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Intelligence
Weekly
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
approved for release date: 5
POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN IRAN
Approval of Prime Minister Mossadeq's unconstitutional plan to dissolve the present Hajlis is expected in thereferendum which is to be completed in Iran onugust. The Tehran area, which votedugust, has already given overwhelming support to the proposal. The prime minister has publicly stated that general elections will be held, but there probably will be considerable delay.
Hossadeq decreed that the referendum would beon-secret ballot. Since voters must include full identification on their ballots, there is little doubt that the referendum will approve dissolution of the Hajlis, the constitutional prerogative of the shah.
Mullah Kashani and other opposition leaders have
oycott of the referendum. Abstention, however,
not block Mossadeq, as he has the vote of his ownthe full support of the Tudeh.
Mossadeq has promised electionsew Majlisthe referendum, but normally several months are needed to conduct the actual balloting. Rigged elections are standard practice in Iran. During the last elections, the Mossadeq government used both legal and illegal means to ensure victory for its candidates, yet it did not secure complete control of the legislative body. There is nothing in the situation today suggesting that Mossadeq could secure the electionore docile Majlis.
Though the Tudeh is supporting the prime minister in the referendum,arliamentary election it would run its own candidates against Mossadeq and some would probably be ew Majlis, if and when assembled, Mossadeq accordingly would find himself facedmall but militant Tudeh bloc, as wellightist opposition, whose election he could not entirely prevent.
Tribal chiefs, army officers, the landed gentry, and the supporters of Mullah Kashani could, if united, defeat Mossadeq. In the rural districts where Communists are Increasing their activities, the landlords still control most of the peasant
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vote. Many of their candidates could be defeated only through wholesale terrorism on the part of the pro-Mossadeq forces.
Thus, Mossadeq night increase bis own supportew Majlis, but the anticipated Tudeh and conservative opposition would not lend themselves to easy manipulation. The Tudeh would probably support bis anti-Western policies, prod him on to store extremist action, awaiting the day when It could take over. Tudeh representationossadeq cabinet Is not an impossibility.
Paced with the prospectsew Majlis not fullyMossadeq will accordingly tend to procrastinate on the elections. Aware, however, that the expiration ln January of the powers voted him by the Majlis will remove the last vestiges of legality from bin position, he will probably call for elections at the last possible moment.
The prime minister's flagrant violation of the secret ballot ln the referendum seems to indicate uncertainty over his actual popular backing, although he insists that the people will support him fully. The considerable conservative and rightist plotting to remove him may Increase in themonths, particularly if he takes more arbitrary action.
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Original document.
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