PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY THROUGH MID-1964 (NIE

Created: 5/22/1953

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

COPY NO.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

./

PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY, THROUGH

CORJ

Published3 3 end

The loltou-ing member organizationsfteMry Committee participated with the CentralAgency tn the preparation of -his estimate The Intelligence organisations of the Deportment! Of State, thehe Havg. the Air Farce, ant the Joint Staff The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this cslimate onay IMJ. The FBI abstained, the subject being outside ol Ui juHjtficlion.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

dissation notice

1 This copy of this publication Is for Uu Information and use of lhe recipient designated on the front cover and of individuals under thc Jurisdiction of theoffice who require the information for the performance of their official duties Further dissemination elsewhere In the department to other offices which require the information for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:

Assistant lo the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department

Chief of, for the Department of theDirector of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy

of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force

Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff

of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Knergy Commission

to the Director, FBI, for thc Federal Bureau of Investigation

Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for anyor Agency

his copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to Uie Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.

inalcrial contains information Uieot the mnuWwithin the

BVeLaUon of which ln ttnytManret

anauthonicd person Is prohibited by

DISTHIBUTION: wnttc House

NaUonal Security Council Department ol state Department of Defense Mutual Security Agency Psychological Strategy Board Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of InvcsUflatlon

PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY, THROUGH

THE -

S0VletaCU0n o Germany, through

ESTIMATE

Wc believe that current Soviet "peace" tactics do not indicate any change in the ultimate Kremlin objective with respect to Germany, which is to bring the entireunder Soviet control. The Kremlin must recognize, however, that it Is notosition to advance directly toward this ultimateby political action because of theof the overwhelming majority ofto Communism. It must alsothat an attempt to impose Communist control over all Germany by force wouldin general war.

e believe that through tlie period of this estimate the Kremlin will seek, by political warfare to prevent or at least to retard the Western program for West Germanand the integration of West Germany with the West. The Soviet leaders willcontinue to believe that thereood chance of thwarting the Western programolitical warfare campaign which plays upon Western European fear ofrearmament and upon Germanor unity. Even if thc EDC is ratifiedest German rearmament begins, the Krcm-

will probably believe that theation of the EDC agreements and theng of West Germany will proceed slowly.and that there will continue to be opportunl-

to thwart the Western program. In any case, It is unlikely that byhe re-

armament of West Germany willoint at which the Soviet leaders would regard West Germanyeriousthreat.

The Kremlin in Its political warfareeeled against West Oermany will seek to encourage defeatism and neutralism bySoviet military might andwhile at the same time It will use "peace" tactics to counter rearmamentSoviet propaganda will appeal to Oer-man nationalism by exploiting anti-American themes and by seeking to aggravate Francc-Ocrman differences. Trade offers and the lure of former German markets in Eastern Europe and mainland China will be dangled before West German businessmen.

As part of its "peace" tactics, the Kremlin may during the period of this estimate make proposals for the establishmentnited. Independent, and neutralized Germany on the basis of free all-German elections and the withdrawal of all occupation forces from Germany. However, we believe that such proposals would contain conditions which the Kremlin would intend to be unacceptable to the West, or that the Kremlin would intend to prevent the Implementation of agreements embodying these proposals.

We believe that during the period of this estimate, thc Kremlin will not give up or

2

Its control over East Germany even to prevent West German integration with the West or West German rearmament. So long as it retains East Germany, the Kremlin will remainosition to use East Germanyever In negotiations with the West and to prevent German unification on termsto tlie ultimate extension of Soviet control ,to all Germany. Furthermore, so long as Soviet troops occupy East Germany the USSR willaluable base for either offensive or defensive military operations and for attempts to Intimidate the West. Finally. East Germany has great economic andImportance for the Bloc Forwo estimate that East Germanyaboutercent of tha Bloc's total production of uranium ores and concentrates. It is unlikely that the Kremlin will surrender the great advantages which It derives from its control over East Germany in return for the establishmentnited and neutralwhich It might hope subsequently to subvert The Kremlin almost certainly fears that, ovennited Gennany were not only neutralized but disarmed, It would eventually rearm and turn against the USSR.

e believe, therefore, that the Kremlin will retain and consolidate Its hold on Eastand will seek to increase East German economic and military power. The Soviet program will be tantamount to making East Germanyull-fledged Satellite with security measures as rigorous, and Isolation of the population almost as complete as in the other Satellite states. However, tlie Kremlin probably believes that the formal Integration ot East Germany Into the Soviet BlocPeople's Democracy" would be likely tothe rearmament of West Germany and its integration with the West and to turn the pressure for German unity against thc USSR. Therefore, the Kremlin will probably continue to make concessions to the needs of thecampaign for all-German unity byulti-party facade in Eastand by allowing some non-governmental groups to maintain tenuous connections with West Germany. On the other hand. If the Soviet "peace" tactics are abandoned and the EDC agreements are ratified, thc Kremlin

mayeparate peace trealy and an alliance with East Germany and Incorporate it into the BlocPeople's Democracy."

The Kremlin probably estimates that the maintenance of Soviet control in Eastls dependent upon the presence of Soviet forces in East Germany. However, themay estimate that it could greaUythe effectiveness of Its political warfare campaign by removing some of Its overtmechanisms from Bast Germany,some of Its military forces. The Kremlin might expect that such moves would give the impression of Soviet willingness to withdraw entirely from East Gennany. thusGerman hopes for unification and theIn Western Europe, particularly in France,atisfactory settlement of the German problem.

It Is even conceivable that at tome stage the Soviet leaders might withdraw all Soviet forces from East Germany, if they werethattep would lead to the withdrawal of all US forces from Europe and would create conditions favorable to theof Soviet control over all of Germany. This isemote possibility, at least for the period of this estimate, but we believe it cannot be excluded entirely.

Despite the recent lessening of Sovieton West Berlin, we believe that theobjective of forcing the withdrawal of the Western Powers from West Berlin remainsSo long as the Kremlin continues its "peace" tactics, it will probably notnew harassing measures against West Berlin. However, preparations for sealing off West Berlin from East Germany and Easthave been substantially completed. If thc "peace" tactics are abandoned, West Berlin will probably be isolated from adjacent Soviet-controlled territory. The likelihood ofwith communications between West Berlin and West Germany, possiblyurface blockade of West Berlin, will Increase substantially If the EDC agreements areHowever, we believe that the Kremlin will carefully assess Western reaction to thc various forms of pressure employed, and that

3

Kremlin Is unlikely to adopt courses of acUon which, in its estimation, would Involve grave risk of general war.

n conclusion, there can be no doubt that the Kremlin regards West Germany asthe most powerful state in Western Europe, and as potentially the most danger-

ous, both to the realization of Soviet aggressive1 plans and to Uie security of the Bloc. During the period of this estimate, the Kremlin is likely to believe that the German situation Is not yet dangerous and that there remain op-portunities for influencing developments In Germany by political warfare.

Original document.

---

---