MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF DIVISION OF RESEARCH FOR AMERICAN REPUBLICS, DE

Created: 6/5/1953

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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M2MORAHTUM FOR TEZ RECORD:

SUBJECT: Meeting vltb Representatives of Division of Research for American Republics, Department of State, as to the Effect upon Guateaala of Arms Procurement by El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.

1. The meeting was held in the office of CWB'clock Thoae^ present were:

Department of State: Mr. Burcln and Mr. Cunningham CIA: Colonel Kinff.C

2. Attached paper una reviewed, paragraph by paragraph, and serious objections taken by CIA representatives to the estimateubstantial rise in. feeling in Latin America night be created by the supplying of aros to El Salvador, Honduras and Rlcaragua. It was pointed out to representatives of the Department of State that only the adverse effects of such an action were mentioned in the paper, and none of tho beneficial effects. It was also indicated that an arced action by theBe three countries against Guatemala would resultnification of tbe Guatemalan people behind Arbenz only if there were prolonged fighting, say for a. period of non ths. This would be highly Improbable because an attaok by tbe throe countries would be launched only if they were convinced that they hod tho means tc bring about rapid military success. Rusercus other minor points were objected to in tbe paper, and tbe conclusion was, at tbe end of tbe meeting,ew draft would have to be made by the State

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Dirt ales of Easearch Special Paper So.aj3 for latia America

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enia* (ha effect of overt procurement of eras froa tba US by zi Salvador, Honduras, aaa neerssaa upon tba tuateaalaa miltarj, political leaders aad public opinion.

1. Jaseedar aa affectively laltlataA aad taatalaei program efastlsUncaalveaer. sasedaras. aad Kcaragaa, together vltb aa eevally effective isolation ef vaateaala la the beedapbare. It le likely tbat tba opposition to arbens will beeoae acre critical and Militant and tbat Iaportant Aray aad political leader* aov supporting Arsonscalculate tbat tbe present reftlaa I* not ia the beat intereata ef either the aatloa ar tsaaselvee. Under theae eoadltloao. Arbens vould probably eventually fall. ubstantial rlae af aatl-TO feeling la Latla Aaarlca and eeaa La tie Avert can reaietaaee teeadership in the CAS and US era likely ccaseeueaess efllltary asetstano* to ftavteaale'e neighbors. Unless sueceesfoll* covntared, neb avppoxt vould prerlaeltb effective propaganda Vltb Which to sustain national patrlotlBB and to prolong Indefinitely the life and present coarse of bio guvrroaoat.

3. the Aray le tha cay to tbe stability of the Arbens regies aaa couldapid aad dmoisl re obaago la tba nrtstsaslsa politioal situation if It were to take concerted set loa. uick change ef attitude ls elossible, tbare Is a* present reason to

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doubt tba continued layelty of too Ano/oamuBat tad of Boat of tao Arar amaa* corps to ereams. fh* Ara/ veal* ba unlikely to toxa revolutionary aettea ueleee tbo ad ah caaaaanubaUotiai body

vara to ami anal byt control of tha Oevefvaaat, ar unleit tbara vara rfdeaprted eeelel dinccrdar aaa protraata* ootorlaratloa of tba aoaaaay.

J. Aa agreement for evert pa oaaf em froa tba unitoa ttatae by ml lelvaeor, aaaAarae, can Beaavaaa, cepcsyiolly tf eavivea at la eooxidaeca and If follovedid aaa suetelaod lapleaeatatlca, probably wold eerlooaly affaat the Oaeteaalea Army. It mould oauae eoaaaraheoaaaad and twain stlmalato eaaapiratarlal activity ea the mart of email, already eiseaTfeatoa army eOeaamto.

4. Altbaaeh the coaeerm ef the flnateaalaa Army leacerc probably vill lavelTe Initial inaatoait aamlaet the Dal tad Statoereference to ao aleac vlth Arbeat, tna military ere cveatoaUy Ukaly to reeoenls* tbat military aid to aaiafcborlna; countrlae le cn emmraealon

ef OS dctermlmation to eliminate OemmBBdst laaeenntji and Influarioe ta

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OaatanvOa. In thin dieiisaisaoeaad tarringexternaland supporttaa amy high coasaad La likely toerae of iWMMd dleaffeetloa uoac low aaheloa officermboldened aetloa ay aleaaate af tba political oppo.nion. aa Issrieso la tba aaabar of ra^olnUonary attaapta against tba sum lauait, tba loaa af alii Wry peal ties aad polltleel laaaarabza la Caatral aaaatoa. aad saw defensive reiulreaenis along <hjataoain't borders.

B. Itprobable tbat these ealaalatlaaa would vltlaabeir esaae atplit saaag top aray Xeeaare, eaaa afwould ba willing to atteupt aaala vltb overt and covert oppositionist eleaante. fivaapa with vbleb eeaa pre aoat aray leaden could negotiate is see

laalada elaaanta af tba whan opposition vbo. although antilotto,

are also strongly utlonalif Ua aad ate voaid favor

asay aapaeta of tba vavalatlcaarr progrsa, tha yraeaatwould nor oeuld aacotlaU vltb oppoaltloala tba

laarTriiUar-alllUry elite, sithoat tba aalte af tba Army, tba artama government oeuld art be aaaaatal to sarrWe.

eo-beas sees net at preaentood peelUoa la vhlob to saneuvar. under thehare envisaged be la art lihsly to alter

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uioooat Mm tot voalfl aptsal to tha sssylo in patriotic tana while taking atmc* aaeaaTsa to oontrol thr appealtlon.

V. arnenseouid rallyinitial support at hear, art only asnar Concraal st-le* labor aon taa realsal fringe af profaialonal aaa tatollosteal sseaps, tat else aaaag aanyini at aatlaaallata la urban areas, esj sat ally Osabassla City. QBSST alronaataasei af oonllaiaa Internal tension saa aaUsaal Isolation, ananas. Iliad aastlea aUl Mas ta fire wayritical estlaate afpolicies sad their saasssasases. rarticularly If tealoyalty ta Artaaa fad tars. It le likely that substantial aTcona aaomg tha sra seat op yo. in cm vUl as artat ta tabs aetloa aaa that the sasny walltissl ajiai taa lets sroaa* Artaaa alll ess* seals vlth proi-pootise new landership.

t. aa (In ml its vii: eteuagly mpport areeaa as long as he controls ths altaaUoa end will as sale te aaka considerable looal and international capital of theImperialist attach* apoa flaa teaala, At the sateet, their position ta aaf stasvaat saa laher la likely te ta strengthened and thay win he able to ass labor for stfaetive aaas dsoooatratloa purposes. The Coeaanlsts bava little power of teal* aaa.

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hewer, end if mill tax/ aad laraer political soppcrt ataaaa arcana weshaaa, tha aaaa lata will sawjssn precreeelvely ieolated aad their leaderehip lapataat. Ia tlaa af oriels labor'a capecltT for effective aalflee aaapaat af art ami, if deprived af Ita present leadership, muU ba Tar/ Ualtaft.

Tha eeexe* af daralopaantihroughra ceatiasaa* wpea what decree af success tba united states aar hara la countering or naturalising uafavoraale latin Aaorloaa raaatloa ta tba supplying af araa la Quateoale'e adchboro. "est auiaiuaauU. vltbcaption cf Argentina, Bolivia, cad Oocta Bloa (especially If rlpam viaey presidential alec tlaa) will proeehly cack Initially ta 1sacra the lecee. Avenaltwe will certainly take advantage ef the rttnatlea prcpeeaavla>tea earn preoaely will oee lt to farther aa ambition toetla Aaerlcaa bloc,particniwly tha eaaparattoa af Chile and Bolivia. Ia ether Letia Aacrlcsa aattoaavrunuay, BrasU, cad etc istally Maxieo, psjhUs aplalca le verr likely te be sharply critical ef the Baited States seat will deplore what will sapecv to tbea tolow against theys tea. The respeatlwe sevaraasate will Vs wader lacseaalng srsaeara to expreecally

oaatonala'e aeieheore veolde*al eaala far internationallaet ta* United Stotce, latin Aaerleaa cooperation -lth Ihe United State* oa otherhe QeJ and the Ol would to ondar an Increaaea etrala.

10. Dnder preeent olroaaatoBeoe, the or near Be eel of area freei the Uhitod state.alvador.urea. earn Sleerego* will Uerieea theilly Of military al tne* by thoee ooantriee oa vnateaala, Sana aa attoekenabi. flaatonala toaae before the Oa*.

U. aueh external poaelMUUe* Bay veil proTlda eufflcteat aeyvholoalcal rapport and ftlnloaetle aaatetoaoa to sa-eloaalhe life

af the araeaa the effeetlveneea ef the OateaaaMaVnii iii*t

jnjiaaHi vlll he greatly limii'i far aaaa/ elaaemto af the ajf lUtlea the ealt naaaaalet teeaa aaa other appeal tien grlitniiiii era likely to ha aoherdlaatodaalalaea. latoaaa aattcaal faellaa theee developiaenta are likely to eaeeareea the Aray to eeanttaea Itaef the apraraaaat.

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Original document.

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