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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE SOVIET BLOC COURSES OF ACTION THROUGH
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
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PROBABLE SOVIET BLOC COURSES OF ACTION THROUGH
THE PROBLEM
estimate probable courses of action of the Soviet Bloc through
CONCLUSIONS
see no sign that the ideological dynamism of the Communist regime is abating and we believe that therulers remain profoundly convinced that permanent hostility exists between the Communist and the free worlds. Their basic objectives, therefore, continue to be an expansion of their own sphere of power and the eventual domination of the non-Communist world.
It appears unlikely that the Kremlin will, during the period of this estimate, consider the Bloc's capabilities relative to those of the West as sufficient to warrant deliberate initiation ol general war. We further believe that Bloc leaders will try to avoid courses of action which in their judgment might involve substantial risk of general war. We also believe itthat the Bloc will initiate new local aggressions with identifiable Bloc forces during the period of this estimate, since the Communist leaders probably estimate that virtually any new localaggression would now entailrisk of general war or political consequences seriously adverse to Bloc interests.
It is always possible, of course, that the Kremlin will deem some act of local armed aggression sufficiently advanta-
geous to make the risk worth while. Moreover, despite its reluctance to run substantial risks of general war, the Kremlin might through miscalculation adopt some course of action involvingisk. We also believe that the Kremlin would not be deterred by the risk of general war fromestern action which it considered to present an imminent threat to Bloc security. It is thus possibleeries of actions and counteractions, initiated by either side, could lead towar even though not intended by either side to have that elTect.
uring the period of this estimate the Communist leaders will conduct apolitical warfare' campaign tothe Western power position. At present the Kremlin seems to be trying to give the Impression that it hasore conciliatory policy than that fol-
ToJUeal warfare techniques Include: diplomatic action, both through nor mil Intergorcrnniental channels aod In Men InternaUoni)as the UM; propaganda and front acUvt-Ues; political and economic pressures andthe action oi Communist parties and ol Communist-con trolled trade unions outside the Bloc; InflltraUon of Communist* or their sympathisers Inlo kcj> governmental posU;and sabotage;fomenting of civilcivil war, and colonial rerolt; and theol naUonaltit and revotuUooary mot era en ts.
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in Stalin's later years. Themay hope by such tactics to relax the vigilance of some Western states, todissension between the US and its allies, and to delay the progress of Western rearmament. We cannothow long such comparativelytactics will continue; it is to be expected that harsh courses of action similar to those pursued by the Kremlin in the past will reappear whenever the Kremlin deems them advantageous.
Wc believe that Bloc leaden during the period of this estimate will probably be prepared to reach an accommodation on some minor questions, and may make plausible but unacceptable proposals on major matters. However, tliey willcertainly be unwilling to settle any East-West differences at the cost of major concessions. We believe, moreover, that the Bloc leaders will be extremelyin pursuing conciliatory tactics, and may revert from time to time toof toughness, especially when they consider that their vital interests arc involved, or that their tactics are being construed abroadign of weakness. Offers to negotiate may be accompanied by reminders lhat the USSR now hascapabilities in the nuclearfield, and as these capabilities further increase, the Kremlin may become bolder in its dealings with the West.
In Western Europe, the Bloc'sand propaganda will attempt to undermine popular support for the NATO alliance and for present programs ofin particular the program to rearm West Germany. France willbe the principal target. Thispolitical warfare campaign will
probably include further proposals toerman settlement, but we do not believe that the USSR is prepared to withdraw from Eastlocwarfare efforts in Italy willcontinue to be particularly vigorous.
In the Far East, the Communists will attempt to use the Korean problem as well as other issues in the area todivision between the US and its allies. While it is unlikely that they will break the armistice by renewingin Korea, they will almost certainly not agree to Korean unification on any terms which would endanger Communist control of North Korea. It is unlikely that, even as parteneral Farsettlement, the Communists would be willing to end the Indochina war except on the basisomplete withdrawal of Western forces. Elsewhere in Asia, the Communists probably estimate thatconditions are not favorable for new attempts at local armed rebellion, though they will exploit any rebellions which-may occur and will continue to support those rebellions which are now in progress.
The Bloc will continue to give highest priority to the rapid development of heavy industry. Promises to increase consumer goods production may require somein economic programs but will not alter this basic policy, and will not result in any curtailment of the Bloc's military effort.
The Bloc armament program during this period will be directed towardand improvement of the armed
'Soviet policy with respect to Germany In the light o( the recent Oerman elections and the prospects of rearmament will be consideredorthcoming NIK.
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without substantially increasing their size. Particular attention willcertainly be given to increasing production of nuclear weapons, to devel-
oping additional types of nuclearto improving capabilities for the delivery of such weapons, and toair defenses.
DISCUSSION
Cohesion ofBloc
ability ol the Kremlin tofundamental* ol Bloc policy does notto have been diminished by theStalin or by subsequent politicalwithin the USSR. We believe thatwill preserve its cohesion throughof this estimate and that thecontinue to play the dominant role Inof Bloc policies.
There have been some evidences ofdisaffection and even of popular resistance within the Satellite stales. Such resistance mayactor in the discrediting andof Individual Satellite officials, and may induce the Kremlin to slow the tempo of Sovletitation and industrialisation which it has required of the Satellite leaders.we believe that the Satellitewill continue to be responsive todirection.
Wc believe that during the period of this estimate common ideology and commonlo the West will keep the USSR and Communist China closely allied. WhileChina's military and economicon the USSR will continue, the end of tho Korean hostilities reduces the urgency of China's needs.
Basic Ideas Underlying Bloc Policy
the death of Stalin and theto powerew generation ofwe see no sign that theof the Communist regime isand we believe that the Communistprofoundly convinced thatexist* between the Communistfree worlds. Their basic objectives, there-
fore, continue lo be an expansion ot their own sphere of power and the eventual domination of the non Corrununist world.
elements of the Communiststruggle against the non-Communistto have been confirmed by theParty Congress of2 andutterances since Stalin'sis that the struggle will continuewhole historical epoch, with historicalinevitably to favor the increaseand the decline ofUnremitting struggle on the partCommunisLs is an essential part ofbut an early resolution of thenot necessarily lo be expected and needsought. Another Communist principlethe form of the global struggle ismilitary, except possibly Inand cataclysmic stage, when thenations become desperate as theirand their Instability increases.strategy, therefore, must be loits own economic and militarywhile simultaneously attempting tonon-Communist power by politicalagainst non-Cornmunist states.
these considerations Itthe Kremlin would not deliberatelygeneral war unless it became(a) Bloc forcesecisiveearly victory, especially If thefelt that this superiority would be<b) war was in any case Imminent and
it wished to have the advantage of thessault; ornited and determinedm coalition was increasing its military power toecisive superiority as "to make eventual retreat from positions considered vital to the security of the USSR the only alternative Lo an ultimate general war. We
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not believe that the Kremlin leaders, will reach any ol these conclusions within the period of this estimate, and we thereforeIt unlikely that the Kremlin willInitiate general war.
KREMLIN ESTIMATE Of PRESENT
WORID SITUATION -
We believe that during the period of this estimate the Communist rulersontinue to consider generalazardous gamble, involvinginimum the .certainty ofdestruction in the USSR and at the same time carrying with it the risk that the Soviet system itself would be destroyed. They know that the US has superior strategic air power and navalarger atomic stockpile, and greater Industrial potential,they probably estimate that the USSR is making substantial progress towardits disadvantages In these respects. We believe, therefore, that the Kremlin will try to avoid courses ol action which In its judgment might Involve substantial risk of general war,
The Communist rulers almost certainly regard the Western alliance and Itsefforts, together with plans toearmed West Germany and Japan tootential threat to Bloc security. However, we believe that the Kremlin Is not likely to conclude that the West will beor psychologically prepared within the period of this estimate to initiate general war against the Bloc. The Coiujnunlst leader* probably estimate that most governments allied with the US, In the absencelear-cut and Immediate threat to their own vital interests, will probably not be willing to adopt more aggressive policies toward the Bloc. They probably also estimate that, in theofhreat, economic strains and popular and political demands will tend to prevent expansion of the Western rearmament efTort, and even to make difficult theof that effort at present levels.
loc leaders probably realize that the Western system of alliances and the0 have greatly increased the risk that new local aggressions will be met by Western military opposition. They prob-
ably estimate that there Is practically no area of the world where Bloc forces could initiate overt military aggression without grave risk of Western military reaction, which might lead to general war or to politicalseriously adverse to Bloc Interests. We therefore believe It unlikely that the Bloc will deUberalely Initiate new local aggressions with identifiable Bloc armed forces duringeriod of this estimate. The Bloc will,continue to encourage and whento give material support to Indigenous insurrections and civil wars, especially In "colonial" areas.
It is always possible, of course, that the Kremlin will deem some act of local armed aggression sufficiently advantageous to make the risk worth while. Moreover, despite its reluctance to run substantial risks of general war, the Kremlin might throughadopt some course of action involvingisk. We also believe that the Kremlin would not be deterred by the risk of general war from taking counteractionestern action whichonsidered to present an imminent threat to Bloc security. It Is thus possiblecries of actions and counteractions, initiated by either side, could lead to general war even though not intended by either side to have that effect
The Communist leaders apparentlylhat the Western coalition, despite its growing military strength, is afflicted by grave internal weaknesses which willreduce Its capability for united action. They seem to believe, for example, that the non-Cotnmurust world iseriod in which conflicts of interest among Its separate national economies will sharply Increase. They apparently believe also that Western solidarity will be weakened by nationalist divisions among tho major Western powers and by nationalist revolt in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa,
PROBABLE BLOC OBJECTIVESe believe, therefore, lhat the immediate objectives of Ihe Bloc in Ihe present phase of Its struggle with the non-Communist world are to continue lo build Its military power
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economic potential, to create and exploit difficulties and weaknesses In theworld, to disrupt the coalition of Western states and In particular to Isolate the US from Its European and Asiatic allies, to mobilize resistance within the Western states to the alliances and rearmamentby existing governments, and to deter from joining the Western alliance those states presently uncommitted or to persuade them to adopt policies favorable to the Bloc.
PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION Within Ihe Bloc
The Bloc will continue to give highest priority to the rapid development of heavy industry and to the integration of its several national economies. However, the USSR and some Satellites have recently promisedin the standard of living which, if fully accomplished, would Increase the rate of growth in the .production of consumer goods or raise the volume of imports of such goods. There are indications also thaton the agricultural population may be eased. We believe that the Communistmay be adjusting their economicin order to allow greater incentives for industrial workers and peasants, and thereby to maintain or Increase worker productivity and popular morale. 'These adjustments in present economic programs will represent no change in the basic policy of giving primary emphasis to heavy industry, will not beto endanger effective political control, and will not result In any curtailment of the Bloc's military efforts
The USSR will almost certainly devote strenuous efforts to Improving the political security and military usefulness of thearea. The new leadership In themay undertake personnel removals or even purges in Satellite governmental, party, and security organizations. Efforts will probably be made to raise living standards somewhat, wherever this is possible without endangering basic economic programs. EfTorts to insure the reliability and to increase the military effectiveness of Satellite armed forces wDJ be given priority over measures to increase their size.
The USSR will assist the Industrialization of Communist China, though more probably In the form of credits and tecluilcal advice than of grants! The USSR's own needs and tlie limited capability of the Chinese to absorb capital goods will continue to limit shipment of such goods. The USSR mayreater voice in the direction of Communist activities in Asia, but willto insist that the USSR have the decisive voice In the determination of Bloc global policy. Despite possible frictions, both the USSR and Communist China are likely to make every effort tonited frontis the non-Communist world.
The Bloc armament program during this period will be directed toward modernization and improvement of the armed forcessubstantially increasing their size.attention will almost certainly be given to increasing production of nuclear weapons, to developing additional types of nuclear weapons, to improving capabilities for the delivery of such weapons, and toair defenses.
Beyond the Bloc General
believe that the Bloc during thethis estimate will almost certainly beto settle any East-West differencescost of major concessions. The Blocprobably believe that the presentmajor Issues In Europe and Asiaonsiderable perioddisadvantage to themselves, andprospects of an eventual split Infront However, they areto reach an accommodation onquestions, and may make plausibleproposals on majorprobably hope that such tacticsan implication to the free world ofof the Bloc military threat andBloc willingness to negotiate importantMinor concessions, thus interpretedWest, might leadurtherWestern arms programs and toWestern powers over the terms ofmajor settlements.
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diplomacy and propaganda will probably continue to stress the "peace" theme and the willingness of Bloc leaders to enter negotiations for the "reductionncluding negotiations for disarmament. Wo believe, however, that the Bloc leaders will be extremely cautious in pursuing conciliatory tactics, and mayfrom lime to lime lo demonstrations of toughness, especially when they consider ttiat their vital interests are Involved, or that their tactics are being construed abroadign of weakness. Oilers lo negotiate may be accompanied by reminders that the USSR now has an improved capability in theweapons field, and as these capabilities further Increase, lhe Kremlin may become bolder in Its dealings with the West,Soviet rulers may be intransigent hi insisting that concrete negotiations be conducted on their terms. These tactics would support what we believe to be the Bloc's Intentions at presentto make no major concessions, settle no major issues, and to promote division in the Western alliance.
During the period of this estimate the Communist leaders willigorous political warfare campaign to undermine the Western power position. At present lhe Kremlin seems to be trying to give thethat it hasorepolicy than that followed in Stalin's later years. The Kremlin leaders may estimate that this will give new effectiveness to their diplomacy as well as to such devices as the "peace" campaign, antl-American and divisive nationalist propaganda, and trade offers. They probably also estimate that conciliatory gestures will enable the Communist parties in non-Communist countries to broaden their popular support by attractinginto united national fronts capable of agitating divisive Issues among non-Com-rmmlsl states and hampering rearmament programs. Wc cannot predict how long such comparatively conciliatory tactics willit is to be expected that harsh courses of action similar to those pursued by the Kremlin in the post will reappear whenever the Kremlin deems them advantageous.
are recent Indications thatIntends to increase Its trade withstates. The Bloc's volumewith tbe free world will probablysomewhat during the period ofbut this trade will continue tosmall in proportion to intra-Bloctrade agreements will probably benot only to obtain desired Importsto weaken the economic ties ofstates wilh the US, and totradeone ofthese states and the TJS. Whilewill not be able to bring about ain present trade patterns, theprobably estimate that politicalcan be earned from even smalltheir current volumes of trade withnon-Communist stales.
Western Europe
Western Europe the Bloc will aimand weakening NATO. Bloccombined with the agitation ofand front groups will attempt topopular support for presentrearmament and alliance with thebest prospects for these tactics are in
Italy and France, where Communist voting strength remains dangerously high and can be used to apply leverage against tho non-Coinmunist left and the center parties. France will probably be the principal target of such maneuvers, since iteystone of the Western defense system and since its perilous economic condition and politicalrenders it the most vulnerable todisruption and external pressure.of aid to tho Vict Miidi In Indochina may serve the duel purpose of deepening the French Internal crisis and complicating France's relations wilh its allies. The USSR will also play upon French fears of Germany in order to prerenl French support for the program of rearming West Germany inwilh the West.
n Germany, the Kremlin's immediate aim remains to prevent the rearmament of West Germany and Its alliance with the West. It may agree to Four Power negotiations on Oerman unity, bul is unlikely to conclude a
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until It feels confident that the all-German government which would result from It would he favorable to long-term Soviet interests in Germany. The Kremlin probably believesnited and neutralisedwould eventually align Itself with the West, andithdrawal from Eastunder present conditions would weaken the Soviet position in the Satellites. It is not probable, therefore, that the Kremlin will at any early date agreeettlement of the German question on these terms.
Nevertheless, it is possible that the USSR might in certain circumstances conclude that its long-term Interests would be better servedettlementnified and neutralized Germany. It might come tothatettlement could set inourse of developments in the West which would Justify sacrifice of the present Soviet hold on East Germany. If by paying the price of withdrawal from East Germany the USSR could obtain withdrawal of US forces from Germany and possibly from Europe, it might consider theood one. We believe It unlikely that the USSR win act onalculation within the period of this estimate.
It is also unlikely that the Kremlin will consent to an Austrian treaty so long as the German question continues unresolved. The Kremlin might become willing to accept an Austrian treaty which it believed would serverecedenterman settlementto the USSR. So long as the Kremlin docs not conclude that an Austrian settlement could have substantial political effects on the situation in Germany, it will probably prefer to retain at least some of the military and economic advantages it derives from its occupation of Austria. The USSR has apparently embarkedrogram of de-emphasizing the military and direct control aspects of the occupation, and it may make further unilateral concessions to the Aus-trians.
Par East
It Is unlikely that thewill break the armistice byin Korea. They will remain pre-
pared to exploit the military opportunities which would be opened to them If thewere broken by unilateral action of South Korea, but we are-unable to estimate whether they'would do soull-scale offensive aimed at the destruction of South Korean and UN forces. Tliey might consider that greater political advantages would result from merely taking defensive action against South Korean forces if the latter broke the truce.esumption of hostilities, the Communists will probably attempt to use the forthcoming political talks to encourage divisions between the US and its European allies over the Korean settlement and other Far Eastern issues. They will almost certainly not agree lounification on any terms which would endanger Communist control of North Korea, although tliey will press vigorously for the withdrawal of all foreign troops. They are probably prepared to pursue the political-diplomatic struggle without renewed recourse to military action in North Asia at least through the period of this estimate.
Japan. Communist strategy towardis probably based on theevival of Japanese nationalism and desire toore independent role together with Japan's urgent need formarkets will ultimately undermine the country's pro-Western orientation. TheCommunist Party will probablyto emphasize anti-US and nationalist themes and resistance to rearmament Bloc diplomacy may hold out the prospect ofIn connectioneace treaty, of some island territories now held by the USSR, and, even in advancereaty, will almost certainly extend trade offers and makeon minor issues such as fishing rights.
Indochina. We think it unlikely that, even as parteneral Far Easternthe Communists would be willing to end the Indochina war except on the basisomplete withdrawal of Western forces. The Indochina war is not costly to the Bloc and the Bloc leaders probably estimate that the heavy drain on French resources In Indochina will ultimately force the French lo terminate
the war on terms which would Insure eventual Communist control In Indochina. TheCommunists may further increase their material support to the Viet Minh. but there are no present indications that Chinesecombat forces will invade Indochina or that Identifiable Chinese Communistwill be engagedignificant scale.
lsewhere In Asia, the Communistsestimate that present conditions are not favorable for new attempts at local armedllion. though they will exploit any rebellions which may occur and will continue tort those rebellions which are now In They will continue to support anti-Western agitation, political action against Western oriented governments, and theof party organizations and para-military formations in preparation for direct action as this may become feasible In particular areas. The Bloc will continue Its efforts to divert the trade of Asiatic countries from the West lo the Bloc.
Middle P'i< -and Africa
he Middle East and Africa will probably continue during the period of this estimate to be routine targets of the Bloc politicaleffort to undermine the Westernbut, except for Iran, we do not beheve that the Bloc will devote major attention to these areas. Trade offers will probably be made to Middle Eastern States, particularly those like Egypt whose economic position Is vulnerable. Bloc delegates to the UN will probably also make special efforts to cultivate
the support of the Arab-Asian blocr Incoming discussions of Par Eastern issues.
ran. Soviet courses of action In Iran will reflect the reduction of Tudeh capabilities caused by the events attending Mossadeq's overthrow and the an ti-Communist measures of the successor government Theobjectives of the Kremlin in Iran willbe the rebuilding of Tudeh strength and the organizationnited front ofgroups. There will be little likelihoodommunist attempt to seize power unless Tudeh strength is revived and the pro-Shah government shows conspicuous weakness,or Inability to solve the country's pressing financial problems. In thethe USSR may continue efforts torelations wilh Iran by negotiations, trade agreements, and other official measures.
Lalin America
he Bloc will continue its efforts through local Communist parties and front groups,particularly to labor, students, and intellectuals, to promote antt-US sentiment, to embarrass US business Interests, and toeconomic and military cooperation of Latin American governments with the US. The recently concluded Argentine-Soviet trade pact mayider effort by Bloc states to expand trade with Latin America. The Bloc may estimate that such trade could eventually deny some vital raw materials to the US, facilitate infiltration of governments and business Institutions, andore receptive atmosphere for Bloc propaganda.
Original document.
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