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- Preliminary Analysis ofIntelligence Assets
A study of the material available in HQS relevant to the osaets and production of the itUPUS positive intelligence structure in Guatemala is set forth herewith toeneral picture of the net structure allegedly ir. existence and pose certain questions to be answered when the case officer arrives in the field.
A review by the undersigned or all the intelligence reports which have been forwarded to HQS by RUFUS seems to indicate that at present there is but one major reporting source ln Guateaala. This source is an alleged Gemmmnist Party penetration whoob in the POT office
in Guatemala City. Although this source, field cryptonym CIRC, appears to do most of his reporting on the basis of personal observations, some of the reports give the impression that he does have several sub-aources whe on occasions have furnished him with information.
evaluation0 was made byuringhey pointed out tho lack of dotail and professionalism inand raised considerable doubt as to his identity, Jobability. In view of tho material whichadmake the analysis, it is folt that their contusions aredue to thef operational information available ln HQStime, no attempt should be made to reach definite conclusionstimeirst-hand investigation of the assets can be made.
ba On the strength of the Information reports which CIRO has produced over the past few months, the following basic concepts are belioved to be valid:
a. CIROlerk oa. Admin. Asst. in PGT HQS. Although hehimself as anhe caliber of reports aa well as the very evident lack of first-hand reporting would seem tc Indicate that this agent doos not perform official functions of any In reading his reports, the impression that is left la that CIRO obtains the better part of his information by virtue of tho Tact that he is physically in an office which is frequented by party functionaries, and in this manner picksonsiderable anount of "shophich ho passos on. In addition, there are several
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in ClflO's reports to his having been asked to locate documents ln the files or handle correspondence of one type or another, which seems to substantiate the theory that his duties are more olerical than executive.
appears that CIRO has access to certainmembers of PGT(CP) who have gone abroad on specialare several copies In tho files which CIRO claims to haveletters received in Party headquarters from surveillanceby the Party in neighboring countries to report on theanti-government groups. There is nothing in the recordswhere or how CIrtO obtained this information, but whenbe determined, there may exist the basis for an excellent
appears to be handled at present by an individualtho reportsl, This person seems to perform thean area agent, in that he transmits instructions and requeststo CIRO and forwards CIRO's reports to RUFUS. There appearat least one cutout between RUFUSl and anotherand CUC. None of these individuals have been identified,their number be determined with any degree of certainty. is attached snowing the relationshipsppear to exist
at present in the CIRO reporting net.
ceptlon of PIO./l, none of the members of the netboon identified, nor is there any indication that they are in
any way controlled by RUFUS.
5- In light of the above, then, the best that can be said for the RUFUS intelligence structure is that itery loose and informal reporting group composed of individuals who pass on to RUFUS by means of letters, notes and conversations, any bits of information that they feel may be of Interest to him.
6. irst step in assessing RUFUS' intelligence assets in Guatemala it will bo necessary to answer the following questions:
many reporting sources are presently being contacted Who are they? What are their positions? Whatbe, or is, ejorcised over them at present?
often do each of those sources report? Khst typeare the>osition to produce? What productionshown in the past?
any single individual in Guatemala central all of If so, does he edit information or merely act as Does he five Instructions to reportingor does he receive instructions from his superior,
any security checks been made cn individual agents? have any Independent sources for continuing checks on
communication channels exist within RUFUS" How is material transmitted from sub-sourcesl forward this information to RUFUS?
security measures have been taken to safeguardinformation frcw source to RUFUS?
l sand copies of all reports to RUFUS, rather What happens to raw reports after copies have been made?
is the identityl? What is his position? doea he know of the entire net structure in Guatemala?
1. eporting source? If ao, what type of Information can he produce? (It appears frcm reading his reports that he makos copies of Information that is sent to him by his sources but on occasion he seems to beosition to provide information himself.) See Report Ko.9
j. Does KUFUS have any undevelopedenetrations, resicent agents, contacts within the Guatemala military structure? If so, will it be possible to recruit sterile couriers to contact these Individuals?
7* During Phase I, then, th* case officer will proceed tc Honduras and endeavor to obtain the specific operational information outlined above. Only when the sources, sub-sources and channels have been identified and brought under control will it be possible toroper evaluation of th: intelligence production.
L 1
RYBAT
access to CP correspondence with teams in foreign countries
Majority of reporting on basis of office documents and personal observation
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Original document.
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