SOVIET FULFILLMENT OF AGRICULTURAL2
CIA/RR23
CONTENTS
Page
Introduction
Weather Conditions,
3- Crop
(Sugar Beets)
d- Industrial
and Forage
li. Textile Goals
Forestry
Livestock
of
Sheep and
(h)
Products
Meat and Dairy Product? and Canned Food
7- Standard of
Appendix
Sources and Evaluation of Sources
Area, Yield, and Production of Groins ln the
1 and 6
Area, Yield, and Production of Sugar Beets
and Production of Raw Sugar ln the 10
Area, Yield, and Production of Specified
InduBtrlalhe 12
It. Estimated Area, Yield, and Production of Vegetable Oil
Crops in the 15
5- Estimated Timber Production In the. 16
Rate of Increase in Cattle and Cow Numbers
on Collective Farms in the 20
Estimated Swine Numbers In thc23 - - 23
Estimated Sheep and Goat Numbers in the USSR,
3 25
9- Estimated Livestock Numbers in the USSR asanuary
3 27
utput of Soviet Food Products as a
Percentage1 28
and per Capita Production of Heat (including
Slaughter Fat) in the USSR and the - 31
Production of Selected Livestock Products In
the USSR, 32
FOREWORD
Thc Soviet Central Statistical Administration recently has adopted the annual practice of announcing the degree to which the varioussegments of the country have fulfilled their predetermined goals during the preceding year. The announcement, released inoncerning fulfillment of2 Economic Planection on agricultureew brief comments on forestry and on the sale of food to consumers. Except for the comments on food sales, this section was devoted almost exclusively to production goals or to goals related to the improvement or Increase of such production factors as theof cultivated land. It omitted mention of many agriculturaland some of those considered were given only general treatment which is not susceptible of statistical evaluation.
The purpose of this memorandum is to evaluate these Soviet claims of goal fulfillment for agricultural ccisaodltles and related products. Its scope Is limited, therefore, to an analysis of the Items mentioned in the announcement. Furthermore, It la confined generally to on analysis of claimed production achievements and an appraisal ofmportance of2 production of major coanioditleo In respect to larger Soviet goals. Where applicable, tables showing estimates for theroduction years are given tourther basis for evaluation of each Soviet claim.
ai
SOVIET FULFILLMENT OF AGRICULTURAL GOALS*
mi
Suiar.nry
In tbs latter part of3 the USSR announced the degree of fulfillment of2 Economic Plan. The announcement states that the annual Plan for gross production was fulfilled. Several ministries, however, fell short of their individuals goals, including the Ministry of the Timber Industry, with onlyercentthe Ministry of the Fish Industry, withercent; and the Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building, withercent. Most prominent among the Soviet claims for agriculture2 are the following: an Increasen the totalacreage; an increase in wheat acreageectares; and an increased grain production amountingillion metric tons, anercent greater than the announced production for
The announced increase in the total cultivated acreage seems to be reasonable in view of the long-standing efforts on the part of tho USSR to broaden Its sgricultural production base by extending crop acreage on marginal lands in northerly areas and in semlarld regions. Small increases in the cultivated acreage also have resulted from the Improvement of irrigation and drainage. The announcedin wheat acreage, although relatively large, is in keeping with the growing emphasis of the USSR on wheat production at theof other grains. This increase must have been at the expense of other grains, since the Soviet announcement also claimedin acreage and in production both for industrial crops and for fodder and grass crops. These claims seem reasonable, with thc exception of1 base figure for sugar production, which is considered to be too high. ercent increase indicated for total grain productionormal Increase in the trend of postwar production.
* This memorandum contains Information available asune ectare1 ucrcs.
Livestock data comprise the most questionable part of theclaims of agricultural Plan fulfillment. Ho mention was made in the Soviet announcement either of total livestock numbers or of
livestock in the private sector of the collective 'faro economy. Since there hasrive to transfer livestock from the private sector of ownership by collective farm members to the socialized sector of the collective farmhole, it Is believed that most, if not all, of the increases in livestock claimed* by the government refer to Increases of socialized herds and nay, therefore, be merely the resultstatistical regrouping of animals already existing.
Despatches received from the American Embassy in Moscowthe Soviet claim that food consumption has Improved in both quantity and quality
Despite tbe failure of tbe Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building to achieve Its goal, the USSR states that mechanization in agriculture has increased. This statement Is probably true, but the quality of this mechanization, as Indicated by many sources ofIs far from satisfactory.
Agricultural production in tbe USSR fell to dangerously low levels during World War II. 5 the USSR has been attempting to return to or surpass prewar production. During the first years of postwar recovery, gains were fairly easy to attain, butears the rate of gain has leveled off without the production ofagricultural commodities having reached the prewar level, much less the overambitlous goals that the USSR has announced from time to time. Some industrial crops such as cotton and oil-bearing seeds exceeded prewar production Grain production was lower than in the best prewarut it approached the average of the li In the livestock industry, only sheep exceeded the numbers reported before the war.
It appears unlikely that in the near future the USSR can expand significantly its cultivated acreage, increase materially the yields of most of its crops, or enlarge substantially its herds and flocks. Even If prewar production Is reached, there willet loss in the per capita supply of most agricultural products in view of the increases in population that are taking place. Although some minor sectors of agriculture and related industries may reach the planned goalshe goals for the major ccenodlties probably will not be achieved.
Each year, as soon after the close of the calendar year asthe Central Statistical Administration attached to the Soviet Council of Ministers publishes on announcement on tbe success or failure of tho various ministries to achieve predetermined goals. In these announcements, successes are hailed, but failures often aro omitted or, if mentioned, deplored. Absolute figures rarely appear, and achievements or failures aro usually shown as percentages of the previous year's accomplishment or of the goal established for the year Just ended, depending on what the Statisticalwishes to emphasise.
Although weather is an Important determinant of agricultural production, no mention of weather conditions prevailing2 appears in the Soviet announcement.
Available information on weather conditions affecting Soviet crops2 indicates that Insufficient moisture retarded the development of crops seeded in the autumn1 for harvest Rainfall during the spring and simmerowever, was favorable in amount and distribution in the principal crop-producing areas, counteracting the earlier deficiency. In some areas,losses may have Increased because of somewhat excessive rainfall during the harvest, but thc net effect probably was the productionrop somewhat better than could have been expected under normal weather conditions.
There are indications that rainfall was slightly below normal In the important grazing regions of the' Baltic republics and In Kazakhstan. This deficiency, however, was not sufficient toan assumption that decreases in livestock resulted.
Crop Goals.
a. Cultivated Acreage.
The cultivated acreage In the USSR2 was reported by the USSR toectares greater than At the same time the wheat acreage was reportedly Increased Acreage devoted to Industrial crops (cotton, sugar bceto, andorage crops, and grasses was reported to haveby unstated amounts.-
Assuming that the total cultivated acreage of the USSR1 vasillion hectares,the Increaseectares would result in on area ofectares,ercent These figures are to be comparedultivated acreageillion hectares, indicating an Increaseercent0 Increases of this small magnitude appear to be reasonable in view of the long-standing Soviet goal to enlarge the productive area. These increases may bepartly to the extension of production Into the marginal or sub-marginal arid lands of Central Asia or into northern areas where short growing seasons limit production and where there may have been same Increase in lands reclaimed by irrigation or drainage.
Since the reported increase in wheat acreageectares plus indefinite increases ln thc acreages of industrial crops, forage crops, and grasses exceeds the increase in the total cultivated acreage of the country, the implication Is that there were reductions ln other crops such feed grains (barley, oats, and corn) and rye and in the follow acreage.
Several observations may be mode concerning thein feed grainpossible reduction in rye
and fallow uere age may have been proportionately greater than was the decrease ln feed grainart of the land that was formerly fallow may have been sown to feedegional shifts in feed grain acreage could result in little or no decrease in feed production: thatelatively small increaseavorable agricultural region could more than offset the productionuch larger sown areaubmarglnal producing region; or (u) theuse of potatoes for feeding swine and the better use of roughage and pastures for feeding other livestock could reduce thc requirements for feed grains, makingradual decline ln their acreage. In any case, minor changesiven year cannot be Interpreted to represent changing trends in the agricultural pattern. They may reflect only weather conditions or other factors at sowing time.
The USSR is rapidly approaching the limits of its potential cultivated acreagehe physical limits imposed by climatic and agronomic factors. There remain ao large areas of land that can he
put into economically profitable production. At best, the draining of swamps and the much-publicized irrigation projects will Increase the acreage that can be profitably cultivated byeu hundred thousand hectares. Faced by these facts, the USSR in its attempt to keep gross agricultural production In line with the increased demands of an Increasing population andarge military force, and vith the need for maintaining reserve stocks, has recently been placing greater stress on the Increase of yields per unit of land already under cultivation through use of Improved strains of seed, greater use of fertilizers, and improved techniques. Grain Is the chief food crop In the USSR, but neither the USSR nor the US has In the past been able to Increase grain yields greatly. As In the case of cotton, the USSR can disregard poor economic returns from the use of land with low yields and extend cultivation of any crop onto sub-marginal land, butarge expansion of mechanization and ato dry farmingreater scale than is now being practiced would not solve this problem. If the population trend continues to rise, the combination of the two factorslimited arable landand limits on yield increasescan be expected to result eventually In food shortages. These shortages may occur during the next generation, forcing the USSR to enterong-time program of importing essential foods.
b. Grain.
According to Soviet claims,grain production2illion1 million metric tons) in terms of the biological grainnd the over-all production of wheat wasercent higher than 2 grain-production figure representsercent Increase over the official grain-production figure1illion2 million metric tons) and Is 5higher than the announced figureillionillion metric tons) for
Tbe indicated Increase In groin production2 seems reasonable because of the moderate Increase in grain acreage and the weather conditions, which were slightly more favorable for the development of the crop than Estimates of grain production in terms of barn12 reflect an increase in
The biological grain crop is an estimate of the amount of grain growing in the field before harvest.
he burn harvest is the amount of groin available for utilization after harvesting has been completed.
1 similar to that given in the Soviet announcements. The2 grain production (barn harvest)0 metric tons isercent higher than1 barn harvest estimateetric tons. The discrepancy in theof increase2 grain production over that1 between the Soviet data and the estimates can easily be reconciled by differences in harvesting losses caused by variations in weather during the harvest period.
The claimed increase2 in thc over-all production of wheat ofercent1 seems somewhat high when compared with estimates of wheat production forears. Estimates of tbe wheat crop120etric tons, respectively. Based on these estimates, wheat production2 exceeded that1 by aboutercent.
Although the USSR states, -in connection with2 grain-production achievement, that the grain problem has been solved finally and irrevocably, its progress'toward fulfillment of its Fifth Five Yearrain-production goal appears to be falling short. Grain production during the Plan period is supposed to increase byoercent. Fulfillment of this goal5 would entail an average annual increase in the biological grain crop over0 biological cropoercent". During tbeears of the Fifth Five Year Plan, however, no such large increase in grain production has occurred. The following figures released by the Soviet Central Statistical Administration (in millions of metric;indicate that thegrain crop2 was onlyercent greater than0 (the base year of the Fifth Five Year Plan). Therefore, if the USSR Is to fulfill5 grain-production goal In theears of the Plan, it must increase grain production at the unrealistic rate ofoercent each year. At present,5 grain-production goal appears to be impossible of attainment.
2 grain crop was the largest in the postwar period, and the per capita supply is higher than it waslthough lower than it was before the war." 2 groin production of almostillion metric tons exceeded that1 byillion tons. Several alternative uses of this statistical surplus
" Thc8 has been selected as the prewar comparison base for acreage and production.
1 production may be visualized: (l) domestic consumption could be expended to meet the Increased requirementsrowingtate grain reserves could berain shipments to the European Satellites could be used to alleviate the effects of poor harvestsnd/or (It) cheap grain could be shipped to non-Soviet Bloc destinations. Tableives thcarea, yield, and production of grains in the USSR1
c. Sugar (Sugar Beets).
The USSR claims that sugar production2ercent above production Considering tbe favorable weatherimproved mechanization,light Increase In the acreage of sugar beets,ercent increase might appear conservative and reasonable. The data upon which the USSR based this claim are, however, open to question. The USSRroductionmetric tons of raw sugar ercent increase wouldroductionetric tons. Both of these figures are basedlanned acreageieldentners per The averageield in the USSR,asi centners per hectare, and In the postwar periodthc average yield wasentners perhe basehich the percentage increase was derived is obviously too high. Based on realistic yields, the estimated rav sugar productionisillion metric tons, whichercent higher than the estimate ofillion metric tonshich was an unfavorable sugar-production year.
2 production of moreillion metric tons of raw sugar claimed by the USSR is obviously unrealistic. esult of large imports from the Satellites, however, the sugar supply situation in the USSRs better than during any postwar year and even better 'than before the war, though sugar consumption in thc USSR is still low in comparison with sugarin the European Satellites- Production in excess of the very low normal civilian requirements can be used to meet increased military requirements, or it can be moved readily into reserve stocks or into trade channels without materially lowering the standard of living- Although it istrategically essential food, sugar
ollows on p. 8.
Table 1
Estimated Area, Yield, and Production of Grains in the12
Cocamcdlty
Bread Grains Feed Grains Rice
Total
Area (Thousand Hectares)
6
Yield (Centners a/ per Hectare)
6.4
7.6
^ b/
Production (Thousand Metric Tons;
7
Area
(Thousand hectares)
6
2
Yield (Centners a/ per hectare)
6
b/
Production (Thousand Metric Tons]
7
All references to centners In this memorandum are to metric0. Average yield.
can be an Important morale factor to both civilian and military The sugar supply situation can be expected to continue to Improve during the next few years because of the emphasis on new agricultural techniques and on the increase of sugar-processing
ives the estimated area, yield, and production of sugar beets and production of raw sugar In the USSR.
d. induatrlnl Crops.
The Soviet report atates: 2 the area underfor cotton, sugar beets, sunflower seed, and other industrial plants was increased
The acreage seeded to cotton2 Is estimated to have been Increased by approximatelyhectaresnd slight increases have been estimated for flax and hemp.
The area sown to cotton2 approaches the planned acreage Recent increases, however, have largely been on unlrrigated lands and have resulted in lower average yields than formerly. Gross production, on the other hand, laercent greater thanverage. This Increase places the .USSRelf-sufficient position at present levels ofby an inadequate textile industry. This self-sufficiency resultsurplus of lint cotton, the greater part of which is exported to the Soviet Bloc countries. Part of this lint cotton imported by the Satellites is later re-exported to the USSR asfabrics under existing processing agreements. The USSR is thus integrating,ertain extent, the textile Industries of theea with those of the USSR. Assuming that the USSR does not engage in war, exports to the Satellite countries can be expected to continue. The quantity of these exports, however, will depend on production and changes in the domestic utilization pattern. ar could adversely affect the cotton supply in the Bloc countries, which are now dependent on imports from the USSR, because that supply would probably be curtailed to meet stronger or new demands within the USSR itself. If the Russians discontinued shipments to the Satellites, their present production of cotton night meet the most urgent domestic needs except perhapsrolonged war.
* ollows on
Ill I
i
Flax ond hemp, like cott&n, are produced in grantor amounts than the established industry can process, although tho quality of hemp products is inferior to similar end items produced from hard fibers. Soviet plans give evidence that tbe linen- and hemp-industries are being enlarged, and it is safe to assume that at least some replacement of worn-out equipaent and even somehave taken place. Under peacetime conditions the industry operates on the basis of meeting immediate current requirements, which may not require maximum output. In the eventalling market, hard fibers may be Imported for stockpiling purposes or for military and industrial uses which require better grades of fiber. In time of war, however, the industry would be pushed to capacity, civilian consumption could be reduced, and, if necessary, cotton could be substituted for hemp fiber or flax tow in many industries.
Tableives the estimated area, yield, and production of specified industrial crops in the USSR.
e. Feed and Forage Crops.
The USSR claims that2 the area under cultivation of fodder was "significantly increased" and that the area under gross was also "enlarged."
Despite unfavorable weather in some grazing areas, nodecrease in the production of grass and hay is indicated. It appears that the total production of roughages for summer grazing and for carrying livestock over the winter remained approximately tne same as This production of roughage supports thethat2 cattle numbers remained constant and sheep and goat numbers increased byercent, inasmuch as cattle, sheep, and goats arc the main consumers of roughages.
It is estimated that the total production of feed grains decreased but that the total production of potatoes increased sufficiently to allow the use of potatoes as feed to support theercent Increase ln swine.
ollows on
Any increuacd availability of rougliage or other livestock feed, however, may be used toreater productivity of milk und meat per animal rather than to Increase significantly total livestock numbers.
i
ill III
di
iss
f. Vegetable Oils.'
The production of vegetable oils2 Is claimed byussians toercent higher than1 -
ercent increase in the production of vegetable oils does not appear to be keeping pace with the estimated Increase in oil-bearlng crops available for processing. There Is,ime lag between harvesting the crops and their processing. Theof vegetable oils2 is assisted to be the output from both raw materials grown domestically1 and rav materials imported1 Domestic raw material production2 exceeded that0 byercent. If imports, which are equal to aboutercent of domestic production, are added, the total Increase in production2 should have been moreercent. The Soviet announcement may indicate, therefore, that processing has reached maximum capacity. Because raw materials may bea continued high level of production of vegetable oils3 can be expected.
2 production of vegetable oils from domestic materials is estimatedetric tons asetric tons in the prewar period. er capita basis, this production Is estimatedilograms per year as compared with theilograms per year, but postwar imports from Communist China have more than compensated for the loss In the per capita supply. The current supplyetric tons of oil foruse Is double the average prewar supply, while the supply of vegetable oils has Just about returned to its former level.
3 level of production will probably show norise, because of the decrease in cotton seed production for the past year. Imports from Communist China constitute oboutercent of the vegetable oils used for domestic consumption and aboutercent of the total used in industry. The USSR Is reported to be negotiating with Argentina for the purchase of linseed.
The average of sunflower seed, which provides approximately hO percent of Soviet vegetable oils, is estimated to haveectares2
Output basis.
-
In addition to postwar increases in the acreage of vegetable oil crops, imports of vegetable oil and oil seeds have been increased to meet domestic requirements. It is expected that, if peaceimports will be maintained at present levels or may even be increased. Under wartime conditions the acreage of oil-bearing crops could be increased, but probably not sufficiently to remove the need for somehe USSR, therefore, would be vulnerableessation of trade in vegetable oils and oil seeds. Table k* gives the estimated area, yield, and production of vegetable oil crops in the USSR.
U. Textile Goals.
The USSR claims that the sown area of cotton and other industrial crops was larger2 than It also claims that theIndustry showed the following gains in production2 ginnedercent; cottonercent: woolenercent; and silk cloth,ercent. Increases ofndercent, respectively, were claimed In the number of looms and spinning fraises.
The sown area of cotton2 has been estimated toectares larger than Because of adverse weather during the spring sowing period, however,2 cotton harvest is estimated to be lower than1 despite the increase in acreage. reater than normal percentage of the largerof row cotton was carried over unginned at the end of the calendar1 to be ginned2 togetherarge part of2crcent increase2 in textile production might be statistically possible.
In absoluteercent increase in cotton cloth would represent the difference5 million meters1o7 million metersillion meters. Considering the available ginned cotton, this increase would appear low, unless it is assumed that spinning and weaving equipment has been unable to keep pace with supply.
* Tablefollows on
The textile figures2 ro-jst be considered in the light of the time lag between production and processing. Ginnings2 include part of1 crop in addition to part of2 crop.
I u>
f,
lis
III
Glnnlngs1 were reported to beercent0 (the highest production year, prevar or postwar) and would largelythe supply availablo for the production of cotton cloth omparison betweenpercent increase in raw material andercent Increase In ths succeeding year's output of cloth pointsottleneck In the processing Industry. The report of Increases In the number of looms and spinning frames2 la the first indication from Soviet sources that this problem Is receiving serious consideration.
The goal for the production of cotton cloth during the Fifth Five Yearl-percent increasen the basis of present production of raw cotton and projections of productiont appears doubtful whether this goal will be attained. The goal will be even less attainable If other Soviet Bloc countries continue to get an increasing share of the raw cotton supplies of the USSR.
The estimated production of woolen cloth2meters, which Isercent more than Thereteady increase in the production of woolen cloth during the Fourth Five Year. The announced increases for that period seemed to be reasonable because of large annual imports. , however, only relatively small Imports of wool werereater dependence on wool domestically produced and wool imported from the Soviet Bloc. Considering that the number of sheep and goats increased byercenthe announced8 percent in the production of woolen cloth either Is high oresult of Increased collections and greater use of coarse domestic wool and blends, which would teed to lower the quality of the woolen cloth output.
The per capita supply of cotton textiles0 is estimated ateters.5 goals arc nttalned, the per capita supply will be raised loeters, and woolen textiles will be increased5 meter per capita0eters. Accomplishments in the Fifth Five Year Plan2 Indicate that the textile goal5 cannot be attained.
There is some evidence that tha production of both cotton and woolen textiles is increasingJiRhtly aore rapid rate than is the population. If this trend continues, the per capita supply of these textiles will be higher5 than lt wasut not so high
-
an would be possible If5 goal could be reached. To attain5 goal. It would be necessary for the USSR to increase its plant capacity, reduce exports to the Satellite countries, and increase imports of raw materials from non-Soviet Bloc countries. At the present time, indigenous raw material supplies cannot be expected toevel of output sufficient to attain planned goals.
5- Forestry Goals.
The Ministry of the Timber Industrypercentof2 annual Plan of gross production.
It should not be assumed from this statement that total timber production wasercent under the Plan, since the output of the Ministry of the Timber Industry Is onlyo U5 percent of all planned timber production in the USSR.
Timber la the USSR is usually broken into two broad categories, based on the end use: industrial (commercial) timber and fuel wood. The Ministry of the Timber Industry was reprimanded for falling to fulfill the Plan for conzoercial timber haulage. It can further be assumed that the gross production Plan vas padded with large amounts of above-quota fuel wood.
Thepercent fulfillmentrop from thefulfillment This shortage can be attributed to adverse weather, poor use of equipment, use of seasonal labor, poor transportation,oal that was, probably set too high. If the reported fulfillment applies to all timber producers, then the total industrial wood production may beillion cubic meters (roundvood measure). Tableives the estimated timber production in the USSR-
The Ministry of the Paper and Wood-Processing Industry, which processes Into finished goods the raw wood furnished by theof the Timbereported overfulfiUaent of2 gross production Planrop fromercent
ollows on
The Ministries of the Timber Industry and thc Paper and Wood-Processing Industry have, sinceeen recombined Into one ministry, the Ministry of Timber and Paper Industry.
-
Rumors have been cropping up that the USSR plana to Increase greatly the exploitation of its timber resources In order to flood the world market with timber. This may indicate only that, with the bulk of reconstruction out of the way, the USSR Is ready to resume its prevar role as one of the largest timber exporters.
The Fourth Five Yearalled for an increase In timber production in areas that were at that time relatively un-exploitedtlic North, Northwest, andecline In activities In those areas where limited timber reserves had been more or less depletedthe Ukraine and Central regions. Perhaps these timber-dumping rumors are an indication thatransfer, at least partially, has taken place and that the industry is ready to produce larger quantities than ever before.
6. Livestock
The USSR has announced the following percentage increases in livestock2 (numbers on: (a) on the socialized sector of collective farms: ercent;ercent;ercent;ercent; and (b) on state farms of the Ministry or State Farms: ercent;ercent;ercent; andercent.
tNo reference was made to total livestock numbers or. toin the private sector: that is, to livestock owned byfarm members, independent farmers, workers, and employees. Neither cattle nor goats were specifically mentioned.
a. Types of Livestock.
attle.
By omitting any reference to cattle numbers the Russians appear to be admitting tacitly that no gains were made. Even for the preferred socialized sector no increases In cattle wore claimed as waa done for swine, sheep, and horses.
ollows on
A comparison between the claimed increase in theof cattle and the claimed increase in the number of cows onfarms for the02 indicates that cow numbers increauedaster rate than cattle numbers, as shown in
Estimated Rate of Increase ln Cattle and Cow Numbers on Collective Farms in the
Percentage(1Previous Year
Since, during these years, cow numbers in the socialized sector of collective farms increasedore rapid rate than total cattle in thisercent increase in cow numbers would seem to indicate, at best, lessercent increase for total cattle numbers In the socialized sector of collective farms. attle on collective farms7 million head, of whichillion, or aboutercent, were cowo. An Increaseercent ln cow numbers2 might indicate an increase of as littleercent in total cattle numbers on collective farms,
Property held by the private sector includes that which Is owned by individual members of collective farms, independent farmers, workers, and employees.
There hocendency ln recent years for cattle numbers, as well as numbers of all categories of livestock, toin the socialized flocks and herds of collective farms at the expense of those In the privatencluding collective form members. Shortcomings in thc stockbreeding program of thesector have been made up by acquisitions from the moreprivate sector. The Fifth Five YearallB for an increase in the socialized livestock of collective farms, which in realityhange in ownership ratheratural increase through breeding. Consequently, if cattle numbers on the collective
farms liave held their ownattle numbers ln the private sector have probably decreased.
Increases in cow numbers, but not in cattle numbers, also were given for state forms, although only for those under theof State Farms. The proportion of cow numbers to totalnumbers on state farms is greater than the proportion of cow numbers to total cattle numbers ln the socialized herds onfarms, but the omission of any reference to cattle numbers seems to reflect only alight gains. If any, in total cattleon state farms. ercent Increase in cow numbers on state farms Is claimed. In the past, moreover, the performance of the Ministry of State Farms in increasing livestock numbers haa been better than the over-all performance of all Soviet state farms.
On the basis of Bll of the above evidence. It Is assumed that cattle numbers3 are not appreciably higher than the figures carried2 and may be even lower. The preliminary estimate for cattle numbera as3 is, therefore, approximately the same as2 total8 million cattle.
It appears that cattle numbers may be leveling off or at least that the future rate of increase may be somewhat leas than the rapid rate at which recovery was being made uphe Fifth Five Yearalls for5 million cattle6 as compared with the above estimate8 million cattle This would require anincreaseercent for each of theears. Although the USSR has planned to Increase substantially the area In summer pastures and the quantity of roughages to be stored as feed tocattle through the winter, it Is Improbably that even under reasonably favorable weather conditions the USSR will be able to increase cattle numbers at an overage rateercent per year. Cattle numbers attainable6 are estimated at aboutillion. On the basis of this estimate, the Soviet goal6 is unrealistic.
wine.
There were reported to1 million swine aa2 in the socialized sector on collective farms in the USSR. When theercent increase2 is added to
this figure, tho estimated number of swine in socialized herds on collective farms as37 million. The Increase in ovine on state farms of the Ministry of Stole Forms la also reportedercent. If this claimed increase, which seems modest enough, is assumed to cover all state farms, swine numbers on state farms increased fromillion asillion as
Swine numbers in the socialized sector have beenaa have cattle numbers, at the expense of the private sector. The absence of any mention of total swine mashers for all categories of owners seems to Indicate that swine numbers in the private sector have not increased and may even have decreased. The transfer of swine from the usually more successful private sector to the socialized sector of collective and state farms mokes tho reported Increase possible. On the basis of reported figures, the total number of swine in the USSR2 has been placed7 million, which, as indicated In Tableelow,1 million swine in the socialized herds on collective farmsillion swine In the herds of collective farm members and other private owners.
As Indicated above, there haseported Increase equivalentillion swine In the socialized herds ofand atute farms. On tho premise that there was no change in total swine numbers in the USSR, It may be further assumed that the private sectorillion svine to the socialized sector. The resulting figure may be accepted as tbe lover limit of3 range of swine numbers. For the upper limit of the range of swine numbers, the claimed Increase in the socialized sector has been added to swine numbers asnd swine numbers in the private sector as2 have been carried overanuaryas Indicated In Table 1.
The median betveen thc upper and lower limits for svine numbers is1 million and Is accepted as the preliminary estimate for svine numbersercent gain over the number estimated
* ollows on
-
Table 7
Estimated Swine Numbers in the23
Million Pead
13
1 JanuaryLimit)
State Farms Sector
of Collective Farms 7
Private Owners
Total 5
The Fifth Five Year Plan for owino, less realistic than that for cattle,oal ofpercent increase over3 numbers1 million. This over-all Increase represents an annual increase ofercent for the3 through Although increases of these proportions In svine numbers are biologically feasible, there Is doubt as to whether the availability of feed, particularly grain and potatoes, will support such Increases. In the USSR, cattle receive relatively little grain, oilcake, or other concentrates. Swine are fed chiefly grain and potatoes. It is extremely doubtful that over one-third more grain and potatoes could be made available to make possible an increase in swine numbers ofercentears, particularly In view of the demand for grain and potatoes by the increasing humsn population in the USSR. It is anticipated that swine numbers vill level off to2 million
heep and Coats.
It has previously been noted that goat numbers vere not mentioned in the report on livestock increases. There is thethat thc USSR may have used the Russian vord for sheep foyxsa) to refer to both sheep and gcats. Hovever, Soviet practice in the past has generally been to distinguish between these cat-gorlcs of livestock. Furthermore, since there arc few goats In the socialized sector, lt would not be too meaningful for the USSR to
speak of both sheep and goats In the socialized herds on collective or state faros. In recent years the combined total of sheep and goat numbers (primarily, sheep In the socialised sector and goats ln the private sector) has shown greater absolute gains than have all other categories of livestock combined, and the Fifth Five Year Plan reflects optimism as to further Increases.
Some of the Increase ln sheep numbers ln the socialized sector Is at the expense of the private sector. The continuing Increases in goat numbers ln the private sector, however, may tend to offset its losses of sheep to the socialised sector. Twohave been made In determining sheep and goat numbers. First, It has been assumed that thecrcent increase in the socialised flocks on collective farms andercent increase on state farms apply to thc few scattered goats in the socialized sector as well au to the overwhelming majority of sheep. It is further assumed that the increase announced for tho Ministry of State Farms appllea to all state farms, although this may not actually be the case.
Oo tbe basis of reported figures, the total number of sheep and goats ln the USSR2 has been placedillion. This total5 million ln the socialized flocks on collective farms1 million held by collective farm members and other private owners.
The reported increase In thc socialized sectorillion uheep and goats. On the promise that there was no change In total sheep and goat numbers in the USSR, It may be further assumed that thc private sectorillion to thc
socialized sector. This figure may be accepted as the lower limit of3 range of sheep and goat numbers. For the upper limit of the range, the claimed increase in the socialized
sector was added to sheep and goat numbersnd numbers In the private sector for that date were carried overhus assuming smaller requisitions from the
private sector and increases in goat numbers ln this sector to
counterbalance the losses of sheep, as indicated In
The median between thc upper and lower limits for sheep and goat numbers Isillion and is accepted as
ollows or.
a
Table "
Estimated Sheep and Goat NumberG In the23
Million Head
13
12 (LoverLimit)
State
Collective
Private
thc preliminary estimate for sheep and goat numbersercent gain over the number estimated.
The- USSR has* million sheep and goats as its goals contrasted with the estimateillion The Five Year Plan goalt million sheep and goats calls for an lncreaee of about U& million sheep and goatsears, or an Increase ofercent3hich amounts to about aIncrease per year. Despite the fact that sheep and goats in the USSR have shown greater absolute galna than hove all other categories of livestock combined, postwar Soviet experience has shown that the average annual increase in aheap and goat numbers93 was onlyercent. Expansion of pastures through construction ofand reclamation projects will enable the USSR to increase sheep and gost numbers to seme extent, but far below the planned goals. It Is estimated that sheep and goat numbers6 willillion. Thus the Fifth Five Year Plan goalould seem to be highly unrealistic.
(a) Roraes.
Theercent Increase In horse numbers in the socialized herds of the collective farms2 indicates1 million horses asain of over uoo.oco
over2 figure7 million horses in thesector of collective farms. Since the Fifth Five Year Plan calls3 million horses in socialized herds on collective farmst is apparent that the current Five Year Plan figures for horses have almost beenears ahead of plan.
esult of wartime losses and Increasedhorsehe private sector have representedmall fraction of total horse numbers since the war. Although not manyare available, horse numbers In thc private sector arc estimatednder one-half millionith collective farm holdings representingillion, orercent of the Soviet total ofillion. State farm horse numbers have been assumed to beillion.
It may still be possible for the socialized sector tohorse numbers at tho expense of the private sector, ae is the case with other categories of livestock. With the virtualof horses in the private sector, however, any transfer ofwould have to bemall scale andiminishing rate.
orBe nu*ber5 OQfarms are IncreasedOOillion to account for theercent increase in horses on state farms of the Ministry of State Farms.
The planned total horse numbers61 million. Since the planned collective farm totalorses has not yet been reached, it is safe to assume6 planned total numbers have not yet been attained. Fifteen million, therefore. Is taken as the upper limit of total horse numbers 2 total ofillion Is taken no thc lower limit. The median between thc upper and lower limits for horse numbers isorillion, which is accepted as the preliminary estimate for horse numbers1 i-porcent increase
The Fifth Five Year Plan goal for horsesI million As Indicated above, this total has virtually been reached and should be maintained through the Plan period.
of livestock numbers in the USSH
23 asanuary. The percentage of change has also been computed.
" ollows on
Table 9
Estimated Livestock Numbers in the USSR as23
Million Head
2 (End
13 (End
Percentage of Change
Farms Collective Farms Privately Owned
Total
Swine
7
8
Farms Collective Farms Privately Owned
Total
Sheep and Goats
State Farms Collective Farms Privately Owned
Total
Horses
State Farms Collective Farms Privately Owned
6.5
51
7
0.5
2.6
-6
h8
0
7
l.h
-
b. Livestock Products.
(l) Heat and Dairy Products and Canned Food.
Plan fulfillment claimed for the food ministries2 was as follows: Fish Industry,ercent; Meat and Dairyercent; and Foodercent. 2 output of various food products in terms or1 output, according to Soviet claims, is given In
Table 10
2 Output of Soviet Food Productsercentage1 Output
1
Milk
Canned
Caimed
Failure of the Ministry of the Fish Industry to fulfill2 Plan may Indicate an Dvorambitlous goal in view of the reported use of obsolete equipment and the reluctance of certain officials of the Ministry to promote the modernization of the2/ Since World War II the USSR has been rebuilding and re-equipping its fishing fleet. Although the fish catch Immediately after thc war was lower than before, lt Is estimated that9 the catch had exceeded that of most prewar years. 9 the rising trend has continued. With the planned replacement of old
equipment and the adoption or new techniques, such as the use of underwater illumination for night fishing and the use of airplanes
6 brtlMedl* catch*
The Russlana indicate that the Ministries of the Meat and Dairy Industry and the Food Industry barely met their goals. These Ministries may have exceeded their goals in certain segments although failing ln others. The Ministry of the Ment and Dairy Industry probably met its goal2 because of the Increased availability of meat and dairy products to government distribution channels. The drive to Increase the number of livestock in the socialized sector has increased the state's control over production and distribution of dairy products, but this control cannot be expected to Improve per capita consumption. Dairy products may, how. ever, move to the various consumer groups in different amounts than formerly. The nonfarm loboring class and other favored groups will have access to more dairy products and,esult of recent price reductions, at lower cost than In the past.
Tbe base on which the Russians computed the outputs of various commodities was shiftedomparison with goalsomparison with the'preceding This shift presents more favorable achievements than would be possible if goals had been usedase, as is Illustrated by the ennned food output, which, although showingpercent increaseercent below the announced goalpercent increase for the year. The canned food output of the USSR wasillion cans (VoO-gran standard cans) . During thc war, production fell to low levels. It had attained and exceeded0 output9 and has Increased progressively in succeeding years. Production2 is estimatedillion cans, and further increases can beto occur. Plants are not being uned at their maximum capacity, largely because of inefficient managementack of skilled lnbor. It is believed that these inefficiencies contributed to the failure of thc industry to attain the announced goals Shortages of tluplate couldrawback If the industry shifted to an all-out military production basis. If, however, production of canned foods adnpted to civilian requirements is emphasized, glass containers can be made and used to greater advantage than ut thc present time.
con-
The increase in meat products was facilitated by the tinued expansion of livestock numbers in the socialized sector,
primarily at the expense of the private sector. It Is believed thatonccailtant of the leveling off of cattle, swine, and sheep numbers during', meat production in the USSR Increased by almost one-half millionetric tons1 as comparedetric tons. Assuming reasonably favorable weather and crop conditions'ome Increase may be anticipated ln livestock numbers. If there is an increase in livestockeveling off, it not an actual drop, in scat production may entative estimate of future Soviet meat production3 productionetric tons4 productionO0 metric tons. The estimated meat production2* Is roughly equal to^ meat production. When the increasing population ln the USSR Is taken into account, however, It becomes apparent that2* per capita meat production is overercent below8 level, as is shown ln" By way of comparison, per capita meat production figures of the US are Included.
ear series of production estimates for specified livestock products is given in
ool.
The production of raw wool was not reported in the announcement of Plan fulfillment. Woolen textile productionowever, is cloimed toercent1 production.
In sheep numbers Justify carrying the amount
of the wool clip proportionately higher than ercent increase reported, however. Is higher than is Justified by theIncreaseercent in sheep and goat numbers. The Fifth Five Year Plan goela visualize large gains both In thc average yieldsheep and In slieep numbers. If they are achieved, woolwill more than double in thc USSR1 It Is expected that Soviet sheep numbers will fall far short of thegoal. Sheep numbers2 were near the record high, and pastures and roughage resources cannot support the plannedof sheep and other categories of livestock at the some time. Planned wool yields5 are also unrealistic. 2 overage
Tableollows on p. Tableollows on
-
Total and Per Capita Production of Meat (including Slaughter Fat) in the USSR and the
USSR h/
Per Capita
Year Metric Tone) (Kilograms) Metric Tona) (Kilograms)
/ MOO 8
iT Based on total domestic production of neat and animal fats andanuary population estimates.
b. Baaed on domestic production of carcass meat and lard anduly population Baaed on present boundaries.
d. Forecasts are based on thc assumption of reasonably favorable veather and crop conditions.
wool clip per sheepilograms is still below the prewar levellt kilograms despite efforts to increase production by the use of better feeding and management practices. Time Is too short to bring about the significant increases in the average wool clip visualized
7- Standard of Living.
The Soviet announcement2 achievement stated that state and cooperative retailers sold to the populationercent more goods than The percentage of increase In the amount of food products sold through these outlets includes the following: meat,ercent; fiah products,ercent; butter, vegetable oils,
EBtlasted Productloa of Selected Livestock Products In the
Production
Meat (Commercial) Butter (Creamery) Canned Milk Canned Goods (including Meat)
Unit
Million Metric Tons Thousand Metric Tons Million kX)-Cram Cans Million "lOO-Cram Cans
X.fcl
and fats,ercent;ercent; milk and dairynd sugar,ercent. It vas also reported that the fifth lowering of the priceB of "mass consumption commodities" since the ond of) took place
The announcement does notlear picture of changes la the availability of food products to consumers. Inasmuch as theof the total retail trade handled by thc state and cooperative stores is not known. The food distributed through state retail outlets represents less thanercent of the food consiaaption of thc notionhole. This retail distribution Is closely related to the controls which the state enforces to procure these products from thc producers, thc extent to which the stote controls the processing or farm products, and the requirements levied on supplies Tor the military forces and for stockpiling.
Sugar, which is one of tbe most completely controlled commodities because it Is processed In state-controlled refineries, can easily be put in or withdrawn from retail channels by the state. Only about one-third of ull meat is processed under the supervision of the state. The state, therefore. Is more limited in thc proportion or totalthat lt can sell at retail than it is in the case of sugar. Such products as eggs and fresh vegetables, which require noare controlledessor extent than seat, and,esult.
a relatively large proportion of these commodities Is consumed In the households of those who produce them, andarge extent their sale is confined to private retailing on peasant markets.
Another consideration that precludes unqualified acceptance of the announced Increases In state saleset gain to the consumer is that no allowance has been made by the USSR for the absolutein population1hich Is estimatedillion,2 percent.
Although reports from the American Embassy In Moscow Indicate that there has been some improvement in the quantity and quality of the food available for consumption by nonfarmors, lt Is Improbablepercent Increase in retail salesommensurate improvement In the standard of living of thc nutlonhole.
Price reductions announced by the USSR2 ore confirmed by the American Embassy. Thc gains from these reductions accrued chiefly to nonfarming consumers because few commodities purchased by peasants were reduced in price. Price reductions applied largely to agricultural products, with many of these commodities being sold at low, fixed prices In state and cooperative stores. The prices received for them by producers were lower than formerly. Thetherefore, were adversely affected in two ways by the price reduction. They wereelative disadvantage In the prices they paid for the commodities they bought, and they were subjected to absolute decreases in their incomes from the sale of their products.
APPENDJX
SOURCES AHD EVALUATION OF SOURCES
1. Evaluation of Sources.
Only two sources are cited In this report. All other Information has been drawn from previously prepared CIA estimates.
The intelligence report published by the Office of Intelligence Research, US Department of State, is considered toeliable estimate of the total cultivated acreage of the USSR available for the year indicated.
The Soviet statement,'paraphrasedeport of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, la suspectonsequence of the official Soviet state policy restricting the dissemination ofabout all phases of Soviet activity. The statement paraphrased, however, is probably true-
2.
Evaluations, following thc classification entry and designatedave the following significance:
of Information
- Completely reliable
sually reliable
airly reliable
ot usually reliable
ot reliable
annot be judged
- Confirmed by other sources
- Probably true
- Possibly trueoubtful
- Probably false
- Cannot be Judged
not Otherwise designated are those appearing on the cited document; those designated "RR" are by the'author of this report. Ho "KH" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the
Original document.
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