INDECISION AND
Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
'*
a. .foli0wJQ8the ftorth Korean attack on South Korea
and the failure of the Chine Be Coomiunists to drive UNree.leaderflincreasingly concerned about US rearma-and OS-Inspired integration of Western defense efforts Tbey aprorently became particularly concerned about the establishment of oLr!eB louflareas of the USSR. In 8pite of this, Soviet policy remained sterile and provocative. Ho new policywere developed to meet tho nev situation. There Is reason to believe that, as the months passed, this problem became more and
nddeveloped over Stalin's continuingline In foreign affairs.
Concurrently, the critical International situation apparently complicated Soviet Internal planning problems. Revisions In tbe draft Five Year Plan and subsequent efforts to re-draft the plan01 probably reflected top level indecision regarding overall Soviet policy in this nev situation and possibly conflict among tbe top Soviet leaders.
Meanwhile, domestic controversy on Soviet agricultural policy broke Into the open lnI. There Is reason to believe that Politburo member Khrushchev attempted torastic change ln agricultural policy, and that this program vas opposed by one or mare Politburo members. Speculatively, It Is suggested that Malenkov backed Khrushchev, but onlyoint, vhile Beria vas the leading figure in opposition.
Inhe replacement of tvbakumov by. Iguatiev as Chief of the MSB probably removed the MSB from Berla's area of responsibility, representing the first major upset ln the power balance tbat had existed among the Politburo members since Zhdanov's death. Judging from tbe secreoy cloaking this shift andtatement published int Is believed that the issue Involved was that of Party control over the MGB.
Later, In Sovieteries of purges began whichmen who had held positions of influence there for many years. It Is believed that this shake-up reflected adversely on Berla, who had retained overlordshlp in Georgian affairs since his departure from Georgia Opinions differ as to whether Malenkov, or Stalin himself, initiated these purges.
Intalin began tbe aeries of letters, published In2 as The Economic Problems of Socialism, whichboth ideological pronouncements and observations on current problems. Several analysts have Interpreted tbe portions dealing vith current problems as revealing significant controversy within Stalin's immediate entourage on fundamental issues, notably on the foreign policy question. The immediate challenge to Stalin'sand provocative foreign policy was overruled but subsequentsuggest that the basic conflict waa not reaolved. Tbeto proceed full-speed with the 8oTietlxatlon of Eastern Germany (evidently dating fromurther hardening of Soviet foreign policy, for lt necessarily Involved rejection of any possibility of negotiation on Germany.
Inoviet leaders again ordered the draftingive-year plan. This order appeared to reveal that definiteregarding both foreign and doaaatlo policy had been taken. There were Indications of controversy regarding the plan; thetaken did not appear to resolve the fundamental questions that are presumed to have existed.
By at leasttalin himself began to manifest anhigh level of personal activity. In July, be held anwith an Italian fellow-traveller, Pietro sennl, unusual indid not seek the interview and it was suggested by Soviet Later, Stalin began to meet foreigners morebe had done at any time since the war. Be apparently didhis regular vacation at Sochi In the fall, for be appearedtreaty oeremonios in September, tbe Party Congressand the anniversary ceremoniescrramfaar.
This unusually high level of personal activity manifested by Stalin continued until his very death. Inor example, be held tares interview with foreigners, two of these with ssfbaasa-dors.
Sometime Inoviet leaders decided to convokeh Party Congress. The announcement was made onugust, and the Congress waa scheduled to beginctober. The brief period between tbe announcement and the opening late of the conference, as well as the apparent haste evidenced la the organisation of thsRepublic congresses preliminary tonionelatively sudden decision. The Congress itself wasdominated by Halenkov: Tbe principal speeches of the Congress
"tttp-sbgrexj
were del Ire red by Malenkov and by two men who are believed toassociate* or proteges at tbat time, Khrushchev andln Party organisation aad Central Committeewere effected at the Congress appeared to work tofurthermore, several of Berla's Importantdisappeared or were reduced from full to alternatetbe Central
In tbe period from the October Party Congress to Stalin'series of events took place which appeared to reflect hightension, behind-the-scenes maneuvering and tbe beginning of rapid personnel changes in Important posts. These events, along with tbe ominous Doctors' Plot announcement, appear to indicate tbat acrisis had finally developed.
In addition to the above, there were Indications of changes In the relationship! and responsibilities of the top Presidium figures. Foremost, of course, was tbe increasing prominence accorded Malenkov. Ambassador Kennan reported ln2 that the "bets were running towardndicating that Soviet officials recognised his Increasing stature. Other changes took place, however, which remain obscure and unexplained:
2. In,abanov vas identified as Chief of Gosanab which, as late as1 and possiblyad been beaded by Kaganovich.
FOREIGN POLICY: STALEMATE AND PROSTRATION
With the collapse of the North Korean Army iabe Soviet leaders were faced with the dilemma of either losing all of Korea or of attempting to salvage the situation by allowing or persuading the Chinese Communists to enter the conflict. The latter course was chosen. Io spite of their Initial successes, however, the Chinese Communists were unable to drive OT forces out of Korea.
Meanwhile, the Korean attack and the subsequent Chinese Commu-nlet Intervention had provoked the US Into an extensive rearmament program, had further stimulated US efforts to strengthen Western Europe's military forces, and had accelerated the HAM base program. In Europe and Africa.
The immediate Soviet reaction to these developments vaa one of alarm, rage and frustration. This was exemplified in Pospelov'a1 speech, which touched off what later was to be known as the Bate-America campaign. Tbe US Embassy in Moscow noted that this speechhift in propaganda from the theme of tbeof capitalism's economic collapse to that of its defeat through war. The embassy further noted that this speech carried no assurances that the USSR could finally win without war or that the Soviet peoples would escape involvement. Rage and frustration were aLso evident in1 interviewravda correspondent, in which he repeatedly and bluntly called Clement AttLce, then Prime Minister of Greatiar, and gave no hint of diplomatic negotiations or compromise. Stalin declared that peace could be preserved only if "peace-loving peoples" of Western countries would take Its preservation into their own handsagainst the policy of their reactionary governments.
However, initial Soviet feelers with regardease-fire in Korea were made In In April and Hay, military operations naa culminated in massive Chinese Communist offensives, which were decisively beaten. esult of these defeats, Soviet hopes that the Chinese might be victorious were probably dispelled. Malik's cease-fire proposal followed in mid-June, and the cease-fire talks began shortly thereafter.
.v JSt *ruce,talkB OOOQ "Ogged down over Ccemnmist Insistence onh Parallelhe demarcation line. The Communistswere preparing another major offensive, which accumulated evidence indicated was scheduled for early Thiswas apparently suspended at the last minute and, since UK operations at that time were not large enough to prejudice thetbe suspension probablyajor policy decision. The truce talks were resumed at the end of1 andslowly until another stalemate developed2 over the priBoner-of-war question. This stalemate prevailed until after Stalin's death.
In Europe, negotiations between the USSR, the UK, France and the US resulted In tbe prolonged and abortive Deputy Foreignmeetings in Paris from April throughI. While theoriginally was Intended to discuss the German question, the
TOr-SEeREI
Soviet delegation Insistently attempted to introduce the question of KATO bases. Inhe Soviet Union undertook en intense diplomatic campaign, officially protestingumber of European powers with regard to EDC and NATO bases. Inenewed propaganda campaign wus begun In September for unificationeace treaty, standard Soviet propaganda themes since tbe earlyyears.
Within the USSR, thereumber of Indications ofon over and dissatisfaction with the uncompromising andforeign policy. Observers of tbe Soviet Union areIn the opinion thateaxmament, Western consolidation andmade In establishing KATO basesrowingdominating preoccupation of Soviet leaders1 Furthermore, tho Inexplicable shifts In Korea suggestpolitical tendencies were operating. This wasIn Soviet press discussion of foreign affairs, whereno attempt, as Ambassador Kennan observed lnocontradictory points of view regarding future foreign
Stalin's letter ofhich formed the main piece of bis Economic Problems of Socialism, discussed some of thesebut arrived at no new policy formula. Stalin reaffirmed that the West was Incapable of achieving lasting unity and tbat,of Soviet Intransigence, tbe "peace" movement and the West's own economla disputes would arouse enough disagreement In the Western world to assure Its final collapse.
In this Utter, Stalin Identified what might be calledpoints of view on foreign policy when he said tbat "somebelieve wars between capitalist states are no longer He denied as "heretical" the following points of view: the US vas successfully integrating the non-Soviet Orbit powers;leaders had learned from disastrous experience to avoidwars; and "imperialism" must attack the USSR. The foreignposition adopted by Stalin in tbe2 letter was much quieter In tone and content than that of one year earlier. ension-reducing statement, affirming that there was no immediate danger of Western attack, but also giving no hint ofconcessions to tbe West. Stalin's position was one of nobut equally, no retreats.
Vacillation and possible dissension on tbe German question are also suggested by several events that took place between March and In March, the USSRraft peace treaty for Germany vbich embodied several significant shifts from the previous
Soviet Position. Mr. keonao tarns interpreted the draft treatyaa possibly representing the temporary triumph of aschool of thought in Moscow. Subsequent diplomatic exchanges, however, came to nothing. In2 the Soviet Ambassador to the Gcrsan Democratic Republic,. Pushkin, was replaced by I. I. Illchev. Inarsh SovietIratloo program was finallyinvolving collectivixatloo, increased attention to tbeof an East German army. Intensified security measures and the sealing off of the GDP, from West Germany.
Thus, Soviet policy on Oermaoy finally crystallised, andwhich previously had held back the conversion of the GDP.normal" Satellite disappeared.
INDECISION IB INDUSTRIAL PLANNING
s of this writing the Fifth Five Tear Plan, announced in2 and approved at the October Party Congress, has not yet been ratified by tbe Supreme Soviet.
Zj Curiously, this was not to be tbe title of the new plan asInt was called simply the "Fifth Five Tear Plan of Development of the USSR."
TOf-SECREX
Stalin discussed Induct rial plana in his Economic Problems of Seela11am. Again the document of chief Interest is his2 letter, since subsequent letters merely elaborated one or another aspect of the first one. As in tbe case of foreign policy questions, 8talin merely reaffirmed and defended the prevailing coarse af Soviet policy, rejecting "radical" solutions of either extreme. In other wards, be defended tbe standing policy ofln tbe capital goods industries, and rejected tbe possibility of major changes, either In favor of heavier Investment ln armament production or ln consumer goods.
It will be recalled tbat the Soviet rearmament program, begunas probably scheduled for completion in1 or It thus seems very likely that the Issue of the futureof tbe Investment program was sidehat it was postponed until tbe rearmament program ncared completion and until it became evident whether or not tbe USSR was facederious possibility of war. Stalin apparently decided in1 or2 tbat circumstances did not call for major increases ln Soviet armaments Investment; yet. In making this decision, he wassubjected to considerable pressure to expand significantly tbe production of consumers goods. This be refused to do.
COKTROVERSI OR AGRICULTURE
It will be recalled tbat In0 Politburo member Andreev was criticized far defending small-scale farming operations, and that subsequently R.hrushchev,olitburo member,tbe leading Soviet spokesman on agricultural policy. Onhrushohevev policy of merging smallfarms Into larger ones;arty Central Committeeapparently applied this policy to tbe whole USSR.
The new agricultural policy provided for more than Justmerger of the kolkhozes. On1 Khrushchevpeech advocated not only tbe merger of the kolkhozes, but also the actual resettlement of peasants belonging to tbe merged kolkhozes In single "urban" centers, known as "agro-cities". The personal plots of land possessed by the individual peasants were to be located
on tbe outskirts of the nev settlement, thus contributing to tbeof the peasantry.
Sorlet press treatment of two Khrushchev speeches on nevpolicy provides the first indication that the nev policy may hare run into trouble. Heajor speech on the merger of the kolkhozes onut it vas not publishedecond speech onn vhlch fas discussed tbe agro-city proposal, vas not publishedarch Pravda, vhich published this speech,urious editorial note the following day stating that Khruahchev'a article bad been run as material for discussion, thus implying that it vastatement" of policy.
vas not long delayed.peech delivered by. Arutyunov of Soviet Armenia, published in the Armenian Kommunist (dally newspaper) onarch, bad this to say: "In connection with amalgamation of small collective farms, some comrades have made statements sowingbey declare) that one of the main problems of tbe amalgamated fares is to move smallerge tbe population of small villages and resettle it in oneam of tbe opinion that these proposals are closer tothan to the real requirements of tbe collectiveill not dwell on other unacceptableegarding)private garden
Onaklnakll Rabochii of Bakupeech of M. D. a. Bagirov, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Azerbaijan, in which Bagirov asserted that the "Party had demanded an end to the "incorrect idea" that tbe most important task Inconstruction waa the moving of small villages into singlesettlements. He also said that the practice of reducing tbe size of the garden plot near the peasant's home and moving part of his plot beyond settlement limits was harmful and Intolerable. Moat curiously, when Pravda publiebed Baglrov's speech ont omitted this aspect.
Following the above developments, the agro-city concept dlaap-peared from prominence, but tbe program of kolkhoz amalgamation Malenkov, ath Party Coogreas Ins-serted that,esult of the merger program, the number of collective farms had been reduced Withto the agro-city program, Malenkov said that "certain of our leading officials have Indulgedrongheir mistake being that they had "overlooked" the maingricultural production. Stalin, In his Economic Problems of Socialism, avoided direct mention of the agro-city policy but, in discussing tbe
elimination of essential differences between "town andaid that "new great towns will appear as centers of the maximum development of culture, and as centers not only of large-scalebut also of the proceaalng of agriculturalnd will tend to even up conditions of life In town and country." He discussed the agricultural problem at length in each of his letters (February, April, May and September). In general, Stalin'senvisaged the ultimate elimination of the "free market" aspects of Soviet agriculture and tbe expansion of so-called "productas tbe Ideal market relationship between kolkhozes and tha rest of the economy. This "product-exchange" isorm of barter which takes place between tbe kolkhozea and the Soviet Stalin envisaged that product-exchange would eventually displace all forma of marketing engaged in by tbe kolkhozes. Stalin repeatedly emphasized the long-term nature of thisand stressed the necessity for proceeding slowly and cautiously.
Meanwhile, throughout the period under review,
'UUFaev, too, remitted sa
the Council for Kolkhoz Affalra. Andreev, it will be recalled, waa no longer the Politburo spokesman for agriculture, following the censure be received In
The question now is: What did these various developments It has been argued that the kolkhoz merger and agro-cityhad been originated by Stalin himself, and then withdrawn when tbey ran into peasant resistance. Some observers havethe agro-city program to have been an experiment Inev form of agricultural organization. hird hypothesis is that tbe merger and agro-city proposals bad bean advanced by some oneor another below Stalin, sad these proposals met with disagreement within tbe Politburo. While the problems involved in these hypotheses cannot be definitely answered, some possibilities can be suggested.
The handling of the agro-city proposal In Arutyunov's and Bagirov'a speeches suggests that it also vaa intended to be Union-wide. The fact that the agro-city proposal was rejected so promptly after its Inauguration, without allowing time for the "experiment" to run its course, also suggests that it had not been conceived as an experimental program.
It seems unlikely that tbe merger program and agro-cityvere merely experimental In nature. The merger program, vhlle begun In the Moscow Oblast, was not limited to lt, but rather vas applied Uhlon-wide later in the same year. This Is evident'
Furthermore, previously noted,
decree uasod the subject, lastly,
5,gPVg COQtlnuedproposalre-
puo^ted. With regard to the agro-city proposal, it also appears that this vas not an experimental program, althoughide nee in tola case is less definite.
These latter considerations also argue against the idea that the agro-city proposal was one which had been originated by Stalin, and then abandoned in the face of widespread peasant resistance. Inlt is wery unlikely that Arutyunov and Baglror would have discussed it ln such strong languagefantastic" and proposals) If tbe program had been initiated personally by Stalin.
There Is good reason to suppose that both tbe kolkhoz merger and the agro-city proposals originated with Khrushchev: It was Khrushchev who took over from Andreev0 the position of Politburoon agriculture. Secondly, the kolkhoz merger program was begun by Khrushchev ln Moscow Oblast at least bynd lt was not until later that yearentral Committee decree was Issued on the subject. This suggests that Khrushchev had begun the program ln Moscow Oblast before It was All-Onion Party policy. Finally,in hU three speeches on the merger program and tbe agro-city proposal, continually cited Illustrative experiences from tbe Ukraine, vhere ha bad been First Secretary89 (exceptrief period, suggesting that be was attempting to sell, on an All-Onion basis, policies he had previously developed In tbe Okralne.
The last question concerns the nature and Identification ofto the agro-city proposal. It is generally conceded tbat Arutyunov and Bagirov had Politburo level support before they made their speeches denouncing the agro-city proposal. Likewise, the curious editorial note opening Khrushchev's1 speech for discussion" Is considered to be highly Irregular and possibly indicative of top-level dissension. Lastly, It may bo noted that Khrushchev, unlike Andreev the year previous, was not required to apologize or recant for his "incorrect" views.
Who formed this opposition? Andreev had been humiliated tbe previous) and he did not reappearrominent figure following repudiation of Khrushchev Malenkov bad been, and still was at the time of tbe dispute, actively concerned withproblems, i-
nor did be lose Julregowing Khrushchev's repudiation, neither Malenkov nor Stalin, ln their respective
-
TOP-SfeGREI]
statemento on the subjectriticized the ogro-clty concept PqrMalenkov, lt la true, did criticize It In terms of timing.
One cine is prorided by the allegation tbat Berlaorer tbe Soviet Transcaucasus, vithln which areArmenia and Azerbaijan, aa well as Georgia. Thus it anythe case tbat Arutyunov and Bagirov, in their attacksproposals, were speaking with Berla'slose association be-
tween ArutJUWT bbulikewise has been reported on close terms with Beria, although there Is conflicting evidence on this point.
HEPLACKMEBT OF THB MDTD3TER OF STATK SECURITY
In Augustevelopment of major inniortance tookMinister of State Security Abakumov was replacedommunist Party functionary. Abakumov had heldsince Following his replacement, at leastMGB Ministers were replaced, while four new Deputyappeared at tbe Ministry in Moscow. One of these, thefor Personnel, was Identified
r**A- Epiabev, who, like Ignatic, nau prcviouBjyarty functionary ratherareer security officer. Eplsbov bad earlierrominent Party official with Khrushchev ln the Ukraine.
These Party appointments, as veil as an unusual statement by the new MGB Minister In Georgia, A. I. Kochlavashvlll, which wasInbed some light on this shift. stressed the need for more effective Party control over the
This supposition wm* given added weight on the occasion of Berla's
purge. On2 the Pravda editorial stated: "It baa now been established that Berla, under various fictitious excuses, hindered In every way the solution of very Important, urgentIn the sphere of agriculture. This vas done to undermine tbe collective farms and to create difficulties ln the country's food supply." This chargeery curious one, since Berla had never been overtly associated with agriculture, nor vas the charge subsequently elaborated to any extent In propaganda on the Berla oaae. It may be that the present leaders do not wish to go into concrete aspects of tbe Beria "agricultural platform" for domestic political reasons.
-
tup-segbjet [
local mgb and continued vigilance by local mgb organs. helocal party organs for insufficient attention to the political education of the security police, and declared that the georgian central committee had sent "experienced party workers" into the mgb. he promised that this practice would continue in the future. the most significant aspect of aoshlavashtili's speech is its suggestion that party supremacy bad been jeopardized by the actions"andof the police, the admonition to follow party directives and the transfer of party workers to the mob imply that the msbbad boonaw unto itself. ineport of1 asserted that abakumov's replacement had been due to criticism of the security organ.
while there is no firm information on the actual reasonsmgb shift or on the details and ramifications of lt, theof abakumovarty figure could not have beena blow to politburo member beria. abakumov was ofand8unior security officer ine became berla's counter-intelligence chief and in
fter the kegb was separated from the nxvd, heeputy minister of tbe kegb. be replaced merkulov ss minister inhereafter the mob (formerly xkgb) continued gradually to gather
under its jurisdiction all police and militia functions. i
beria retained politburo level responsibility for state
security matters, at least up to may beria was lastwith security questions int that time he want to pragueeries of conferences following the widespreadof key men in the czechoslovak communist party and czechapparatus.
tbe georgian pobqes
another area in which previous and long-standing arrangements were changed was in the georgian republic, from the latter port1 throughuring this period thereompute reshuffling of positions, in the course of which all of the central committee secretaries were changed, the buro of tbe centralwas completely revamped, and many of the ministries, including those of internal affairs and state security, were given new chiefs.
the personnel shifts began inhen the georgian central committee removed m. i. baramiya from his post as second
-
top-sfcgjuo:
Secretary and expelled A. H. Rspavo, Minister of Justice sod farcer Minister of State Security fron the Party. Rapeva and ShOniya, tbe Procurator of the Republic, were relieved of their offices and turned over to tbe courts for prosecution. These actions climaxedof large-scale eabeitlament ln one of tbe largest Tbilisiloo trusts; the charges against the three men Included tbetbat, as is "wellhey "gave protection to various workers who bad perpetrated crimes, and ln every way defendedt tbe saae tine K. Chlchlnadxe and V. Kuprava were removed from their positions In tbe Georgian apparatus for "mistakescadres." The purges continued ln1 and Tbe First Secretary of tbe Komsomol, I. S. Zodelava, wasand replaced by M. Magrelishvill.
Later, at an2 meeting of the Georgian. Berla attended, Georgian First Secretary Charkvianl was removed from hie position and replaced by A. I. Mgeladxe, who bad been prominent in Komsomol work and was at the time Firstof the Abkhaz ASSR. Charkvianl, who bad held his post as Georgian First Secretaryad presidedanuaryln Tbilisi of leading officials at which economic malfeasance In many ministries vas aired. In tbe words of N. Rukhadze, the Minis-
_ -ww. Mirof State Security, Charkvianl sin bad beenluntingoliticalhich bad "enabled hostileto Ingratiate themselves, occupy responsible positions, and inflect damage on Party work and tbe Georgian people." It wasthat Charkvianl badfrom the limits of tbe." Consequently, he vas removed from tbe Presidium of tbe Supreme Soviet as well as from his other posts.
Charkvianl's removal did not end the purge. Inbe four remaining old secretaries of tbe Georgian Komsomol were removed, and ln July, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Trade and even Rukhadze, the Minister of State Security, fell. At the Georgian Party Congress int was revealed tbat nineteenofficials had lost their Jobs between June and August, and tbat Kvirkveliyx, who bad beenecretary of the Centralonly the previous December, bad already lost his post.
The official charges had sufficient truth in them toartial Justification far the complete overhaul of Georgian Economic Inefficiency on the part of governmental officials, collusion with Party personnel, embezzlement and other economic crimes, and an Increase in Georgian nationalistic outbursts were, in themselves, sufficient to condemn Party leadership In Georgia. These charges carried over into the Georgian Party Congress heldnd formed tbe major substance of the speeches. Tbe cry
-
TOP-SEGREI
went up for vigilance against economic saboteurs and internal and external enemies of the State who were trying to undermine socialist advances at tbe behest of'the capitalists.
There can be little doubt that this purge was directed
toe Annie-up Tn"that Btalin
ordered, thcanrge; according to
rumon
Istmlln's visit bad in part been motivated by mountingor embezzlement sad other irregularities in Georgian affairs.
may have
been in Georgia InIY the purge began there In nbvember.
Accordingwere rumors that the
purge ofijibb personally directed by Malenkov,Stalin's emissary.that these purges weakened
Beria'a position cons
Throughout tbe period, propaganda Insisted that tbe purge was instituted under tbe direct guidance of Stalin and, after Berla's attendance at the Plenumpril which removed Charkvlanl, the Tbilisi newspaper Zarya-Voatoka wrote that Beria "aidedtbe mistakes and shortcomings In the work of the Georgian Party organizations." Thepril Tbilisi meeting adopted ato Beria promising him that "we vill resolutely struggle against soy attemptsostile agency to harm the task of communlatand undermine the might of the Soviet State."
There Is ample reason, despite Berla's presence at the2 Central Committee meeting and the propaganda associating him with tbe purges, for believing that tbe Georgian purges vere anreflection on him. Beria has been aasumed to have bad aInterest in Georgian affairs for many yeara, buteorgian by birth, had alsoersonal interest in these same affaire. The severity of tbe purges may have been an Indication of Stalin's pereonal diseatiafactloo with the course of events there.
BTAIJJ 'S "ECOBCMIC PROBLEMS OP SOCIALISM"
Frequent reference has been made throughout this paper to Stalinja Economic Problems of Socialism, publishedi/ The publication of this document, with its accompanying
i/ There will be no attempt here to recapitulate Stalin'a declaration on particular policy problems, which were covered In the appropriate sections. The attempt here, rather, is to present certain aspects of the EcoDoalc Problems not easily discussed In the other eectiona.
- ik
propaganda fanfare, tended to overshadow the opening of tbe Party Congress three days later.
The Economic Problemseries of four letters, ostensibly written by Stalin,ebruary,pril,ay The first letterommentary by Stalin on tbe proceedingsonference of economists, purportedly held Inhichraft textbook on tbe "political economy of Socialism, "i/ The other three letters are replies to economists who had written to Stalin la response to his first letter.
Stalin's letters discussed Communist politico-economic theory, the prerequisites for attaining Communism In tbe USSR, and theof war betveen capitalist states. As has already beenrge part of the discussion of tbe transition to Communismtbegricultural problem and commodity exchange in the USSR. As one study of Soviet economic theory has pointed out, Stalin's Bconomlc Problems seUctlvely summed up pertinent trends evident In Soviet theoretical thinking since the war.2/ Another summary declared it to beheoretical grounding of policies and an attempt to settU troublesome points of theory neverreconciled with
Isaac Doutcber has noted tbat "tbe transition from Socialism to Communismhe chief 'doable-talk' formula for tbe discussion of real probUms" la Stalin's letters.5/ The author further commented:
extbook had long been discussed ln tbe USSR, but anbook bad never been produced. l, Zhdanov mentionedwas being prepared. According to Dodljer's biography oftold the Yugoslavs In7 tbat Sovietworking out Soviet polltlco^conomic doctrine on tbe basisrumors
90 that uxaiin had assigned to Malenkov the taska standard work on the economic principles ofthe task was entrustedpecial commissiondirection.stories were
told in the form of a
Soviet Studies,A Political Economy In tbe. Miller.
urrent Soviet Policies, the Current Digest of tbe Soviet Press.
bj Soviet Studies,Dogma and Reality In Stalin'sProblems,'" I. Deutscher. This artlcU had been written before Stalin's death.
recent writingslimpse of the movement of ideas going on ln the Soviet ruling circles behind the half-real and half-deceptive facade of uniformity. It is thisthat distinguishes present day Russia from the Russia of the late thirties which was from head to foot stunned andafter the shock of the great purges. The movement of ideas reflects conflicting social aspirations and pressures whichonolithic regime Is notosition tofor good.'*
Deutscher goes on to suggest that the discussions of thefrom socialism tohich had been startedad provided an opportunity for Implicit criticism of the regime: "The guesses about the future sometimes sound like reflections on the presentthis is not the first time tbat Utopia is either an implied critique of existing society or an escape from it."
Ambassador Kennananalysis of the Economic Problems,rew attention to two significant aspects of tbe Kr. Kennan described the view of the world put forward by Stalin asery old-fashionedeminiscent of the thirties and appearing toll that has happened In the Intervening fourteen years' since Hitler's attack on Poland. Mr. Kennan went on to say:
"We see reflected (in this) the fact that this SovietIs today an old man's government, ruthless and terrible to be sure, but insensitive to the contemporary evolution of Its external environment Just as lt is to the deeper experiences of its own subject peoples, living ln Its own
Kr. Kennan then analyzed certain political Implications of Stalin's discussion of tbe capitalist world, and noted that. Judging from the letters, the view Stalin had put forward wasnanimous view in the Kremlin but one tbat had been opposedroup which doubted its soundness and challenged lt.
if This observation takes on considerable significance In light of subsequent medical analyses of Stalin's physical and emotional condition, based on the report of Stalin's lllncsB and the autopsy report. The majority opinion of medical specialists is that Stalin had Buffered emotional changes for some time prior to his final lllnesB, and these changes would have been in the direction of "living ln the past." This will form tbe subjecteparate paper.
TOP-SfiGREI
requires no great stretch of tbe imagination to ace that thla difference of opinion vaa no abstract disagreement about the nature of capitalism; itolicy Issue ofaccent. Whoever eald that it waa dangerous to depend on the Internal break-up of capitalise and the development of another war between Germany and the western powers, presumably aaid that you bad to face up to tbe reality of the westernand Its growing strength, which meant that you had to prepare sooner or later to fight it or to come to some aort of accommodation withhether to do the one or the other to depend, we must assume, on what terms you could get. This, however, meant negotiationsand not only 'demonstrative' negotiations for propaganda purposes, or disarmingo weaker members of the western coalition with divisive intent, but actually negotiations with the major member of the western coalition: the United States.
view was obviously overruled. There are onlyarguments that could have been used against it by thegroup whose views found Stalin's support. Tbe firstargument that has now been'made public: it ianegotiate with tbe Americans; their world, with afrom us, will go to pieces on them anyway. Thehowever, may have been: it is impossible towith the Americana; they are bent only on the overthrowSoviet system, by subversion or war as "the case maycould never be induced to negotiate seriously. the extent that this Utter thesis can be establishedand renders unnecessary further discusaIonnumber one. But lt Is thesis number one which hasas the real center of ideological disagreement
PABTT CQHOHBBS: 2
Ont was announced that the long overdue Party Congreea would be convenedctober.
There is some evidence which suggests that tho Party Congress waa to have been held) For example, tbe new name which the Party adopted inommunist Party of the Soviet Union, had been used by Suslov, Malenkov and As noted earlier, Madame Kolloutal referred in9orthcoming Party Congress, and there were many rumors89 that one would soon be held. Moreover, as Hr. Kennan has pointed out, it is doubtful that the Soviet Union would have aceuaed
Tito and tbe Yugoslavs of not havingarty Congress for aany years if they vere not planning to hold one soon themselves. Thus lt appears very probable tbat tbe Congress vas indeed planned at tbat time, but for some unknown reason vas suspended.
When tbe Congress was finally convoked, the period allowed for the holding of preparatory regional Congresses was extremely short, and in many cases there was evidence of baste.
The announcement calling the Congress outlined as subjects foreries of changes in the Party statutes. Two of the most important changes indicated were the dissolution of the Orgburo (one of the three bodies which had been set up originally to handle matters in lieu of meetings of the Central Committee)hange in the name of the Politburo. The new Presidium, as the Politburo was to be called, would "control the work of tbe Central Committee between plenarynd the Secretariat was to "controlwork, primarily organizing verification of fulfillment of Party decisions and selection of cadres."
As vas the case with tbe other changes In tbe Party statutes, these changes seemed intended to regularize already existingrather than to institute new ones. Tbe Orgburo apparentlyeased to function, and the authority of tbe Secretariat innatters had been increased accordingly. Both the Secretariat and the Orgburo had been controlled by tbe Politburo, which wasfor final policy decisions and, in the person of Stalin, had exercised ultimate authority In tbe ae lection of personnel for all important posts. The new statutes abolishing the Orgburo and assigning personnel selection "primarily" to tbe Secretariat did not therefore reduce the authority of Stalin and other top Politburo (Presidium) members over top-level personnel matters.
The Presidium that vas appointed at the Congress vas much larger than the old Politburo and may have been designed largely as anbody. While the Politburo hadull members and onethe Presidium includedull members andlternates. This loose, unwieldy body may never have met; decisions probably were taken in its nameBuro" of tbebody vhosevas not acknowledged until Stalin's death.!/ An analysis of
as functioning
ew members to tbe Presidium apparently did not surrender their old positions. One Presidium member, Korotchenko wasidentified
in his old position:
the composition of tbe Presidium gives uo some clues as to itsfunction, as well as to the probable membership of tbe "Buro".
Tbe most Important members of this body were the ten men from themember Politburo: Stalin, Molotov, Halenkov, Beria,Bulganin, Kaganovleh, Mlkoyan, Khrushchev and ShvernU.i/ Tbe only portraits prominently displayed in Red Square on-floveaber 7th were of these ten leaders. Tbe treatment these men received in propaganda, and references after Stalin's deathBuro" of the Presidium, suggests that the Presidiumhole was In nouling body, but rather that the old Politburo members constituted Its nucleus.
The remainder of tbe Presidium was composed, for the most part, of two categories of personnel: Government and Party administrators on the level Just below the old Politburo, and regional Partyor members of the Central Party apparatus. The former group Included the four remaining Deputy Chairmen of the Council ofwho bad not been in the Politburo, Pervukhin, Saburov, Hmlysbev and Tevoeyan; two members of the old Secretariat, Ponomarkenko and Suslov; the Secretary of tbe Komsomol, Mikbailov; tbe bead of tbe Party Control Commission, M. P. Sbklryatov; and, among others, VyBhlnsky, tbe Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Zverev, the Minister of Finance.
Party Secretaries from key areas and Party and propagandacomprised the balance of tbePresidium. Andrianov from Leningrad, Korotcbsnko and Melnlkov from the Ukraine, Arlstov from Chelyabinsk and Brezhnev from Moldaviaew of theofficials to be Included. From the Central Committeecame JL, M. Pegov, bead of tbe Light Industry Section. D. I. Chesnokov, Chief Editor of Questions of Philosophy, P. F. ludln mad H. B. Hitln represented the Party propaganda specialists.
the Politburo had
ruledystem of committees which handled various aspects of Soviet policy, and that top level administrators had reported to these committees on technical aspects of problems; the inclusion on the Presidium of those members of the technical bureaucracy whoumably voold have reported to these committees suggests that much of tbe enlargement of the Presidiumormal recognition of this system.
olitburo member A. A. Andreev was dropped completely, while A. K. Kosygin was reduced to candidate membership of tbe new Presidium.
aries had lost
uwir eariy ideological fervor and had become prlmar-
At tho aane time, the enlargement of the Presidium and theaa veil ae of the Central Committee itself, createdpoaltloos in the top hierarchy for deserving Partyleaders may have been concerned over the gap vhich hadbetween the top and lower echelons of thes, real power had been concentratedmall, selfgroup vhich the Party functionary had little'hopeentering,reported that Party function-
ily concerned with maintaining their positions, raising their own standards of living, even Illegally, and eluding the Partyultiple control mechanisms.
At the Congress, the spate of criticism directed againstand the repeated demands far improved leadership pointed to tbe growth of this self-seeking group as one of the regime's most pressing Internal problems. To alleviate this situation, the Kremlin was tightening controls, demanding greater Party discipline, and placing Increased emphasis on education and criticism and
At the same time, however, new rules concerning methods offrom the Party were Introducedeans of safeguarding tbe position of tbe members of the hierarchy. It was stipulated that, on the Loverember was to be allowed to continue toull part in the work of bis cell, including its secretuntil his exclusion had been ratified by higher committees. For members of the Party committees at any level, expulsion was to be decided uponwo-thirds majority of the plenary session of tbe committee to which the member belonged. The expulsion of an All-Onion Central Committee member was to be decided uponarty Congress, to be convened once in every four years, or by tbe All-Onion Central Committee between congresses. In this vay, while tbe nev rules made greater demands on Party members, they also made their positions, at least formally, more secure.
Of the five new members added to tbe Secretariat, only two bad been full members of tbe old Central Committee elected The remaining three bad been alternates; one of then, H. G. Ignatov, bad been elected as an alternate member9 but excluded1 for failure to discharge his duties. His return to membership, not only on the Central Committee but on the Presidium and the Secretariat as well, suggested the backing of some powerful figure on the oldlevel. H. M. Pegov, another of tbe newly elected members of tbe Presidium and Secretariat, had worked ln the Central Committee apparatus since at7 *bea be was identified ae Chief of the Light Industry Section. r
The election to the Central Committeeull membersandidateorecedent eat In thea when the full membership was stabilized atnd the candidate membership at Prior to this time, the Central Committee had reflected thegrowth ln Party Dembernhlp. The stabilizationa continually growing Party membership, occurred after Stalin bad completely consolidated his personal supremacy by pocking Party organizations with his own appointees.
Tbe expansion of the Central Committee in2 indicated the elevation of Party careerists orer specialists and technicians from other sections of society and clearly Indicated the conparatlre importance of tbe professional Party worker. This developmentincreased Halenkov's influence In this body, since be was the Party organization specialist and therefore probably badreat deal to say in these appointments.
ofew Central Committee members, someull members andandidates are Party careerists, as contrasted with someull ncmbers andandidates who have governmental assignments. Seventy percent of the full members of the Centralhave come up through Party ranks. Onlyfentral Commltteo members have military command assignments;9 the ratio was, and1 lt vas. 1 there wre ninemembers of the Central Committee who vere career military men; tbe new Central Committee hoe only five. Several officers whobad been full members were dropped to alternate status. Rather than having increased Its share of these honorary positions, the military appeared to have loot considerable ground.
^he belated announcement onctober that Karsbal. Govorov bad been Inadvertently left off tbe list of candidatearoused speculation regarding the operation of behind-the-scenes Influences involving military leaders. Observers pointed outistake of tblB nature was Inconceivable and that some disgruntled element must have forced tbe addition of Govorov to tbe Centralafter the Initial selection. Govorov, it will be remembered, vas apparently part of, or on the periphery of, the Zhdanovand he Later figured In the Doctors' Plot announcement.
The problem of succession was not dealt with overtly In the major readjustment of Party leadership at the conclusion ofh Party Congress. However, the increased importance accorded to the
reglocal Party aecretarles, as demonstrated io their election to the leading Party organs, reemphaslzed Malenkov's key position. Since tho basis of their selection appears to have been more their personal qualifications and connections than the significance of theareas Which they represented, it is highly probable that tbey owed their advancement to Malenkov, as well as to Stalin. Tbeitself was apparently dominated, at least Indirectly, bysince lt was he who delivered the keynoteheof the Central Committee, which at past Congresses had been given by Stalin.
POST-CONGRESS DEVELOPMENTS: POLITICAL CRISIS
Every republic Congress held beforeh All-Onlon Congress strongly emphasited the need for vigilance, stressing that thenationalist rather than the actual "spy" was tbe root of trouble. Only the Congresses in Georgia, Lithuania and Estoniacited foreign spies British, American and Turkishas the enemy to be watched, but even here tbe internal enemy, thenationalist and the lax person, was strongly condemned.
The uniformity of certain remarks made at these congresses,ospionage and hostile actions by kulaks and bourgeoisand concerning negligence and crime by industrial managers and workers, pointed to the existence of one or more central Partyon these subjects. The cause for these criticisms seems to have been long-standing apathy toward Party aims, neglect ofand failure to react properly to tbe lias of Great Russian nationalism. Speeches ath Congress left no doubt concerning these problems. Malenkov, Suslov, Bulganin and Poskrebysbsv, among others, strongly warned against such errors. The Party statutes, which increased the Party members' duties and made ideological atody mandatory, were aimed at erasing apathy.
Throughoutumber of arrests for crimes ranging from embezzlement to cheating the public and state were announced in the press. ecember, tbe death penalty was imposed on three persons charged withang In "speculation, embezzlement, and racketeering." This waa the first application of tbe deathfor economic crimes since this penalty bad been reintroduced inlso inn editorial and propaganda campaign was begun against "wool gathering" and "gullibility."
Following the October Partyumber of other events indicated continued political tension and maneuvering behind tbe scones.
-
Onctober, fifteen days after the conclusion of the Party Congress and tbe publication of the list of nevC emit teepecial announcement stated tbat tbe name of Marshall L. A. Govorov had been mistakenly omitted from the list of Central Committee members. He vas added to the Central Committee as an alternate member.
Onecember, an article ln Pravda by M. A. Suslov criticised P. Fedoseev for having written articles on,Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism without at the same time admit -ting that" he' too had held the erroneous views denounced by Stalin. Fodoseev's articles had appeared ln Isvestla about two weeks earlier. Fedoseev hastily apologised in public for this error, whileest la editorial board apologised forthe articles to run. In his article, Suslov questioned whether or not Fedoseev vas "being sly" and bad really changed his views.
D. T. Shepilov, ousted from Agitprop9 forIncluding complicity'in the Voznesensky affair, was Identified in mid-December as tbe nev editor of Pravda.
*. Onbe Doctors' Plot vas announced.
nonferences of economists end ofscientists were bald, in which various figures apologised for having held tbe incorrect views criticized byhe chief report at tbe session of tbe Academy of Sciences on3 vas given by Pavel Yudin. In these conferences, numerous specific figures were criticized, while Tudin, ln his speech disclosed that the proscribed-views were vldcly held ln high Soviet circles.
'6*. It was learned in January that Pospelov bad beenas bead of the Marx-Engels-Lenln Institute and reassignedeputy Editor of Pravda. At theanuary ceremonies commemorating the anniversary of Lenin's death, the principal speech was given by H. A. Mlkhallov;his speech bad been delivered by Pospelov. Curiously, for tbe first timebe Soviet press failed to publish tbe list of Politburo members who bad attended.
7- ebruary, Pravdaitriolic article entitled "Revolutionaryhich vas striking In the extent to vhicb It revealed disputes. Tbe article lashed oat atrottenbat capitalistno longer exists, and tbat capitalism will renounce its
Attempts to harm the Increasingly strong Soviet Union. Thocharged, that "Soviet successes" had given rise to moods of complacency, eeIf-satisfaction and conceit. In Itson foreign policy, the article appeared to both paraphrase and supplement Stalin's foreign policy discussion of Its sharp tone. In tbe context of the vigilance campaign following tbe Doctors' Plot announcement, suggested that tbe foreign policy disputes bad not been resolved, but rather had become more acute, over tbe year since
- au -
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: