DATS: 4
SECURUY INFORMATION
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
communist capabilities and probable courses of action in korea
3
the totlmring member organizations of the intelligence advlforp committee participated rnllh the centralagcntp in the preparation of this estimate: the intelligence organizations at the departments of stale. ihe army, the kami, the air force, and the joint stab-
all members of the intelligence advlttrg committee concurred in thlt estimatearch iss3.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
copy of this publication ti for Ihc Information and use of theon the front cover nnd of individuals under Hie Juiisdiclion of iheofTlce whn require llie Information for the perfWmance of their officialtlUscinluatioii elacwhera in tho department to oilier olllccs which requirefor the performance of official duties inity be authorised by the following;
n. fSpeclal Assistant to the Secretary lor Intelligence, for the Dcparlmenl of State
Chief of, for the Department of the Army
of Naval Intelligence, for the Dcparlmenl of the Navy
of Intelllsoncc. USAF. for the Dcparlmenl of the AirDeputy Director for Intolllccnco, Jolnl SlafT. for the JointSlafI
of Intelligence. AEC. for the Atomic Energy Commission
to the Director, FBI. for the Federal Bureau of InresUgaiion
Director for Collection and Dissemination. CIA, for anyor Agency
copy may be cither retained or destroyed by burning in accordancesecurity regulations, or relumed to the Central Intelligence Agencywith the Office of Collccllon and Dissemination. CIA.
DISTIllDUTION: WMIfl House
National Security Council nr-partim-nt ori i of Defense Mutual FWurity Arrnrv IViitliolorlefil Slmtr-cr Hoard Alomk Fiw-rryComml^SOfl Krtfrrnl Mnrtiu ot MveMiraUon
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE3
NOTICE TO HOLDERS OFCOMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN3
SUBJECT: CHANGES INND MAP
The Intelligence Advisory Committee ha* noted the apparentbetween data Inond data In the reference legend on the Map In that estimate, and haa apprcved the uhanges below:
ANNEX D
L Reference column headed "Combat Radius (Nauticalevise heading to read "Maximum Combat Radius at Best Operating Altitude (Nauticalnd revise figures fors follows:
' art* *
eviseo read: "With two6 gal. tanks".
MAP
eference legend In lower right-hand corner. Revise to read as follows (arcs on map should be changedANGES RADII of AIRCRAFT OPERATING FROM COMMUNIST BASES
Slfnnnc mixtion with tllnlil out ml ret jrn nl be*l
"?TlWiiLiT_
auticalithound bombs, and internal fuel only
Oith no addedand Internal fuel only'
auticalwithgallon wing tanks, and no added armament
auticalet light bomberound bomb load, atboo feet.
CEIITRAL IlITP, ILICEHCC
iir.avjrDtii rai tietveott
SUBJECT; UTE-GOi CcCTtnlct Capabilities nnd ProViblo Ciurnca of Action ln Korea
Tho Director ofF, has nstod that thoro In on apparent Inconsistency bot-.ocn dntn lnD to nin-CO end data In tiio reference-n thehat cotinate.
Tho ottoehftd chnnfpo hnra broiby Ura Air Force to brinend tho thj>'*.
lot Ed hCOW your concurrence (or
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P/Aofit.ational Entlr.aboe
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1SS nauticaloand internal fuol ortly^
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COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA3
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Communist capabilities and probable courses of action in Korea
CONCLUSIONS
The Communist military potential in the Korean area has grown steadily since the initiation of cease-flre negotiations Inroop strength has more than doubled and logistic support has been substantially improved. Jet fighter strength has more than tripled.et light bombers have been introduced in Manchuria. Combatof Communist military forces has improved and is now believed to range from good toighlywell-integrated defensive zonepossiblyoiles to the rear of present battle positions. Manyareas have been constructed in rear of this zone and are being Improved and expanded.
he Communist Air Force in Chinaurrently has the capability of seriously challenging UNC daylight air operations under conditions of goodover North Korea. It also has the capability of expanding CAFIC air oper-
'The term CAFICeant lo Include North Korean nlr unit* nnrl Soviet unlta which nre beloved lo be operaUint with live ChineseAir Force.
ations into UN-held territory andwaters. If the Communistsa major ground offensive bythe maximum capabilities of the CAFIC over the entire Korean theater of operations and UNC supporting bases, and achieved optimum success in these operations, the enemy might place the UNC forces in Korea in Jeopardy.
The enemy is capable ofajor ground and/or air attack withor no warning. On balance, current Communist military, diplomatic, and propaganda activities do not indicate tbat the Communists intend lo launch large-scale ground or air operations in the near future.
Political and economic conditions within North Korea and Communist China are not exerting compellingon the Communists to conclude an armistice in Korea.
We believe that during the period of this estimate Sino-Soviet cooperation in Korea will not be materially reduced by frictions and conflicting interests.
i
1 f m
Communists probably estimate that the Korean warivisiveon the Western Powers and that at least during the period of thisthe UN/US is unlikely to commit the military strength in the Far East necessary to drive the Communists from Korea. At the same time theprobably believe that the UN/US will take actions during the period of this estimate which will increase the costs and risks of the Korean war for the
We believe that during the period of this estimate the Communists will seek to maintain strong military pressure in Korea whilerimarilyposture. At the same time, the Communists will continue to build up their mililary strength in the Korea-Manchuria area in order lo be in alo exploit any advantage which might develop br to counter possible UN/ US intensification or expansion of the war.
We believe that so long as the military stalemate in Korea continues, theare unlikely lo make concessions on the POW issue to secure an
We believe that the Communistto gain control of all Korea willunchanged. We also believe,that the Communists desire to avoid general war over the Korean issue and that Communist courses of action in Korea will be determined by Communist global interests.
DISCUSSION
OF COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES IN KOREA
Forco Strengths
round Forces. Enemy ground forcesKorcnn area have grown steadily lnstrength since the Initiation ofnegotiations inndmore than double theirF ENEMY ! March
North Korean hinese Communist
0
In North Clilna. These forces could be used In Koreaituation develop which required rapid, substantial Communistof their current forces.
he combat cfTccllvcnoss and morale of Communist ground units In Korea Is judged lo range from good lo excellent. Majorof reorganization, rc-cqulpmcnt. and reinforcement, particularly ln armor, artillery, and antiaircraft artillery units, have resulted In substantially Increased enemy fire power. In recent months, improvements have been noted in the enemy's employment of field and AA artillery and In training, as evidenced by
In addition to the Chinese Communist forcci In Korea, there archinese Communist troops In Manchuria
way ot eomrcirbton. United Nation* Commandound force strenctti Inits. UNC rround force xlrcncth at present I*.
Probable Effect* on the Sorict Bloc ot Certain Course* of AeUon Directed at theand External Commerce of Communist China". concludesaval blockade ofChina. Inwith larne-xenle and sustained air nnd narnl bombardment of key Chinese CommunM transportation linen, would nnt tn lUelf Induce Uie Communists toorean settlement on present UN terms.
i_
belter leadership and tactical use of troops, particularly in small unit tactics. There has been an Increased emphasis on the use of fire and maneuver and less emphasis on "human sea" tactics.
The Communist logistic position in Korea has improved during the long semi-static period since the beginning of armisticeAlthough UNC operations against lines of communication in North Korea have made Communist re-supply cflorts difficult, the enemy 1ms been able, though atcost In effort and equipment, tosufficient supplies to meet his combat requirements and to create stockpiles. It is estimated that the enemy now has stockpiled In Korea sufficient supplies to support aboutays of offensive operations.imited transport capability forof his attacking echelons, the enemy probably would not be able toarge-scale offensive for more thanoays. It should be noted, however, that the enemy's build-up in military strength In North Korea has brought an accompanying Increase In his kgistlc requirements. Thus, effectiverapportajor sustained offensive would now necessitate, more than at any time In theteady flow of supplies toareas.
Air Forces. The Communist Air Force in Chinaas grown steadily since the Initiation of truce negotiations int Is estimated that the enemy's Jet fighter strength has more than tripled sincen addition. CAFIC strength has been Increased in recent months by tlieofet light bombers, anf which arc now in Manchuria.
Jet Flehter
Jet Light Bomber
Other Type*
Total
ESTIMATED CAFICTRENGTH'
Of the present total combal strength.ombatet fighters andet light bombers) are believed to be in the North Korea-Manchuria area. The remainingaircraft (includinget fighters) are believed to be in China proper, basedaround Peiping, Shanghai. Canton, and HsucIhiu.
By US criteria, CAFIC fighter unils are believed to beairly high standard of combat efficiency. There hasteady improvement In enemy air tactics and,the degree ot Individual enemy pilots aggressiveness has fluctuated periodically, the proficiency and aggressiveness of enemy fighter pilots by US standards is considered "good" at the present time. The most serious current CAFIC weakness is its deficiency in all-weather and night-interception capability. Although the CAFIC has been able to main-tain sustained air activity over the past year, the average CAFIC daily sortie rate, based on sightings by UN aircraft, appears to beraction of the number of sorties possible with the total aircraft believed to be available.
Airfield construction and repair has been underway In North Korea sincet present, there arcn North Korea which are or could be-
'Present actual strength of CAFIC units Is not known, but most units arc believed to be near their authorised strength. Tabic oland Equipment strength Is used as tho bod-tor eiUmaUon of CAFIC strength sincehat prior to any deliberate Communist expansion of the air war the USSR probably would provide Ihc CAFIC with sufficient aircraft to bring any undcrr'rength units to their fullomplement. Secndabular and graphic prcsentaUon ofair strength since the outbreak of the Korean war, togethertrength forecast through the period of this esUmatc. SecCabular presentationvlel Far East air strength, andor CAFIC and Soviet Air rorce aircraft performanceBy way of comparison, the actual UNC air strength In mld-lfttl warhe malorlty of which were piston type. The actual UNC air strength at prcwnl Isircraft, of whichre Jet net)ten.
ri iii ii i
suitable lor military operations. Of these, there are eight airfields which couldhort time be capable of handling sustained jet operations. Within Communist China, an Intensive airfield repair andbuild-up hasood system of airfields capable of liandllng all types ofnow available to Die CAFIC. Inthe recently developed air facilities are so located as to provide excellent bases for the air defense of Manchuria, and the ten jetin the Antung Mukden complex are so located as to permit Communist jet fighters to strafebut not to bombforward UN
The CAFIC is almost wholly dependent upon the USSR for logistical support,aircraft, fuel supplies, armament, andIn addition, the USSR appears to be providing advanced pilot training within the USSR for CAFIC pilots, and Sovietmay be exercising operational control of the CAFIC. cither directly or indirectly.
Naval Forces. The small prewar North Korean Navy was largely destroyed early In tlie Korean war. Exceptubstantial capability for minclaylng. Its presentis insignificant. The operational Chinese Communist Navy consists ofhips, includingmphibious vessels. The Chinese Communist Navy has increased its effectiveness in the past year. There has been no Indication to date of Chinesenaval aid to North Korea.
Tlie USSR is supplying the ChineseNary, andesser extent, the North Korean Navy, wilh motor torpedo boats and other small naval vessels, as well as naval ordnance, mines. POL. radar and deck and mineswecplng gear. No Soviet submarines are known to nave been transferred. The Chinese Communists and the Notth Koreans arc probably receiving Soviet guidance ond training In naval wnrfnre and coastal defense.
Over-All Military Capabilities
Force.1'. There arc currentlyin North Korea approximatelyhi-
' SfC nttachrd map.
nesc Communist armiesorth Korean corps. Artillery, rocket launcher, andunits are attached to infantry divisions.f these forces arc cither engaged In or immediately available for coastal defense operations. The bulk of this force Is disposed in the coastal areas where armrfiibious operations might be nnticl|Hited. The Communists have been engaged in the strengthening of their coastal andefensesighly organized, well-integrated defensive zone extends possiblyoiles to the rear of present battleMany fortified areas have beenIn rear of this zone and are being improved andeicnsivc zone is believed lo exist slightly to the rear of the forward fortified areahird zone has been reported across the waist of Korea.-indicate extensive employment ofwire, mines, and roadblocks in all defensive areas. Strong field lortiflcatlohs have been constructed in depth along present front lines and along the cast and west coasts. Logistical reserves have been substantially improved In these areas.
the present time and underof limited air support.forces in Korea have the
large-scale offensive, with little or
offensives;
In depthrolonged period;
guerrilla operations in
Forces. Tlie CAFIC currently hasof seriously challenging UNCair operations under conditions ofover North Korea and ofair operations into UN-heldadjacent waters. CAFIC capabilitiesto have been greatly Increased duringsix montlis by the conversion of tworegiments in Manchuria loombers. The maximumradius of thes such that by
n p _
staging (torn Southern Manchuria bases the CAFIC could launch attacks throughout South Korea and part o( Jiipan,:
The CAFIC does not hare the presenthowever, of challenging UNC air operations under conditions of poor visibility and hasimited all-weather capability. CAFIC capabilities against UNC ground forces and Installations arc presently limited by the lack of operational jet-fighter installations in Korea from which short-range attacks,bombs or napalm, could be mounted. The CAFIC has not yet demonstrated the capability of cntrylng out either effective air-ground support operations or effective high-altltudc bombing by Jet aircraft.
Communist air defense capabilities in Korea. Manchuria, andesser extent in China proper have considerably Increased during the past yearesult of Intensiveisual observer and/or radar air warning net has been established whichalmost complete coverage along the China coast from Hainan Island through Manchuria to the Soviet frontier. Anradar net has been developed In the Korea-Manchuria area. However, despite the considerable progress made, presentradar control and communicationsare not believed capable of operating effectively against mass or saturation raids. Communist antiaircraft fire In North Korea has continued to increase In volume andover the past year and now Includes some use of radar-controlled searchlights and guns The Communists have anet fighters in the North Korcan-Manchurlan area and have the capability In this area ofigorous fighter defense against UN air attacks under conditions of daylight and good visibility. However, these fighter defense capabilities arc severely limited by darkness and poor visibility. Elsewhere In Communist China, the CAFIC may be able to deploy enough aircraft for defense of selected
'Seep- lU-Ws arc believed toombat ccHln*0 feet, approximate maximum nlr speed of ISO knots, and bomb-load capacity of opounds.
specific areas against nir attack, bul Iheavailable forces arc loo sparsely deployed and oilier elements of tlie air defense system are too weak to prevent saturation of the air defense system through simultaneous attacks against several areas. There is no indication thai airborne Intercept radar equipment Is available to the CAFIC.
ombined Air and Ground Capabilities. If ihc Communists employed their maximum air capability simultaneouslyajor ground force offensive but restricted their air activity to Communist-held territory, they would Interfere al least Initially with UNC close-support and Interdiction operations. This relief from UNC air action against enemy forward elements and LOC would improve considerably the enemy's opportunities for limited success. However, under theseCommunUt forces would probably not have the capability to eject UNC forces from Korea. If the Communistsajor ground offensive by surprise attacks exercising their maximum air capabilities over tlte entire Korean theater of operations andhe enemy would causedamage to UNC Jet airfield Installations In the forward areas. In addition, suchwould divert komc UNC aircraft and AA weapons to purely defensive missions.the groum. force capabilities would be enhanced In that their troop movements and logistic efforts would be under considerably
'Insufficient Information Is available on which toirm esUmale of the maximum number of CAFIC aire raft which could be committed in the initial attackajor air offensive. However, assuming that units In the CAFIC are assigned approximatelyercent of theirtrength andtand-down Inspection was was held priorajor air offensive, the enemy, without redeployment o( aircraft, rould possibly commit al presentetiston0 Jet light bombers, nnd IS piston light bombers. WlUi redeployment, and with (he same assumption* ns above. these fig-urts would Inrmw toet nghters. ISO pt.'nn0 Jet light bombers, and ISO plilnn light bombers. The sortie rate1 which eouM Seafter an Initial air strike- Is estimated to beer month for enrh Jet flghler, ander month for all other types.
i t
lighter Blr attacks. Although no firm rati, mate can bo made of the situation winch might ultimately develop under these clrcum-siunces. It Is iMMMblc that If theajor ground oflenstve bytheir maximum air capabilities over the entire Korean theater of operations and UNC supporting bases, and achieved optimumIn these operations, the enemy might place UNC forces in jeopardy.
forces. With the exceptionNorth Korean navallo be negligible. If theNavy should enter theIt would be capable of assisting thoNavy as follows:
a. Motor torpedo boat surprise attacks on UN shipping In the coastal waters ol theSea,
aying and sweeping naval mines, e. Supplying uprained submarine personnel.
d. Providing amphibious liftalanced forceivisions In the coastal waters of the Yellow Sea. using conventional landing craft. Control of the sea and air areto conduct such operations.
Trendt in Enemy Militaryim Korea.'
a. Under continued conditions of awar In Korea. Under theseCommunist capabilities probably would contlnuo gradually to Improve during the period of this estimate. The enemy Is capable of continuing the augmentation of ground forces by the introduction of nddl-tlonal infantry, artillery, and armored units, and of continuing the Improvement of fire power, tactical use of troops, and logisticIf the USSR continued to support the CAPIC. the over nil capabilities of thewould probably be significantlyand the threat to UN installations In Korea would be Increased. The Chinese Com-
effect of certain UN/US course* of nrtlnn on Communist enpn hi title* In Korea Is diseasedeets on the Soviet nine at Certain Courses of Action Directed al tlie In-term! and External Commerce of Communistarch ISSJ.
munist Navy Is believed capable of absorbing considerably more naval equipment, including small coastal submarines or coastal destroyers, than is now apparently bring suj>plicd them by the USSR. Whether or not suchSoviet support Is given. Chinesenaval capabilities for operations dc-scrilxl in paragraphould continue to Increase. North Korean naval capabilities would increaseery modest cxlcnL
b. in the eventease-fire in Korea. The most significant trend likely to develop in enemy capabilities under these circumstances would be the rebuilding and re-cquipping of North Korea's alrficlds.
Soviet Capabilities to Inlerveno in the Korean War
Forces. If the USSR shouldto Intervene openly In the Korean war.at the present lime commit toKorea an estimatedo IStroops) withinecision had been made loforces. No firm estimate can hethe Soviet forces available for use InIhc event of full mobilization in theEast. The total force under suchwould probably be substantiallyivisions.
Forces. The Soviet Fnr Easternconsists at present of anaircraft,etJet lightistonIt Is believed that availablewould allow deployment Into theof less thanercent of thestrength. However. Ihe Soviet nlrlaunch air strikes wilhJet lightistoniston medium bombersbases id the Southern MaritimeArthur areas against UN inalal]nllonsnnd Japan while maintaining nnof Soviet territory. The SovietAir Force could also provide an alr-
"trength. See Annex C.
"I1 Mil II I L
borne liftaratroops, or II could0 to is.ooo paratroops in an operation extendingay period.
Naval Forces. Present Soviet naval strong ih in Uie Pacific area is estimated tourface vessels, the largest of which are Iwo heavy cruisers endestroyers; andubmarines, of whichre modern types. This force could be immediately employed in Ihe Korean area. Soviet naval aviation In the Far East (all shore-based and included In totals given above for Ihe Sovici Far Eastern Mr Force) is estimated) to consistircraft. Utilizing Iheir presently known number ofmphibious vessels, it is estimated that the Soviets could provideliftalanced force of 2against the cast coast of Korea or Japan. Utilization of merchant vessels would afford an increased capability.
Likely Trends in Soviet Militaryin the Korean Area. No major changes are expected In Soviet Far East ground force or naval capabilities during the period of this estimate. The effectiveness ol the Soviet Far Eastern Air Force will probably improve through continued re-equipping of existing unils wiih Jet fighters and jet light bombers, and through increased proficiency of flying personnel wiih respect to formation flying, high altitude bombing, and long-rangeunder both clear and restrictedconditions.
PROBABLE COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA
Soviet Globol Interests
terms of Communist globalKorean war has had both advantagesOn Ihe positive side, theserved lo tie down US militaryource of tension between theils allies, and hassefulstimulus for Communist propagandaforms of political warfare. Onside, the war hasrainresources of the USSR ondand hastimulus for the West's rcarmamcnL efforts.
Moreover, the Communists probably estimatelosing out of the war by concessions to Ihe UN would encourage Ihc West toa firm position on other issues of the East-West conflict, wouldoss of prestige, and might increase Communistdefections in the future.
the Kremlin estimates thatInterests ip Ihc Far East conrolongation or by athe war in Korea depends in largeSovici world-wide strategy. Thewould prefer to move towardof its objectives by meansgeneral war. While the CommunistIn Korea has involved,inherent risk of general war. thesought to limit Its own role in theand has not sought to use the warexcuse for initiating broaderKremlin appears desirous ofwar over the Korean issue andreason would probahly prefer citherof the present situationpread in hostilities that inwould lead to general war.
Internal Conditions in Communist China and North Korea
Communitf China. During the Korean war, Chinese Communist political controls have been intensified. Forced collection ot funds has been instituted In order to finance the war and Ihe regime's Internal programs. These coercive measures have In alldecreased tho degree of willing support given the regime and the war effort. But the Increasingly effective totalitarianof the regime arc almost certainlyto control any resentment which may develop.
The economic ond polilical strainson CommunLst China by the Korean war arc probably less at present thanwere0lie ilso tn thea.id agricultural output ofChina and the strengthening of political and economic controls have increased Ihcnt the disposal of the regime. Wc
111 lihi ill I.
ti 11 .
nlikely that domesticcillier economicicing the Chinese Communisl regime under any Immediate and demanding pressure to con-elude an armistice in Korea. So long as the USSR continues toarge share of the military equipment and supplies for the war anil provides economic; assistance. Ihe Chinese Communist war effort, at current or even somewhat expanded levels. Is not likely to subject the economy lo serious strains.
ritical food situation
apparently exists in North Korea. Although the regime hasumper cropood production and distribution have apparently nol met civilian and militaryand substantial assistance from Communisl China has been necessary. North Korean housing. Industry* ond electric power have all been severely curtailed by UNC In addition, major shortages exist in consumer goods and In agricultural Accordingly, morale among the civilian population has conlinued to decline and there Is some evidence of factionalism within the regime. However, lliere Is nolhat resolution of the North Korean regime or the morale of the North Korean armed forces has been substantiallyA prolongation of Ihe war will almost certainly have an increasingly adverse effect on Internal conditions In North Korea. this will probably have llllle Influence on Communist rourscs of action In Koreathe Interests of the North Korean regime will continue to be subordinated to the global or regional interests of the USSR
Sino-Soviet Cooperation in Korea
lthough therevidenceecentIn Chinese CommunLst Influence In North Korea, we believe that the USSR still dominates North Korean affairs Theof primary Influence in North Korea may eventually have an adverse effect upon Slno-Sovletnns, but It Is unlikely that such rivalry will, during the period of this estimate, have nny major cfTect upon Communist courses of action in Korea,
ontinuation of the Kenan war almost certainly creates strains in tnc Sino-Soviet partnership. The war undoubtedly raises the problems of Ihc distribution of ils burdens bclwrcn the Iwo powers. Kurtheimore, the drain of Stalin has probably created some uncertainties In Ihe Slno-Sovlet relationship. In ndditlon. Communist China's growing military and economic dcj*ciHlcncc on tho USSR probably poses other difficultiesld eventually place serious strains on the Sino-Soviet relationship. However, theindividual interests and the frictions, actual and potential, which may exist in the Slno-Sovlet partnership have not lo datethe enemy's effective cooperalion in Korea, and there Is al Ihe present time no evidence of changes in the Korean policies of cither of Ihe two powers. Communist China probably views Us security as being closely linked to Uiat of the USSR and hasIts willingness lo subordinate itsinterests lo Uie broader objccUves il shares with Ihe USSR. Therefore, wethat the effectiveness of Sino-Sovietin Korea, at least during the period of this estimate, will nol be materially reduced.
Current Indicoiions of Communist Intentions in Korea
Militaryresentmilitary activities In the Far Easta Communisl Intention to maintain their military commitment in Korea. While the nature of Communist military acUvllies in Korea suggests an immediate Intention to continueperations, thebuild-up of bolh ground and air strength of all types apjicars to anticipate the possibility of the resumption of full-scale ground fighting and an extension of air
Indications from Communist Diplomatic Mores. Soviel and Chinese Communisl dip-lom.itie actions, while providing no conclusive Indications of Communist courses of action, suggest an intention to continue the war ln Korea. In particular. Ihe Communists have
i i r x
refused to make any concessions on the POW Issue. Since the indefinite suspension of truce negotiations at Panmunjom. the Communists have not Indicatedeadiness to compromise on their demand for "total repatriation" oi POW's, Thiswas demonstrated in the Soviet Union's violont rejection of the Mcnonin tho UN General Assembly. The Moscow Sino-Soviet discussions andino-Soviet exchange of notes on the retention of Soviet forces in Port Arthur offer no conclusive Indications of Communist Intentions in Korea. However, these events doommunist desire to Impress the West with the solidity of the Slno-Sovlet alliance.
Indications. Recentpropaganda has indicated noon the part of the Communists totruce on other than their own terms.burden of recent Communisthas concerned itself with allegedto extend the war andto thwart these plans.has been no Indicationajor CommunistKorea. Chinese Communiststressed that its Internal economicnot be disturbed and indeedontinuation of the
Probable Courses of Action
Communists probably estimateKorean warivisive influenceWestern Powers and lhat at leastperiod of this estlmale the UN/US isto commit Ihe military strength In the Far East necessary to drive the Communists from Korea. At the same time UteprobaUy belk-ve lhat the UN/US will lake actions during the period of thiswinch will increase the costs and risks of Ihe Korean war for Uie Communists.
We believe that during the period of this estimate the Communists will seek lostrong military pressure In Korea whilerimarily defensive posture. At the same time, the Communists will continue to build up their military strength in the Korea-Manchuria area In order to beosition to exploit any advantage which might develop or lo counter possible UN/US Intensification or expansion of the war.
We believe that so long as the military stalemate In Korea continues, theare unlikely to make concessions on the POW issue to secure an armtsUcc."
We believe that the Communist objective to gain control of al! Korea will remainWc also believe, however, that the Communists desire lo avoid general war over the Korean Issue and that Communist courses of action in Korea will be determined by Communist global Interests.
Pre-bJible Effects on the Soviet Bloc of Certain Courses of Acllon Directed nt theand External Commerce of Communist China", concludesaval blockade of Communist China, in eon-JuncUon with lance-scale andnd naval bombardment of key Chinese Communist transportationould not In itself Induce the Communists toorean settlement on present UN terms.
_
'IU1
A
THE ESTIMATEDTRENGTH OF THE COMMUNIST AIR FORCE IN CHINA
TYPE Of AIFCKATT
Fighter
Fighter
Attack
Light Bomber
Light Bomber
Bomber
T
g
THE ESTIMATEDTRENGTH OF THE CAFIC
AIRCRAFT
0Jet
g
*e*
in m u> irS
S
rj rj M
m >n m wi
r tKvrt ft
C
ESTIMATED SOVIET FAR EASTIR STRENGTH
AXRCKXrr TYTE
2
3
3
4
Jet Piston
750
550
Jet Piston
*
450
Bomber Jet Piston
860
Bomber
Jet Piston
ISO
inr Miii.
nriiFT
D
CCAF AIRCRAFT TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES
AIRCRAFT
Jet Fighters MIG-15
MIO-9
YAK-15
COMBAT RADIUS iNautKal Mien
'
COMBAT CETLIKO fFeetl
0
m.7 mm,ounds
3 mm,ounds/gun
m, rounds/gun unknownm, rockets
Fighters
Jet Light Bombers
0
ounds/gun
ounds/gun
ounds/gun
m,bs. bombs
Ion Light Bombers
7bs. bombs
Attacks IL-10
170
27m,0 lbs. bombs
Bombers TU-4
'
0 mm.
bs. bombs0 lbs. bombs (maximum)
Internal fuel only.
' With two extcmnlst. tanks. .
' With two externall. tanks.
'8trlpped-down vcnlon.
Combat celling* will *ary with grot* weight.
top ngrrrft
j
0
ir i'
Original document.
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