-TOP SECRET
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES, THROUGH
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
The following member organkeuom of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelll-ye-ice Agency in the preparation ol thu estimate: The Inielligence organizations of the Departments of Slate, Ihe Army, the Navy, the Atr Force, and ihe Joint Staff.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred inon3 Thesublect
being outside of Us jurisdiction.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES, THROUGH
THE PROBLEM
To estimate: (a) the present and probable future extent of Soviet control over the Satellites, and (b) probable developments within the Satellites.
ASSUMPTION
That there wil! not be general war within the period of this estimate.
CONCLUSIONS
of the Satellites has in effect advanced the frontiers of the USSRiles westward in Central Europe and has established for theuffer zone now garrisoned byoviet troops, organized intoivisions,atellite troops. In addition, the area provides ample advanced air bases, space for aair defense system, and naval bases.
Soviet control over the Satellites iscomplete and is unlikely toor to be successfully challenged from within during the period of this estimate. Eventruggle for power should break out within the Soviet ruling group, thc struggle would probably be carried on within thc higher echelons of the Soviet Communist Party, and would not signifi-
used In am piper, lhe term -SateUJlcj-meaus "Ruropean SalclUlea" and Includes Emit Oermany, Poland, Crechoslovafcia. Albania.y. Rumania, and Bulgaria.
cantly affect Soviet control over theHowever, if the struggle within the Party should spread to the Soviet Army and the Soviet Security Forces and should lead to open conflicts within or between the forces, the stability of the Sovietand Soviet control over the Satellites would be shaken.
Although the majority of the Satellite population is and will remainwith the regimes, organizedhas been virtually eradicated. The regimes will not be able to eliminate passive resistance and sabotage, nor to isolate their populations completely from Western information, but these factors will not seriously affect Soviet control over the Satellites.
The Satellites now supply about two-thirds of the Bloc's uranium ores and concentrates; East Germany alonefor aboutercent of total Bloc
supply. They also supply largeof raw materials and industrial goods, notably petroleum products, industrial chemicals, certain non-ferrous metals, and engineering equipment. Thecapabilities of the Satellitesan important addition to Soviet economic strength and war potential.
The Satellites have obtained from the West and from the Far East materials and equipment which contribute to the Bloc war potential. About half of officially reported East-West trade is conducted on the Bloc side by the Satellites. Thcof the Satellites and the partition of Germany and Austria facilitatetrade with the West.
By thc endhe gross national product of the Satelliteshole had returned approximately to the leveluring the period of this estimate, thc average annual rate of growth of the gross national product for the Satelliteshole will probably be about 5Emphasis will continue to be placed upon expanding thc heavySatellite industrialization will continue to be hampered by deficiencies in skilled labor and competentin raw materials, and in capital equipment. The industrial capacity and general economic strength of thewill remain low in comparison with those of Western Europe.
Thc Satellite ground forces are now estimated toen,into approximatelyivisions. The armies are supplemented bysecurity forces which totalen. The Satellite ground forces arc improving in quality and havein strength steadily
We estimate that they will be stabilizedtrength ofy the end
The Satellite Air Forces are capable ofimited defense by fighterand ground attack.by re-equipping the units'with jet fighters has progresseduickened pace and probably will be completedthe period of thisew jet light bombers have been introduced Into the Polish Air Force and during the period of this estimate some of the other Satellite Air Forces may be similarly equipped. Almost all operational type aircraft and parts (or their logisticalare furnished the Satellites by the USSR,
The Satellite Naval Forces have only minor capabilities. Small numbers of Soviel ships, notably mine and escort types, have been turned over to thenavies, apparently to be used asforces to the Soviet Navy. Byhc SateHite navies will probably be capable of providing appreciableto the Soviet Navy in such fields as mincsweeping, minelaying, escort, and coastal defense duties.
of deficiencies inand morale, thc Satelliteas such do not now possess thewhich their size would appearHowever, they are alreadyfactor in the Europeansituation. If they continue toalong the lines projected bythey willubstantialto Soviet military strengthand will offset, at least in part,of Western strength in Europe.
DISCUSSION
CONTROL Degree- of Control
Soviet control over the Satellites Iscomplete. It ensure* the subservience and reliability of the Satellite governments and continued Soviet economic and military benefit from the area.
The Kremlin has decapitated andthe old political parties andgroups in the Satellites.ast majority of the Satellite population is discontented with the regimes, and thismay be intensified. It will remain unorganized and practically Impotent.resistance groups have survived only as scattered remnantsew areas, and are now generally Inactive;
The Communist hierarchies in thehave been purged of practically alland groups distrusted by the Kremlin. However, "cleansing" of Communist regimeserpetual process. There will continue to be purges within the Communist parties, governments, armlet, and police forces of the Satellites to insure the reliability andof the Satellite regimes asof the Kremlin.
Soviet control over the Satellites isto diminish or to be successfullyfrom within during the period of this estimate. Eventruggle for power should break out within the Soviet ruling group, thc struggle would probably be carried on within the higher echelons of the Soviet Communist Party, and would not significantly affect Soviet control over thc Satellites. However, if the struggle within the Party should spread to the Soviet Army and the Soviet Security Forces and should lead lo open conflicts within or between these forces, the stability of the Soviet regime and Soviet control over the Satelliles would be shaken.
Instruments and Techniques of Soviet Control
primary instruments of Sovietover thc Satellite* arc thc Satellite gov-
ernments and Communist parties. Inthe Kremlin uses the Cominform to helpniform political and propaganda line. Although the Kremlin permits andprograms of cultural, economic, and technical collaboration among the Satellites, it appears determined to bind the Satellites individually to the USSR rather than to unify them. However, the USSR almost certainly will not Incorporate any of the Satellite states directly into the USSR, at least within the period of this estimate.
Nationalization and direct operation by the governments of the vital industrial and commercial sectors of the Satellite economies simplify Soviet control. Soviet authority over these economies ls exercised in addition through trade and financial agreements to implement specific production schedules, the use of Soviet advisers in key positions throughout the economy, Joint companies (notably in Rumania and Hungary) and the Council of Economic Mutual Assistancehich functions as an effectiveboth of control and of "Joint planning."
The police and security forces of each of thc Satellites are large, carefully selected, and well trained. In each Satellite they have adopted the Soviet scheme of organization. They are infiltrated and often directed by experienced Soviet personnel.
IB. Large Soviet military missions arethe reorganization of the Satellite armed forces, which are adopting standard Soviet methods, doctrine, organization, and equipment. Soviet commanders, advisers, and technicians are located in key command and staff positions In the military forces and in the defense ministries. The creationolitically reliable officer corps is wellThe Satellite forces will remainupon the USSR for most of their aircrafl. tanks, and heavy artillery.
igorous training and educationintensive Communist indoctrination of selected segments of thc population, and
favored treatment of some groups will almost certainly Increase the number of supporters of the Satellite regimes- Calculated use of terror creates hopelessness, physical and moral fear,ense of isolation. Throughout the Satellites, severe security measures have reduced personal contact of the population with representatives of the West to the vanishing point. Frontierhave drastically reduced the possibility for escape, except for the present gap in Berlin. However, the Kremlin will almost certainly not be able within the period of this estimate to isolate completely the populutlon of the Satellites from Western information.
ultimate basis of Soviet controlmilitary domination of theseestimate that the Soviet forcesthe Satellites and in the SovietAustria in3 consisted ofthe Soviet Armyecurity troops,oviet-mannedstrength).1
Troublesome Factors
number of factors remain whichirritations for the KremlinEurope, but which will notauthority. Certain of thesethe history of this area:traditional hatred of Russia (exceptandesterntraditions, religion, territorialthe Satellites, and ethnic orwithin the Satellites. Othersproducts of Soviet control: theof the Soviet system and of SovietSoviet economic exploitation of thethe decline of the standard of livingareas and for most classes. ThcIn the past has been so ruthless andin coping with the unrest resultingfactors and In discovering andhostile forces that none of theseexpected to develop Into moreui-
'For further detail concerning Soviet foreeswithin the Satellites, see Appendix A.
sance or an Impediment to the Communist program within the period of this estimate.
of agriculture is astill facing thc USSR and theThe extent and the tempo ofvary from Satellite tobelieve that collectivization will begradually throughout thethe period of this estimate. Inevent that the newolicy of rapidagriculture, peasant resistance wouldand agricultural production Inwould decline for some time.even rapid collectivization ofprobably not seriously shake
SATELLITE CONTRIBUTION TO BLOC STRENGTH: ECONOMIC 1
Long-Term Program
During the first years after theof hostilities, the USSR ruthlesslyfrom Eastern Europe the immediately obtainable economic benefits. The means used included outright requisition ofand equipment and the Imposition of bilateral trade pacts on terms advantageous to the USSR. While this policy ofwas being pursued by the USSR, the Satellite states were themselves endeavoring to recover from thc wartime damage Inflicted upon their economies.
The economic programs both of the USSR with respect to the Satellites and of theregimes themselves began to change lateew programs provided for theplanned Industrialization of thecountries and their integration into the Soviet economic system. Main emphasis was placed upon expansion of productive capacity, especially of thc mining, metallurgical, and engineering industries.
'These estimates of Satellite economicare based upon extrapolation of past Satellite trends andritical appraisal of published Satellite economic data. It isto estimate whether the political de*clop-ments followine. the death of Stalin will change or disrupt these trends and plans.
6
long-range program was designed inay that the industrial base andreadiness of the Satellite countries should advance simultaneously. After the outbreak of the Korean war, the emphasis of this program was shifted in the directionore rapid development of heavyand armaments-serving Industries. While the Satellites.are thusrogressivelystate of preparedness, there ls no indication that the program envisages the outbreak of hostilities at any particular time, or that the long-term plan for economicis being further modified to achieve greater immediate war-readiness.
Behind the facade of the Council ofMutual Assistance, in which alltheoretically operate as equals, and through its other instruments of control, the Kremlin directs the allocation of rawcapital equipment, and foreign exchange among the Satellites, and arrangesand division of labor. The USSRsome of the raw materials and capital goods necessary for the industrialization of the Satellites, but the industries developed arc those which can contribute most to the military potential of the Bloc. The Satellites have thus been forcedattern ofand trade subservient to the interests of the USSR.
Principol Economic Contributions
the period of thisSatellites (except Albania) willcontribute substantially to theof the Bloc, particularly withthe following: *
a. Uranium ores. We estimate- that the Satellites2 supplied about two-thirds of the Soviet Bloc's uranium ores andwith Eastern Germany accounting for aboutercent of total Bloc supply,aboutercent, and Bulgaria. Poland, and Hungaryercent.
'ompares Satellite, Soviet, and total Bloc production25 of various selected raw materials and manufactured
industrial products. Someproducts requiring highly skilledlocomotives, railway passengercars, automobiles, merchantmachine tools) constitute anto the strength of theoutput of these items willthroughout the period of thisto accountubstantialBloc production, varying amongfromoercent.
2 the Satellitesapproximatelyercenf of theof crude petroleum, overof which came from Rumania.percent of the Bloc's output offuels Is derived from theEast Germany (syntheticforercent of Blocnatural petroleumfSatellite output of petroleumboth natural andercent is exported to thethe period of this estimate theof Bloc production of crudesynthetic liquid fuels furnished bywill decline somewhat in view ofgreater rate of increase ofthe USSR.
The chemical industriesSatellite area make an Importantlo the Bloc's war potential.of which Satellite productionis significant in relation to Bloca whole include syntheticcalcium carbide, caustic soda,acid, benzol, and toluol. Eastand Poland are thc mostproducers of chemicals.
products. Satellite2 amounted to about one-fifthBloc production. The Satellites arecontributors ofercentBloc'she Satellitesabout three-fourths of the Bloc'sof rayon and one-third of the Bloc'sof cement.
he scientific and technical assets of Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, and lo
TOP
a lesser extent of Poland andubstantial addition to those of the USSK. The contributions of Satelliteand technicians, especially In electronics, optics, instrument development, and phnrma-ceutlcals. are of great value to the Soviet economy.
Satellites have obtained fromand from the Far East materialswhich contribute to the BlocAbout half of officiallytrade is conducted on the Blocthe Satellites. Their establishedwith the West and theirsupply coal, grains, and some otherneeded In Western Europe,the continuance of thisthough Western controls over thcstrategic commodities have reduced Itpercenthe location ofand the partition of Germanyfacilitate clandestine trade with
Limitations on the Development of Ihe Satellite Economies
deficiencies in the Satelliteconstitute Important limiting factorsdevelopment of the Satellitein Soviet plans for the Satellites:
a. The planned expansion of industrya larger supply of skilled labor and management than will be available.the non-agricultural labor force will increase because of growth of population,of women, and reduction of the agricultural labor force by increasedthe skilled labor market will remain tight.
ome materials and equipment needed for Industrialization of thc Satellites are In short supply not only In the Satellites but also in thc USSR Itself. In particular, thewill lack adequate supplies of high-grade iron ore. copper, lead, zinc, nickel, chromium, molybdenum, tungsten, rubber, sulphur, and tin.
c. The capacity of the machine-building industries will probably remain inadequate to
meet the high demand for turbines,petroleum exploration and drilling equipment, complex automatic machine tools, precision instruments, and machinery for manufacturing anti-friction bearings required for the projected program of
morale of the workers and ofin general will remain low.
resistance to compulsoryand to collectivization will limitoutput and marketable supplies.
Probable Economic Developments
the endhe grossof the Satelliteshole hadapproximotely to the level ofthe period of this estimate, theannual rate of growth for thea whole will probably be about Sproduction bas grown and willlo grow more rapidly than theof the economy.1
Estimated Indices of Satellite ProducUon In Industry and Agriculture
Consumer Goods
Producer Goods IU
81
the Satelliteshole,emphasis will be placed uponthe heavy industries, which willbase for further expansion ofand for increasing producUon ofend-items. Tlie pattern of allocationgrowing naUonal product in theIncreasingly large allocations towith consumption kept low. In Poland
'The current emphasis upon Industrialin tbe Satelliles Is clear. For example, the value of agricultural production ln Poland (postwar boundaries)8 was about SOgreater than the value of Industrialbut1 um value of industrialwasercent greater than lhat of agricultural, ln Czechoslovakia, the value of Industrial producUon8 wasercent greater than that of agricultural,I was nearly double.
and Czechoslovakia, for example, gross capital Investment byill probably be about one-third above the levelithconsumption of goods and servicesabout the same aauch an allocation of resources would permit aincrease In the defense expenditures of these countries.
Comparison of the Satellites and Western Europe
thc period of this estimate therate of economic growth of theprobably remain somewhat higherof the Western European NATOHowever, the total gross nationalof these countries, plus WestAustria, is nearly four times as greatof the Satellites; their totalalf times as great,
SATELLITE CONTRIBUTIONS TO BLOC STRENGTH; MILITARY
Advanced Bosos for the USSR
Control of thc SatelUtcs has in effectthe frontiers of the USSRiles westward in Central Europe and hasfor theuffer zone nowby anoviet troops, organized intoivisions,atellite troops. In addition, the areaample advanced air bases, spaceorward air defense system, and naval bases.
The bulk of Soviet forces in thc Satellite area is concentrated in East Germany and represents the core of Dloc military strength in Europe. Soviet air units based in thcand in the Soviet Zone of Austria have an estimatedtrength ofircraft (actual strength Isf whichrc Jet fighters,et light bombers. Although the over-all figure will probably remainunchanged during the period of this estimate, the proportion of Jet types will (See Appendix A)
Satellite Ground Forces
present strength of theforces Is estimateden
organized Into approximatelyine divisions, ofre armored andechanized. These forces are supplemented by Internalforces which totalen. The Satellite armies are improving In quality and have expanded in strength steadilye estimate that they will be stabilizedtrength ofntoine divisions, by the end (See
The reorganization of the Satellite ground forces to conform to the Soviet pattern is nearing completion in all countries except East Germany and Albania. Although the equipment program is well advanced, there will be major shortages in heavy armor and artillery at leasthe Satellites are now manufacturing for their own use Soviet-designed non-combat vehicles, light artillery, small arms, ammunition, and parts, but they will remain dependent upon thc USSR for most of their heavier equipment
The Bulgarian Army is believed to be the most loyal and the best trained of thearmies, but it is not yet completelyand equipped along Soviet lines. The equipment which has been issued tos almost entirely Soviet, but there are still deficiencies in heavy armor and artillery. Stockpiles of materiel, which includeof German weapons, are available.is good. Limited quantities of moreSoviet weapons such as them SI* gun,m field anti-tank gun will probably soon be made available to Bulgaria.
Other Satellite forces will approach, and some may attain, the capabilities of theArmy byhe Hungarian and Polish ground forces have progressively improved in proficiency and in equipmentin the Soviet arms standardizationHowever, they will probably still be short of heavy equipmenthe armed forces of Czechoslovakia and Rumania are less advanced in training and equipment than other Satellite armies. East German forces,re officiallyas the Garrisoned People's Police (Kasernlcrlc VolkspolizeiKVP) but are de-
veloping inlo an army. They will needand higher level training and they are still below the level of Uie other Satellite armies in equipment. Their morale is low and their reliability is questionable. The small Albanian Army will continue toegligible combat potential.
the eventeneral war thecould not rely on the Satellitefor employment in secondarythe Bulgarian. Hungarian, andlesser degreethe Rumanian armies could
* be expected to fight effectively againstOreece, and Turkey. If fully supported loglstically. Throughout the period of this estimate, the armed forces of East Germany and Czechoslovakia will remain leastfrom the point of view of the Kremlin.
The ground forces of the various Satellite powers do notingle coordinatedThere is no reliable evidence of thc existence of joint staffs or commands among the ground forces. No combined high-level maneuvers of Satellite or Soviet-Satellite forces have been conducted.rend toward coordination ls indicated by Soviet efforts to standardize on Soviet-typeand weapons in all the Satellite armed forces. In the event of total mobilization by the Bloc, all higher staff planning wouldcertainly be done by the Soviets.
Satellite ground force reserves areat. This pool now includes moreully trained men andartially trained. The tolal will probably not changein thc next few years, but the percentage of fully trained men will increase steadily. There is little equipment available forexcept In Bulgaria and except for the equipment and stockpiles of Soviet forces now stationed in Eastern Europe.
Satellite Air Forces and Airfieldshe mission of the Satellite Air Forces is primarily defensive. These air forces in3 had an estimatedtrengthircraftnd we estimate tnat5 they will prob-
ablytrength. ofill probably be Jet fighters. As3 the European Satellite air forces are estimated at an over-all personnel strength of (SeeE.) The Kremlin is continuing tothese forces. Tlic main increases arc occurring in Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Piston fighters are being replaced by jet fighters (there wereet fighters in3 compared tond other equipment is being The Jet re-equipment programa new phase with the Introduction ofet light bombers Into the Polish Air Forces. During the period of this estimate this phase of the program will probably beto some of the other Satellite Air Forces. Almost all operational type aircraft, and parts for their logistical support, arethe Satellites by the USSR The re-equipment program will probably beIf the Korean war should end. Intensive Soviet training of carefully selected Satellite pilots is assuring Soviet control,techniques, and tactics.
n extensive program of airfieldand construction is being carried out in all of the Satellites. There are atir facilities available to the Soviet forces tn the Satellite countries. There areirfields capable of supporting heavy and medium bomber operationsustained basis andthersimited basis,otential bomber fields. All of these airfields areof supporting sustained Jet fighter and light bomber operations. In addition, there areirfields capable of basing lighterplanes. Most fields are being extendedoot runways, and many others eveneet or longer. The most extensiveconstruction program has taken place In Eastern Germany with Hungary.and Poland sharing in priority work schedules. The developing network ofairfields, some of which are equipped with night lighting and radio navigational aids,an integrated and well-coordinateddevelopment program. Uponthc network will add to both the oflensive and defensive capabilities of the Bloc.
he Soviet forces stationed in theare supplied with modern antiaircraft equipment, but intensive development for the Satellites of early warning radar networks, radar-controlled antiaircraft equipment, and civil defense began only in thc springatellite antiaircraft units have been supplied with AA equipment which by modern Western standards is deficient because it lacksradar warning as well as controlThere are indications that improved equipment, such as gun-laying radar, and techniques have been developed by the Soviets, but there is no evidence at this time that Satellite forces have benefited from these developments.
Satellite Naval Forces
wing to their small site, their meager equipment, and the unreliability ol the per-
sonnel. Satellite navies have only minorThe USSR is placing Soviet naval officers in thc command structures,personnel whose loyalty is suspect, and conducting Intensive political indoctrination courses. Satellite naval tactics, techniques, and training are entirely patterned on Soviet concepts. Small numbers or Soviet ships, notably of mine and escort types, have been turned over to the Satellite navies, apparently to be used as auxiliary forces to the Soviet Navy. (See Byhe Satellite navies will probably be capable of providing appreciable assistance to the Soviet Navy in such fields as rruneswecping. mine-laying, escort, and coastal defense duties. Satellite shipbuilding facilities are largelyto the construction and repair ofvessels.
1U
APPENDIX A
SOVIET FORCES STATIONED IN THE SATELLITES. April
Stcuimr Taoora
Coufmr
Number
or Troopi
Light
Bom be
Line
22
2
WlAttack 20
FlEhters Jet. | Pis
1*0
210
0
no
130
E. Germany
Zone of
10
110
eo
TOTAL
30 0
330
SovnT-MAWxro Aircraft'
Recon. [jet I Pis'
30
units of the Air Force of the Soviet Army and Naval Aviation
o ^nCar tl*figures based on
APPENDIX B
ESTIMATED SATEUJTfc PRODUCTION OF SKIJKTED COMMODITIES
T
Ferrous MeUIs Iron ore PlS Iron Raw steel
Metallurgical coke Rolled steel Manganese ore Chromite (MT)
Hon ferrous Mela Is Primary Copper Secondary Copper Refined Lead Re fined Zinc Antimony
Bauxite
Primary Aluminum Secondary Aluminum Fluorspar Magnesium (MTI
Coal
ituminous Lignite
Petroleum
Crude Petroleum
Liquid fuels (fromt. shale oils!
ynthetic Petroleum Products
Natural Gas (Million M'j
Chemicals Ammonia (Synthetic) Nitric) Sulphuric Acid Toluol Chlorine Calcium Carbide Caustic Soda Crude Benzol Refined Benzol Refined Phenol Synthetic Rubber Reclaimed Rubber Rubber0 units)
USSR
% or
Bloc'
* or
1M5
USSR
NA
A. NA
A. NA
NA. NA. HA
382
4
268
3S6
J155
:b4
5
SOW
158
7
38
1
4
Vilf
688
590
7
A
a
including Communist China.
MT
Piowcnow
mim itt
or
or
.
S
5
lass
toss
8
0
TIO
322
108 no
2 7 84
0
0
410
123
553
7
6
Ofl.3
398
NA.
NA.
NA
M
0
0
00
2
235
242
NA
358
3
NA
NA
398
NA.
NA.
Including Communistange of
APPENDIX C
the DXveLonasr or SATrairrr oroukc forcess
1
cf
An..,
Troop*
*
s
Germany
;
1
a
I
1
i
M
1
1
:::
2
1
Mean
0
7 ean Areraft)
trmany nas IB Cadre uniu of rerlmental site.
APPENDIX E
ESTIMATED SATELLITE AIR FORCES April 1U3
COKt> jbY
POKT
AH CI
I
OffmarT'
newly formed East German Air Force Ii now considered to have an estimated TOSrE strengthiston Engines fighters and an estimated actual strength otrainer-type aircraft. Conversion to operational type aircraft may be directly to Jets rather than piston fighters.
'Includes Polish Naval Air Arm consisting ofctual) Piston fighter,ctual) atlack planes,ctual) light bomber (Piston).
'Does not include approximatelyingle engine trainer types carried in so-called "night Ught bomber" units
Original document.
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