MEMORANDUM
ST ?
TO FURTHER THE DEVELOPMENT
SOVIET AGRICULTURE
CIA/RR3
COt'tABXS na-OHMATION AFFECTIN& THE'NATIONAL DEFENSE OK THE UNTTEp. STATES" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE IAW,SC,Xm TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH Jfrhtt MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSONIITED BY LAW.
FOREWORD
3 tho Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union madeeries of measures for raising the output of tho agriculture of tbe USSR. On the surface it might appear that the Kremlin has changed its policy toward producers ofcommodities,areful reading indicates that there has been no material change In the fundamental policies of the government to control the economy of the USSR. Certain concessions have been made to obtain the temporary cooperation of the collective farm workers during the Interim required to make the cadres of the government-owned and government-operated Machine-Tractor Stations, end not the collective formers themselves, the decisive force in agricultural production.
CIA/RR
MEASURESURTHER TIE LEVELOPMKNT
OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE..
Tbe keynote of the decisions on agriculture passed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)3ound In^.the folloving;statement: "When- collective- farms' become'- big diversified,nd when "the. Machine-Tractor Stations constitutes decisive force in agriculturaloth must be strengthened with skilled personnel..
The collective farm system serviced by the Machine-Tractor(MTS'iO had failed to meet the expectations of the Kremlinof World Warhe averagei standard of livingwas lower than that en Joyedheregime^Immediately preceding World: War I. -The-position of theective; farm systemource of: food for'the nonfanc populationand of-materials for Industry worsened during the war.- Although the US supplied the USSR with meat products equivalent to the ration ofillion men under arms, fats and oils nearly equivalent to thc .quantity processed by. the food industry of the USSR, andercent 'of -the"*US production of lump sugar, millions ,of; town' dwellers and factory workers were unable to obtain even sufficient bread to meet subsistence requirements. Town-dwellers and factory workersherefore, forced to cultivate private garden plots to get potatoes, cabbage, cucumbers, and other vegetables to eke out their inadequate food supply. The Russians were unable to furnish sufficient seed for the gardens, and thc US, under Lend Lease, shipped tons of seed to salvage the situation.
Throughout thehe Kremlin made every effort to regain lost ground and to increase agricultural production to the level required to supply the needs of the increasing population. The problem was not only one of production but, more than that, one Of procurement of bread grain, potatoes, imtat, fats and oils, and other products for distribution to nonproducers and for affording supplies with vhlch to implement economic developments at home and political policies abroad.
The Soviet government succeeded more or less in the cases of cotton, sugar, tea, and citrus fruit and actually increased the acreages of wheat and rye by cutting down the acreages of barley.
oats, and corn. The Soviet government also attempted to bolster up meat, milk, butter, and egg supplies by forcing peasant households to sellheep, hogs, and chickens to the collectiviwed .farm ccpno^i, Reaving about Uo percent of thewithout cattle. t best, the production of animalwas not proportionate to the increase
y
'off sharply:because the collective ited In' producing potatoes end
Lcn plots: for sale on the open. -
vhicu'sy_-
. on theicollectivized fields/
ted with them on these some markets..
ng further" Into detail as to causes, the.e procurement 'situation,-was unsatisfactory forhap1 during-to'regulato-ithe collective farm system had-be>'mco7ole of-thef-collective farmho had hadsyctee of coilcctlvization'.was about to.bework on the-collectivisodr fields
iff: r to facilitate .the procurement of
nenontrol Oyer the collective-to each collective,
rm that-'ito* boundaries were inviolate and-.took drastic steps toward0 farmsew big farming0 as The Kremlin vent further than that and took steps 'toward concentrating scattered village populations into big, so-called "agrogorods." This meant theloss to the collective farm households of their ancestral private garden plots. Unrest was created among the villagers', vho were already dissatisfied over the loss of their privately owned livestock. Thc plan of the "ogrogorod" had to be abandoned temporarily.
The government, lt is true, had itsig collective ram enterprises, but these were poorly managed. ollective farm chairmen had higher agricultural education, andad intermediate special education. The discipline of collective furm workers wasow ebb. pven the operations of the governnent-ovned MTS's were unsatisfactory. The overwhelming majority of directors, chief engineers, and chief agronomists of the MTS's had
no higher education. The MTS's rented to the collectivescombinea, and other machines, which wore operatedby the all-too-poorly-trained collective farm.
There was little improvement In the.general situation1 Although favorable weather conditions somewhat increased the production of certain of the field crops, the animal industry situation was bad, with the prospect of becoming worse. Against this background were made the decisions affectingthat were.passed by the CPSU
0 "big diversified enterprises" under tbe temporary guise of "collective farms" have been pronounced to be the Soviet base for the production of foodstuffs for- the population and raw materials for Industry* The operation of these big farmingis to be under the control of the MTS's under, the following mandates from the CPSU:
3-
a.
5.
6.
To increase yields of crops;
To insure an increase in the.number of commonlya simultaneous rise In the
roductivity per head;.
oi
To complete the mechanisation,of fieldtcrop
production;
To augment tbe total output and the output for market of farm and livestock products In the collective farms which they serve;
To extend the mechanization ofas well as in
the production of potatoes and vegetables;
To introduce into collective farm production the achievements of science and the most advanced practices of agriculture;
Insure tbe further organizational and economic consolidation of collective fanes; and
8. To' ljsprove the material veil-being of the 'col-
-
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ThereTS'station tobig faming enterprises, which, under the present: organisation, ears to' be' spreading^tbecont^
Thc proi Soviet agricul* and proL_
posslbly even little'iffeet on that
As presently organised/ "the Machine-Tractor Stations are big State enterprises'which do about three-fourths of all agricultural work ln the collective farms." liaynot lesseneral-purpose tractorsn termsractor cultivators, as well as thc necessary quantity of agricultural machines, motor vehicles, mobile repair shops, containers for oil products, ami other equipment are to be sent to the MTS'6. The government can. In all probability, supply the MTS's with this additional equipment. All of this added power will not materially affect thc production of grain, which at present is more thanercent mechanized. The tractor cultivators are
agronomists "and'he*'Tractor' .'aasls'tante/ as 'wee I'pernnrient'cadres the decisive force" In In addition tond attendants of
designed to lake over tbe cultivation of row crops which at present are largely band-hoed or worked with horse-drawn implements. of potatoes on collective farms is-to booercentU end Bo toercent Batwoenrthe-row 'cultivation of vegetables is to be mechanized* andoercent Mechanisation will not necessarily Increase yields but will greatly reduce tbe dependenceovernment on the collective farm households to perform this work.ay cutting, new'done largely with scythes or horse-drawn movers. Is to beercent mechanised; sllaglng,ercent; lifting root fodder,ercent; while gathering and stacking'straw Is to be mechanisedercent. It Is probable that the.*government can put enough tractors and other machinery Into the field to- effect these increases in mechanization, but tbe quality of the work will leave much to be desired. Nevertheless, It in obviousxtension .of mechanization in farm operations will make theincreasingly independent of the collective farm households.
It is Interesting that with the exception of the ratherresolution of .the CPSU to expand potato acreage byand vegetables3 hectaresittleId about acreages.It appears that in increasingo be placed on increasing yields .throughof better breeds, better and mechanized techniques,.the use of more mineral-
By the end9 the' Soviet chemical 'Industryindustrial plantsapacity5 millionmillion metric tons of fertilizers annually. By the end* this* capacity is to be increased to betweenillionillion metric tons. It is estimated that some expansion In fertilizer facilities will take place, but It is highly unlikely that thewill approach the magnitude of thc expansion envisioned by the CPSU. The production of fertilizer2 In the USSRetric tons, of which aboutercent was applied to cotton,ercent to sugar beets,ercent toercent to potatoes and vegetables, andercentariety of Industrial crops or specialized cultures. No significant quantity of commercial fertilizer was applied to grain. It Is possible, in the future,onsiderable expansion In the production of commercial fertilizers takes place, that grain may bo fertilized. There Is at present,no basis for appraising tbe extent to which the USSR can realize
its expectations In the production of fertilizer or the direction
Its utilization will take.
- r ^
Stalin the collectiverivateand privately owned livestock vas at variance, withhe-use1of pressure to weaken thecconoray.hos not-produced/the*to work harder' in.,the}collQGtlirlzedequires time to-build ia?.its.own productive forcedisregard the.present.work potential^of-
ntll theomeo.when collective .forms,are, loig diversified enterprises? -on-which the MTS's-are"the. .Jfoxce .'In agriculturalhe Soviet,government willhe"productive labor force of thearm, households, not"only 'on the socialized1 fields and with .It he [flocks .and. herds .of the -collective economy Ibutialso on the privatergarden p] and virivately-owned- f rft&fuaifs^otffvttJlWf
The plenum ofentral Committee- cftherefore, eiterates the right, of the collective farm household toito 'small-personal' plot tb:satisfy 'itsds.whlcB'cannot be -satisfied completelyhe.nlenum.-o'he practice-of<infringing thearmers "with regard-to .'livestock ln<the.lr.p
" de]
farm-ccoaomy and^th&rcollective'J
deliveries ofere writtenereaii^creased,.
iS Strf'.Hv"J-
All these measures are designed as Incentives to St collective farm households. to perform more .and ibetterhus creating an upsurge in production not only on the socializedf tbe communal economy but on tbe private household garden plotB as well. These measures further offer assistance ln tbeof markets to facilitate the profitable disposal of anythat thc collective farm economy and the collective farm households may produce.
The collective farm worker responded to the stimulation applied to induce him to grow cotton, sugar beets, tea, and citrus fruit and will probably be stimulated to further productivity by the above measures. Thc degree to which he will respond, however, cannot be
predicted at this time. It la probable, that whatever Increasemay take place idurlng the next year or tvo will bethe activities ofvthe'collective farm households thanvltallzatlon of the permanent cadres of [the-MTS's. Inunder government pressure, the permanent "cadres willincreasingly decisive .force in.agriculture^ leaving tb thehouseholds the ;less Important^tasks.dn field crop.and animal
The' apparently sudden concern of the Kremlin over laggingproduction is not an Indication of weakness withinresent ruling circles of tbe USSR. The agricultural problem has been eerlous8 and has recently become worse. There could* be no better time to inaugurate what appear to be "new measures"-': than at the beginning of the new administration. The leading '. personalities in the new administration are much the same as those who formulated the policies In the old administration^ and it is'V believed that there has been no fundamental change inolicies. If the various measures outlined above are carried out, they will greatly strengthen the basic Cconunist "policy that has been in existence for the pastears and will, result In the Vy, CPSU achieving complete control of the Soviet economy.
The government will gradually, through the MTS's, takeontrol of peasant markets and eliminateource ofame. Household economy will be veakened; and the peasants.hemselves will become more and more dependent(Upon the. tlvized economy, which will sooner or ldter.spay wages In cash. The collective farms themselves will become, in fact, "big agricultural enterprises" wholly operated by the government. The "agrogorod" inhabitedural proletariat willeality. Thc achievement of this goal will unencumber the Kremlin from the uncertainties of the present existenceural capitalistic class and leave the Soviet rulers free to prosecute their struggle with the non-CoiDzunist world more vigorously than ever.
The question as to whether the fulfillment of this policy can sufficiently increase production to meet the requirements of the increasing population cannot be answered at this time. Some of the neasures are, it is believed, realistic and move in the right direction. Their effectiveness, however, vlll depend,arge extent, oil the ubillty of the local Party units and others in control to understand the multitude of problems that continuously
arise. Heretofore, Party organizations, as veil as the MTS's
the efforts of agronomists, veterinarians, and engineers to. A
The solution of tbe food and raw material production problems of the USSR would Increase its war potentialeal danger for the Free World.
Original document.
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