IMPRESSIONS OF PBFORTUNE

Created: 9/4/1953

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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PROGRAM

FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: impressions of PBFORTUNE

following initial observations are made on the basis ofi

Two briefings by Col. Kingnd 26

August

One meeting with CfcH and CPP in DD/P's

Study of basic paperof NtE-8ii, datedayof sundry papers forof chief field case officerconferences with King and

current situation in the target country would havea considerable change before it would be favorablefor the implementation of PbTrXIRTDNE.

Certain changes in the balance of military power in the general central area in question would have to be established prior to the activation of any kind of revolutionary activity, in the target country.

A series of support measures planned for the three neighboring countries recognize this. These preparatory moves in themselves are of very considerable interest in the over-all anti-Coramunist effort ol the Agency and could well pave the wayumber of important covert activities even if tho presently contemplated revolutionary climax of PBFORTUNE would have to be cancelled or delayed indefinitely due to lack of internal covert support assets.

h. The position of thes weak. His available assets outside the target country are negligible. His plan of action is based entirely on expected popular support. There is no evidence that such popular support would be forthcoming. There are no actual proofs of any effective covert mechanism of any consequence inside the target country.

eVet

Securi/Tnformatlon

The military plan of action visualized bys highly questionable in view of the fact that the main forces would consist of untrained irregulars. It appears thatilitary plan grossly underestimates the attitude and defensive capabilities of the regular array. AccordingU, this army "can defeat any force which the three neighboring countries could deploy againstlong as it remains united." his connection, it is noteworthy that there is no evidence to indicate that the regular army is susceptible to defection or revolt.

5*. According to the chief field case officer and otherseadquarters, thereefinite time element involved in the PBFORTUNE operation. Time limitsays3 have been indicated as desirable or ultimate. These time limits are mentioned partly for reasons of climate and partly for reasons of expediency relative to the deteriorating situation within the target country where active opposition snd resistance against the present regime is fast disappearing.

this stage, it is tho personal opinion of the undersigned

that:

a. The present concept of PBFORTUNE with an operational climax centeredevolutionary effort on the part ofs currently planned is Impracticable;

b. Preliminary measures involving Uie three neighboring countries aimed at offsetting the balance of power* especially* military strength, in the ovor-all central area could be of very considerable importance.

Followed by well-timed covert operations of the PP-type and some well-planned ffl activities, it is possible that the target country and its Government could be greatly harassed and placed in an untenable position in due course.

In this connection, it is possible that thend his assets could be brought into playroper, limited scale.

is meeting with the leader of the allegedwithin the target country in Mew York this weekend. Itthat up-to-date reports from this leader may change tothe thinking outlined in the above.

HAMS V. TOFTS

Original document.

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