MISC RE GUATEMALA 1954 COUP

Created: 9/4/1953

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

1-.

a population of approximately three and ons quarter million.

economy ie essentially agricultural with smphpsis on tho oroduction of coffee, bananas anfl hemp. Although nominally an independent republicho country has beeb ruled primarilyories cf dictators until loWiiberal coalition brought about the overthrow of General Ublco. The present political situation ln Ouateoala is an outgrowth of the devolution ofFroa: that uprising theretrong national movement toe country from militaryocial backwardness and "economic colonialism" which had baen the pattern of the past. The present administration of President Jacobo Arbenz still derives some strength from its claim to leadership of the continuing national revolution.

he successive administrations ofnd Arbenz hove pursued Increasingly radical and nationalistic policios. Toleration of Communist activity which characterized the early years of tha Arsvalo regime has devalopsd into an effective working alliance between Arbenz and The Communists. This alliance, through formationommunist affiliated national labor confederation, persecution of foreign economic interests, snactmont and implementationonfiscatory agrarian reform law, court packing,and the conduct of eu agresaively anti-Aiierican, pro-

>iational Agrarian Department, the Institute of Social Security, the Labor Courts, tiie ministry of Education, the Presidential Secretariat of Propagandahe official press aw) radio.

ans Political tactics of ths ^onoinists ere Adjusted to international

itrotegy and local environment. Through their various positions in ths government thoy liave been able to pronote direct Soviet objectives such as the condemnation2 of the Korean war as "Worth American agression" byeputies In congress, and withdrawal of Guatemala from the Organization of Central American States in3 when faced with the possibility that other members would

an anti-wooumnist resolution, included support of foreign policy lies

elements in neighboring countries end

refuge

c:ld to exiles

.0 the Guatemalan governaent actively and directly supported subversion against ma* "dictatorships" by participating in the military operations of the Caribbean Legion. Recently, the Guatemalan based, anti-Somoza, .icveiusnt of Wicnraguan Partisansnocraey hasouiMiniat line program. The governmentalvadoreen harassedviolently abusive attacks by the Guatemalan press and radio labelling; the Osorio government "feudal, reactionary and fascist" and "an instrument through which Washington hopss to liquidate tne democratic and progressive government of0 the Guatemalan Embassy in.Salvador lms beensource of material and moral assistance to leftist and Communist elements while agents and propaganda flow freely latoalvador from the Guatemalan frdntsar. Honduran Coma-unist front groups receive dirsction and aid fro= Guatemalan CoLipr.inists^vith probable government connivance and aupportjwhils coeparablo activities are dlrectod eowsrrd Costa Jtica end Panama, Guatemala's rolease for agresstve Communist subversion has naturally aroused grave concern throughout Central America.

ofl

k3

n1 the first of many meetings vas held between Agency

c

I

a careful survey of anti-Ccemtuniet Guatemalan revolutionary leaders. It wes decided that BJFOS vas the only one with sufficient presilge,and ability, to organize anduccessful revolution. A

Director. Accompanying the planist of requirement6 Inmunitions, which was estimated ae sufficient at tbat time,the known capabilities of tbe regular Guatemalan Army anddefection of one-third of its forces, to bring to athe projected novement. ay vas5 Boveetberprocured, and arrangements set up for their shipmentase In Nicaragua offered by President Somoza of Coinciding with this vere numerous PW activities All went well until the shipment had actually leften route tc The Department of State refaced an

export license andeeting attended by the Under Secretary of State, hie Deputy, the Assistant Secretary for Latin America, and representatives of this Agency, refusal of permit was sustainedirective given

Information

-2-

that we were not to spark any revolutionary movement. In spite ofexport permit, tbe shipment leftout because of our nev

directive waa diverted from the Hiearaguen port to our own base e* where it Is still In storage.

This ledomplete revision of plana by the RUFUS group. The organised anti-coantunlst civilian elements inside Guatemala, who vere anxious to move, proved veil enough disciplined to obey RUFUS' Instructions not to disclose their hand until the proper Bignal vas given. Persistent

*

efforts vere made vith the assistance *

Conversations also took place with Panama, Bl Salvador, Cuba andcommitment vas actually madedeliver an additional

quantity of arms, by this time required to offset the increasedthe Guatenalaii Army. opened a

credit of0 with his Ambassador in Washingtonpurchase of planes.continued to finance,

up0 per week, the forces assembled by RUFUS in Hondurasand to support some of bis key people Insidevas scheduled for Easter Week, At the lastreneged and another unconnected group

ledevolt at Salana which led to disaster

for those involved end to the arrest of RUFUS' number one men lnalde

-3-

Guatemala, lawyer Cordoba Cema. Although Ceraa had nothing to do with

the abortive revolt,because of his outspoken attacks on the Arbenz

Government, hia great prestige and popularity among the people, and

probably some knowledge of his efforts to organize anti-Ccramnnist cells,

he was arrested, tortured for eighteen days, and finally pushed across

the frontier Into Honduras. Prior to tbe 8alama incident there vas

continual agitation and several large demonstrations by enti^WDmunlst

groupseriod of months. In Guatemala City, since Salama and

the exile of Cerna, there have been no public denonatrations by antl-

Ccmmunlsts, and there Is an apparent apathy and fear which lt Bust be

assumed has weakened the spirit of resistance and willingness to fight

of0 five-man cells reportedhave been organ1ted.

Any successful action oust be preceded, therefore, byore

the

favorable climate inside Guatemala. Although/RDTOS planear ago would have little or no chance of success if launched immediately. It ls believed that there are sufficient favorable factors if all assets and capabilities are utilized, touilding up of RDTUS' chances of success to At this time it is not possible toategorical statement, and it ls recommended that thend when this prerequisite of 8ojt has been achieved. Our preliminary estimate of the time required is four to six months.

Original document.

---

---