ASSISTANT
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
CURRENT COMMUNIST TACTICS
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CURRENT COMMUNIST TACTICS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the significance of current Communist "peace" tactics.
ESTIMATE
the announcement of the death of Stalin thc various gestures and statements by thc Soviet and Chinese Communisthave followed so swiftly upon each other, and the evidence concerning relations among the men in thc Kremlin has remained so obscure, that any estimate of the situation is apt to be quickly outdated. This estimaterief presentation of provisionalon lhe subject as of the present dale.
Recent statements and actions of theand Chinese Communist governments demonstrate that the Communists have adopted, at least for thc moment, aposture in their dealings with the West.
have also been developmentsUSSR which may prove to be offor Soviet foreign policy. Weas "yet to estimate the meaningdevelopments. It may be thatSoviet Qovernment is united,in power, and has agreedwhich will be developed withand determination. It Ls alsohowever, that an intense strugglemay be in progress in UieUie latter is thc case, current Sovielproceed from the regime'sSoviet foreign as well as domesUcfluctuate as one or another factionKremlin gains temporary ascendancyhowever, the current Soviet tacticsrelations give no indication ofin the Kremlin.
n Korea, we estimate Uiat Uieare now prepared to make some,ln order to reach an armlsUce. However, there are ambiguities fii Uieproposals on thc POW Issue. These ambiguities may conceal difficulties which would prevent the conclusion of an armistice. Moreover, we believe Uiat, possibly inwith Uie armisUce negotiations, andcertainly in connection with negotiationsolitical settlement, the Communists will introduce proposals which the US will find extremely difficult to accept but which some members of Uie UN will not be disposed to reject, especially In the atmosphere of hope created by the current Communist tacUcs. In any case, we believe Uiat the Communist objective to gain control of all Korea willunchanged.
5 With respect to Germany, we believe Uiat the Kremlin is unlikely to implement courses of action which would Jeopardize Kremlin control over East Germany. Thcmay again make dramaUc proposals for free elecUons, for Uie withdrawal offorces, and for the reunification ofHowever, wc believe Uiat such pro posnis would contain eondiUons which the Kremlin would intend to be unacceptable to lhe West, or Uiat, in making these proposals, the Kremlin would intend to prevent their implementation These proposals would be designed to frustrate thc EDC program and Lhe rearmament of West Germany, capital it-
ing on the atmosphere created by Communist concessions ln Korea and by tlic conciliatory Soviet behavior.1
6 Likewise, the Kremlin will probablyto make proposals for generalbut we believe that these will be made for propaganda effect, and not In thcthat they would be accepted by thc West
n many other ways thc Kremlin could easily win some temporary advantage andthe West without real disadvantage to thc Bloc. For example, the Sovietmight accede to the8 calling for the return of Trieste to Italy. It mighteace treaty to Japan containing various attractive economic and even territorial clauses. II might facilitate the departure of Jews to Israel from Eastern
Europe and the USSR. Thc Communists might propose an Austrian peace treaty, or eveneaceful settlement of the war in Indo-Chtna, on terms difficult alike to accept or to reject The aim of such maneuvers would be to Impair the political and military strength of the West, and to reap ttic greatest possible benefitsecision.to end the Korean War.
ur present view Is that the purpose ofKremlin tactics is to create anin which resistance to Communism and to Soviet imperialism will be weakened. There is no basis for concluding that thehostility of the Kremlin toward the West has abated, that thc ultimate objectives of the Sovicl rulers have changed, or that the menace of Communism to the free world has diminished.1
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that with respect to Germany, the Kremlin may be willing to withdraw Its troops from East Oermany. II the Soviet Unionthat by doing so. It could force the Western Powers to withdraw their troops from Westfrustrate the EDC program, and theof Oermany. Thc Communists may also make proposals foe free flections and for the reunification of Oermany. In the hope that they would be able toemilitarized and neutral Oerman state.
The Deputy Director for Inlelbgenee. The Joint Staff, believes the last sentence ofhould read: "Although there Is no basis for concluding that the fundamental hostility of the Kremlin toward Uie West has abated, lhat Uie ulUmale objectives of the Soviet rulers have changed, or that the menace ol Communism to the free world has diminished: It ls possible that the Soviets have adopted courses of actionlor the preseni lo reduce trie threat Ol genera! war."
Original document.
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