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probable consequences in non-communist asia of certain possible developments in indochina before
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PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES IN NON-COMMUNIST ASIA' OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA BEFORE
the problem
To estimate lhe probable reactions and consequences in non-Communist Asia of:
the eslablislunent of effective Viet Minn control over Indochina beforer; the attainment by the Viet Minn, beforeegree of success which rendered the French union position in Indochina untenable;
the intervention, beforef US ground, naval, and air forces in order to prevent the fall of Indochina to Communist control.
assumptions"
For (a) above:
No Chinese Communist intervention in force had taken place.
No US combat units had been committed. For (b) above:
No Chinese Communist intervention in force had taken place.
French Union forces stilloothold in Indochina.
CONCLUSIONS
consequencesiet minh victory in indochina
iet Minh victory in Indochina wouldignificantommunist sweep through Southeast Asia, expose the remainder of that region to greatly increased external Communist pressures, and probablythe capabilities of local Commu-
' Non-Communist Asia, as here used. Includes Japan, the ROK, Nationalist China, theIndonesia, Malaya, Thailand, theSlates ol Indochina, Burma, India,and Ceylon. 'The Questions of probable Chinese Communist courses of action with respect to Indochina and of Communist reactionsS Intervention In Indochina are not within the scope of thisand will be covered in
nists. There would probably be littleon the part of the governments of the area toward collective defense."
"The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Stall, believes that this paragraph should read as follows:
"The establishment ol Communist control over Indochina by military or other means wouldcertainly result in the communization of ell or Southeast Asia and the exposure of India, the Philippines and Australia to increasingpressure. Communication of Southeast Asia would, in effect, transfer the rice surpluses. Uie oil, tin and rubber, now largely available lo Uie West, lo the Communists and wouldtheir Interruption of communication lines. The loss of the rice surpluses would weaken Uie bargaining power of Uie West with the rlce-dellcicnt countries of. India. Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia, Uie Philippines and Japan, while strengthening that of Uie Communist Dloc."
Most Asian leaders wouldiet Minh victory in Indochinaefeat for the Westajor blow to US power and prestige in Asia. The policies adopted by the non-Communist governments to meet the new power situation inAsia would be largely determined by the jisychologieal impact of the Western defeat, andumber of contingent developments, such as the subsequent policies and actions of the US, Communist China, and the new Indochina.
Thailand would be most directlyby Uie Vict Minh victory. Unless the US were able to give Thailand asecurity guarantee and to convince the Thai Government that it could safely continue to entrust Thailand's security to the West, Thailand would almostbegin to reorient its positionthe Communist bloc.
governments of India, Burma,Pakistan, and Ceylonnot appreciably changepolicies toward thein the absence of furtherin the area and so longretained essentially itsHowever, Thaito Communism would probablyand possibly Indonesia, totheir neutral positions in favor ofwith one or Uie other ofblocs. If Burma should clearlyitself to the Communist bloc,be forced lo reassess itspolicy and the chances arcthan even that in thisIndia would seek quietly toto the Western democracies;would probably continue itspolicy, particularly if the USto give substantial military and economic support.
ationalist China, the Republic ofthe Philippines, Japan, and thein Malaya would probably continue essentially their present policies.
probable consequencess
intervention in force in indochina
ationalist China, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines would lend toorceful US intervenUon in Indochina; Japan and the UK would at least acquiesce. These countries could be expected to give diplomatic support and might provide varying degrees ofassistance. The Pakistanwould probablyolicy of benevolent neutrality toward the US action.
The non-Communist Indochinesewould support US intervention if they believed that such US action would soon bring the Indochina warlose and would insure the independence of the Associated States.
Thailand, initially at least, wouldattempt to avoid involvement in Uie conflict. However, if Thailand obtained satisfactory guarantees from the US, it would probably permit the US to use Thai territory and facilities.
* The Deputy Director lor Intelligence. The Joint Stall, believes thathould beby Uie lollowing additional paragraph:
"US. intervenUon In force in Indochina would cffccUvely Mop further Comniunlat advance In Southeast Asia, reduce their capabilities Inandulwark to theand Australia; thit would assure the avall-utiility of rice to the non-CommunistnaUons and nunnuitce to the West the con-Uuutns availability of the vitalraw materials of .Southeast Asia and IU contiguous areas."
Burma, Indonesia, anddisapprove interference instill tend to regard as aagainst an Asianand, at least initially,fearful of an extension of war inwould denounce the US actionprobablyolution ofproblem in the UN; thecountries would probablyavoid any involvement.
the longer run, reactions inAsia would be largelyby the success of the USIf the Viet Minh were quickly defeated without leadinghinese Communist invasion of Indochina, and if truly independent and effectiveemerged in Indochina,Asian leaders would accept the new situation and would welcome theof Communist expansion in Asia. On the otherrotracted stalemate in Indochina would almost certainlysupport for the US throughout Asia.
ATTITUDES IN THE NON-COMMUNIST ASIAN COUNTRIES TOWARD THE WAR IN INDOCHINA
Throughout non-Communist Asia,of the full implications of thewar as of other international issues is largely restricted to government officials,leaders, journalists, students, andThe nature and intensity of the attitudes of this policy-determining elitedevelopments in Indochina vary widely and are determined largely by the degree to which appreciation of Communist objectives and policies in Asia modifies the nationalist and often anti-Western attitudes held by this elite. At present, however, nationalistare generally dominant.
Present Asian nationalist andattitudes are in largeeritage of the struggle for independence from thepowers. Many Asian leaders,in India. Burma, and Indonesia, view Western objectives in Asia with strongand regard the Indochina war primarilytruggle between indigenous nationalism and French colonialism.
Their past experiences with colonial rule and their present real or imagined grievances against the West tend to blind many Asians to the threat of international Communism and to the close relationship between tlie Viet Minh and the international CommunistAlthough most non-Communist Asian leaders recognize the internal Communist threat In their own countries and generally acknowledge that the Communist blocthe Viet Minh. many believe that the Indochlnese nationalists turned to thefor assistance only because ot French Intransigeancc. and some hold that thesewould rid themselves of theircolleagues once the French hadfrom Indochina. Some non-Communist Asian leaders even believe that their countries should accommodate to Communism.
he strongly antl-Communlstof Korea, Japan. Nationalist China, and the Philippines, which rely on US power for their security, probably find US support for the French and Associatedeassuring indication of US determination to resistexpansion. However, many Asian leaders, particularly in India, Burma, andare critical of US policy towardThey are convinced that the war has been prolonged by US assistance and that US "intervention" in what they consider toar for independence has further embroiled Asia In the struggle between the Western Powers and the Communist bloc. They also fear that US policies will lead lo expansion of the area of conflict in Asia.
thererowinginadequate recognition among leadersand Southeast Asia of theof Communist objectives and policiesIn addition, there is increasedthroughout non-Communist Asiathe aims of Communist China, notbecause it is Communist asfear the expansion of Cliincse power.
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCESIET MINH VICTORY IN INDOCHINA
(Assumptions:
No Chinese Communist intervention In force had taken place.
No US combat units had been
A Viet Mlnh victory in Indochina wouldignificant military barrierommunist sweep through Southeast Asia and would expose the remainder of Southeast Asia to greatly increased externalpressures. There would be no indigenous mililary force in the area capable ofthe current protective role of the Franco-Vietnamese forces in Indochina, and there would probably be little initiative on the part of the governments of the area towarddefense. '*
Most Asian loaders wouldiet Minn victory in Indochinaefeat for the Westajor blow to US power and prestige in Asia. The policies adopted by the non-Communist governments to meet the new
'The Deputy Director for Intelligence The Joint Staff, believes this paragraph should read as
'The establishment of Communist control over Indochina by military or other means wouldcertainly result In the communization of all of Southeast Asia and the exposure of India, the Philippines and Australia to increasingpressure. Communization of Southeast Asia would, in effect, transfer tho rice surpluses, the oil, tin and rubber, now largely available to the west, to the communists and would facilitate their interruption of communication lines. The lass of the rice surpluses would weaken thepower of the West with the rice-deficient countries of India, Pakistan, Ceylon. Indonesia, the Philippines and japan, while strengthenine that of Die Commuuislower situation in Southeast Asia would be largely determined by the psychologicalof the Western defeat andumber of contingent developments, the mostof which we believe would be: (a) the apparent success with which the Viet Minn established and maintained effective control over Indochina, and the apparent degree to which the new Indochina was dominated by Communist leaders; (b) the degree to which the new Indochina appeared toatellite of Communist China; (c) the degree to which Communist China and the newpursued either aggressive orpolicies toward their non-Communist neighbors; (cl) the activities of the indigenous Communist movements within the various non-Communist countries; and (e) theand actions of the US In Asia.
Despite the numerous variables involved, we estimate that the following reactions and consequences are likely to resultiet Minh victory in Indochina.
Thailand would be most directly affected by the Viet Minh victory. The Thaiconcern for the security of the country would immediately Increase, and thewould almost certainlypecific guarantee that the US would protect Thai independence. Unless the US were able to give these guarantees and to convince the Thai Government that it could safely continue to entrust Thailand's security to the West, Thailand would almost certainly begin to reorient its position toward the Communist bloc.
The governments of India. Burma,Pakistan, and Ceylon, while probably increasingly aware of the Communist nature of the Viet Minh and of its relationship to Asian Communist power, would probably be slow to recognize the seriousness of the threat to their security posed by the new powerin Southeast Asia. In the absence of further Communist aggression in the area and so long as Thailand retained essentially its present orientation, these governments would probably not appreciably change their present policies toward the Communist bloc.Thai accommodation to the Communist
bloc would probably impel Burma, andIndonesia, lo abandon their neutralin favor of an alignment with one or the other of the power blocs, but wouldhave little ciTect on the policies of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon towards Communism. If, however, Burma should clearly reorient itself to lhe Communist bloc, India would be forced to reassess its non-alignment policy and Ihe chances are slightly better than even that in this circumstance India would seek quietly to move closer to the WesternCeylon would probably seek economic guarantees from the US and show interest in defense arrangements with the West.would probably continue its present pro-US policy, particularly if the US were prepared to give substantial military andsupport.
In the eventiet Minh victory in Indochina, the governments of Nationalist China, the ROK, and the Philippines would almost certainly continue to pursue strongly anti-Communist domestic and foreign policies. The British in Malaya would continue toto the limit of their capabilities theCommunist pressures which would probably accompany the extension ofpower in Southeast Asia. However, the premised situation would facilitate anin Communist effectiveness, thusan increase in British forces to counter it.
Japan would retain its pro-Westernbut would Insist lhat the US fullyils security and economic viability. However, Japan would probably attempt to expand economic and political relations with the Communist states in Asia, as far as this could be done without jeopardising itswith the US.
Most non-Communist Asian governments would become more apprehensive over the activities of local Communists and mightmore stringent measures against them. Although local Communist movements in Asia outside Indochina are not now capable of overthrowing existingiet Minh victory would probably increase the capabilities of local Communists, particularly in Southeast Asia. If the local Communists should intensify their efforts in support of stepped-up political and economic pressures from the Communist bloc, the awareness of the Communist threat would increase in Asia. However, in the short run local Communist action would be likely to have less effect upon the policies of the governments ofAsia toward internationalthan would external Communistand each government's assessment of the new power balance in Asia.
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCESS INTERVENTION IN FORCE IN INDOCHINA
(Assumptions:
No Chinese Communistin force had taken place.
French Union forces stilloothold in Indochina.)
nitial reactions lo US intervention would vary among the non-Communist Asianand within each country, depending upon such factors as: (a) each government's estimate of the likelihood that the US action would lead lo Chinese Communistin force in Indochina; (b) the policies and tactics of Communist China with respect to Korea and other Asian issues; (c) theof the US intervention, inthe attitudes of the leaders of theSlates toward the intervention and the state of political relations between France and the Associated States; (d) the position of the UN with respect lo the US action; and (e) the extent to which non-Communist Asian leaders estimated that the US intervention wascale and nature sufficient to defeat the field forces of the Viet Minh.
Deputy Director for Intelligence. The Joint Stuff, believes that this paragraph should be preceded by the following additional paragraph: "US. Intervention In force In Indochina would effectively stop further Communist advance In SouUieast Asia, reduce their capabilities inandulwark to theand Australia; this would assure theof rice to the non-Communist rlce-defl-cient nations and guarantee to the West the continuing availability of the vital strategic raw materials of Southeast Asia and Its contiguous areas."
The Asian nationstrong antl-Communist orientation would tend toor at least acquiesceorceful US intervention in Indochina, viewing such action as evidence of US determination to prevent further Communist expansion. Thesecould be expected to give diplomaticand might provide varying degrees of material assistance. On the other hand, the "neutralist" countries would, at least initially, view US intervention with apprehensionby overriding fears of extension of war in Asia. Those countries would alsointerference In what they still tend to regardrench struggle against an Asian nationalist movement, nl though thismight be modified by some feeling of reassurance over the exercise of US power.
The government of Nationalist China would welcome US intervention In Indochina but would be concerned that US aid would be diverted from Taiwan. The Nationalistwould probably welcome the threat of Communist Chinese intervention in force In Indochina in hope that, should It occur, it would involve the US In war with Communist China. The Nationalist Government would probably not offer forces for service In
The Philippine Government wouldthe intervention and would probablythe US to use Philippine territory and facilities. In addition, the Philippinemight offer token forces. The threathinese Communist Invasion in Indochina would probably not dissuade the Philippine Government from supporting the US action.
The non-Communist Indochlnese leaders would support US intervention if they believed that such US action would soon bring thewarlose and would insure the independence of the Associatedhreatened Chinese Communist invasion would probably appreciably lessen thisunless ihr scale and nature of the US intervention appeared lo Indochincse leaders to be adequate to deter or to defeat such
and some Britishare presently engaged In Malaya. The
UK, although apprehensive of the possibility of war between Communist China and the West, would probablySin Indochina as necessary for the defense of Malaya and for the prevention of further expansion of Communist power in Asia.and New Zealand would clearlythe threat of expanding Communism in Southeast Asia and would give full support to the US action. These three Commonwealth countries might be able to provide token naval and air support. However, none of these countries would be capable of providing ground forces at present unless units now in Korea were diverted for service in Indochina.
ROK leaders would be apprehensive that the US intervention in Indochina would divert US military support from the ROK, but would favor the intervention if they thought that it would involve the USar withChina and thus improve the chances for the unification of Korea under the ROK.
The Indian Government would probably denounce the US intervention on the grounds that it was undertaken to suppress astruggle against colonialism and that this US action would greatly increase the chances of extending the area of conflict In Asia.would probablyolution of theproblem In the UN-
The Burmese would be apprehensive that US Intervention would provoke Chineseintervention in force in Indochina which might involve Burma in war, The Burmese Government would probably attempt toeutral attitude towards the US intervention. However, if India initialed UN action, Burma might support it.
The Indonesian Government would be critical of US intervention, but would probably seek to avoid any involvement in theproblem. Ceylon would be unlikely to take any official position.
The Japanese Government would probably lend diplomatic support, but withoutThe government would fear that the US action might lead to the diversion of US armed forces and material aid from Japan and might even Involve Japan in war.
The Thai Government's reaction wouldalmost entirely on its estimate of the effect of US intervention in Indochina on Thailand's own security. Thailand, initially at least, would probably attempt to avoidin Uie conflict. However, ifobtained satisfactory security guarantees from the US, It would probably permit the US to use Thai territory and facilities.
The Pakistan Government would probablyolicy of benevolent neutrality toward the US action, although some public opinion would probably be critical of US intervention because of nationalist feeling and because of the fear of expanded war in Asia. TheGovernment would probably not support any UK action condemning US intervention.
ver the longer run, reactions in non-Communist Asia to US intervention in force in Indochina would be largely determined by the success of the Intervention. If the Viet Minh were quickly eliminated or decisively defeated without leadinghinese Communistof Indochina, and if military victory were followed by the emergence of trulyand effective governments inCambodia, and Laos. non-Communist Asian leaders would accept the new situation and would welcome the setback of Communist expansion in Asia. On the other hand, astalemate in Indochina would almost certainly reduce Rupport lor the USAsia.
Original document.
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