ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,ONg
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US THROUGH ^X,
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SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US THROUGH
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities of the USSR to attack the continental US by or clandestine means, through
SCOPE
estimate is concerned solely with Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the continental US during the periodot does not attempt to assess whether the USSR intends to attack thc US during that period or what courses of action the USSR would adopt before, along with, or after such an Furthermore, the paper estimates
Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the US without reference to anyof military forces which the USSR might make elsewhere and withoutto any advantages which the USSR might gain for an attack on the US by previously occupying territory that is not now within the Soviet Bloc.
PART I
SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES
MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS Atomic Weapons
eneral: The Soviet atomic energyhas been given and almost certainly during the period of this estimate willto receive, one of thc highest priorities in the allocation of resources available to the USSR. The emphasis of the programto be on weapon development with the objective of furthering their atomic weapon capability and thereby reducing the relative advantage which the US has in atomic weapons development, production, or stockpiles The USSR has made substantial progress toward this objective. Theof new sites indicates that its uiomic
energy program is continuing to expand. Byhe USSR had established aplutonium production capacity,ajor increase in plutonium production probably became effective during the latter partlie USSR has achieved the production of weapon graderanium reserves available lo the USSR appear to be sufficient toarge program, but the rate of exploitation of these reserves will depend on the balance decided upon between atomic energy and Other Soviet activities. In fission weapons the USSR has reached the point in technology at which the types of weapons can be dic-taled by military requirements rather than by technical limitations.
EECWHi
Date
2 Atomic Weapons Stockpiles: Whileof Soviet plutonium production during the period up tore considered reasonablyelatively large uncertainty exists with respect to installed or plannedroduction capacity.other than some evidence of theand efficiencies of thc three bombs tested by thc USSR, there is no specificconcerning thc characteristics of weapons presently stockpiled or likely to be stockpiled. In converting fissionablestockpiles to weapons stockpiles it has been assumed that both compositend plutonium) and all-plutonium weapons will be fabricated. On this basis, thc estimate of the cumulative Soviet atomic weapon stockpile for the periodhroughs as follows;
Number of
ariations and Uncertainty in Stockpile Estimates: In view of thc uncertainty in the evidence concerning the producUon ofmaterial, the stockpile for future dales may be as low as one-third less than the figure givenorr as high as twice that figureort also should be noted that by changing weapon components it is possible to Increase or decrease the number of weapons in the stockpile substantially. Such changes would, however, alter the kiloton-nage yield according to the quantities ofmaterial used In the individual weapons. It is estimated that the USSR is piobably capable of producingilotons, but in so doing would reduce the number of weapons in stockpile. On the other hand, the USSR could also make smaller yield weapons (as lowT) lhan those used in calculating the stockpile estimates given above.
Thermonuclear Weapons
t is believed that the USSR has notthermonuclear tests, andIs not stockpiling this type of weapon.
Research which may be relevant has been noted, but there is no evidence ofactivity at the present time. There is no direct evidence on which to base anof the lead the US may have in this field; nevertheless, thererowing Soviet capability for quantity producUon ofmaterials, and therefore moreresearch and development, and even field testing byre possible. It would be unsafe to assume that the USSR will notorkable thermonuclear weapon by
Rodiological Weapons
is most unlikely, for technologicalthat the USSR will have theproduce militarily significant quantiUeswarfare agents during thcthis estimate. However, the USSRavailable small quantities of grossfission products which mightas RW agents.
Biological Warfare
USSR has extensive knowledgeplague, tularemia, brucellosis,quick-acting intestinal diseases, anddiseases. No information isthe production or thcBW agents. The USSR couldsuch agents If it so desired.
Chemical Warfare
USSR can probably engage inwarfarearge scale. Wethe stockpile of standard agentsaccumulated during World Warbeen maintained and will be availableduring the period of this estimate.to these standard agents, thehave been producing at least one ofgases9 and may haveone other nerve gas through thestage. Bytocks ofmay be available for limited
DELIVERY OF CONVENTIONAL ANO MASS
DESTRUCTION WEAPONS BYresent Strength ol Long-Range Aviation: Long-Range Aviation, consisting essentially
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three Air Armies, one in the Far Bast and two in the western USSR, constitutes the strategic striking force of the USSR. Thehich was copied from thes the only Soviet bomber, known to be in operational use, capable of carrying atomic weapons to distant targets. Asotal ofU-4's wasto be available for operational use. (Table of Equipment strength of Soviet air regiments known to be equipped with or in process of being equipped withircraftircraft, but theegiments are currently estimated to be at only aboutercents3U-4's (six regiments with antrength) were located in the Far East. It is believed that deliveries of TU-4's to Lhe Far East are
uture Strength and Composition of Long-Range Aviation: The future strength and composition of the Soviet long-range bomber force is difficult to estimate. We have very little information on Soviet development work on new types of medium or heavy bombers. There is evidence of theof jet mediumrototype heavy bomber probably powered by piston engines has been observed. It maybe powered by turbo-prop engines. This type of aircraft is not known Lo be in series production. There have been recent sightings of aircraft reportedly larger than theype. These sightings, if confirmed as heavy bomber aircraft, would establish that at least prc-sericsxperimental) production has begun. It seems safe to assume that thc USSR is planning to replace theiston medium bomber with aircraft of higher performance characteristics. The following table of the estimated actual strength and composition of the Soviet long-range bomber force5 is based, therefore, on the assumption that the USSR will initiate scries productionet medium bomber during Ihe period of this estimate and that the USSR began series productioneavy bomber inntelligence presently available does not rule out the pos-
sibility that series productioneavy bomber could have started early
ESTIMATED ACTUAL STRENGTH
Medium Bomber
Jet
Bomber
percenttrength.
ew not In operational units,
ircraft Characteristics: Thender normal operating conditions, istoombat radiusmilesombat rangemiles0 pound bomb load. Under cruise control conditions necessary to reach distant target areas. Its speed would benots at an altitude of0 feet. However, it is capable ofaximum speednots at0 feet for short intervals.there is no intelligence to indicate that it has done so, the USSR is considered capable of modifying theo increase Its range in the same manner that theas stripped to produce. This modification involves removal ofarmament, except for the tail turret, and increase in the fuel capacity,et weight reductionounds in take-off weight. Soould have markedly reduced defensive capabilities againstattack, but its combat radius would be increasedautical miles and itsrangeiles0 pound bomb load.
With moderate technical advances. It Is possible that byhe USSR may be able to improve performance characteristics of theo some degree, but there is no current evidence of Soviet development orof the more powerful piston engines which would be essential to majorWe consider it more likely that the USSR would devote its efforts to developing an aerial refueling capability for TU-4's and to the creationeavy bomber force.
No intelligence is available concerning Soviet inflight refueling capabilities, llow-
'BO a SB CRET
inflight refueling techniques do notserious technical problems, and the USSR has had access to the techniques andemployed by the US in this field. With one refuelingtripped-downts combat radius could be increasedautical miles toautical miles, and its rangeautical miles.
Future Jet Medium BomberIt is estimatedet medium bomber could appear ln operational use some timeomber would have improved altitude and speed characteristics, but less rangelthough littleis available in this field, it has been calculated that such an aircraft mightombat radiusombat rangeautical miles0 pound bomboviet jet medium bomberthese characteristics could reach targets in thc United States onlyne-wayfrom the Chukotski base area. Onission it could reach targets located north of an arc roughly passing through Los Angeles, Denver, and Minneapolis.
Future Heavy Bomber Characteristics: The prototype heavy bomber, assuming it is put in scries production and equippedurbO' prop power plant, couldombat radiusautical milesombat rangeautical milesomb load0 pounds. Byechnical modifications and improvements oneavy bomber mightombat radiusautical milesombat rangeautical milesomb load0 pounds.
Base Areas for Direct Air Attack on the United Slates: Three base areas, thePeninsula in Northeast Siberia, the Kola Peninsula in Northwest USSR, and Soviet and Soviet-controlled territory along thc Baltic and In Eastern Germany, are the closest to the United States. From any of these base areas the stripped-downne-way mission with one inflight refueling could reach any target in the United States. TU-4'sin this manner, havingmile range, could also operate from
bases in the interior of the Soviet Union for strikes against the US.
Of the three base areas mentioned, the Chukotski Peninsula is nearest to the United States. The standardwith no inflight refueling)wo-way mission could not reach the United Stales.ne-wayIt could reach targets within an arc drawn from San Diego to Lake Superior. The stripped-downwo-way mission could reach Seattle without Inflight refueling. With outbound inflight refuelingwo-way mission, this type of aircraft could reachwithin an arc San Diego-Lakene-way mission, without inflight refueling, would permit the stripped-downo reach targets in all parts of the United States except Florida from the Chukotski base area-Soviet heavy bombers, when produced, could operate from Northeast Siberiawo-way basis with one refueling against targetsin the United States, and even without refueling, against targets located north and west of an arc drawn generally from central Texas through central New York.
Logistics problems are difficult in the Chukotski Peninsula, but these could beby advance stockpiling and use of the area for staging bases only. Bombersthe United States from Northeast Siberia would have favorable tail winds most of the year. There are now no known first-classwhich could be used for sustainedand airfield information is not sufficient Lo enable positive Identification of any specific installationaunching site or staging base for medium bombers.) and Anadyr/Mys) could possibly support staging operations by TU-4's, at least during nine months of the year, if adequate advancetook place. Other similarare Velkal, Tanyurer, Magadan, and Pet-ropavlovsk. It is possible that new airfields have been built without detection. Thc USSR has emphasized use of frozen surfaces in the Arctic, which makes possible the wintertime use of airfieldsinimum ofeffort.
ircraft sorticd from the Kolaand Baltic-East German areas could not reach the United States and return to thelr bases. even with one outbound refueling. The principalhreat to thc United States from these base areas would stem frommissions flown by stripped-down aircraftombat rangeautical miles. From the Murmansk area,ange would permit Soviet bombers to reach targets roughly north and eastine from Charleston, South Carolina, to southernFrom tlie Baltic area,ange would enable TU-4's to attack targets north and eastine drawn generally from Charleston, South Carolina, throughAll of the northeastern industrialof the United States could be reached from either area. The estimatedof heavy bombers should enable them to reach thc New York-New England area on two-way missions from either the Kolaor the Baltic area. With one outbound refueling they could attack any target in thc industrial northeast and return to home base.
There are now no known airfields in the Kola Peninsula area capable of launchingorties. However. Alakurttt, at the base of the peninsula, and Murmansk-Vayenga. ninealf miles northeast of Murmansk, could rpMdily be adapted to accommodate TU-4's. Eight other airfields5 offered runways or take-ofteet or more in length. It is possible that some or all of these bases could have been improved tomedium bombers. As elsewhere in thc Soviet Arctic, virtually all of these airfields arc extensible and all will bear the weight of TU-4's during the six or more months of the year tlte ground is frozen. During the spring thaws and summer months, permanent all-weather runways of suitable length would be necessary. Both Alakurttl and Murmansk-Vayenga are favorably situated loglstically. and great circle routes from this area would avoid initial overflight of nations friendly to tlic United States. The Baltic-Fast German area has adequate bases to support largeof medium bombers. These bases are favorably situated with respect toand weather and arc adequately served
by existing transportationajor disadvantage is that great circle routes to the United States pass over portions of Western Europe or Scandinavia, and any attempted air strike might be detected early enough to provide warning.
Crew Proficiency: Achievementigh-level of combat effectiveness has been retarded by lack of combat experience and byupon flying. Intensive training has been underway for five years, but there is no evidence of extensive training in long-distance flying and navigation. It is probable,lhat byome of thesewill be removed. It is also probable that evenimited number of crews has been given sufficient training to undertake anagainst the US.
Targeting and Bombing Accuracy: The USSR ts able to obtain the data necessary for identification of most targets in thc US under visual and blind-bombing conditions. The USSR possesses optical bombslghts equivalent to US World War Il-type models. Sovietcould therefore be expected to execute satisfactory bomb placement under visualThe USSR has produced, and is equipping itsndlight Jet) bomberj, with blind-bombing and navigation type radars of the USnd AN/ariety. It is estimated that aquantity of tills equipment is available for use in aircraft employed in attacks on thc continental US. The inherent error of the Soviethnd-bombing system itself (the radar and bombing equipment alone) isto beeeteet of altitude againsi an easily defined point target. There is no information available on the ballistic characteristics of Soviet atomic weapons, but it is considered that the inherent ballistic error might rangeeet toeeleet of altitude. The base error (the combined errors Inherent in the bombingand the bomb) might thus range fromoeeteet of altitude. We have insufficient evidence to estimate withlhe degree of accuracy which Soviet crews might actually achieve.ighly tentative basis, we estimate that the median
of all aiming errors would beeet when easy radar targets arc bombed0 feet or above. On an equally tentative basis, we estimate that the median of all aiming errors, when bombing difficult targets from an altitude0 feet or above, might beeel.
vailability, Abort Hate,ariety of circumstantialincluding US experience, it isthat the USSR could have aboutercent of itstrength operationally available for an initial, deliberately-prepared surprise attack. However, the numbersortled would dependultiplicity of other factors. The abort rate on those staged against US targets is estimatedercent without consideration for interception and poor navigation, and with variations in either direction according lo season, weather, extent of preparation, and other factors. In view of the fact that most US target areas could be reached only by one-way missions, the attrition rate would be extremely high. No appreciable reserves of TU-4's arc believed available. (The same would apply to any new types of aircraft introduced during thist present,roduction isat aboutlanes perigure which could probably be Increased slightly in the short run.
eather: Thc USSR has consislcntly devoted considerable emphasis to both short and long period meteorological forecasting. Special techniques for upper air research and improved synoptic methods are beingfor use In weather forecasting for periods longer than one month, although we cannot estimate the degree of success which will be achieved during the period of5 it ls believed that thc USSR will havehort period prediction capability in at least the European USSR ofercent reliability as compared with the present reliability ofwicent, Thiscapability plus extensive experience in meteorological research in the extremelatitudes, good weather reportingin Siberia, availability of records of weather conditions which have prevailed
throughout North America for many years, and constant access to current Northweather conditions and forecasts should enable the USSR to predict both route and target weather with reasonable accuracy.
Countermeasures: Thehad accesside variety of USradar and to US jammingUSSR is apparently well aware ofadvantage to be gained byradar and otherestimate that today the USSR candisrupt long-range radiobetween the continental US andfacilities. We further believeUSSR will Increase thc effectivenessjamming equipment as well as theand number of its trainedthe period of this estimate. Itprobable that the USSR hassufficient electronicto equip someircraft. Itknown whether Soviet TU-4's havebeen equipped with such jammingor what would be the effectivenessdevices against US defensiveof effective jamming equipmentthc employment of extraspecially for this purpose.
DELIVERY OF CONVENTIONAL AND MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS BY OTHER MEANS
Guided Missiles
General: There is no positivethat the USSR now has any guidedin an operational status. It Is known that the USSR has been conducting anresearch and development program.ype weapons, which were used operationally by the Germans during World War II. are estimated to be the only missiles presently available. These types probably have been improved, and may be available In limited numbers. Neither is known lo be ln series production.
haracteristics: The USSR hasdevelopment oningle pulsc-jel version could
e -p
warheadangeautical milespeedwin pulse-Jet version has been developed which couldarhead upounds for shorter distances. Launching anubmarine is considered currently feasible and within Soviet capabilities.to date, no launching equipment,facilities, or missiles have actually been sighted on Soviel submarines.ew intelligence reports arc available indicating that the USSR has launched guided missiles from submarines, these reports are of low or undetermined reliability und have not been confirmed. It is conceivable thatype could be fitted with an atomic warhead, although there is no Indication that the USSR has either developedarhead type or incorporated ituided missile. It is estimated that the USSR would not attempt to improve tins missile type in regard to range or speed, but would accent the factors of reliability, load-carrying characteristics,and the techniques of rapidand firing from the launching craft.
The USSR has carried forwardof theypehowever, this missile could nota threat against the continentalthc period of this estimate.
CLANDESTINE DELIVERY
Atomic Weapons: The USSR is capable of producing atomic weapons which could be smuggled into the US cither as complete assemblies or as component parts orThc assembled devices could range from small-yield weaponsT or less)ew hundred pounds to larger-yield weapons (possibly upT)several thousand pounds. Their size could range from thatackage small enough to fit Into the luggage compartment of an automobile to thatacking case large enough to contain an automobile.
All of these weapons could be designed to break downumber of relatively simple and readily transportable components. Those
designed toelatively low kllotonnage yield would not require much labor ortraining to assemble. Somewhat more labor and training would be required toweapons designed to give high yields, and. once assembled, they would be more difficult to transport.
It Ls conceivable that only the fissionable material, in small pieces, need be smuggled into the US, since other components could be fabricated or procured in this country. This scheme, however, would require carefulplanning and coordination bypersonnel with engineering skill and familiarity with the US sources of needed components, and wouldonger time to carry out. It would probably resulteduced yieldiven amount ofmaterial. It wouldubstantially greater security risk than the clandestine Introduction of all components.
A variety of forms of clandestine delivery suggest themselves. Assembled weapons could be dropped by apparently friendlycould be detonated in the holderchant ship, or could be sown asmines. Either components orweapons could be brought in underimmunity, smuggled across land or sea frontiers, introduced through normal import channels, or brought In as bondedawaiting transshipment. Thc selection of thc method of introduction and ofand assembly within the US wouldon the Soviet objective and thc risk of detection which the USSR was willing to accept
Considering the known limitations of the means of physical detection, it Is probable that the USSR could introduce into the US and detonate inonsiderable number of atomic weapons by clandestine means. However the USSR would have to take into account not only the estimated chances of detection, but also the consequences ofdetection in forfeiting the clement of surprise in any intended overt attack and in provoking US counteraction. As the number
'POP OHUnilT'
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weapons clandestinely Introduced wasthe risk of compromise wouldThis increased risk would beunction of US capabilities for physicalthan of the scope and complexity of Uie clandestine operations, particularlyas larger numbers of Soviet agents became involved. Consideringreach of security, the USSR would probably be unwilling to risk Uie use of even selected and trained agents ln such numbers as would be involvedlandestine attackcale comparable to that which might be delivered overtly by aircraft. Wc conclude, therefore, that, althoughattack with atomic weapons might occur against specially selected targets asto overt delivery by air, such an attack,cale comparable to that which mightelivered overtiy by air, would probably be precluded by security consideraUons.
We have no evidence to Indicate whether or not thc USSR has actually made any plans or preparations for the clandestine delivery of atomic weapons.
Biological Weapons: Some BW agents are peculiarly adaptable to clandestineThe introduction of small amounts of BW agents would be difficult to detect or Identify as to source, but Sovietwould be required for theirarge number of people would be required for extensive dissemination of BW agents, and Soviet security considerations wouldimiting factor in the scale and timing of such an attack.
Chemical Weapons: CW agents are not easily adaptable to clandestine use. Into the limitations noted above asto BW attack. CW agents are easilyby their immediate effects and it probably would not be feasible to build up sufficient supplies or to procure the means clandestinely for their dissemination against large population centers. The mostuse would be against personnel In key installations, but even this would be difficult. Wc have no evidence to indicate whether or
not the USSR is developing the means for the clandestine delivery of chemical weapons
ATTACK ON THE US WITH CONVENTIONAL NAVAL ANO AIRBORNE FORCES
Conventional Naval Attack
oviet capabilities for attacking thc US with naval forces employing conventional armament are low. The Soviet surface fleet Is geographically divided, lacks advance bases, has limited operational experience, and does nothipborne air arm. Its minor combatant vessels, including amphibious types, are entirely unsuited for transoceanic attack. The Soviet merchant marine, which would be called upon to provide the lift, could not be developed into an efficient auxiliary element to amphibious operations on any significant scale. Tlie only substantial naval threat to the US which the USSR could muster would be that of its submarine force. In addition to its potential In connection with the delivery of mass destruction weapons, the submarine force could, at least in the initial phasesonflict, inflict serious damage on US overseas communications and carry out offensive mining in the shipping approaches to principal US harbors. It is expected Uiat during thc period of this estimate theforce will be enlarged and unproved by the introduction of additional numbers of improved ocean patrol types, by Uiemodernization of existing types, and by thc possible adaptation of submarines tolaunching.
Airborne Attack
oviet capabilities for airborne attack upon the continental US (except Alaska) are also veryU-4's could be adapted for troop-carrying service and operate within thc same limits and under the sameas Uieomber. We have noto indicate whether or not the USSR has made any plans for thc dropping offorces in the US, but the USSR could, if It chose, drop specially trained assault and sabotage forces for attack upon Important but difficult bombing targets.
PART fl
CERTAIN FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET EMPLOYMENT OF THE FOREGOING CAPABILITIESOVIET DECISION TO ATTACK THE US
Soviet rulers would expect aon the United States towar. Inar thewould expect to have an initialof military power on thecontinent, but in their attack uponUS would be concerned to(a) US retaliatory air attack onUnion with weapons of mass(b) mobilization of the superiorof thc Western allies,of the United States; and (c) USof anti-Soviet forces in Eurasia.
Soviet rulers have demonstratedto thc danger of US air attackof mass destruction by thewhich they have given to theof defenses against such anthe substantial progressin building up their defenses, itthat they would regard theircapabilities as adequate tonumbers of attackingreaching strategic targets in theIs likely, therefore, that in initiatingthe USSR would be concerned:to destroy or cripple USretaliation in kind, with particularto SAC continental and overseasto deliver such an attack onpsychological targets in the Unitedwould prevent, or at least hinder,of the US war potential; andretain the means to counter any USof Eurasia.
s among thc available forces andfor attacking the continental US, the USSR's highest capability lies In openaltack with atomic bombs delivered byype aircraft, for the following reasons:
low capabilities offorces and airborne forces.
security difficulties inherent Inof comparable numbers ofby clandestine means.
methods of delivery ofare Insufficiently developed foruse.
mass destruction weapons aredeveloped or subject toIn their large-scale use.
he Soviet rulers might, however, employ other methods of attacking the USwith or immediately following an open and direct atomic attack. In the cases of guided missiles, airborne attack, submarine bombardment, and biological warfare, Soviet capabilities al best appear to be .severely limited. Theyreater capability for chemical attack in connection with, orto, atomic bombing.
landestine attack in the form of sabotage or small-scale biological warfare might occur at any time, and without an overt attack ever being launched. The USSR must weigh the timing and value of the sabotage in relation to their complete plan of attack and lis eflect upon the capability of the United States toetaliatory military attack.atlack with atomic weapons might occur against specially selected targetsupplement to overt delivery by aircraft. Subsequent to an overt attack, clandestinein any form could be expected to the maximum practicable ex lent.
e believe that the considerationsSoviet employment of their capabilities will remain throughout this period essentially the same as those outlined above,
Original document.
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