^OYIET,teEDyH5SK:PABrLITIES
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
ublished3
The'InteUigence Advisory Committeehis estimation 9Jakehe FBI abstained, thesubfect..
eing outside ol Its jurisdiction: The-faUdwlng member organizations of thedvisory Committee participated with the Central InUUi-'; genet Agency-ln the preparation of this estimate:-The'. -Intelligence organisations of the Departments .of.he Army, the navy, the Air Farce, and the Joint Staffs
CENTRAL INT^^IIGENCE iAGtHOW
OF
SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES7
THE PROBLEM
To analyze the principal factors affecting Soviet Bloc capabilities and lo esUmate the probable development ol those capabilities,
ASSUMPTION
That there will not be general war within the period of this estimate.
CONCLUSIONS
Developments within the USSRfrom thc change in leadership may ultimately affect Soviet Bloc capabilities, but so far the economic and military bases of Soviet power are believed not to have been affected by Stalin's death. This estimate, therefore, is based on thc trends within the Soviet Blocnd does not attempt to estimate whether, or to what extent, these trends may beby changes within the ruling group.'
Special Anuunt, Intelligence. Department of Stale. Uie Assistant Chief ofepartment ol thc Army, snd the Deputy Director for Intelligence. The Joint Stuff. belleTe that this sentence should be replaced with Uie following;
it is Impossible aa yet to estimate withwhether orrolonged struggle for power among the new leaders will developthee believe, however, that Iftruggle for power should develop, it would be confined to the higher echelons of thc Soviet Communist Party and Oovernmenl and would probably not precipitate open conflict within or between the armed force* and security police, or involve the Soviet popalaUon. Wethererore. thatstability of the regime In thc USSK la unlikely to be jeopardized bythat may develop among the Soviet leaders
Thc rate of growth of the Sovietwill almost certainly remain higher than that of the US or any other major Western state. However, the output of the USSR will remain much lower than that of the US, and the output of theBloc will remain much lower than that of the NATO states.
Bloc scientific and technicalwill continue to increase throughout the period of this estimate. However, the scientific assets (the number and quality of trained personnel, facilities,and financial support) of the US will remain greater than those of the USSR, arid thc assets of the Westhole will remain far greater than those of tlie Bloc.
Byhe USSR maytockpile oftomicilotone. have no evidence thateapons are being developed by the
'The estimates beyond mid-IBM are tentaUve pro]ecUons of the esUmalas for the earlier years.
2
Soviet research, development, and even field testing of thermonuclear reactions based on the disclosures of Kuchs may take place byt is very unlikely that the USSR couldull scale thermonuclearhascd on these disclosures beforehere isossibility that Soviet field tests based on independentand development along other and advanced approaches to theweapons problem might occur byesting of advanced models might be possible earlier if USwere known through espionage or other compromise.
he USSR now has the capabilityto disrupt Western long-range radio communications and navigationSoviet capabilities in relatedfields indicate that the USSR is now capable of developing equipment for jamming frequencies up through SHF, and the USSR could producef such equipment were producedarge scale and placed in operational use, it would probablya threat to Western short-range radio communications, navigation, and,esser extent, bombing systems,Western anti-jamming capabilities were improved.
e estimate that the size of Bloc forces-in-being will notlie emphasis in the program for increasing Bloc military strength will continue to be placed upon modernizing the armed forces and upon enlarging the atomic stockpile.
'For more detailed Information, ateioc CapablHUe* and Probable Couraea of AcUonpril
estimate that the Bloc now hasto undertake*operations in continentalthe Middle East, andThe Bloc could reinforce withCommunist and Soviet forcesforces now in Korea, andsame time undertake' an invasionby Soviet forces.
USSR now has the capabilityconcurrent airthe US, the UK, continentalthe Middle East, Japan, and theisland chain of Asia. against the US would bedifficult than those againstareas. The USSR has theto reach all parts of the US andthe delivery of its fullatomic weapons. However,ould reach onlynorthwestern corner onwithout aerial refueling.aerial refueling and otherttack upon thenortheastern industrial areamost of thc principal strategiccertainly would involve theof the attacking aircraftof the crews on one-wayiteavy bomber availableuse, the USSR will notcapability to reach most of theImportant areas in thceavy bombera type which has been seen in flight
'No esUmat* of the success of these oprraUooj can be made without considering the eflects of the actions of opposlne forces.
' We believe lhat the USSR haa the capability to uUUae range extension techniques, but we have no evidence Uial any of theae techniques have been ex pi oiled.
may be in production and may be(or operational use within the period of this estimate.*
estimate that the Bloc has theof providing vigorousair attacks on critical targetsinterior of the USSR, underof good visibility. Undernight conditions, Blocare fair against pistonand negligible against jetconditions of poor visibility, dayBloc interception capabilities
Currently known trends point to an increase of Bloc air defense capabilities during the period of this estimate.it is impossible to estimate theof significance of any increase,the future development of airborne intercept (Al) equipment and of guided missiles is obscure; in any case, such an estimate would require knowledge of the characteristics of attacking aircraft through the period of this estimate.'
Bloc naval forces (except forsubmarines, and new cruisers and
'For more detailed Information, seeapabilities for Attacks on the US through6.
'The Director of Naval Intelligence believes that this paragraph should read as follows:
Wc believe the Bloc will continue Its present emphasis on air defense, and that IU capabilities tn this respect will Increase during the period of this estimate. Operational use of Improved early warning and ground intercept radar, and the extensive employment of airborne Intercept equipment will contribute to thisdevelopment and production of all-weather Jet fighters and guided missiles, which are within Bloc capabilities, would further Improve Bloc air defense. However, we cannot estimate Uieof these Improvements relative toair offensive capabilities.
destroyers) as now constituted areto protect Bloc coastal areas and seaward flanks of ground campaigns. We believe that, as new construction with improved characteristics becomesemphasis will be laid on theof striking forces which couldwithin the limits of the range of land-based air support. Bloc minelaying capability is extensive, and in the event of war, could seriously interfere with Allied sea communications in Europe and the Far East, or with Western navalin waters adjacent to the USSR. The Soviet submarine force will increase its capability to undertake offensiveand mining operations along most of the world's strategically vital sea lanes, and possibly, if the specialized craft have been developed, simultaneously to launch guided missile attacks against.targets on both the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards of thehe Soviet Navy will have no long-range amphibious capabilitiesthe period of this estimate, but it will remain capable of mounting short-range amphibious operations in considerable force.
he principal sources of strength upon which Bloc political warfarearc based will remain Blocpower, which generates fear and defeatism, and the Bloc's size, strategic position, economic power and potential, and centralized direction. Other sources of Bloc political warfare strength are the highly organized Communistmovement, and the leadership and discipline of the individual Communist
believe the USSR capable of adapUneto this use. but we have no evidence to Indicate that such modifications have been made.
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Communist ideas and doctrine, which influence many non-Communists as well as Communists; and theexperience and professional skill of Soviet intelligence, propaganda, andorganizations and of Soviet use of front organizations. Finally, the fixity of Communist purpose to imposeon thc world and the unifiedof Communist action give thca taetical political warfare advantage in determining the nature,and intensity of courses of action to be used against the non-Communist world.
t is difficult to estimate how Bloc political warfare capabilities will develop, since they dependarge degree not only upon the situation within the USSR but also upon the success with which the non-Communist world meets theto its stability which would exist even if there were no Communist threat. It is also difficult to estimate theof Bloc political warfare capabilities because they are dependent not only on the relative attractive power ofand non-Communist ideas, but on the relative military strength of the Bloc and the West. If Western military strength should increase, relative to that of the Bloc, Bloc political warfarewould probably decline. On the other hand, fear of war and consequent vulnerability lo Bloc political warfare would probably increase in theworld, if the Bloc's capability to deliver atomic weapons should increase relative to Western defenses, and if the Bloc should improve its air defensesto Western offensive capabilities.'
We believe that during the period of this estimate Communist capabilities to establish Communist governments bywarfare techniques will be most likely to increase in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. These capabilities will probably remain greatest in Iran and Indochina.
In other areas of the world,capabilities to influence the attitudes of non-Communist governments andwill constitute the principal danger posed by Bloc political warfare. The Communists may be able to undermine support for Western programs of defense and for increased political and economic unity, and they may be able to heighten tensions among the members of thecoalition. For these purposes, they can exploit national differences between the Western Powers, economic and trade difficulties, nationalism in colonial and dependent areas, and dread of war.
' The Direclor of Naval tnlelllgence believes this paragraph should read as follows in order to render lhe military hypothesis more realistic and
inclusive;
II Is difficult to esUmate how Bloc political warfare capabiliues will develop, sincearge degree upon the situation within the USSR, the .success with which the non-Communist world meets the challenges to Its stability which would exist even if there were no Communist threat, and the relative rullltary strengths of the Bloc and the West. Thus. Bloc political warfare capablllUes will Increase if thc non-Communist world falls to solve adequately the problems of economic stability, naUonal rivalries, common defense, and aspirations tor independence in the colonial areas. If Western military strength and cohesion should Increase substantially relative to that of the Bloc. Blocwarfare capabiUUes would probably be checked, and might decline In some areas. On the other hand. If the over-all military strcneth of lhe Bloc should substantially Increase relative to that of the West. Bloc poUtical warfarewould rise. parUcularly with respcel to the promotion of appeasement. apaUiy, and the fear of war.
DISCUSSION
FACTORS AFFECTING BLOC CAPABILITIES
Internal Political Factors USSR
Developments within the USSR resulting from the change in leadership may ultimately affect Soviet Bloc capabilities, but so far the economic and military bases of Soviet power are believed not to have been affected by Stalin's death. This estimate, therefore, is based on the trends within the Soviet Blocnd does not attempt to estimate whether, or to what extent, these trends may be affected by changes within the ruling group.'0
Conflict within the ruling group would be thc Internal development most likely to jeopardize Soviet stability during the period of this cslimate. Tlie dissatisfaction latent among large numbers of the Sovietover low living standards and over the severity of police controls will remain great, but it will nothreat to the stability of the new regime. The years of isolation and indoctrination and theto instill hostility toward the West have almost certainly reduced but notthe reservoir of popular good will toward the US. During the period of this estimate, the regime will almost certainly be able to reduce further the effect of external propaganda on the general population of the
-The Special Assistant. Intelligence, Department of Stale, the Assistant Chlcfof, nnd the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Start, believe lhat this sentence should bewith the following:
It Is impossible as yet to estimate with-whether orrolonged struggle for power among thc new leaders will developthe. Wc believe, however, that Iftruggle for power should develop, it would be confined to the higher echelons of the soviet Communist Party and Government and would probably not precipitate open conflict within or between lhc armed forces and security police, or involve the Soviet population. Wetherefore, that the stability of the reirime in Uie USSR Is unlikely to be Jeopardized bythat may develop among the Soviet leaders.
USSR and to continue rigorous limitations on access to Western information."
ajor reorganization of Sovietmight, at least temporarily, weaken Soviet stability. Before Stalin's death, there were indications that the Soviet regime mightajor reorganization of Soviet agriculture, through an atlack upon the kolkhoz market and thc private sector of agriculture. While we believe it unlikely that the new Soviet rulers will adopt this policy, there Ls not sufficient evidence to make this estimate with confidence.ove would ensure more complete control ofand would satisfy the doctrinaire Communists. However, it would almostevoke peasant resistance andthe food supply, at least temporarily."
We believe It Improbable that any internaldevelopment, incossible sirupvle for power sufionR soviet leaders willIcoDaraTze the stability of the Soviet regime during the period of this estimate. As long as the Soviet leaders arc able to resolve their differences or to keep Incipient conflicts from spreading to the armed forces and security police, the existing system of controls over the popufaUon will al-
the Soviet regime was planning to introduce at some unspecified 'time, measures that wou'dor eliminate that kolkhos market ond the private_ economy of collective farmers, he also ^lr,^ich Ch^6cs could become effective Sn'ew*^
merit'oftKssStan'fchllr of^tar:
Mowing paragraph should be substituted for
Thc new Soviet leadership will almostpursue the Basic domestic policiesIs hed during recent years. In particular, it will con-
fu.ndamc'ltalh/ hostiletoward the West and to emphasizeBloc military power and tlie'ndustrtai base. It Is also",ew'cadershlp will institutechanges in Soviet agriculture duringol this
The Satellites
oviet control over the Satellites Iscomplete and is unlikely to diminish orto be successfully challenged from within-during the period of this estimate.truggle for power should break out within the Soviet ruling group and if lt werewithin the higher echelons of the Soviet Communist Party and Government. Soviet control over lhc Satellites would not beaffected.'* However, If thewithin the Party should spread to the Soviet Army and the Soviet Security Forces and should lead to open conflict within or between these forces, Soviet control over the Satelliles would be shaken.
In the unlikely event that the new Soviet rulers shouldolicy of rapidof agriculture In the Satellites, peasant resistance would increase andproduction in thc Satellites would decline for some time. However, evenollectivization of agriculture In theltcs would probnbly not seriously shakeiet control.
There will continue to be purges of the various Satellite Communist Parties, but the purges arc unlikely to weaken the reliability of these Parties or their control over the Satellite populations. The USSR will almost certainly not be able7 completely to isolate the population of the Satellites from Weslern Information, and thc passivenow general among thc Satellitewill persist and perhaps increase.Communist indoctrination of selected segments of the population, including the youth, and favored treatment of some groups will almost certainly increase the number of supporters of the Soviet system.
"The Special Assistant,Department of Stale, and the Assistant Chief of. believe that this sentence should read: >
Eventruggle for power should brcnk out within the Soviet rutins group, the struggle would probably be carried on within Uie higher echelons of the Soviet Communist Party and Government and would not slRnMcantly affect Soviet control over the Satelliles.
Communist. China
The Chinese Communist regime has firm control over mainland China, and there is little likelihood of its control beingor shaken by domestic forces within the period of this estimate, unless Communist China shoulderious military defeat or unless conflict should develop within the Chinese Communist Party over thcbetween Moscow and Peiping.
Communist China has accepted Moscow leadership in the international Communist movement, but appears to be more an allyatellite. Moscow and Peipinga united front to the world and are apparently agreed upon the following aims;
eliminate Western power andfrom Asia.
increase their military potential in
Asia.
prevent the resurgence of annon-Comrounlst Japan.
advance the world Communistin particular, to divide thecountries and to weaken theirdetermination to combat Communism.
Thc military dependence of Communist China upon the USSR will almost certainly increase, at least until the Korean war has ended- The Chinese Communists have launched an Industrialization program, which will require large-scale Imports ofequipment. So. long as Western trade controls continue, these requirements can be met only by Imports from the Bloc.should thereeduction of tension in Asia, the military and economicof Communist China upon the USSR might be reduced.
Sino-Soviet relations may be strained by problems relating to levels of Soviet economic aid. by the extent of Soviet militarylo Communist China, by disagreement over the control of border territories, ond by the definition of Mao's role in the Asian Communist movement. However, we believe that tbc new Soviet leadership will dealwith Mao andplit between
Peiping and Moscow Is unlikely during the period of this estimate, unless the stability of the Soviet regime should be seriously
Economic Factors"
gross national product of thebeen Increasing rapidly during theyears. Calculation of its magnitudewith prewar years aresubject to considerable error. Wehowever, that8 level offor thc Blochole hade estimate further that bygross national product was aboutgreater thanhusthe averageercent per annum.
The rate of growth of the Soviet economy will almost certainly remain higher than the rnle which thc US or any other majorstate will attain, unless thererastic reorientation of Soviet economic programs. We estimate that the Soviet average rate of growth during tlie period27 willercent annually and that Soviet gross national product will increaseoercent.
Despite Soviet achievements during the postwar years, the output of the USSR will remain much lower than that of the US, and thc output of the entire Bloc will remain much lower than that of the NATO states. Wc estimate that thc Soviet gross national production was about one-quarter to onc-thlrd that of the USnd that the gross national product of thc entire Bloc was about one-third that of the NATO states. These disparities in ratio terms willbe reduced slightly during the period of this estimate, although the disparities interms will be widened somewhat. Bloc output In the basic Industriesenergy,
"These wU males of Bloc economic developmenta are based largely upon postwar publishedplans nnd recent trends In the USSR; the Satellites, and Communist China. The esU-mates do not consider whether, or to whatthese trends or plans may be affected by changes within the ruling group of the USSR or by developments oulalde the Bloc.
minerals, metals, and chemicalswillsubstantially below that of the NATO slates.
comparisons in terms ofof all types of goods and servicesmisleading as Indicators ofcapacity to produce militarypeacetime. Since the end of Worldthc USSR hasuch largerof Its gross national product topurposes than has any Westernestimate that about one-sixth ofgross national product is nowmilitary outlays, and that thcremain at least as high throughof this estimate,
Bloc during thc period of thiswill almost certainly continue toupon expanding its industrialSoviet industrial production willexpand by aboutoercent.production of consumer goodswill probably Increase onlyto one-third. Satellitea whole will probably .expandnot so rapidly as that of theindustrial output inwill probably also Increase, lt willtomall part of the Blocof consumer goods in theand in Communist China willmore slowly than In the USSR.
resent per capita food consumption In thc USSR (in terms of calories) is nearly equal toverage. Agricultural output in the USSR will probably increase betweenndercent during thc period of this estimate. The largest gain will be In non-food crops. Qualitatively, the average diet will probably improve somewhat during the period of thisespite the growth of new centers ofin the USSR, the older industrial(including the Urals) will still provide the bulk of Soviet industrial production Programs to disperse Soviet industry and to create self-contained regional complexes will continue, but the production of many basic materials and of most equipment will remain geographic oily concentrated.
The Soviet stockpiling program Isto maintain vital sectors of theunder wartime or emergency conditions and to facilitate the conversion of Industryartime footing. We are unable tothc magnitude and composition of the Soviet stockpiles, but wc believe Increases In total production7 willonsiderably enlarged strategic stockpile. Stockpiling has already begun in someand we believe that during the period stockpiling programs will be adoptedthe Bloc.
he Bloc economy wUl haveigher level of self-sufficiency than at present, although certain imported items will remain of substantial Importance to Bloc Industrial and military production. These items include electronic tubecertain chemicals, certain types of machinery and equipment with their spare parts, and probably also tin, natural rubber, copper, zinc, and cork. If these Items ofshould cease to be available, bottlenecks would appear in the Bloc productive system, andimited period of time adversewould spread through thc economy."
We believe that Bloc capabilities forto the non-Communist world willsomewhat during the period of this estimate. Wc estimate that7 thc Bloc
'will be capable of exporting capitaland Increased quantities of-rawto thc non-Communist world.
Scientific ond Technical Factors"
scientific and technicalIncreased rapidly since World Warwc believe that they will continue tothroughout the period of thisUSSR has given science and technologypriority and has given greatIncreasing the contribution of science and
"For more detailed discussion of this problem, seeProbable Economic Effects Severance of East-Westprtf 1VM).
"These estimates of development* In Blocand technology are based on Uiethatand technical capablllUea will not be sleniftcanUy affected by poliUcal developments.
technology to Bloc military capabilities, with results most evident ln air defense and in the development and producUon of atomic weapons.
Tlie scientific assets of the US (theand quality of trained personnel,equipment, and financial support) are greater than those of the USSR, and the assets of thc Westhole are far greater than those of the Bloc. However, the USSH tsgreat effort to reduce tills disparity, and it will probably continue toigher proportion of its scientific andassets to military purposes than the US Therefore, the difference between Soviet and US scientific capabilities in this period may not be so significant as the over-all superiority of thc US in scientific assets would suggest
Soviet higher education In most scientific and technical fields is roughly comparable to lhat of the West,hortage of scientific and technical personnel will continue throughout the period of this estimate. We estimate that there are slightly over oneSoviet citizens who have receivedor technical degrees from colleges and universities (about three-fifths tho USre people are engaged lnresearch and in teaching science In the USSR, compared toimilarly engaged In the US. We estimate that during the period of this estimate at least as many people will graduate In engineering and the physical sciences in the USSR as in the US
Soviet science and technology arc subject to the same type of centralized planning and control as all other Soviet activities. Even though Soviet scientistsrivileged group, their research is subject to many of thc usual totalitarian restrictions. Such restrictions will probablyore deadening effect upon long-range theoretical research than upon practical applications within the period of this estimate. While numerous theories in chemistry, physics, and biology have beenthere is no evidence that Ideological restraints hamper developments directlymilitary weapons.
East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser extent other Satellite countries,
CliGRE'fl
scientific and technical manpower and (acuities whichignificantto thc total resources at the disposal of the Bloc. On the other hand. Communist China, because of thc extreme shortage of scientific and technical manpower andls unlikely to contribute to Bloc science.
Scientific and Technical Capabilities in Particular Fields
ince World War II, the USSR has made substantial achievements in atomic energy, aircraft design and production, electronics, and ordnance. Soviet science will continue to contribute substantially to the Increase of Bloc military strength and capabilities throughout the period of this estimate,in the following fields:
a. Atomic and Thermonuclear Weapons. The Soviet atomic energy program willtu have one of the highest priorities in the allocation of Bloc resources. Sovietfor atomic research will remain considerably less than those of the US in both personnel and equipment. We believe that the Soviet atomic energy program willto concentrate almost entirely upon the 'development and production of weapons."
We have no evidence that thermonuclear weapons are being developed by tho USSR. Basic research which may be relatedhermonuclear program is being carried on, and the USSRrowing capacily for quantity production of materials which could be used in the development of thermonuclear weapons. Soviet research, development, and even field testing of thermonuclear reactions based on the disclosures of Puchs may take place byowever, it is verythat thc USSR couldull scale thermonuclear device based on thesebeforehere is also athat Soviet field tests based onresearch and development along other and advanced approaches to theweapons problem might occur byesting of advanced models might be possible earlier if US developments were known through espionage or other
"See paragraphor the csUmatcd alt* ol the Soviet atomic stockpile.
Soviet aircraft laboratorieswill continue lo develop andof high performance qualities.endost Soviet combatbe gas turbine (turbo-jet,Fighter aircraft superior lo thcJet fighter, theay alreadydeveloped and may be inn all-weather jetalso have been developed, and suchmay be ln operational useWithin the period of this estimate,may complete development andproductionet medium bomber.bomber basedype whichseen ln flight may be in productionbe available for operational useperiod of this estimate.
Thc USSR has madeprogress ln expanding itsand in adapting WesternIs now developing and putting Intoelectronic equipment of modernSoviet electronics industry is nowindependent research and developmenlthe technical capability to produceelectronic equipment. Wehe USSR will have developed andproduction the following equipment.unable lo estimate the prioritiesof these kinds of equipment or thcof each kind which will be produced.
Improved early earning radar with performances at least equivalent to thc best now in operational use in the West.
Ground control intercept radar for stralegic areasnd forThe USSR now has at leasteara GCI sets In operational use.)
Fire-control radar, includingradar, comparable to equipment now in operational use In the West; field radar for field artillery fire. and airborne fire-control radar.
Blind bombing/navigation radar. (The USSR now has some operationalwith this equipment.)
Airborne intercept equipment. The USSR almost certainly now has experimental quantities of some type of AI equipment, and il may have some type ol AI equipment avail-
able.for limited operational use. although the Indications are not as yet conclusive. We estimate that AI will come Into extensive use within thc period of this estimate.
War/are. Thehas the capability seriously tolong-range radionavigationovietin related electronic fields indicateUSSR is now capable of developingfor Jamming frequencies upand the USSR couldf sucharge scale and placed inuse. it would probably constituteto Western short-range radionavigation, and.essersystems, unless Westerncapabilities were improved.
Warfare. The USSR hasto produce and disseminateCW agents. It also possessestechnical capabilities for thenerve gases. Although there is muchof research closely related tothere is no evidence thatnew chemical warfare end-itemto be developed
iological Warfare. On the basis of known and estimated Soviet capabilities, we estimate that the USSR can develop andseveral highly virulent BW agents. Within thc period of this estimate, the USSR might also accomplish the directed mutation of selected viruses and bacteria and thcof certain animal viruses. Success in the application of such research to the production of virulent and stable variant* might increase Soviet BW capabilities."
"For more detailed Information, seeloc CapabiliUes and Probable Courses of Action In Electromagneticpril
"The Assistant Chief of. and the Director of Naval Intelligence believe that available seienUflc evidence at present raises doubt as to thc probability ol crystallizlng animal viruses and indicates UmltaUons as lo which viruses could be eryatalllaed.there is no evidence at this time that If one or several animal viruses could bethai this would affect BW capabiliUes
g. Guided Missiles. While we know that the USSR acquired German operaUonalplans, and personnel and that ato develop guided missiles has been in progress for several years, we lack adequate data to determine the priorities which may exist between the various categories ofthe characteristics of the weaponsand the quantities which are being produced. Wc know that the USSR has built atimited number ofypes. We believe that it has the capability to produce, within the period ot this estimate, operational quantities of other guided missiles, including surface-to-air, air-to-air, and air-to-surface types. Wc nl.so believe that the USSR has the capability of fitting atomic warheadsypeand of adapting submarines to launch such missiles.
MILITARY FACTORS AFFECTING BLOC CAPABILITIES*0
lie Bloc nowignificantsuperiority over the major Western Powers in combat forccs-in-being and inground and air armament.the Bloc profits from centralized control and direction and from greater geographical concentration.
otal forces-in-being, including Security Forces. Total armed force strength will probably Increase byotal oft present, the total is. of which0 arc
"These estimates are based upon an analysis of trends In the development of the Bloc military forces, of current Bloc military strength, ol Uie Bloc weapons research and developmentand of data from other sources. Tliey do not consider whether, or to what extent, these trends or plans may be affected by changes within the ruling group of the USSR or hy developments outside thcor Mi detailed Information concerning Bloc military strength, see Uie Appendices1Soviet Bloc CapabiliUes throughnd thetoSoviet Bloc Capabilities throughhich will probably be pub llshed In1
Chineseorth Korean;iet Mlnh. Most of Uie increase In Bloc armed force strength will beby thc Satellites, whose forces-ln-being will probably increase fromoen.
Ground Forces.loc ground troops Will probably totalfill be0 Chineseorth Korean;iet Mlnh. The mobilization capacity of ground forces0 will probably be0 men, comparedresent capacityhe disposition of Soviet ground troops will probably not changewith aboutercent remaining stationed in Eastern Europe and thc Western USSR;ercent in thc Far0 percent in thc Caucasus; andercent in Middle Asia. The troops in East Germany willthe most combat ready, and in general the troops along the borders will bemore combat ready than those in the interior.
Air Forces. We estimate that at present: (a) the actual strength of the Bloc air forces is0 aircraft.etiston medium bombers,et light bombers, and (b) the authorized strength is0etistonbombers,et light bombers. Over-all authorized strength is not expected to Increase significantlyut thestrength will probably be closer to thestrength than it is now.
The following significant developments are also expectedomplete conversion of Soviet fighter and light bomber components to jet aircraft,arked expansion of the jet fighter and jet light bomber elements of the Satellite and Chinese Communist air forces. It is also possible that some jet medium bombers and turbo-prop heavy bomb-
"Thls docs nothinesePublic Security (provincial)ightly-armed and equipped full-Ume force, used largely for security purposes andource of trained manpower for the field forces.
ers will be Introduced into the long-range striking force. We have very littleon Soviet development work on new types of medium or heavy bombers, but it seems safe to assume that the USSR is planning to replace theiston medium bomber with aircraft of higher performance characteristics. While no Soviet prototype Jet medium bomber ls known to exist, there is firm evidence of the advanced stages of the development of the German-designedet medium bomber,rototype of such an aircraft mayhave beenrototype heavy bomber has been observed; it was probably then powered by piston engines, but it may now be powered by turbo-prop engines. This type of aircraft is not known to be in series production.
Aboutercent of the present total Soviet air strength, includingf the jet fighter force andf thc medium bomber force, is now concentrated in the European Satellites and the western and southwestern portions ot the USSR. We believe that thesewill not change significantlyxcept that about one-third of medium bomber strength will be In the Far East. Theand Communist Chinese air forces will almost certainly remain dependent upon the USSR for logistic support.
Naval Forces. We believe that the present Bloc naval construction program will beconcentrating upon cruisers,submarines, and patrol craft. The number of major surface vessels" willincrease fromnits, and submarine strength will probablyfromofre ocean-goingong-range andedium range)otal ofofill be ocean-goingong-range andediumoviet Naval Aviation will probably continue to
"This Includes all naval vessel types down to and including coastal destroyers. Tho figures for surface vesselsumber ofunits;eavy and Ught cruisers, andestroyer types. Submarines overears old are considered obsolete and are not Included In these esUinates.
broaden Its concept of operations ondto stress fleet support tasks and coordinated operations with surface andforces.
he USSR has the capability of building carriers and battleships (as well as cruisers) in alUts fleet areas except the Far East, and thc emerging pattern of its present building programoncept of operations beyond defense of the coast. While It is possible, that one or more battleships orcarriers may be laid down, we do not believe that any capital ships other than cruisers will be completed during the period of this estimate. The Bloc will probably also continue to lack modern amphibious vessels. Thc Baltic fleet comprises aboutercent, the Pacific and Northern fleets each aboutoercent, and tbe Black Sea fleet aboutercent of the major surface vessel andstrength. We cannot estimate the type and extent of redeployment which will take place as new construction becomes
Dale
tomic Weapons. In our calculation of thc Soviet atomic stockpile, weapon types0 kllotons are assumed. The estimate of the cumulative Soviet stockpile of such weapons follows. In view of ourconcerning the production ofble materials, particularlyhe possible minimum and maximum quantities of weapons in that stockpile are also Indicated.
Possible
We believe that weaponsare probably within Soviet capability nnd that the USSR could make smaller weapons (as lown the event that the USSH should choose to stockpile weapons of smaller or larger yield, the number of weapons In the stockpile would be altered accordingly.
" The estimates beyondrr tentative
projections of tlie csUmates for the curlier years.
Trends. We believe that thein the program for Increasing Blocstrength will continue to be placedthe armed forces and uponthe atomic stockpile.
over-all capabilities of Blocnnd air forces will almost certainlyto increase during the periodesult of: continuedtraining; progressivestandardization of weapons andparticularly those Incorporatingguidance and control; Increasedefficiency of Satellite andforces; enlargement of the Blocbase; and the growth of Soviet stocksmateriel.
owever, the Bloc armed forces willto be hampered by certain weaknesses: deficiencies in experience, training, andfor strategic air operations and airthe lack of experience and of specialized equipment for the conduct of long-rangeand naval operations; significant qualitative disparities between Bloc units, both within and between national forces; and the complicated logistics arising from the size of Bloc territory and the relatively Inadequate road and rail network and merchant fleet.
Bloc Military Capabilities
We estimate that thc Bloc now has the capability to undertake" concurrent large-scale operations* in continental Europe, the Middle East, and mainland Asia The Bloc could reinforce with Chinese Communist and Soviet forces the Communist forces now in Korea, and at thc same tunc undertake" an invasion of Japan by Soviet forces.
Flue naval forces (except for thesubmarines, and new cruisers andas now constituted are designed to protect Bloc coastal areas and the seaward finnkround campaign. However,haracteristics of the new constructionppearing, and the Increasing coordination between Naval Aviation and the Fleeta growing emphasis on offensive opera-
"No ciUmate of Uie success of these operations can be made without considering the effects of the actions of opposing force*,
BT.
top crjoncT-
13
tlons. We believe that, as newupon thc strategic northeastern Indus-
becomes operational, emphasis will be laidarea and upon most of the principal stra-
the creation of striking forces whichbases almost certainly would involve the
operate within the limits of the range ofof the attacking aircraft and most
based air support. With respect to minethe crews on ono-way missions. Until it
fare, the USSR now has the capability ofa heavy bomber available for operational
ously interfering with Allied seathc USSR will not have the capability to
Hons. In the European area, this effortmost of the strategically important
include all the ports and approaches of thein the US on two-way missions. A
and Western Europe. In the Far East,bomber basedype which has
of the vital Allied port areas and seaseen in flight may be ln production and
around the perimeter of the Bloc couldbe available for operational use within
similarly attacked. The advancement inperiod of this estimateand use of mines and the introduction
of jet bomber types for minelayingWe estimate that the Bloc has theincrease this threat to Allied supplyof providing vigorous oppositionSoviet Navy will have no long-rangeattacks on critical targets in thecapability within the period ofthe USSR, under conditions of goodbut it will remain capable of Under clear moonlit nightshort-range amphibious lifts indefense capabilities are fair againstforce. The Soviet submarine forcebombers and negligible against jetits capability lo undertakers. Under conditions of poor visibility,and mining operations along mostr night. Bloc interception capabilitiesworld's strategically vital sea lanes,if the specialized craft have beensimultaneously to launch guidedCurrently known trends point lo anattacks against target* on both theof Bloc air defense capabilitiesand Pacific seaboards of theperiod of this estimate. However, it isThc USSR now has the capability toto esUmate the extent orconcurrent air operationsany mcrease. because Uie futureUS. the UK, continental Europe, theo(quipment and of guidedEast. Japan, and the off-shoree,Asia However. operaUons against theof the characteristicsbe much more difficult than thoseaircraft through the period ofthe other areas Thc USSR hasto reach all parts of the US and to
attempt the delivery of its full stockpilemore suited InformaUon. see SEJO "So-
./ CapabiliUes for Altack on Uie OS through
atomic weapons. However,MarchiMJi.
downould reach only theDirector of Naval Intelligence believes that
northwestern corner on two-way missionsparagraph should read as follows:
out aerial refueling. Even with aerialbelieve Uie Bloc will continue iu present
.ngjmd other range extension
i.mi uk or-sc. out we nave no evidenceearly warning and groundlhat such modlflcaUons haveand tho extensive employment ofintercept equipment will contribute to
No esUmate of the success of theseIncrease. The developmenl and produe-
can be made without considering Uie effect*of all-weather Jet flgliters and guided mls-
tlie actions of opposingwhich are within Bloc capablUUcs. would
believe that Uie USSR has Uie capabilityImprove Bloc air defense However, we
utilise range extension techniques, but wcesUmate the significance of these Im-
no evidence lhat any of these techniques relaUve to future air offensive
oe#-n
"We believe the USSR capable ol adaptingof this esUmate. Operational use of im-
marhies to this use. but we have no
FACTORS AFFECTING BLOC POUTICAL WARFARE STRENGTH
olitical warfare plays on extremelyrole for Communists, who consider military warfare only an extension of poliUcal warfare in their persistent campaign tothc strength of the non-Communlst world. Bloc political warfare techniquespolitical and economic pressure,manoeuvres in the UN and elsewhere, propaganda and front activities, the action of Communist Parties andtrade unions outside thc Bloc, sabotage, exploitation of subversive and revoluUonary movements and of civil wars, andwarfare.
GO. The principal sources of strength upon which Uloc political warfare capabilities are based will remain Bloc military power, which generates fear and defeatism, and the Bloc's size, strategic position, economic power and potential, and centralized direction. Other sources of Bloc political warfare strength are the highly organized Communistmovement, and the leadership andof the Individual Communist Parties; Communist doctrine, which influences many non-Communists as well as Communists; and the accumulated experience and professional skill of Soviet intelligence, propaganda, and subversive organizations and of Soviet use of front organizations. Finally, the fixity of Communist purpose to Impose Communism on the world and the unified direction ofaction give thcaction! political warfare advantage In determining the nature, direction, and intensity of courses of action lo be used against thcworld.
n thc other hand, there are factors which tend to place limitations upon Bloc political warfare strengths These include theof the Communist philosophy and the Communist world outlook, especially inpolitical developments in the-non-Communist world; tbe Communist Insistence upon the maintenance of totalitarian control; frequent conflicts between the Interests of the Soviet Communist Parly and the interests of oilier national Communist Parties; and In-
creasing awareness ln the non-Communist worldspecially ln the West, of the actual conditions prevailing within the Bloc and of the Kremlin's aggressive IntenUons.
political warfare capabilitiesthe stability and power of thecapabilities would be seriouslya prolonged and indecisive struggleshould develop within the SovietParty ortruggle for powerSoviet Communist Party should spreadSoviet Army and the Sovietand should lead to open conflictor between these forces.
some time, the new Soviet leadersbe able to achieve Stalin's status asof thc International Communistand as the undisputed leader ofThis may have an adverseupon rank-and-file CommunistsBloc, at least temporarily, althoughthat thc loyalty of the hard core ofParties outside thc Bloc willImpaired. If there should be afor power within the SovietParty, the cohesion of theCommunist movement wouldbe weakened.
t is difficult to estimate how Blocwarfare capabilities will develop, since they dependarge degree not only upon the situation within the USSR but also upon the success with which the non-Communlst world meets thc challenges to Its stability which would exist even If there were no Communist threat. Thus. Bloc political warfarewould increase if thc non-Communist world should fall to maintain economicif nationalist conflicts ln Westernshould be intensified; if conflicts between the US and its allies should undermine the program for improved Western defenses, nnd if nationalist movements in colonial areas should stimulate rebellions against thePowers. Bloc political warfare capablli-Ues would decrease if the non-Communlst world during the period of this estimate should succeed tn neutralizing or overcoming Uie dangers arising from problems such as these.
It is also difficult to estimate theof Bloc political warfare capabilities because they are in large part dependent on the relative military strength of the Bloc and the West. If Western military strength should Increase, relative to that of the Bloc. Bloc political warfare capabilities woulddecline. On thc other hand, fear of war and consequent vulnerability to Bloc political warfare would probably Increase tn the non-Communist world. If the Bloc's capabilities to deliver atomic weapons should increase relative to Western defenses, and if the Bloc should improve its air defenses relative to Western offensive capabilities*1
Bloc Political Warfare
OB. We believe that during the period of this estimate Communist capabilities to establish Communist governments by political warfare techniques will be most likely to increase In Southeast Asia and the Middle East. In these areas, the political and economicof some st.are unstable, andchanges are often sudden and violent. Communist capabilities for infiltration andmay Increase because of thenationalism In those areas, the social disintegration and economic dislocations which afflict those societies, and theleadership of the governments. These capabilities will probably remain greatest in Iran and Indochina.
a. Iran. Iran will probably remainunstable, and thc Tudeh Party will re-
"The Director of Naval Intelligence believes that Hits paragraph should read as follows In order to render the military hypothesis more reallUlc and Inclusive:
Il ls also difficult to estimate the development ot Bloc poliUcal warfare capablllUes because Ihey arc in large part dependent on the relative military strength of Bloc and the West If Western military strength and cohesion should Increase substantially relative to that of thec political warfare capabilities would probably be checked, or even decline In some areas. On the other hand. If the over-allstrength of the Dloe should increaserelaUT* to that of the West, uloc political warfarewould rise,with respect to the promotion otapathy, and the fear of war.
anger Uiroughout this period, since the NaUonal Front appears to be insufilcienUy unified totable government and since the peasants will remainettlement of the oil crisis might diminish Tudeh capabilities.
b. Southeast Asia. The Communists will continue to have dangerously significant capabilities for political warfare in this area, with the probable excepUon of the Philippines. The poUtical fate of most of this region may be decided In Indochina.
n other areas of the world, thehave some capability to establishgovernments through politicaltechniques, but their capability tothe attitudes of non-Communlstand peoples will constitute the principal danger posed by Bloc politicalThe Communists may be able tosupport for Western programs ofand for Increased poliUcal and economic unity, and they may be able to heighten tensions among tho members of the Western coalition. For these purposes, they cannational differences between the Western Power, economic and trade difficulties,in colonial and dependent areas, and dread of war.
Europe and Japan. InEurope and Japan, theapability to harassconfuse opinion, and to interfereprocesses, even thoughthese Parties will probably decline inin influence. Moreover, in theseBloc may be able to use economicparticular effectiveness. ForBloc may be able to conclude and totrade agreements damaging to theand to thc export controls of thestates.
Tlie Communists retainto use the German problem tothe Western program for defenseIncreased unity. This capability willincreasingly dangerous unlessis formally brought into thecoalition In the near future andfears of France are calmed. Even if
Western Germany is brought Into thecoalition, the traditional mutualbetween Germany and her Western
European neighbors will probably continue to offer opportunities for creating dissension and friction.
Original document.
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