PROBABLE EFFECT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN GERMANY ON SOVIET POLICY WITH

Created: 7/24/1953

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SPECIAL ESTIMATE

PROBABLE EFFECT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN GERMANY ON SOVIET POLICY WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

pproveduly IW3 Published3

The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on Zt July The TBI abstained, the subject

its jurisdiction.

The following member organization of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the CentralAgency in the preparation of thu esUmate: The intelligence organizations Ol the Departments of Stale, the Army. Ihe Haoy, the Atr Force, and thc Joint Staff.

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PROBABLE EFFECT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN GERMANY ON SOVIET POLICY WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the probable eflect of recent developments in Eastern Germany on Soviet policy with respect to Germany.

ESTIMATE

DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY

L The Recent Communist Relorms in East Cermany. In late3 Uie USSRa civilian to Uie post of Highof the Eastern tone ofeemphasis of Soviet military control over that area. Onune Uieauthorities In East Germanyeries of measures involving majorand. in some cases, even reversals of past Communist programs. The governmentannounced that it would halt the collective farm program at its present level; restore confiscated property and full civil rights lo East German refugees who returned; make state bank credits available to private businessmen;eneral amnesty for prisoners guilty of minor economic offenses; and issue ration cards toasi Germans who had recenily been deprived ol them. On the same day lhe East German Governmrnt and Protestant Church leaders joinUy announced Uiat Ihey had resolved most of their outstanding conflicts.

2 Soviet tccogniUon that lhc accelerated pace of East German salcllt&ation had produced serious popular dissatisfactionactor in bringing about Uie adop-

tion of these measures. Though therealized that these measures would retard their basic program of communlzaUon. they may have felt that thc establishment of substantial armed forces and thc rapid pace of Industrialization were causing dangerous strains In thc East Germans also likely Uiat they expected to encourage West German belief that early unification is feasible. They may have hoped thus toWest German rearming and integration with Western Europe and to help bring about the defeat of Adenauer in the forthcoming Wesl German elections.

he Disorders inmalltook place in East Berlin onune and expanded on thc following day Into strikes and nots there and throughout the Soviet tone The Soviet authorities declared mirUal law and proceeded to put down the disorders, relying almost exclusively on the use of Sovicl troops. The USSR began to withdraw that* troops onune, when order was appaicntly restored. However. Ihcre are reports ol continuing outbreaks, and sometroops remain in thc affected areas

4 At this tune the full significance of these disorders is difficult lo assess. Al least:

disorders demonstrated LheEast German resentment against theand thc willingness of the Eastto undertake active resistanceextended period of Communist control.

extent of thc disorders appearsbeen wholly unexpected by the Eastauthorities. Tlic decision to employSoviet forces to quell thc disorderssoviet distrust of the Eastmilitary, and security forces.

disorders themselves, and theSoviet troops were required toauthority or the East Germanhave further discredited thatIn thc eyes of the East Germansignificantly, the government haswith thc Soviet leadership.

disorders have probablyUSSR that Soviet control over Eastcan be assured only by maintainingtroops in the area.

disorders have furtherhopes for unification andIncreased West German demands ongovernment for greater readinesspossibilities tor unification even atof progress toward rearmamentintegration.

orkers' revolt against thc authoritiesworkers stale" is inetback for worldwide Communist propaganda.

THt EFFECTS OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS ON SOVIET POHCY IN EAST GERMANY

S. Tlie riots have not so far resultedeversal of the June concessions. In fact, lhe Communist aulhurilies in East Germany have not only announced thai ihese measures will be carried through, but that they will be amplified. Forecrease has been promised in Ibe allocation of resources to heavy industry and thc East GormanVi') in favor of an increased supply of food and consumer goods. We believe lhat the Communists will attempt to implement these economic concesskMis within their capabilities. Wc estimate, however.

lhat they arc unlikely to carry out anyor other measures lhat would endanger their control over East Germany.'

e believe that within the nexl several mouths the SovieL authorities will probably reconstitute the East German Government and purge thc East German Communist Party (SED). Although the USSR wouldropaganda advantage in both East and West Germany by including more non-Communist representatives in the East Germanthere are few. if any, political leaders left in East Germany who are not well-known Communist collaborators. Hence, we believe that the USSR willew Easi German Governmenturged SED. Non-SED parties may be encouraged toore independent line, to assume someaspectsloyalnd to attempt to develop ties with West German political parties.

n restoring order and maintaining control over East Germany the Soviets are facedilemma. Additional concessions andof error may convince lhe people in East Germany and in other parts of theBloc that their plight can be relieved by active resistance. If, on the other hand, thc Kremlin withdraws all concessions and exacts submissionegime of force and terror, it must reverse Its newly adopted "soft" policy and Jeopardize Its chance to influence WesL Germans. We believe that the Knemun will probably attempt to continue this "soft" policy in East Germany, although it willforce as necessary lo maintain order.

SOVIET APPROACH TO GERMAN UNIFICATION

he Soviet approach lo Germanwill be determinedargerthan lhat of recent developments In East Germany alone. However, tlie USSR wltl not ignore the renewed upsurge ofsentiment which tins appeared in bolh East and West Germany. The USSR will

fool note ot the Dcpul* Directoc torThe Joint Suft. to Uie first sentence ol psracrsjthace i

3

agreeour Power conference, though not necessarily to the proposalstn tlie Western notes ofuly. It will probably regardonference as an appropriate forum in which lo exploit the unification sentiment in Germany In an cflort lo delay West German rearmament andwith thc West. Ineeting the USSR might propose several plausible bui unacceptable schemes of German unification, involving, for example, various methods of holding "free" elections which would not in fact be free,erman unification on thc Austrian pattern, with continued military occupation. The USSR might even advance proposals unsatisfactory to itself, but which it would expect the Western Powers to reject, hoping to derive propaganda advantages from the fact of Western rejection Despite these and other possibilities, thc USSR would probably consider that thc basic alternatives before it inegotiation reduce to two:

agree to thc creationnifiedGennany on tlie basis of freeand the withdrawal of all foreignGennany, which would mean theof Soviet conlrol in East

negotiate for unification, but withof agreeing to any solutioninvolve the relinquishment ofover East Germany.

c estimate that the USSR is unlikely to adopt the firstowever, recent developments in the Soviet Union andin thc Bloc suggest the possibility of some change in Soviet policy. The Kremlin might come to the conclusionolution of the German problem could no longer be postponed, and yet could not be achieved without losing cOnLrul of East Germany. It might even see some compensatingin the first alternative For instance,

an agreementnified, neutralizedwould eliminate the potential German contribution lo Western military strength. In addition, the USSR might estimate that such an agreement would relax present East-West tension and thus abort thc Westernfor rearmament and weaken theof the NATO Powers Moreover, the USSR might believe that If Western troops were withdrawn from West Germany, thc stationing of US troops elsewhere in Western Europe would create dissension between thc US and ils allies.

c believe lhat the second of theseIs far moreo long as Soviet troops occupy East Germany, the USSR willaluable base for either offensive or defensive military opcraUons and forto intimidate thc West. So long, as the Kremlin retains control over EastIt remainsosition lo use East Germanyever in negotiations with Uie West and lo prevent any unification ofwhich would prejudice Its ullimate objectives In Germany. East Gennany has great economic and technological importance for the Soviet Bloc. The Kremlin almostfearsnited Germany would eventually rearm and turn against Uie USSR. It is, therefore, unlikely lhat Uie Kremlin will surrender lhc great advantages which itfrom Its control over East Germany in return for the establishmentnited and nculral Germany which it might hope, at best, eventually lo subvert. Furthermore, Uie Kremlin probably estimates thator relinquishing its conlrol over East Germany would have adverse poliUcal and psychological effects on Uie remainder of Uie Soviet Bloc. In conclusion, therefore, asine believe it unlikely lhat lhc USSR will agree lo any solution of thc German problem lhat involves the surrender of Soviet control over East Germany.

Deputy DitCuUi lur Intelligence, The Joint staff, believes that thc first Alternative is more likely.

Prutiaulc Soviet Courses cf Action wiUi llespcct lo Cermany, through1

Original document.

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