified as Chairman of Gossnab in January. His new job suggested that Mikoyan's ministry would take over some of's functions.
Ho deputies were listed for Beria's Ministry ofSaburov's Ministry of Machine Building, Malyshev'sof Transport and Machine Building, or Pervukhin's Ministry of Electric Power Stations and Electrical Industry.
Kosyacbenko became the new chief of Gosplan. Afigure, as recently as2 he had recanted in Planned Economy for his support of Voznesensky's economic views. He hadeputy Chairman of Gosplan in0 and was raised to First" Deputy Chairman In1 shortly after the Chairmanship passed to Saburov. He remained in this position when Voznesensky returned He edited Planned Economy from at least March$ until JuneJ.
7. With regard to Party affairs, tbe decree also named four alternates to the Party PresidiumShvernik, Ponomarenko, Melnikov and Baglrov.
(a) Shvernik haderennial alternate before his elevation to the enlarged Presidium in October.
hukov's relations with Bulganinatter of some interest but there is no firm evidence on this point. At one stage during World War II, Bulganin served as political commissar to Zhukov. This may have engendered some friction and there are several reports indicating that this was tbe case. Bulganin, of course, isolitical administrator.
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(b) ponomarenko was at the sane tine relieved of his position on the secretariat. along with his running oate, suslov, he bad long been thought to rank just below tbe politburo level. (moat observers associate ponomarenko with malenkov because of tbe fact that he became mlnlater of procurement0
first party secretary in the ukraine, had also been elevated to the presidium in october. bis retention as an alternate was viewedove to keep some regional party representation on this body. be had served as second secretary to khrushchev in tbe ukraine79 and succeeded khrushchev when the latter moved to bis secretariat assignment in moscow in
baglrov's appointment vas unusual. enior party regionale bad been overlooked ln thepromotions for some unknown reason. he now superseded twenty-two members of the october presidium. he bad worked with beria in transcaucasus security affairs and at one point had been boris's superior. yet his writings on party affairs in the transcaucasus bad paid little lip service
to beria. while both melnlkov's and baglrov'swere interpretedaneuver to retain somefigures on tbe top party organs, it soon became evident tbat both these men were to continue in their regional jobs and hence would not be physically present in moscow most of tbe time.
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following publication ofarch decree, attention vas once more centered on stalin's funeral, which was scheduled for tbe 9tb of march. presumably fear of disorder had been reflected ln the swift moves of the soviet leaders to set their house la order. some part of this atmosphere bad crept into the language of the decree itself which talked of "panic andJ
pril the us haval attache in
stating thatinnish border guard officer attempted
to offer condolences on 8talin's deathounterpart in the pork-kola guard, the latter broke into tears and said tbey were allabout their future and feared military purgestruggle for power. yet reports from moscow indicated that ln general tbe militia handled itself with normal effectiveness.
Western press reporting from tbe Soviet capital drew attention to the vast wave of mourners who came to view Stalin. In contrast to this, the US Embassy in Moscow found little evidence of extreme grief in the capital over tbe death of Stalin. arch it noted that tbe atmosphere in Moscow was calm, that markets were open andwas conducted as usual. The Embassy in fact reported that an American who bad been in Moscow5 recalled more evidence of grief over Roosevelt's death than there was over Stalin's.
Tbe official reaction of tbe European Satellites to-Stalin'a death was expressed in propaganda re offinning unity and gratitude toward the USSR, and in increased internal security precautions Reports of unusual security measures cane from various sourcesin
Czechoslovakia and Romania from US officials;!
in Bulgaria and Aimma,
roaac&BTa concerning them. ightening of security Is fairly standard practice on occasions which might elicit unexpected reactions from tbe vublic. In this case, non-Communist response to tbe news wasixture of hope and despair, withreportedly more prevalent in Poland.
It seems to be the consensus of most Western students of Soviet affairs and propaganda that tbe deification of Stalin waa so all-pervaslve in scope, so penetrating, as to haverofound effect on the Russian people, particularly on tbe uneducated. Stalin was portrayedod, who" of course could do no wrong. Els goodness was unbounded. The bureaucratic level between Stalin and thewas blamed for anything reflecting negatively on Stalin'sBetween tbe lowly peasant and the great god Stalin, thereast middle ground wherein lay responsibility for all ills affecting the Soviet Union. Stalin prevented those ills fromworse and was responsible for all good in the USSR. Ho other Soviet Leader had ever been allowed to achieve independent stature.1/
When Stalin died, therefore, it was necessary to fill thevoid with secondary figures. All of the important ones were apparently employed to fill tbe breach, at leastoldingto calm tho people and keep them under controlore permanent setup could be worked out.
Tbe Soviet leaders also began what in retrospect appears to haveery clever and intelligently-conceived de-emphasis of Stalin, imperceptible at first but one which was eventually to make itself apparent to tbe entire world. estern survey of Soviet propaganda
i/ In World War II, the pattern had been interrupted, but only briefly, by the attention given such men as Zhukov and Zhdanov.
In the period following Stalineath revealedwo-week period of idolizing Stalin had been followed by an apparently deliberate de-emphasis, and concluded that the "progreaflively but still only partially eclipsed god-head is being replaced only by the impersonal concept of government and Party."
This change took tbe following forms: (a) avoiding orthe use of Stalin's name in connection with his hitherto heavily publicized contributions to communism, such as the Soviet nationalities policy and6 constitution; (b) utilizingfrom Stalin without attributing them to him;r minimizing tbe use of his name in connection with several measures apparently intended to woo Soviet public opinionthe price reduction, tbe amnesty, the release of the accused doctor plotters, tbe Pravda answer to Eisenhower; (d) paying tribute to the Communist Party leadership rather than to Stalin as being responsible for victory in World War II (Bulganin's speechnd (e) failing to award the annual Stalin prizes for literature and science.
The de-emphasis apparently moved from the Moscow center out to the provinces gradually. epartment of State survey was toin May that Soviet propaganda media hadasicin the treatment of Stalin. Both the central andpress continued to refer to him regularly, but not nearly as frequently as during his lifetime. References were always made with respect and admiration, however, and nothing suggestive of criticism of Stalin appeared. In many cases, Stalin was referred to jointly with Lenin.
Stalin lay in state for four days, tbe key Soviet leadersas honor guards. On the day of Stalin's funeral, tbe OS Bmbaccy coaaented that, considering the facilities available, the rites for Stalin wore unspectacular. The embassy found particularlythe fact that Stalin's body was placedarrow aisle on
the side of Lenin's bier, and that it was poorly lighted."that tbe decision to hold the
burial only four days after Stalin's death, "contrary to conjecture and without allowing tbe public sufficient time to view tbe bier, is interpreted as meaning that the present high ranking officials do not eye favorably the continual demonstrations of affection accorded tbe former dictator by the people."
Of tbe three funeral speeches delivered by Malenkov, Beria and Molotov, only Molotov's was regardedeal funeral oration by the American Embassy. The embassy noted that while Molotov's voice was shaken in delivery, Malenkov and Beria remained in complete
trol of themselvec. Malenkov sod Berla devoted most of theirto the future. Malenkov'o speech vas non-belligerent in tone, and in general Indicated that the sane policies vould be carried on.
Berla's speech vasimilar vein, with the curious exception that it did not refer once to Stalin as Comrade Stalin, nnd that it rarely mentioned Stalin except in conjunction with Lenin's name. In addition Beria emphasized that the Party's policy would brook nothat tbe Party's organs bad decided to continue national policy without Interruption, and that one of tbe decisions taken in this connection was tbe appointment of Stalin's comrade7ln-erms, Malenkov, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.!/
All three speeches paid special deference to thend in every reference to the Satellites, China came first. Hone of tbe speakers specifically mentioned tbe OS, UK or tbe Western nations.
A close re-reading of all three speeches was to provide Western observers with much food for speculation, perhaps more valid than usual, since tbe speeches were deliveredatber unique situation. For example, Malenkov, who had been placed at the top of the list of the new Party Presidium, did not once refer to the Central Committee; Beria, on tbe other hand, referred to it five times, suggesting that perhaps, in contrast to Malenkov, he wasid for its support. Beria,urious message, alluded to the Government's regard for the rights of Its eltitene. This wbb later to take on added.
THF. ABORTIVE HAIEKKOV BOTID-UI'
The funeral ceremony presented the Soviet leadership to the worldriumvirate: Malenkov, evidently the primus Inter pares; Beria, close behind and givingort of half-hearted blessing; and Molotov,elatively poor third. urvey of
arious observers differed ln Interpreting this passage in Berla's speech. Some thought It to he laudatory of Malenkov; others thought the praise extremely reserved, since Berla had said Malenkov'dwas one of the most important decisions and thatbad now fallen on "leaders" trained by Stalin.
hou En-lai woo granted tho unusual honor of marching third in Stalin's funeral procession.
official comment in tbe Western world on tbe personal powerwithin the Soviet Union shortly after Stalin's death found general agreement that no single leader of sufficient stature was available to assume the position and role of Stalin. Most of tbe individual estimates concluded that political power would beamong several of the top Soviet leaders. There was-someof opinion as toarmonious relationship would prevail, and predictions varied as to the strength of tbe Individual power positions.
Many Communist and non-Communist observers bad predictedwould return to his old job as Chairman of the Counciland that Malenkov would become Party Chief and possiblyStalin's title of General Secretary of the Party. Thereaddition,indicating that various
Communist leaaerc in western Europe thought Molotov would become
Malenkov bad already begun to capitalize on bis position ashead of the triumvirate. arch, the day after Stalin's death, Pravda singled out Malenkov for special attention by quoting from his speech to tbe Party Congress. This was the first reference to any Individual leader, except to Stalin, since the Soviet Premier's illness had been announced. Onarch, Pravda againquotations from Malenkov'6 report to the Congress, beginning at this time to use tbe heavy black type previously reserved forfrom Stalin. arch issue alsoicture of Malenkov delivering tbe Party Congress report in which Stalin was tbe only other person visible. arch Pravda again gaveeavy play and Izvcstiaicture of Malenkov and Stalin taken on May Day Onarch, Pravda and Izvestla both reported that Khrushchev had called on "Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Secretory of the Central Committee of the CPSU, G. M. Malenkov" to speak, tbe first indication that be bad remained on the Secretariat followingarch reorganization.
Onarch Pravda printed the much-publicized picture of Stalin, Mao and Malenkov at0 signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty. The picture had been retouched to place Malenkov next to Mao bythree persons who had been standing between them. Tbe picture also eliminated Molotov, who had been at Stalin's right band, and Vyshlnsky, who had been seated ln front of Mao. The newspaper also published an article by Mao Tse-tung referring to tbe Central Committee and tbe Soviet Government beaded by Comrade Malenkov.
Stalin had waited five years after the death of Lenin to usher in his own deification campaign; Malenkov made his bid even
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before Stalin'g funeral. In tbe days immediately after the funeral, Malenkov's funeral speech vas rebroadcast almost more times than Beria'8 and Molotov's together, and began to be referred to inin the provincial press. This effort to build up Malenkov vas also evident in Radio Kiev broadcasts onndarch stating that the local city and oblf st Soviets had enthusiastically dispatched letters of greeting to the Chairman of the USSR Councilinisters and tbe Secretary of the Party's Central Committee, Comrade Malenkov. An effort to model Malenkov after Stalin vas also apparent in another Radio Kiev broadcast, vhich quoted the chief Ukrainian -languageto the effect that "Comrade Malenkov made an oath on behalf of the Party over the coffin of Comrade Stalin to serve the people Stalin hadimilar oath at Lenin's funeral.
The Malenkov buildup was short-lived, and in tbe ensuing days of March his prominence was sharply cut back. An outside observer, Solomon Schwartz, was to note that the buildup had costreat deal. Upon checking the Soviet press, he found that fromh of March to the end of the month, Pravda did not once quote Malenkov in its editorial articles and only infrequently (onh,h) made any reference to the funeral speeches of Malenkov, Beria and Molotov. He noted that "only in Its editorial ofarch, devoted to the Supreme Soviet session did Pravda, refer to the speech of tbe new Chairman of the Council of Ministers, but in this case tbe editor hastened to underscore tbe confidence of the Soviet peoples in tbe 'Government headed by the faithful pupils and comrades-in-arms of greatotupilomrade-in-ams but by 'pupils and comrades'."
A Bulgarian Communist travelling in tbe West is alleged to have stated that following Stalin's death, the Bulgarian Government ordered substitution of Malenkov's portraits for Stalin's. later tbe Soviet Embassy in Sofia ordered Malenkov's picture removed and replaced by Stalin's.
This initial buildup of Malenkov threw some Satellite andpublications off tbe track. Bertram Wolfe haa pointed out that tbe April issue of tbe American Communist journal Political Affairs, which waa prepared in early March, publisheduneral speech and not those of Beria and Molotov,ead article by William Z. Poater entitled "Malenkov at tbe Helm." However, in the May issue which was prepared in early April, Poster dealt with Stalin andnot even referring to Malenkov's remarks on this subject in bis funeral oration.
Onarch an article by Alexeyev in Izvestia, entitled "The Great Stalin is the Creator of our Five Yearontained a
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Eubstaotlal quotation from Beria and ended oo tbe note that Party and State leadership vas in tbe reliable bands of tbe Great Stalin' faithful "conpanions-in-arms."
/^uunng ^ne penua ironpiarcn, articles
by regionaT^PartjTTeaders Patolichev (Byelorussia) and Kalnberzlns veil as by Party theoretician Cbesnokov, Bade no mention of Malenkov, but stressed tbe leading role of the Central Committee. Onarch Pravda referred to tbe leading role of the Central Committee. Tbe same Issue described the Big-ThreeMalenltov, Beria and Molotovas "faithful comrades-in-arms of Stalin."
There vere some indications in the Immediate period following Stalin's death that the Satellites vere not clear on the leadership In the USSR, butittle toward Malenkov. urvey ofpropaganda up toay found that Malenkov, as weU as other Soviet leaders, vas mentioned only sparingly after Stalin's death. On tbe few occasions that Malenkov was mentioned, it was ineither with his speech at Stalin's funeral or with his speech ath Party Congress. Malenkov, hovever, was mentioned more than Beria and/or Molotov, and these latter two were not mentionedof Malenkov.
This braking of tbe Malenkov buildup was to be paralleled in the action taken by the Central Committee meeting of Ik March, an action that was not publicly revealed until six days later.
THE SECOND GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION
Meanwhile tbe Supreme Soviet meeting scheduled for tho lUtb was postponed one day, obviously to allow the Central Committee meeting to take place. When it met, tbe Supreme Soviet approved with its customary unanimity the appointments of Malenkov as Chairman of tbe Council of Ministers and Voroshilov as Chairman of its own Presidium. In addition, itweeping reorganization of the Government which went far beyond the changes proposed at tbe Joint sessionarch. Byarch, It looked as though tbe earlier changes had lacked unity and bad been hastily put togetherisorderlyarrived at under considerable pressure and tension during the days of Stalin's illness.
At thearch meeting, Khrushchev gave the nominating speech for Voroshilov aa Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme 8ovlet. Beria gave tbe nominating speech for Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of
Ministers.
;Mr. Beam",
can Embassy in Moscow at the time, observed that of all the Soviet leaders, Molotov received the warmest applause.
Malenkov presented tbe composition of tbe new Government,that tbe measures for amalgamating the ministries were worked outong time during Stalin's lifetime and that theirbad been "merely hastened." Some of the highlights of the additional reorganization measures follow:
Tbe decreeweeping reversal of the ndminiotrative policies followed It reduced the number of Soviet ministries or .organs of ministerial level fromlacing control of this simplified structure in tbe hands of men who were for the most part experienced.
The Ministry of the Navy was merged with the Warand became tbe Ministry of Defense, under Bolganln. (On
6 March Bulganin had received control of the Ministry of War only).
3- A. I. Kozlov received control of the newly-merged Ministry of Agriculture and Procurement, formed out of fiveministries. Kozlov'e appointment wasurprise. Heelatively young Party functionary who had been chief of the agricultural section of the Central Committee, and had been Identified there as late as Ik March |
Yet at tbe October CongroBs ne bad been node an
alternate member of the Central Committee. In getting this position he moved ahead of two full members of the Centralwhose ministries were merged under hie control.
_ the Council of Collect! re farm
flairs unoer Anareev was later abolished, giving Kozlovcontrol of agriculture.
k. P. K. Ponomarenko received control of the new Ministry of Culture. Ponomarenko, in addition toember of the Secretariat, bad been Minister of Procurement arch decree had slated Ponomarenko for "leading work In the Council ofnd Western observers thought that he might
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eputy Chairman of that body or receive control Hie nev Ministry of Culture vas formed out ofof Higher Education, Cinematography and Laborthe Committee on Affairs of the Arts, the RadioCommittee, and tbe Chief Administration ofand
5- The State Committee of Material and Technical Supply of tbe National Economy (Gossnab) and tbe State Committee on Supply of Food and Industrial Goods (Gosprodsnab) vere merged vith the State Planning Committee (Gosplan). This gave Gosplan the supervision over allocations of materials, food andproducts, thereby greatly increasing Its Importance, Kosyachenko, the nev Oonplan chief appointedarch, vas notember of the Central Committee. At that time it was thought that Mikoyan's Ministry of Domestic and Foreign Trade would receive at least some of Gossnab's functions since its Chief, Kabanov, had become First Deputy Minister under Mlkoyan.
6. Mikoyan, vboarch had been named Minister of Internal and External Trade, vas appointed oneputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. His stature vasurious vay. Since Mlkoyan vas now the only Deputy Chairman, heiche by himself, presumably belov the Presidium of the Council of Ministers composed of tbe five First Deputy Chairmen yet above the ordinary ministers comprising the full Council of Ministers.
7- N. G. Ignatov who, like Ponomarenko, had been marked for "leading vork" in the Council of Ministersarch, did notinisterial assignment. His status waopril when Leningrad Pravda announcedarty Secretary In Leningrad.
8. The Supreme Soviet failed to ratify either the Fifth Five-Tear Plan or3 State Budget, both of which wereeady in effect, suggestingeview of existing plans by the reorganised ovemment was underway.
$. Malenkov, in submitting tbe nominations of tbe government appointments, referred to tbe principle of collective leadership. Be stated that "the strength of our leadership rests In its collective, cohesive and moral-ethical nature. He regard atrictist observance of this supreme principleuarantee of correct leadership of tbe countryost important condition of our further successful progress along the path of building communism in our country." He said that the USSR would follow
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the policy elaborated by the Party, and that this policy hadby himself, Beria and Molotov at Stalin's funeral on 9elaborated further to say that there was no question thatbe settled peacefully by mutual agreement of the interested This applies to our relatione with all states.tbe United States of America."
V. V. Kuznetsov was released from his dutiesember of tbe Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in connection with his appointment as USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Onarch Kuznetsov had been assigned as Ambassador to Peiping. In contrast to previous Soviet practice, he evidently did not relinquish his title as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs uponiplomatic postoreign country. Malik, for, who replaced Gromyko in London, was relieved of his title of First Deputy Foreign Minister upon receiving this assignment. (An exception to this is the USSR permanent ambassadorial post at the UN, which in recent years has been held by men of Deputy Foreign Minister rank. Vyshlnsky, the present incumbent,irst Deputy Minister).
A. A. Andreyev, tbe ex-Polltburo member andChairman of tbe Council of Ministers, wasember of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. (This automatically excluded him -from any ministerial position: as mentioned above, |
the Council of CollectiveFaro Affaire, which be headed, has been abolished). K. M. Shvornik, deposed as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, was neverthelessember of that body.
The complete reorganization was presented to the Supreme Soviet in about an hour's time. It was revolutionary and hence bound to canse much confusion ln the countryhole. I
Inat least one
major reorganization not spelled out in the official decrees, which basically altered tbe structure of an important sector of Sovietthe economic organs of tbe MVD. The foundation on which that structure had been built, the Chief Directorate of Camps of the MVD,
vas transferred to tbe Ministry of Justice, which therebycontrol of the USSR's vast forced labor supply. Furthermore, the special Chief Directorates of Camps for Mining and Metallurgy of the Far Northern Constructionnd possibly the Chief Directorate ofn-Ferrous Metals, were shifted to theof Metallurgy. The Bydrological Projecting and Exploring Directorate vas moved to the Ministry of Electrical Power Stations and Electrical Industry, and the Chief Directorate of RailroadCamps of the MVD vas transferred to the Ministry of Land Transportation.
In some cases the chiefs of these directorates as well asmoved with
Curiously, this breakup of the. self-sufficient MVD empire has not yet been revealed by] |Soviet sources, although it was later reflected in tbe ramifications of the amnesty decree. Since theof tbe MGB from the MVD inhe police functions of the MVD had all gradually been absorbed by the MGB, and the MVD'e interest had become primarily an economic one. How that the MVD was merged again with tbe MGB it was losing its economic role completely.
Interest in this development was heightened because of Berla's accession to control of the reorganized MVD. He had held sway over the economic, functions of tbe MVD through his old deputy, Kruglov. These functions, incidentally,reat deal of thework for the Soviet atomic energy program, which Beria It seemed at first glance hard to believe that Beria would preside over the liquidation of his empire; possibly Beria bad to sacrifice these economic functions in thearch in order to regain control of the police, which had previously slipped from bis grasp.
This atmosphere most have also affected another rival for powerG. M. Malenkov.
As mentionedeeting of the Central Committee had been held on Ik March, resultingay's postponement of the Supreme Soviet meeting, undoubtedly, it was called to work out tbewhich Malenkov was to present to the Supreme Soviet. Tbe results of this plenary session of the Central Committee, unlike those of thearch Supreme Soviet meeting, were not made public untilarch,
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six days after tbe Central Committee meeting. The Soviet press thenist of three decisions taken:
To accede to the request of Chairman of tbe USSR Council of Ministers, G. M. Malenkov, for his release from the duties of Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
Toecretariat of the Central Committee of tbe CPSU to consist of the following: Comrades N. S. Khrushchev, N. A, Suslov, P. N.. Shatalin, S. D. Ignatiev.
m accordance with paragraphf tbe Communist Party Statute, to transfer Comrade H. H. Shatalin from candidate to member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
ive-man Secretariat vas named with Khrushchev listed first. Among other things, Suslov, who was not mentioned inarch decree, was retained; Aristov, also unmentionedarch, was dropped; Kikhailov, identified as being in tbe Secretariatarch, was also dropped. The ranking of tbe three newcomers was reversed:arch Ignatiev was listed first, then Pospelov, and Shatalin; onh, Shatalin was listed first among tbe newcomers, followed by Pospelov and Ignatiev.
SIGKiyiCAKCE CP REORGAKIZATIOK OP PARTI SECRETARIAT
Malenkov thus abandoned direct control of the Party Secretariatsomething which Stalin in his lifetime bad never done. Stalin had used tbe office of General Secretary to achieve absolute dictatorship. In later years be had delegated considerable authority to the rankinga position held by Malenkov at the time of Stalin's death.
The presumption of tbe authors of this paper has been that Stalin had allowed Malenkov's influence to grow, that Malenkov had achieved predominance by capably handling the intricate affairs of thein the name of Stalin, and that Malenkov's influence bad become quite strong in the last two years of Stalin's life. Stalin, despite whatever infirmity may have gripped him, must have been aware of and allowed this personal rise to takeise which culminated in Malenkov's leading role at the Party Congress. Stalin thereforeto approve of this Malenkov preeminence and had done nothing to stop it.
It is the author's contention that Stalin was unable toanyone succeeding him. Perhaps in tbe doctors' plot the evil genius of Stalin, as has been speculated earlier, was moving against
all his enemies, and perhapo he had planned to use Halenkov for this purpose and then discard him. If this supposition is valid-it would appear to have beenuestion of time before Stalin, realizing Malenkov's independent power position would have set about to destroy him.
At any rate Stalin's death prevented this, and left Halenkov vith hla power intact. This power evidently vas not great enough, however, to withstand the pressure of the other Soviet leaders, who apparently moved at an early moment to restrict it. It appearsto assume that Malenkov gave in to their pressurewhether direct or indirect, spoken or unspokenand vilhdrew from the Secretariat. It is probably true that in so doing he immediately began to take steps to minimize the role of tbe Secretariat. There is some evidence that this has been tbe case. It Is also probably true that the other Soviet leaders wholeheartedly approved of these attempts.
Malenkov's withdrawal, thus does appear to standign ofign that be was not able at tbe outset to inherit all the trappings of Stalin's power. Be appeared to have some supporters left in the Secretariat, and his Influence and power wouldcontinue to be felt there. But this was not the same as being in it himself. Malenkov, the first ranking member of the Party Presidium, but not officially Its Chairman, would still have toto tbe desires of others. 8talin also was neverChairman" of the Politburo, but he had certainly acted in thisand had done more than break tie votes. In Stalin's absence from the Politburo sessions before the war, reliable Soviet defectors have reported, Molotov chaired the meetings.
Krushchev's rise in the Secretariat, first indicated inarch decree, was confirmed by this announcement. He waa listed first In the rankings of tbe Secretariat, and hence took over tbe day-to-day control of party affairs previously performed by Malenkov.
Much speculation immediately centered on the politicalof Khrushchev and tbe other members of the Secretariat,their relations vith Malenkov. As has been previously noted, Khrushchev and Suslov figure prominently in tho vigilance While this was not unusual in light of their positions and the Party's role in tbe campaign, it did seem to align them in this instance with Malenkov. In addition their careers were not such as
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to indicate that they were anti-Malenkov. The biographicalon the sen does not add much further In this respectj/
Various biographic appraisals of Khrushchev lay stress on his ability toenter line, his opportunism and his blind obedience to Stalin; yet such appraisals are common to most Soviet leaders. Suslov's orientation had come inood deal of attention at the time he entered the Secretariat7 when Zhdanov was In He remained prominent, however, after Zhdanov's death,that he had been able to overcome any stigma that may have been attached to him in this regard. His attack on Pedoseyev had also served to array him againsthdanov adherent.
With regard to Ignatiev, the authors had previously assumed him toalenkov man. The fact that be was listed after Sbatalin and Pospelov, rather than before them as had been the casearch, was perhaps an omen of hla later downfall. Sbatalin was only anCentral Committee member In October, possibly indicating aout with Malenkov. Pospelov, although an old time Bolshevik and Party theoretician, had declined in stature prior to Stalin's death. There is some indication that he is on close terms with Molotov.
Tbe braking of the Malenkov propaganda buildup, and theof Malenkov from the Secretariat, was to be followed Inmonths by stress on the collcgial nature of theIs perhaps reasonable to assert that this concept receivedCommittee's formal support in its lh March meeting. on colleglal leadership is best documented in Soviet andpropaganda media of the period. The concept has also beenseveral other contexts.
s far as can be determined, the rumor that Khrushchev's sister or daughter wub Malenkov'c second wife Is false.
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Original document.
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