PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN GUATEMALA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the current political situation in Ouatcmala and probable future
CONCLUSIONS
current political situation inis adverse to US Interests. The Guatemalan Communists exercise ainfluence far out of proportion to their small numerical strength. Theirwill probably continue to trow as long as President Arbeni remains in power.
Communist Influence In Guatemala is based on militant advocacy of socialand nationalistic policies.identified with the Guatemalan Revolutiont is exercised through the personalof individual Communists with the President and within thepolitical parties, throughof the bureaucracy, throughof labor organisations, and through leadership of the agrarian reformThe Communists' presentis not open and direct control of Guatemala. Rather, they seek toGuatemalally of the United Stat, sand to convert Its Govemmentlnto an effective, though Indirectly controlled, instiumenl of Communism.
J. President Arbeni still exercisescontrol ot the Administration and of the Army and the Police. It is still possible for him to break his ties with the Communists and to moderate the policies of his Administration, but it is highly unlikely that he will do so.
Implementation of the Agrarianlaw2 will be the principal objective of the Arbeni Adinlnlstraliont is to be expected that the large Guatemalan landholders and the United Pratt Company will beIn the process.
The Implementation of Agrarianhasense of Insecurity which hasepressing effect on business activity In Guatemala. However, Its direct effect on agriculturalIs likely to be negligible, at least for several years. As long as coTee prices hold up the general economy ofwill not, be vitally affected. -*
The nel internal political effect of the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law will probably be to strengthen the Arbens Administration and to Increase Communist Influence and capab'lilles. Keither the landholdeia nor the Fruit Company can expect any sympathy In Guatemalan public opinion. Red.slrlbu-tion of their land will be used to mobilize the hitherto Ineit peasantry In support of the Administration,
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he most effective opposition to the Arbenz Administration is found In Quale-mall City. Tlie urban elements which constitute this opposition are strongly anU-Communist, but they are also sltongly nationalistic. In general they could not be expected to make common cause with the landholders and the Fruit Company or to welcome foreignIn Guatemalan internal affairs, al* though some of them might be disposed to accept foreign assistance InAtbenz. There is no hkelihood that this urban opposition could alter the course of the Government by political action. It could not succeed In aattempt opposed by the Army.
The Army Is the only organizedIn Guatemala capable of rapidly and decisively altering theuick change ofIs always possible, there Is noreason to doubt the continued loj alty of the Army high command and of most of the Aimy to Arbenz. The Army under its present leaders could not be expected to take revolutionary action unlessecame convinced that their personal security and well-being were threatened by Communist Infiltration andof the Government, or unless the policies of the Government were loin extreme social disorder andcollapse.
So long as It remains united, the Guatemalan Aimy can defeat any force which the Governments of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua could deploy against It. These Governments arethot the trend In Guatemala will lead to Commun'st subversion and sociallu their territories. They are probably giving serious consideration to the possibility ofolitical change In Guatemala throughsupport of revolutionary action there. It Is highly unlikely, however, that they would or could mount an open military intervention In Guatemala.
Guatemala will probably continue lo assist Communist subversive activities In the Caribbean area, but will probably avoid involvement In filibustering opera-lions like those of the Caribbean Legion. To counterbalance ItsIn Central America It will seek political support elsewhere, particularly in the United Nations. If actuallyIt would seek to Invoke the Rio Treaty as well as the UN Charter.
Guatemala haa frequently taken occasion to demonstrate its independence of US leadership and In general has been less cooperative than could be desired, particularly In Hemispheric affairs. Moreover, the regime has systematically been hostile toward US private economic interests In Guatemala. Detriment to Hemisphere solidarity would not deter Guatemala from any course of action suggested by its own Interests.
discussion
arbenz administration
he presentituation InIs the outgrowth of tbe Revolution That Revolution waa something more
outine military coup. From It theretrong national movement to free Ouatems'a from the mllitaiy dictatorship, social back* aidnd "economic
bin" which nndthe pattern of the put. These aspirations hare Inspired the loyally andith the srU Interest of moatGualcmalsiu. The Ar-bent AdmlnlttratiOD still derives some strength from ita claim to leadership of the continuing ruiUunal revolution
n the name erf the Revolution1 the successive admmistrtlk-ns ofnd Arbenz have pursued Increasingly radical and natkmalistlc fxttrtes. Theirof fon-lgn economic interests In Guatemala, especially tho United Fruitand their demands lor ihe 'restitution" of Belue (Br.llsh Honduras) hare had the atii/port orot alnxat allTheirollon of labor organiia. lion end agrarian reform has tended lopolitical opposition by creating mass support for the present regime. Anyto the trend of developments inhas been stigmatized as resistance to the Revolution4 bynd
Tho toleration of Comieiinist activity which characterized the early years ol Arevato Admlntatrstion has developed into anworking alliance between Arbcru and ihe Comrm-nkta. The pursuit of leftist and nationalistic policies has been greatly accel-cialed under live Arbrni Administration HU first year In office waa highlighted by active Government support for the formationational labor totdederaUon andoint UborXlovrrnment attack on the United Fruit Company. That attack failed, but theof the Government with Communist led organttcd labor was firmly established in the course of the struggle.
The potnl of reference for consideration of the present political tensions In Guatemala Is the Agrarianw enacted inhis Law provides for theof Urge tracts of unused land andtnbutlon to farmlthough pre irnlcd^ overdue measure of social and ecooc-inic refoi m. Ihe Law has stream political motivation and significance. Communists snd felknetrawleraeading part In Its enactment; they honeycomb the National
Agrarian Department established toit. The Cornmunists have Incitedpeasant setiutes of privately owned landsw is being administered Inay ss to destroy the political eflecllttness of the large landholders and to mobilize the hitherto politically Inert peasantry In support of the regime.
ne recent congressional electoralhas futthir emphasised Art-ens" political alliance with the Communists. Pressure from the President's office forced someAdministration supporters to accept the newly reorganised and legallted Communbt Party (called the Guatemalan Labor Party, or POT) Into the Electoral Front, thecoalition. The Electoral Fronthe country, except Guatemala City, where Its ticket was decisively detestedtrong anil-Communist vole. The over-all result of the electioneduction of Opposition strength in Congress from eleven lo flvs of theeats. Although Communist Party representation remained at four, themembership Includes several addl-tiona] ciyptoCommunlstsajority may be considered sympathetic toward thtParty Une so long as Arbena favors It.
A further Increase In political tension has resultedupreme Courtuatemalan landholder who had appealed for prolect-ou from arbitrary esecu-tioo ol the Agrarian Reform law: At tht in-silgauon of Arbeni. the Ouaternajn Congress Immediately unseated the Justices whohis decision and replaced therri with others more reliable from IU point of view. This action provoked an Intense but transitoryon Ihe pan of professional and other elements In Ooatemala City already entl-Admintotrauon In sentiment
President Arbeniiddle-classas have most of his political associates. At least initially, his Involvement with Revolu-Uonaiy forces was probably asatter of simple political expediency and opportun-Ism as of peiaonal Inclination. By now. however, he has become emotionally com-milted to the social and nationalisticof the Revolutionspecially to
Agrarian Reform. Although flDtltty notommunist, he hat foundleaders among his mast ardent and useful .upportf rs and value* accordingly his political alliance with litem. Inasmuch as Arbeni has thus far kepi personal control of the corurtd-trable powers ol the Guatemalan Presidency. It Is sliU po-aible lot him to break with the Communists and lo moderate the pohclea of hi* Admlnlsti stion. He has shown noto do so, however. Aa the situation in Guatemala develops the political slUrnaU.es open to him are steadily reduced.
Communist Strength ond Influence
IV The Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party Is estimated lo have no moreembers, of whom perhaps less than one-hali arc militants The Parly is In openwith International Communism thiough the Communlst<ontrutledlabor organisations (the latinCTAL and the world wide WFTU) and through vtolls made to the Soviet Bloc byCommunists and front group
The Communists have achieved theirpoll lira! influence In Guatemala, notolitical party competing with others, bul through personal Influence with the President and through the coordinated activity ofCommunists within the leftist pouti-esl parties and labor unions which emerged from the Revolution of ttti. This Cornmu-nUt infiltration of other parties andhas been facilitated by the coincidence ofCommunist social and -antllmperial-Hf objectl<et with those of the Rerohitlon. The recent kgaiuaiUon of Ihe Party and Its acceptance Into the pfO-AdjnlnlstrsuonFront has not altered Its bask: strategy of seeking power through Infiltration rather tr^lhro.jghoj*npolitksleompttillon. Its immediate objective laeoplesunder open and direct OornmunUtbut rather to neutrallre Guatemala as an ally of the United States and to convert the Government Into an effective, thoughcontrolled. InsUumenl of Communism.
ith the assistance of the Government, Communist andlabor leadeis have been the most aucceisfulOf Guatemalan labor. Their formation of the Oeneial Confederation of Guatemalan Workers (COTO) and Government pressure lor labor unityacUitated the extension of their control over all organlied labor. In the Important railway workers' and leaeherV unlwii, however, there has been some rank-and file opposition to association with Com-munLuo. Inmoreover, rank-and-filefrom Communist leadership was an important factor Inajor strike against the United Fruit Company. The basic weakness of Guatemalan CommunUt labor leadership Is that it Is imposed from above through top control ol lha machinery of labor organization and cannot be sure of rank-and-file support In all circumstances.
M Implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law hasew field of Co mra unlitactivity. The Communists are seeking to roobUtae Ihe hitheito Inert mass of rural workers through the COTO and theConfederation of Oualemalan Peasantsn which theytrong
JJ. Thiough their leadership In organlied labor and Ihclr Influence with the Presidentwithin tho pro-AdmlnlitraUon poMieal parties, the Communists hare gained many positions of Influence within the.Qovernment; In Congress (ahere they dominate theCommittees on Agrarian Reform andCoden the National Electoral Board, the National Agrarian IVpartment. tho Institute of Social Security, the labor Courts, the Ministry of Education, and thesecretariat of Propaganda, and In the official and pro-Admlnlstratlon press and radio. Their influence to extended by annumber of Communist ayrnpathlieri In similar positions. At the sameommunist holds any position of Cabinet rank and Ihe Communists appear to have made little or no effort aa yet to gain control over the Police or the Army.
Antr Communist Element* In Guotemolo
arious ekrnentswOuatemalMncmdlng many loyal adlierenls of the RevoluUonih IncreaUng concern tbe rapid growth of Communist Infloence In thatThese ekmenta. however, have shown Utile capacity to organize for effective counteraction. In general, each haa tended to react only aa Its own peculiar Interest* were du celly affected and all hare been deferred by the success nf Admini.tr*tkm propaganda In stigmatizing any critlchm as opposition to the principles of the Revolution4 and support of -feudalism- and "foreign etor>omtc mil- i '
K Aside from US private Interests tnthe Urge Guatemalan UndhoMers have been Ihe chief target of the RevolutionaryDuring the Arivalo Administration the landholders failed tn their attempts tothe course of the Revolution. They now appear lo be politically Isolated and Incapable of effective self-defense.
he Catholic hierarchy in OuatemaU Is Implacably opposed to Communism, but the Church has heen excluded frvn an active role In national affairs since the late Nineteenth Century. Moreover, the Church Isby the meagerneaa of Its resources, the small number of priests In proportion tothe fact that most priests are aliens subject to deportation, and the lacko-gram capable of competing with theu-nlstled labor movement or with Agrarian Reform. , _
TJ. UrtMn opposition to Communum (largely confined to Ouatemalaomposed of;
commercial and manufacturing Interests;
certain professional groups; (c) university students; (d) moderate tabor elements; and (e) the market women of Guatemala City. This urban opposition Is strongly anti-Corn-munlsl. but ll Is also strongly nationalistic. In particular. It resents the predominance of US private economic Interest* In Guatemalan
Unitedv. theUwaja of Oetral Amerlra. ltd Oipttsu ESk-biru 1th* arlMlpalMcM and pner owpafljl.
We So far the Arbeni AdrnlnblraUoo haa treated Guatemalan urban economic Interests viilh consideration, has supported them against foreignd haa made no sustained effort lo break their strong pollUcal position in Ouatemala City.
he pollUcal effectiveness of the urban opposition hat been hindered by theof ita element* and by conflicts of In-terert among them, as well aa by theirloyalty to the stated obJecUvea of Ihe Revolutionevertheless, thewon the mayoral election In Ouatemala City Innd even moredefeated the Electoral Front there in the January IBM congressional election. Ths unwillingness of urban opporlUon groups to be Identified with the landholders will remain an obstacle to ths unification of all anU-Com-muntst elements In Ouatemala.
Tha Position ofy ond the Polka (Iho GuardCivil)
The0he onlyelement In Ouatemala capable ofdecisively altering the politicaltwo0 men) stationedcapital city arc an elite force trainedsupervision of the US Army Missionequipped than other units ofArmy. The Guardia Civilb dispersed In small detachmentsneither defeat an Army coup northe Oovernrnent wltMtit ArmyAll officers In the Guardta Civttofficer*.
SO Since the Revohilion4 the Army and the Polk* have refrained from activein politics while supporting the con-sUtutlonaHy established admlnlsUauons ot Artvalo and Arbeni. The present Army lead-eis owe their personal advancement to Ihe Revolution, and particularly to Colonelwhoilitary kader In theand Minister of Defense under Artvalo before himself becoming President. There la no reason lo question their personal loyalty to Arbeni An; possible disaffection In the Army would be likely to occur at the Junior
officer level. Atbcni has sought to enhance morale through pay Increases, additionalquarters for many field gradepromotions emy three years, duty-free commissary privileges, and appointments to desirable government positions. Especially generous treatment has been provided for the officers of the two regiments stationed at Guatemala City, while less reliable officers have been assigned to isolated posts In the hinterland. The military units outside of Guatemala City have little potential forrtvoluticnary action because of theirand isolation, the Inferiority of their equipment and training, and the watchful supervision of trusted area commanders. The rank-and-file of the Army Is conscripted and Is susceptible to the same political appeals which the regime addresses to the mass ofittle or no Communistor Influence In the Army.
In'oMollonol Relohons
uatemalan foreign policies reflect the nationalistic and "democratic" altitudeswith the Revolutionlthough they have not been systematicallytoward the United Slates. Guatemala has frequently taken occasion to demonstrate its independence of US leadership and In general has been less cooperative than could be desired, particularly In Hemispheric affairs. Moreover, the regime lias systematically been hostile toward US private economic interests In Guatemala (the United Fruit Company, the International Railways of Centraland Empresaso keeping with Its attitude- towardI has given tacit support to Puerto Rkan nationalism, it has complicated lis adherence lo the Rto Treaty with reservations relating to Its claim to Belize (Britisht haslo the prlncip'e of Inter-American military cooperation, but narrowly interprets that ccanmltmcnt. It voted for Ihe UN "Uniting for Peace" resolution, but hasthat It would not implement It. These attitudes arc not unique In latin America, but Guatemalan propaganda In relation to themtrong antl-US slant Detriment lo Hemisphere solidarity has not deterred and would not deter Guatemala from any courseof action suggested by Its own interest!.
4 Guatemala has supported theocratle" elements of other Caribbean countries In their rlruggle* againstand has provided material assistance to "democratic" sidles from such countries.0 Ouaternata supported the Alibuitctlng operations of the "Caribbean Legion" against the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica0 the Legion has ceased to be operation U. largely because of theof Guatemalan support for ruchHowever, Guatemalan offklalwith Its heavy emphasis on conflict between democracy and dictatorship andnational Independence and "eec-notnlcisturbing factor In the Caribbean area. Uoreover, the Guatemalan Government, at the least, tolerates andassists clandestine Communistactivities In other countries. The Guatemalan Ccenmunlst Party absorbseaile* Into Its local organization,Into Its labor and front groups, and through them it maintains contact withelements in other countries, thus enhancing Its capabilitiesocal point for subversive activity throughout thsarea
ver since the breakup of the Central American federation9 there hare been periodic attempts tofce degreenion among the fiveVateraala, ashe principal state,'has usually been Ihe leader In such efforts.l Salvador proposed the formation of an Oiganiiallon of Central American Steles (ODECA)iew toward gradual eccnorruc union and eventual political union. Guatemalato assume the leadership cf this movement, but El Salvador, Honduras, ami Nicaragua, alarmed by the manifestations of Communist Influence ln Guatemala, showed themselves resolved to ute ODECAeans of ccenbatling Communism. Io consequence Guatemala has withdrawn from ODECA, alleging the existence of an Internationalto Interfere In Guatemala's Internal
nfl.nts Thl* withdrawal confirms Gustr-uals'i isolation in Central Arnrrka
ii. Simultaneously with its withdrawal frooi OOKCA O'lateniala complained lo th* United Nations regarding this alleged foreign Inlcr-feience. It i. notable thatpasscd the Organisation of Ametka Stales in addrevung thiso the UN. lt probably calculated that Its charge that US private Internals fie, the United Fruit Com-jwny and Ita affiliates) were responsibleml conspiracy" to subvert the existing leglt'ie would cnlirt the support of the Soviet and Arab Asian Blocs In addition to that of such latin American countries as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Mexico.
Salvador has shown extremethe danger of an extension ofInfluence from Ouatemala Intoand other neighboring states;persistent reports that El Salvadorfcrtous consideration to Jointwith Honduras and NicaraguaOther Caribbean countries,the Dominican Republic,Venezuela, have also shown concernthe development of Ouatemalacenter of subversive influence and evenoperations.
Prouture Developments
of tbe Agrarianof J'.'sa wW be the principalthe Arbeni Administration duringthe process Ihe large Guatemalanand the United Fruit Companybe victimised. The netefTecl of Agrarian Reform willbe to strengthen the ArbeniNeither the landholders norOcmjiany can expect sympathypubliceirt be used to mo&UlaeInert mass ef rural workers Inof the Administration. Agrarianalso afford the Communists anto extend their Influence bypeasants as they have organlied
giailan Kefwm has already Intensifiedsense of Insecurity which has hadde-pitsaiiig effect on business acUvtty InAs regards agricultural production lis immediate effects arc likely to be negligible: as prcscnUy Implemrnted It will do little more lhan increase the number ol subsistencehe longer run It may seriously rurlall the production of the Fruit Companys long as coffee prices hold up, iwwever, the general economy ofIs not likely to be vitally affected.
The dissatisfaction of Important urban elements will probably Increase, but cffecUvc political unity among Ihcse elements Is not likely to be achieved. The political union of rural and urban Interests In opposition to the Aibens Administration Is even less likely. No group or foreseeable combination of groups Is likely to be able to bring about any llgrufl-rant moderation of the Administration's policy by political action. No revolutionary attempt opposed by the Anny can be expected to succeed.
The Army couMapid andchange In the Guatemalan political situationere lo take concerted action.ukk change of attitude Is always possible, there Is no present reason to doubt the continued loyally of the Army highof most of the Army to President Arbeni. The Army could not be expected to take revolutionary action unless Itsecame convinced that their personaland well-being were threatened byInfllltatlon and domination of the Government, or unless ths policies of the Government were to result In extreme social disorder and economic collapse.
As long as President Arbeni remains In power* Ihe Arbeni Communist alliance will probably continue to dominate Quatemalan pcrlitks. Any Increase In pollUcal tension In OualemtU would tend to Increase Arbeni' poiitkal dependence on this alliance.
'Aebe-iii* lerUiinite term In office will erpJre onhether be will reach ths end cf Mi term, whether he wouldetire, and what the .character ol his successor udghl bt cmnot new be citlffisted.
s
nts of Bl Salvador.and Nicaragua will continue to seek means to opposeommunistic tendencies of Guatemala, and will give serious con skito the possibility ofolitical change In Guatemala through clandestine support of revolutionary activities. It is highly unlikely, however, that they would undertake an open military intervention In Guatemala or actually could organize an effective operation of that character In vie* of the limited strength of their armed forces, thef that strengthfor the maintenance of their ownsecurity, the fact that their forces are Iit-cquipped and untrained for fieldthe (for them) probably Insuperable logistical obstacles to an open Invasion of Guatemala, and the internal andpolitical difficulties which would ensue. Moreover, foreign military intervention would tend to cause all factions In Guatemala to unite to repel the Invasion. So long as it remains united, the Guatemalan Army could defeat any force which El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua were capable of deplojlng against It. In Ihe event of such an Invasion Guatemala oouldlear case ofIntervention to the Organization of American Slates.
he Guatemalan Government willcontinue to assist Communist subversive activities In the Caribbean area, but willavoid Involvement in military operations like those of the Caribbean legion. To counterbalance its Isolation InAmerica It will continue lo seek political support elsewhere, particularly In the United Nations. If Latin American attitudes, asat the UN. Justifyourse. It will probably raise the same Issue of foreignIn the Organisation of American States. It would certainly seek to Invoke the Rio Treaty as welt as the UN Chartert were to be invaded by Its neighbors.
uaUmaia'stoleranceofCommunlsmand hospitality toward exiles makes It availableonvenient haven for Communistfrom the United Stales.
Original document.
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