StCUBIT
SPECIAL
SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE
The fatlowimg member organUations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the CentralAgency in the preparation of tkis estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate onJ. The FHI abstained, the sublect being outside of its turUdtctton.
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SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE
THE PROBLEM
To assess the electromagneticapabiliUes of the Bloc, the potential development of these capabilitiesnd probable Bloc courses of action4 in employing and developing these capabiliUes.
SCOPE
estimate considers Blocwarfare operaUons againsttelecommunications and elec-
tronic navigaUon aids in the frequency range belowegacycles.
CONCLUSIONS
electromagnetic warfarehave thus far been concentrated primarily on jamming of Westernbroadcasts beamed at the Bloc. This effort has been most effective in the European USSR. Penetration isnil in Moscow and probably in other major urban areas of the European USSR.
The Bloc telecommunications systemapacity substantially in excess of essential requirements. We estimate that under cold war condiUons the Bloc could allocate the necessary facilities and technical competenceargeof its present electromagnetic war-
'KlectromnKiicUe warfare la denned as thefor tlir control or nil or parts of the radio spectrum or the denial of use by others through preclusive use. lamming, and related measures.
fare, including large-scale operations against Western communicaUons,aids, and broadcast reception, without thereby significantly impairing essential Bloc communications. We also estimate that under conditions of general war the Bloc wouldubstantial part of its present capability for expanded electromagnetic warfare.
e estimate that the Bloc has the capability of disrupting most US high-frequency transoceanic circuits for aproportion of the time. The Bloc could at the same time seriouslywith US long-range mobileincluding long-range VLF communications with US submarines as presently equipped. Under mostthe Bloc could also subject Western
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navigation aids in the North Atlantic, North Pacific, and European areas to serious jamming and spoofing.1
e believe that during the period of this estimate thc Bloc will continue to expand rapidly its telecommunications system and its output of electronic and other related equipment. Thiswillurther increase in Bloc capabilities for electromagnetic
The Bloc is dependent on long-range radio {technically susceptible tofor essential communication in Siberia and Communist China generally, and throughout the Bloc in respect to mobile operational communications and navigation aids. The Bloc is, however, reducing its dependence on jammable radio by developing alternative means of communication.
Under cold war conditions, the Bloc will almost certainly continue to restrict its electromagnetic warfare activityto the jamming of Westernbeamed at Bloc audiences. In pur-
suing its cold war objectives, the Kremlin will be restrained in the exercise of its full electromagnetic warfare capabilities by its desire to avoid (a) any substantial impairment of its own essentia)(b) diversion of materials and manpower to increase the capacity and reduce thc vulnerability of the Blocsystem; (c) alertingnations to Bloc electromagneticcapabilities and techniques; and (d) stimulating accelerated improvement of Western offensive and defensivein the field of electromagnetic
n the event of general war, theexisting restraints on the Bloc's exercise of its electromagnetic warfare capabilities would disappear. The Bloc would attempt to disrupt Westernand other essential corrimuriications and navigation aids, and in this effort would not only employ jamming and spoofing techniques but probably would also undertake military and sabotage action against Western communications and navigation aid facilities.
ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE ACTIVITIES TO DATE
n general. Bloc electromagnetic warfare activity has been concentrated against the VOA and other Western propagandaintended tor reception within the Bloc. Systematic jamming of such programs beganincehis jamming has been so extensive and so efficient as tothe existencearge, well-equipped, and well-integrated organization. Thisusesransmitters, with
'Spoofing Is the Introduction of extraneoussignalshird party. As applied to navigation aids, spuoflnc can be used to give erroneous Indications of position.
associated control facilities, in its jamming operations. Cooperation between the USSR and Satellites, and among Satellites, isby the use of jammers in one Bloc country to cover programs directed to another Bloc country.
his jamming has been particularlyand effective against broadcaststo the USSR. Despite the fact that Russian-language VOA programs have at times been broadcast simultaneously on as many asrequencies, these programs achieve only sporadic penetration in theUSSR. Penetration is virtually nil in Moscow and probably in other major urban areas of thc European USSR. Programs
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directed to Uie European Satellites are Jammed leas effectively; by simultaneously employing at limes as many asrequencies, the VOA can be heard adequately onhannel at least half Uie time. Far Eastern VOA programs, for which as manyre sometimes used simultaneously, can be heard on some high-frequency channel nearly all Uie time, although medium-frequency broadcasts arc received well only about half the Umc.
The Bloc has supplemented its jamming operations by various other measures designed to impair or prevent Bloc reception ofbroadcast programs. Owners of receivers are registered and there ls extensivedesigned to discredit the sources of Western broadcasts and to Intimidatelisteners. However, the Bloc has not resorted to either mass confiscation ofor specific legal prohibition ofto foreign broadcasts. The Bloc'sand rapidly increasing use of wire-diffusion systems and radio receivers for group listening also helps to reduce the potential Bloc audience for Western
At least in the USSR, thc availability or short-wave receivers to individuals has been reduced, and the radio services available to medium and long-wave receivers and wire-diffusion speakers have been expanded.lhe number of Individual owners of radio sets In thc USSR is increasing, Uiewho can tunc to Western short-waveis comparatively small and may be decreasing.
The Bloc has for about three yearswith Western programs intended for West German and Austrian audiences by broadcasting on Uie same irequencies from nearby high-powered stations. There have also been at least two instances of deliberate Bloc jamming of Western broadcasts for other Western audiences In cases where Uie material could be deemed politically offensive to the Kremlin
There is no evidenceystematic jamming effort against Western civilian or
military communications. However,Jamming of Western militaryhas occurred, and in some instances appears to have been deliberate.with Western navigation aids (reported as Jamming or spoofing) has apparently been unintentional in all Instances thus far
PRESENT BLOC CAPABILITIES
FOR ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE
Any radio transmitterotentialHowever, Uie extent to which anyBloc transmitter could be useful In electromagnetic warfare depends on the power and other technical characteristics of the transmitter, its location relative lo thc circuit to be jammed, and fluctuatingot wave propagation. Thus, many of Uie Bloc transmitters now used to Interfere with radio reception within the Bloc would not necessarily be useful for interference with reception outside the Bloc.
The Bloc's telecommunications resources are such, however, that the Blocarge capability, not merely for increasing Uieof its present internal jamming effort but also for interfering with radionavigation aids, and broadcastoutside theubstantial fraction of the0 long-range Blocnot now used In Jamming could be diverted to an expansion of Blocwarfare simply by more intensive use of transmitter capacity, reduction oft raffle. and diversion of some traffic from radio to alternative means of communication. Moreover, no serious technical difficulties would arise in extending the present system of jamming coordinationreatlyeffort.
Extension of Bloc electromagneticactivities would compel Uie Bloc to lake additional measures to nwnimixe incidental jamming of its own communications andaids. However, by using available alternative means of communication for essential traffic, and by advance scheduling of necessary long-range communlcaUons, the Bloc could probably avoid serious interfer-
encc of this type. Wn believe therefore that problems arising from self-Jamming would probably notarge extension ol Bloc electromagnetic warfare.
We estimate, therefore, that under cold war conditions the Bloc could allocate the necessary facilities and technical competencearge expansion of its presentwarfare. Including large-scalea^ainil WMtvn OGormiitailanB,aids, and broadcast reception outside the Bloc, without thereby significantlyessential Bloc commu nications.conditions of general war, Uie Bloc's essential communtcaUons requirements would be significantly changed and in some fields markedly increased. Wc are unable topecific quantitative allowance for thisbut believe that under conditions ofwar the Bloc wouldubstantial part of its present capability for expanded electromagnetic warfare.
We estimate that thc Bloc has theof disrupting most US high-frequency transoceanic circuitsajor proportion of Uiehc Bloc could at the same time seriously Interfere with US long-range mobile communications, including long-range VLF communications with US submarines as presenUy equipped. Under most conditions, the Bloc could also subject Western long-range navigation alas in Uie North Atlantic. North Pacific, and European areas to serious jamming and spoofing *
EXPANSION OF BLOC CAPAB1UT1ES FOR ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE
over-all development of Blocfacilities, including both radiomedia, automatically yields anoffensive and defensive clectromag-
* Recent sample tests and studies Ravethe vulnerability of US transoceanic circuits to Blue Jamming (see Appendix B: "Evaluation of Technicalheof other long-range Weslern point-to-point radio circuits has not been investigated.
'The relative vulnerability of Uie various types of lone-range navigation aids Is discussed In Appendix B: "Evaluation of Technical Factors."
netic warfare potential, since thereide latitude of lnterchangeabUity in facilities. Since World War II the Bloc has made good all war losses in communications facilities and has proceeded apace with expansion of facilities and Improvement of techniques. The radio transmission network has been steadily expanding in terms of number and power of transmitters, traffic, and areaFor the purposes of this estimate, comparable significance attaches also to the rapid development of alternativemedia not vulnerable to electromagnetic warfare. There hasugeof wire-diffusion systems for the wire line distribution of mass aural broadcasting programs. There is evidence that In UieArctic area several new land lines and at least one submarine cable have been laid. Bloc producUon of radio communications equipment using frequenciesuggests Uiat some such systems are already in operation. While these systems have only linc-of-slght range and requirestations for longer distance transmission, they are essentially non-Jammablo.
On the evidence of recent growth,of planned expansion, and our estimates of Bloc industrial resources and capabilities, wc believe that Uie Bloc telecommunications system and Bloc output of electronic and other related equipment will continue torapidly during Uie period of thisFor example, thc output of electron tubes is expected to increase overercent during the next two years. Furtheris also expected In Uie production of radio equipment using frequencies aboveegacycles, in the extension of wire-diffusion networks, in wire and coaxial lineand in the capacities of some existing wire lines
We believe lhat Uie supply of trainedin the Bloc will be adequate to support the projected rate of expansion of thesystem. In some, though not all. fields of communications technology,
'For further detail* of the projected expansion and IndicaUons of probable HmlUng factors, see Appendix A: "BvaluaUon of Economic Factors."
Bloc competence appears to be as advanced as that of the US.
Present Bloc telecommunicationsas noted earlier, are sufficiently ln excess ot essenlial communicationtoubstantial fraction of radio facilities free for actual or potentialwarfare use. The estimatedof the Bloc telecommunicationsand Bloc production of equipment will probably increase this margin. The Bloc could increase its Jamming facilities at the expense ofmall fraction of theallocated to the telecommunications or electronics expansion generally. Forthc buildingKW transmitters, capable of both internal and external jamming, would absorb electronic equipment to the amount ofercent of the estimated value of thef such equipment Use of these thousand transmitters as jammers could more than double the Bloc's present jamming activity.
Increased production of electronicfor either communications or jamming would be at the expense of production for Important other uses such as navigation aids, military radar, fire control and missilesdevices. But thc fact that the Bloc has already built up its telecommunications and Jamming facilities in excess of likelyor cold war requirements suggests that the strengthening of Bloc capabilitiesorrelative Increase in electromagnetic warfare capability. Isby the Kremlin as an important part of its preparation for possible war.
VULNERABILITY OF THE BLOC TO RETALIATORY ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE *
strategic eflect of possiblewarfare operations onwould be limited by the extent toBloc could resort to alternative means of
"The extent lo which the US and its allies now possess or may develop the capability ofthe Bloc's vulnerability to electromagnetic war fun: Is beyond the scone of this estimate.
communication Immune to such warfare. In the European Bloc, extensive alternative telecommunications are available, andexpansion is under way. However, the Bloc is still dependent on long-range radio (technically susceptible to jamming) for essential communication in Siberia andChina generally, and throughout the Bloc in respect to mobile operationaland navigation aids.
isruption of Bloc long-range radiocould impair (a) the efficient operation of government controls, (b) the readiness of its armed forces, and (c) theof the Bloc economy. It could alsoiversion of scarce resources for the accelerated expansion of substitutefacilities. Bloc capabilities for air and naval action and for coordination of military operations could be impaired by electromagnetic warfare.
PROBABLE BIOC COURSES OF ACTION Basic Objectives
nder cold war conditions, the Kremlin's primary objective in regard towarfare will almost certainly continue to be that of minimizing the penetration of Western propaganda broadcasts beamed at Bloc audiences. Concomitantly it will also almost certainly seek further expansion of Bloc capabilitiesossible extension of electromagnetic warfare to other types of Western transmissions, and further reduction of the Bloc's vulnerability to electromagnetic warfare (including self-Jamming).
here is little conflict among theseThe continued expansion of both long-range radio and alternativemedia, the development of improved techniques, and the training of personnel serve all three basic objectives, and theemphasis put on the several objectives could rapidly be shitted without necessitating serious economic or other adjustments
n the event of general war. the Kremlin would almost certainly seek to achievedisruption of Western military commu-
tWW IW-
nicatlons and navigation aids. At the same time, the Kremlin would continue to seek to insulate its peoples from Western radio
Estimated Bloc Courses of Action Under Cold War Conditions
In pursuing Its cold war objectives, the Bloc will almost certainly not employ Its full capabiliUes for electromagnetic warfare. The Kremlin will be restrained in the exercise of those capabiliUes by its desire to avoid (a) any .substantial impairment of its owncommunications, either by interference or by diversion of transmitters towarfare, or (b) the diversion of greatly Increased amounts of materials andfrom other uses in order to increase the capacity and reduce the vulnerability of the Bloc communications system. Thewill accordingly seek to avoid disclosing Bloc electromagnetic warfare capabilities and techniques by premature use. in order tothe advantage of surprise and to avoid stimulating accelerated development ofdefensive and offensive capabilities In the field of electromagneticurther consideration which may restrain the Bloc from systematic interference with Western communications and navigation aids is that such clearly illegal activities would worsen thc Bloc's diplomatic position. Theeffect of this consideration would depend on the Kremlin's general policy in regard to relaxing or tightening tensions between the Bloc and the West.
The Kremlin will almost certainlyto concentrate its electromagneticactivities primarily on restricting thc penetration of Western propagandabeamed at Bloc audiences. Thisobjective can be served by three types of preventive Internal action, as at present: (a) jamming of Western broadcasts beamed at the Bloc, (b) reducing the availability to Bloc citizens of those types of radio receivers capable of receiving Western broadcasts, and (c) exercising pressures and controls on Bloc listeners. Wc believe the Kremlin willto use all three of these types of action.
Primary reliance will almost certainlyto rest on jamming. It is also probable that further efforts will be made to restrict the number of radio receivers in the Bloc capable of receiving Western broadcasts, but massof such receivers is unlikely.
The Bloc will also continue to seek tothc expansion of Western capabilities for beaming propaganda broadcasts at BlocUnder cold war conditions. It will employ only propaganda and diplomaticaimed primarily at nearby Westernwhere actual or proposed Westernsites are located. The relative emphasis upon threats as against conciliatory gestures will reflect the Kremlin's general policy in regard to relaxing or tighteningbetween the Bloc and the West.
The Bloc will probably continue deliberate Interference with Western broadcasts directed to German and Austrian audiences. Wehowever, that it will probably not extend this Interferencearge scale to Western broadcast reception outside Germany and Austria, since the Kremlin almost certainly estimates that such extension ofwarfare would worsen the Bloc'sposition without affordingadvantage to the Bloc.
The Bloc will almost certainly continue, and may expand, its use of radio facilities such as existing quasi-clandestine stations for the dissemination of "black" or "gray"possibly to the extent of occasional uso of Western frequencies for such purposes. The principal limiting factor on tills activity would piobably be the risk of politicalin the event of actual exposure of such means, or of loo frequent and obvious use.
The Bloc will almost certainly not resort to all-out electromagnetic warfare, including
"-Black- propaganda is pcopacanda deliberately mis-Id en lined as to source,roadcast pur-porUng to ongjnat* In Prance but actuallyloc slaUon "Gray- propaganda iswith the sourcerenchloc station with no Men-UricaUon given, so that listeners might infer that it onginaled In France.
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tntcrlcrence with Westernand navigation aids. Interference with Western navigation aids maybe used to create Incidents of actual oralleged trespass of Bloc territory by Western (particularly US) aircraft Such incidents could be used, as In the post, to sow dissension among the Western nations by fostering an impression of US recklessness or aggressive intent.
be Bloc will continue to expand its long-range radio transmission system and theand capacity of ils electronic equipment industry. It will continue to promote theof facilities and techniques forits essential military and civilianless susceptible to interference arising cither from Bloc or from outside sources.
Estimated Bloc Courses of Action Under
Conditions of General War
n the event of general war the principal existing restraints on the Bloc's exercise of its electromagnetic warfare capabilities would disappear. The Bloc would attempt toWestern military and other essential communications and navigation aids, and in this effort would not only employ jamming and spooling techniques but probably would also undertake military and sabotage action against Western communications anda,id facilities. At the same time the Bloc would probably intensify Its crTort to prevent reception of Western program broadcasts ln the Bloc. In addition to jamming of such broadcasts it would also almost certainly adopt more drastic measures, Including direct police action against listeners and probably the mass confiscation of some types of radio receivers.
Original document.
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