cw historical review PR$m
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releaseso3
SUBJECT: PBTORTUHB, Essential Blemems
1. Planning and execution of PBFORTOHB auat include affactlTa coverage of tba following elements. Detailed planning for each anat be consolidated and action advanced vlth highest priority.
and Irrieaentation of militaryvltb Kcaragua, Honduras and El Salvador.
of evidence of Communist doadnatlon ofGovernment. Thisxpected to IncludeIn the. hands of State and CIA aa well as materialdiscovery of synthetic cells and caches InBl Salvador, plus documents obtained froa files ofCom mist Party.
e. Preparationoaalble conference of Foreign Ministers or the OAS.
of biographical data on Latin Americanwho may become involved in this case in the OAS or OH.
of economic preesure.
of diplomatic pressure.
of psychological pressure.
b. Control of ccentunl cat ions within Guateaala.
1. Control of power within Guateaala. '
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j. Subversion and control of Guatemalan military leaders, k. The military plan.
1. Tbe consolidation period. This will Include provisionadTicehe new government, establishment of favorable control over Guatemalan labor, and guidance for Guateaalsn PP activity.
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The urgency forhange in the Government of Guateaala, while effective opposition otill cxisto and before the cancer of Conmmisa has spread and eetabliahed itself still more firmly ln this Headaphere, la further aggravated by the approaching coffee harvest and thenecessity for at least threatening some economic pressurethis year's crop ia eold in recember. While other action will be necessary, it is recognized that only through military actionew and stable government, friendly to the United States, be established promptly. It la agreed that RUFUS is the only Individual with theideals, following and organisation who can satisfactorily effect thin change through armed action. However, during the past year the Government of Ouatemala and the Cccamxoint elements within the country have strengthened their position, while that of at least como of the opposition dements has deteriorated.
1. The probability of military coccees will be greatly rtreogthened if plans ore revised to include:
a. Capture of Qfotcmsla City from within, rather than trm without by an attack vhlch would beupon possiblyguerrilla forces from the ^nterjor. Original planning; oalled for tbe capture of Puerto Barrloe by assault, the establishmentrovisional capital in that city,ubsequent attack oa Ouatemala City by guerrilla forces. The capture of the capital can beif the officers of its garrison are converted, subverted, abducted or assassinated cKracurrently with other effective meaaurea. Although tbe purported organisation0 anti^caaunlate ln cells may still be Intact, the effective participation of an appreciable percentage
orecurjjy Information
EYES ONLY
of this group Inml nilitary act ion la too wneertain at this tlaa to pernlt Bound planning to plana too heavy oVrpandanos upon than as saYabera ofguerrtlla amy. Unless there Isn of sfflM^VwaBnrrUt Hisses its coup lad with strong livM nations of Initial iiiitssiay,es lb lo that asar/ elements vould not rise to formuerrilla army. It alao appears tbat some of these si Minis oovla be utilized SOTSln types) of art ion vhi ch Ao not call for sustained ccsftet courage In the face of organl ted treepm.
b, san^llshwwtttt ce? the new raxrrisiccel gawnaapt in tbe capital rather thenemotenh as frssrto Barrtoe ae originally nifiuesied. fiat aiyyinnssanit fron tbe capitalew pWsssafJsa vltb arpreciahle Arsatd Fcreea backing, eoasled vltb tba snrreiTressrit of strong feme. Barfing oa tba capital froa outlying districts, would carry vltb lt endurance of euooeee and vould give tbe necessary courage to riee to nany of tba civil inn ouu^ouauu
vbo might ta unwilling otherwise to tabs tbaro-ax.
via local auteu lament aetahllahad la tba capi tal woold also ecemvand more reapect and permit acre open support froa other goveximatnts than one preearioualy estahUehodemote point*
e. Cogtaro of the coaaaalcntlaoe and public utilities faoill-tlee at tbe very outset of the action. Capture of the Government Redlon In Guatemala City la an important elssssct In enabling the new provisional government to call ita people quickly to eras
StffiET
Secusfy Information
EYESjONLY
and to solicit the support at other ap renuavata. Plaai should insurejnla= tho denial of all ftoaararl cation* tarllltla* (tmlisttn* militaryhxooghoat tho country, to tba Quaternion Government.
prohabUlty of adlltary Boeceaa oan ba furtherBPTtB can count oa tha rapportajor prcyirttoa of tbaAnanalaa to pzaeaoa aaavjd action ahouldabake tha laith of tba Army la ita Qrneiand la ita oantbat Ooiaxusaut byi
c. Flaringtba knoan fact that tha Oeraroaant laarnlag civilian* and placing rora reliance oa tba Colonists than on Its oaa nalltag-y.
b. Iff acting antual defense and allltary goalstance pact* with palfhbortng eoiartrlaa.
o. FTQTlolry material and allltary training alanines to naighborlng otwntrlos.
fl. blthdrarlne allltary rjaalona to ftjatemala and toCaaUng and stiffening tha araa tcJbargo.
Tha non-political OoatataUan Araed porceu ore quite likely tonvexnaent vhich, by Ita cam preaadltatad actions. Is weakening ita allltary and forcing tba atrrngthenlng of Ita neighbors, and at tba sane tlaa la araing Ita own pro-Coccninlflt civilians. Individual officers vbo reealn loyal to the Government must be eliminated by other means.
probability of ndlitaxy suoceoa can be further Btnragthcoed
EY^NLY
through tba enaloymant of PW daalgnafl to strengthen the will of tbe Opposition, break tha faith of and create die sensIon anong presentof the Ge-roiisasnt, and discredit the Oovenn-cnt with the Deao-cxatic World. PW ahould loe lode at least the threatonference of OAS or of roreicnto consider evidence thathreat to Besdspnere aaaiulty through Its aupport of lotar-rattlrral Crrartnlen This oooference should be bald In Bovecfcer end sufficient convincing, incontrovertible evidence snot be provided, by fabrication If necessary.
a. The probability of militaryray be further ctrcngthc^ned through bringing to boar, or threatening, certain eccooalc proocuroe. Soma eocccolc preaaura la feasible and can be affective. Tbe threat of other eoonoocLc pressure* can be equally effective.
5. The probability of Military soccsee can be greatly strengthened through tbe delivery of mterlel to BDFB3 by the following secure meonci
of aatorlel no* at DTBOBAIC to the Free PortYork for pick-up and call very by C. hips.
and delivery of addltlooal ratericl throuahPort of newomateriel (cost) to be purchased lth money delivered to BDFIB throu,>hand turned over by hln to C C ill makebase at C- vailable to TiSFUZ.
wpport of HfFOS and Ms group,dnifliaai
a payaanta tba laaedlata fntnre to
satisfy present debts aaj fifiBBJftBfife
X) Bcothljr regular psgrreriTo froaay vfalafa will paradt HOTUS to bold bla paaawsnttoasjthsr.
tba lajsniifi Uated above are cicrelnarably loaar tbaa tba figures preuautud by HDTOS, but are believed to ba eafflolant to tnelntaln aa effective ivjletanee group, aad not ao blab aa to attract undo* attention to tba nalnteneaoe ofroup. Booh payaento oan ba aada through foreign sources ao tbat tbay oanoot be attrleaxted to any. aource. ether peyaenta far tbeof transport and other Itone of special cqnlpaont nay be necessary.
e. With tba axpeodlturo of furthar Quae at tbe tlaa pdlltary
action la Initiated and daring the establishing of the new govern-meat. In the thirty days prioray as aneb aaany ha required, ktonsy requirements during tho period la whieh the nas Govarnaent le eatahllahing itaelf^ecn be bandied on aa overt loan basin.
All action taken aunt be carefully planned In detail, tined to perfection, and faultlessly eucocuted. Support of ell lutoreeted grope
Original document.
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