CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
CF NATIONAL ESTHIATS3
83
PGR THE llTfELLIOENCS ADVTECRY CCMtTTTEE SUBJECT: Probable Dovelopmsnte to Guatoaala
Tho attached text ofs submitted for your conoidorotion.
You ulU recall that the IAC at its lost mootingext datedpril, end revised the foUoving paragraphs of* thepril texti rtron. In addition, tho IAC agreed, at tha request of tho FBI, to tho inclusion in thc appropriate place of tho potential of Guatemalaafahavon for fetonuniats fleeing tho US.
At the request of tho Dirootor of Central Intelligence, tho IAC ronronentatlveo roconvoruxl after the IAC neotlng to rcconoidor certain aspects of tho oatlmato In the light of information currently being rocolvod. The IAC roproocntotlVBo cot onpril and againiny. At this latter mooting
tho follouing paragraphs wore revisedi lures.nd Al. Inev para. A3 vas agreed to In ordor to cover the point raised by the FBI (above). eproe-ntatlve took tentative reservations to parf the Conclusions (and counterpart paras.nd Al of tbe Disouselon) and to
A. Thia estimate has boon nlaood on tbe agenda ofC nootinc ocbodulod5 Tuesday,tiy.
PAULEL Executive Secretary
"A"
CEHTRAL AOSNCT
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SUBJECT: BZB-8hl PROBABLE DCTELOPIlEffTS IW GUATFlftlA
THE PROBLEM
To rat irate tho currant political situation in Guatonalc. and probable- future developments*
COKCLUSIQHS
current political si tut tion in ouateaala ic odVersointerests. The Guatemalan Communistsoliticalout of proportion to their auallenr-th. will probably continue to prou as lonr/an Preeidont Arbenz
in power.
influence in GUfttcnala is based onof social reform) and nationalistic polictoc identified with
the Qiiaterwlan Revolutionti. It Is exercised through tho personal influence of individual Coraxunieto with the Preeiatsnt end within tho pro^dMnistration political parties, through infiltration of tho bureaucracy, through control of labor organizations, andaidership of the agrarian reform toen to ihe Coflroiidsta' Present objective is not open and direct control of Guatemala. Rather, theyo neutralize Guatemala as an ally of the United states and to convert its Government into on effective, though indirectly controlled, lnstrtanarrt of Coramnisra*
President Arbonz still exercisoa personal control of the Administration and of the Army end the Police. It ia otill possible for hijo to break his ties with the CorsrunistG and to moderato the polioses of his Acbjiniirtration, but it ia highly unlikely that he will
do fio.
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li. Inplesmtatlon of the Agrarian Roform Lawill, he the principal objective of tha Arbonz Adrainistration It is to be expected that the largo Guatemalan landholders and the United Fruit Ctonpany will be victlnised in the procasa.
The ImpXementation of Agrarian Reform hasense of insecurity which hasepressing effect on business activity in Guatemala, however, its direct effect on aerlcultural production is likely to be negligible, at least for several years, Ao long aa coffee prices hold up the general economy of Guatemala will not ba vitally affected.
6. The net internal political effect of tho iraplcBiontatlon of the Agrarian Reform Law will probably be to strengthen the Arbena Administration and to increaso Communist influence andeither tho landholders nor tho Fruit Company can expect any sympathy in Guatemalan public opinion. Redistribution of their land will be used to mobilise the hitherto inert peasantry in support of tbs Administration.
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7o Tho most affectivo opposition to the Arbonx Administration is found in Guatemala City. The urban elements which constitute this opposition are strongly anti-Cotxniniot, but they ore also strongly nationalistic. In general they could not be expected to moke common cause with tho landholders and the Fruit Company or to welcome foroign intervention In Guatemalan internal affairs, although some of them night bo disposed to accept foroign assistance In overthrowing Arbonz. There Is no likelihood that this urban opposition could alter tho course of tho Government by political action. It could not succeedevolutionary attempt opposed by tho Army.
Oa The Amy is the only organized elenent in Guatemala capable of rapidly and decisively altering tho political situation. Although
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a quick change of attitude is always possible,there is no reason to doubt tho continued loyalty of the Army high command and of most of tho Amy to Arbenz. Tho Army could not be expected to takeaction unless its leaders became convinced that their personal security and well-being wore throatoned by Communist infiltration and domination of the Government, or unless tho policies of tho Govorn-oont irero to result in extreme social disorder and economic collapse.
9o Tho Governments of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua are fearful that the trend in Guatemala will lead to Communist subversion end social upheaval in their territories. They are probably giving serious consideration to the possibility of efoliticaln Guatemala through clandestine support of revolutionary action there. It is highly unlikely, however, that they would or could mount an open military Intervention in Guatemala. The Guatemalan Army could defeat any force which they could deploy against, it, except in theimultaneous and effective uprising in Guatemala.
ootnote,/ Seeootnote,.
10a Guatemala will probably continue to assist Conamniatactivities ln the Caribbean area, but will probably avoid involvement in fill bustaring operations liko those of the Caribbean Legion. To counterbalance its isolation in Central America it will seek political support elsewhere, particularly in tho United nations. If actually invaded it would seek to invoke the Rio Treaty as well as the UN Charter.
11. Ouatcnola has freouently taken occasion tcltd independence of US leadership and in General has been less cooperative than could be desired, particularly ln hemispheric affaire. Moreover, the regime has systematically boen hostile toward US private- ocononla interests in Guatemala. Detriment to Hemisphere solidarity would not deter Oaatenala from any courso of action suggested by its own intercuts.
Discussic;-:
The Arcana Administration
12. The present political situation In Guatemala lo the outgrowth of the Revolutioniu. That Revolution was something morooutine military coup. From It theretrong national
movcnont to free Guatemala from tho Military dictatorship, eoolal bacawnrdnoaa, and "ooonomic colonialism" which had boon tho pattern of tha past. These aspirations have inspired tho loyalty andwith the self-interest of most politically conscious Guatemalans.
Tho Arbenz Administration still derives some strength froa Its claim to leadership of the continuing national revolution.
13* In the name of thc Revolutionii the successive administrations of Arevaloand Arbeox have pursuedradical and nationalistic policies. Their persecution of foreign economic interests In Cuatemala, especially the United Fruit Company, and their demands for the "restitution" of Belize (British Honduras} have had the support or acquiescence of almost all Guatemalans. Their promotion of labor organisation and agrarian reform has tended to neutralise political opposition by creating mass support for tho present regime. Any objection to the trend of developments inhas been stigmatized as resistance to the Revolutionh by "feudal" and "imperialistic" interests.
The toleration of Corjsunlst activity which characterised tho early years of the Arevalo Administration has developed into an effective workinc alliance between Arbens and tha Comniinists. The pursuit of leftist and nationalistic policies has been greatlyunder tho Arbenz Administration. His first year In offlco was
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highlighted by active Coverneent support for the formationational labor confederation andor-Govontncnt attack on the United Fruit Company. That attack failed, but the alliance of the Government with Cocrnunlst-led organised labor was firmly established in the course of tho struggle.
point of reference for consideration of thetensions ln Guatemala is the Agrarian Reform Law enacted
in This Law provides for the expropriation of largo tracts of unused land and their distribution to farm workers. ong-overdue measure of social and economic reform, the Law has strong political motivation and significance. Communists and folioy-travelerseading part in its enactment} theythe national Agrarian Department established to adainister it. The Communists have incited disorderly peasant seizures of privately owned lands. The Law is being administered inay as to destroy the political effectiveness of the large landholders and to mobilize tho hitherto politically inert peasantry in support of the regime
recent congressional electoral campaign hasArbonz' political alliance with the Connunicte. tho President's office forced some reluctantto accept tho newly reorganized and legalised Communist
Party (eallod tho Guatemalan Labor Party, or POT) Into tbe ELootoral Front, tho pro-Adminls tration coalition. Tho Electoral Front swept the country, except Guatemala City, vhera ito ticket naa decisively defeatedtrong anti-Oonnunint vote. The over-all result of the electioneduction of Opposition strength in Congress from eleven to five of theseats. Although Communist Partyreruinod at four, tho Congressional rasrabership includes revcral additional crypto-Co Hrainintoajority nay bo consideredtoward the Communist Party line so long as Arbenz favors it.
urther increase in political tension has resultedupreme Court decision favorableuatemalan landholder who had appealed for protection from arbitrary execution of the Agrarian Reform Lav. At tho instigation of Arbonx, the Guatemalan Congress iaasdiataly unseated tho justices who favored this decision and replaced Hub with others more reliable from its point of view. This action provoked an intense but transitory reaction on ths part of prof osslonal and other elementc in Guatemala City already pnti-Adndnistratior. in sentjjoent.
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1G. President Arbenziddle-class background, as have most of hie political associates* At loast initially, his involvement with
Revolutionary forces we probably asatter of simple political expediency and opportunism as of personal inclination. By now, how-over, he has become emotionally committed to the social and nationalistic objectives of tho Revolution of63peotally to agrarian ReOirm. Although probably notommunist, he has found Cominlst leaders anong his most ardent and useful supportors and values accordingly his political alliance with them. Inasmuch ao Arbonx has thun far kopt personal control of the considerable powers of the Quaternion Presidency, It is rtiU possible for him to breakthe Communists and to moderate the policies of his Administration. He has shown no inclination to do so, however. As the situation in Guatemala develops the political alternatives open to him aro uteadily reduced.
CorTEunist Strength and Influence*
1?- The Guatemalan Labor (Coejaunist) Party is estimated to have no norcembers, of whom perhaps less than one-half are militants. Tho Party is in open communication with international CoDtuQism through the Comunict-eontrollod international labor(the Latin American CTAL and the world-wide WFTU) and through visits aade to the Soviet Dloc by Individual Conrsinists and front group delegations.
The Comnuniats have achieved their present politicalIn Guatemala, notolitical party competing with others, but through personal Influence with the President and through theactivity of individual Communists within the leftiot political parties and labor unions which emerged from tho RevolutionU. Tills Communist infiltration of other parties and organizations has been facilitated by the coincidence of avowed Communist social and "anti-imperialist" objectives with those of the Revolution. Tho recent legalization of the Forty and its acceptance into the pro-AdBdnistration Electoral Front has not altered Its basic strategy of seeking power through infiltration rather than through open political competition. Its Immediate objective isPeople's Democracy" under open and direct Contaunist control, but rather to neutralize Guatemala as an ally of the United States and to convert the Governnent into an effective, though indirectly controlled, instrument of Comtainlsm.
With the assistance of the Government, Communist and Communist-influOTced labor leaders have been tho most successful organizers of Guatemalan labor. Their formation of the Oeneral Confederation of Guatemalan Workers (CGTOJ and Government pressure for labor unity have facilitated the extension of their control over all organised labor.
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In -the Important railway workers' and teachers' onions, however, there has been some rank-and-file opposition to association with Communism.oreover, rank-and-file defection from Communist leadership was an important factor inajor strike against the United Fruit Conpany. The basic weakness of Guatemalan Communist laboris that it is imposed from above through top control of the machinery of labor organization and cannot be sure of rank-and-file
support in all circumstances.
Implementation of the Aitrarian Reform Law hasew field of Communist organizational activity. The Coiajiuniots are seeking to mobilize the hitherto inert moss of rural workers through the CGTG and the National Confederation of Guatemalan Feasantsn which theytrong influence.
Through their leadership in organized labor and theirwith tho President and within tho pro-Administration political parties, the Communists have gained many positions of influence within the Government! in Congresshey dominate tho Special Committees on Agrarian Reform and Labor Coden the Rational Electoral Board, the Sntional Agrarian Deportment, the Institute of Social Security the Labor Courts, tho Ministry of Education^ and the Presidential
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Secretariat of Propaganda, and in the official and pro-Administration press and radio. Their influence is extended by an indefinite number of Communist sympathizers In similar positions. At the same time, no Communist holds any position of Cabinet rank and the Comnuniots appear to have made little or no effort as yet to gain control over the Police or tho Army.
Anti-Corranist Elements in Guatemala
Various elements inncluding many loyal adherents of the Revoluticni, view with increasing concern the rapid growth of Communist influence in that country. These elements,have shown little capacity to organise for effective counteraction. In general, each has tended to react only aa its own peculiar interests were directly affected and all have been deterred by the success of Administration propaganda In stigmatising any oriticism as opposition to the principles of tho Revolution* and support of "feudalism" and "foreign economic imperialism."
Aside from US private interests lahe largo Guatemalan landholdersbeen the chief target of the Revolutionary
ft The United Fruit Company, tho International Railways of Central America, and Onprosas ELcctricaa (the principal electric light and power company).
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pttfxnc. Siriae, tbe Rimlc
their liteapta to alter thcha Knvslu' tx. v
to tc jolitlcally iacUted Ud IfleapfJJ* of -eTef.tX-a
aW fr= j avjtfwfl tele .'r. rational atlcxra tlnec theorn'titch isoapnrc by th:of IVfccracerrUieist'.on-r'.cstso, ani fueHMPfalfStS Wjbrr STTacost sr withfi.oi'crr.i.
37, n srxwitlericr.*ljtc Qu*tHtlla
c ccrfctred of i (a) ommraiai auc"trttorfwtaj 0a) certain sceftet&eoalj (o) rrArersil/ cia.nj; t-i
ler^.iej and <e>ert mjik of^.aie Ci'-y. .tile tfbtn apfcsf&at. ia itgOBaflj antx-CoT-fWist. tat It is alsoetionlif-tt> - Intre&teifUVDPti ti USt'. ecor -Atife* 'ar the JUAaOBjrharirttrcitj vlthi^cportoO than againstrapot&tlcnj ndnr.t tc tr-wl- theirx Pitied pedtlon i'i
20. The political effectiveness of the urban opposition has boon hindered by the multiplicity of its oleaente and by conflicts of interest among them, asas by their continuing loyalty to the stated objectives of tho Revolutioni. nevertheless, the opposition won the mayoralIn Guatemala City in1 and oven mora decisively dofoatod the Electoral Front there in the3 congressional election. The unwillingness of urban opposition groups to be Identified with the lanoholders will remain an obstacle to the unification of all anti-Communist elements in Guatemala.
The Pooltlon of the Army and_thoj police (the Guardia CivilJ
0 mon) is the only organized elementcapable of rapidly and decisively altering tho The two0 men) stationod In thoore an elite force trained under the suj-crvislon of tho USand bettor equipped than other units of thc Guatemalan Army.
GuardiaU men) is dispersed in snail detachmentsit ocxiId neither defeat an Amy coup nor itself overthrow tho Government without Army support,
the Revolution of, the Army and tho PoUcofrom active participation In politics while supporting the
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constitutionally established administrations of Arevalo and Arbens. The present Amy leaders owe their personal advancement to the Revolution, and particularly to Colonel Arbcnx, whoilitary leader in the Revolution and Minister of Defense under Arevalo before himself becoming President. There is no reason to question their personal loyalty to ArbenB, Any possible disaffection in tho Army would be likely to occur at tho Junior officer level. The Arbensowever, has provided especially generous treatment for tho officers of the two regiments stationed at Guatemala City, while assigning loss reliable officers to isolated posts in the The military units outside of Guatemala City have little potential for effective revolutionary action because of their dispersion and isolation, the Inferiority of their equipment and training, and the watchful supervision of trusted area commanders. The rank-and-file of the Army ia conscripted and io susceptible to the same political appeals which the regime addresses to tho moss of the population. There is little or no Communist penetration or influence in the Army.*
epresentative wished to add the following: "Xt is probable that Arbonz can rely on the continued loyalty of the Army and toe Police." The Board and tho other representatives concluded that this point was more precisely and appropriately covered elsewhere in the estimate.
International Relatione
foreign policies reflect the nationalisticattitudes associated with tho RevolutionU. have not been systematically antagonistic toward the Unitedhas frequently taken occasion to demonstrate itsUS leadership and in general has been less cooperative than could
be desired, particularly In Hemispheric affairs. Moreover, the regime has systematically been hostile toward US private economic interests In Guatemala (the United Fruit Company, tho International Railways of Central America, and Bnpresas ELectrica). In keeping with its attitude towardt has given tacit support to Puerto Rican nationalism. It las complicated its adherence to tho Rio Treaty with reservations relating to its claim to Belize (British Honduras). It has subscribed to the principle of inter-American military cooperation, but narrowly interprets that commitment. It voted for the UN "Uniting for peace" resolution, but has declared that it would not iiiplencnt it. Those attitudes are not unique In Latin America, but Guatoralan propaganda in relation to themtrong anti-US 3lant. Detriment to Hemisphere aolldarity haa not deterred and irauld not deterfrom any course of action suggested by Its own interests.
Guatemala has supported the "democratic'1other Caribbean countries in their struggles against "dictatorship"
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snd has provided material assistance to "democratic" exiles from ouch countries. uatemala supported the filibustering operations of the "Caribbean Legion" against the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica. 0 the Legion has ceased to be operational, largely because of the withdrawal of Guatemalan support for such operations. However, Guatemalan official propaganda, with its heavy emphasis on conflict botweon democracy and dictatorship and between
national independence and "economicisturbing factor in the Caribbean area. Moreover* the Guatemalan Government, at the least, tolerates and indirectly assists clandestine Communist subversive activities in other countries. The Guatemalan Communist Party absorbs Caribbean exiles Into its local organization, particularly into Its labor and front groups, and through them it maintains contact with disaffected elements in other countries, thus enhancingocal point for subversive activity throughout the Caribbean area.
33- Ever since the breakup of the Central American federation9 there have boon periodic attempts to restore somef union among tho five states. Guatemala, as the principal state, has usually been the leader in such efforts, 1 lil Salved:proposed the formation of an Organization of Central American(ODECA)iew toward gradual scone rale union and eventual political union. Guatemala attempted to assume the leadership of this movement, but SI Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, alarmed by tho manifestations of
Communist influence, in Guatemala, showed themselves resolved to use ODECAeans of combatting Communism, in consequence Guatemala has withdrawn from 0DB2A, alleging the existence of an international conspiracy to interfere in Guatemala's internal affairs. Thisconfirms Guatemala's isolation in Central America.
3U. Simultaneously with ita withdrawal from ODECA Guatemala complained to the United Nations regarding this alleged foreign It is rotable that Guatemala by-paseod the Organization of American States in addressing this complaint to the UN. It probably calculated that its charge that US private interestshe United Fruit Company and its affiliates) were responsiblevast conspiracy" to subvert tho existing regime would enlist the support of the Soviet and Arab-Asian Blocs in addition to that of such Latin American countries as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Mexico.,
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' El Salvador has shown extreme sensitivity regarding, the danger of an extennion of Communist influence from Guatemala into si Salvador and other neighboring states; there are persistent reports that El Salvador is giving sorious consideration to joint military action with Honduras and Nicaragua against Guatemala, Other Caribbean countries, particularly the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Vonosuela, have also shown concern regarding the development of Guatemalaenter of eubverslTo Influence and even of eucveroive operatione.
j-robablo Future Developments
of the Agrarian Reform Lew2 willprincipal objective of theAdministration
In tho process the large Guatemalan landholders and the United Fruit Company will cortainly be victimised. The net internal political effoct of Agrarian Reform will probably be to strengthen the Arbeni Administration. Neither the landholders nor thc Fruit Company can expect sympathy from Guatemalan public opinion. Redistribution of their land will be used to mobilise the hitherto Inert mass of rural workers in support of the Administration. Agrarian Reform will also afford the Coneunlats an opportunity to extend their influence by organltlng the peasants as they have organised other workers.
Reform has alreadyense ofhasepressing effect on business activity in Guatemala.
As regards arTiCultural production Its iLTicdLate affects are likely to be negllglblec as presently implemented it will do little more than incroaoo tho number of subsistence farms. In tho longer run it may seriously curtail the production ofil Company plantations. As long as coffee prices hold up, however, the rcneral economy of Guatemala is not likaly to be vitally affected.
The dissatisfaction of important urban elements will probably increase, but affective political unity among these elements is not likely to be achieved. The political union of rural and urban Interests in opposition to the Arbens Administration is even less likely. ik> group or foreseeable combination of groups is likely to be able to bring about any significant moderation of the Administration's policy by political action. Ho revolutionary attempt opposed by tho Army can be expected to succeed.
Tho Army couldapid and decisive change in the Guatemalan political situation if it vre-re to take concerted action.uick change of attitude is alwayshere is no present reason to doubt the continued loyalty of the Army high comciand and of mot of the Army to President Arbens. The Army could not be expected to take revolutionary action unless its leaders hocanethat their personal security und well-being were threatened by Communist infiltration and domination of the Government, or unless the policies of the Govenraent were tc result in extreme social disorder and economic collapse.
epresentative reserved hia position on thc desirability of including this Introductory clause, expressing the view that it ohould not be included.
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Aa long as President Arbem remains ln power" the Aroant-Cummunist alliance will probably aontlnue to dccrlnote Guatemalan politics. Any increase ln political tension in Guatemala would tend to increase Arbcns' political dependence on this alliance.
Ul. The Governments of F3 Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua will continue to seek means to oppose the Ckmsunistic tendencies of Guatemala, and will give serious consideration to the possibility ofolitical change in Guatemala through clandestine support of revolutionary activities. It is highly unlikely, however, that they would undertake an open military intervention in Guatemala or actually could organise an affective operation of that character ln view of the limited strength of their armed forces, the proportion of that strength rt-cuired for the maintenance of their own internal security, the fact that their forces ore ill-equipped and untrained for field operations, the (for thorn) probably insuperable logistical obstacles to an open invasion of Guatemala, and the internal and International political difficulties which Mould, ensue. Moreover, foreign military intervention would tend to cause all factions in Guatemala to unite to repol the invasion. The Guatemalan Army could defeat any forcealvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua were
Arbene* legitimate term in office will expire onhether he will reach the end of his term, whether he would then retire, and what the character of his successor might bo cannot now be estimated,
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capable of deploying against it, except In the event imultaneous and effective uprising in Guatemala. Even in thio combination of clr-cuaatancea, it is improbable that the attack on the Cuatsmalan regime could quickly achieve decisive results. Meanwhile, Inituation, Guatemala couldlear case of foreign intervention to tho Organization of American States.
u2. The Guatemalan Government will probably continue to assist Conmunlst subversive activities in the Caribbean area, but willavoid involvement in military operations like those of the Caribbean Legion. To counterbalance Its Isolation In Central America it will continue to seek political support elsewhere, particularly In the United Nations. If Latin American attitudes, as revealed at the UH, Justifyourse, it will probably raise tho same issue of foreign intcrfnronco In the Organization of American States. It would certainly seek to invoke the Rio Treaty as well as the UN Charter if it were to bo lnvadod by It neighbors.
u3- Guatemala's tolerance of Commnlan and hospitality toward exiles makes it availableonvenient haven for Conninist fugitives from the United States.
* epresentative desired to retain the former warding "except in the unlikely event". The Board and thu other IAC representatives felt that it mm Irrelevant to Include this estimative language In an essentially conditioning clause.
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Original document.
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