II
MEMORANDUM TOR: DIRECTOR Of CEHTRaL INTELDIRECTOR (PLANS)
PU* ol Actio*
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L, fct of Action tne
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UEMOB-AjNDDM FOR THE
IXiringt few years Guatemala haa become the leading base of operations for Moscow Influenced cenamuniem la Central America.
Ruled try powerful,Preaideat Arbena supportedilitiDD ferernmcet, with ell key positionslne: level thoroughly controlledoounmiit clornlnated bureaucracy* Guatemala, nowrione threat to hemiepbarlc aolidaxity Jm' to oar security In the Caribbean area.,
Eseentirimitive, rural countryie of Louialaanaapulationillion, Guatemala la currently engaged In annationalistic program of progress colored by tbe toothy, eati-foreign inferiority complen of the rBtaant Republic'*.
Wltb laborarge degree organJaed according to communisticend reform plan benefiting the peat entry, the present Arbena government commends subetsjtflal popular support In spite of evidence of opposition ln the capital. Guatemala City
with an army of TOCO, tba well-trained, and quite well equipped, hard core of which la etationcd in the capital city. Guatemala maintain* the balance of military power lo Central America. This, coupled with corn-
ubversive eetivitleaioj ocroas th<bordera. la
a matter of increasing concern to nearby States including Nicnrague. Hondurasalvador.
The disturbing and subversive Influsnc* of communist dominated Guatemala within the Pan-American orbit,l aa an aggressively bordening anti-US policy targeted directly against American interests in
rh* cowtry, haa recently canaednitedovvrmnttA toowvwhii /firmer attitude tmroU GuUmtU than heretofore. Bated Mip-to-date PSB policy fuldancc. 'CIA >jplaced top operational priority on en effort to reduce ud poaeibly eliminate Com -muni at power in Guatemala. Appropriate authoriaetloa haa been iatued to permit clove and prompt cooperation wltb thof Defcnac. State and othar Government egeociee In order to eupport CIA In thla teak.
a
A arody ol available intelligence oetlmatea (moat recently
s
revealno internal conditiona tbat coulddeveloped lotovital threat
to tba praacnt Arbene adjnlnUtratloo vithout dotorrrilned aupport from tba
out aide.
Though it la pointed out that tha malation to tho govaramtot la located lo tha capital city. It la elao elated that, although tho diaaatielection of important urban element* will probably lncreaac, effective political unity among theft element* la not likely to bo achieved. Tha political union of urban and rural Latere eta la avan loaa likely.
Additional Information appoara to Indicate Chat prevlouely available active raalatanca to tba government la decreasing rapidly due to general diacou rage meat, eepeeially after an abortive uprlelng earlier thie year, whlcb raaulted Idprlaonmenile of Important oppoeUioo loadera.
It ia further eatimated that the army la the only organiacd element in Guatemala capable of rapidly and dVcleiveVy altering the political actuation and that there la no reaaoo to fcubt the coatinuej jcyalty of the army high ta.iinimd and oioat of tha army to the Pretidant, who in turn .*
under to* direct and Indirect of Communist officials ba key
I -rix:,an! pott*firmly entree rbed wltbio pro-Ailmini*trerion political parties.
Military halt* ouia.de tbe capital ere reported to have tittle potential Tor elfactive revolutionary action due to poor equipment,of training and tbe vigilance end security measures of truetoG area co^miiwUri.
Tbe policeould neither defeat an army coup nor iteelf overthrow the government wiinoet army support*
Another of tho few orgenlaed elemeate oi eny cceasequenace* the Catholic Church, te reportedly handicapped by tha rneag ernoee oi lie resources, the email number oi prlaata in proportion to copulation, tbe fact tbat moat priests are ellene subject to deponetloci. and the lackrogram capable of competing with the Communist-led labor movement or with agrarian reform.
A studyecent evaluation of CIA's political and peychologicaJoporeJJoeu indicates tbet peat efforts by tbe Agency to combe* Communism In Guatemala have been hamperedolicy of eonreme caution adKered te by 5late Departmentn the field. esult of thla, existing CIAnd otherwise*In reapect to peycaolotteal warfare and political action wjthla Guatemala arc negligible.
The main operatloc*al aeeet trnmadiaiely available to CIAroup of revolutionary activists numbsew hundred, led by an exiled Guatemalan army officernd located In llondnree, aaorsear ago, aome planning within the Agency contemplated the Implementation
ol an MBbii.ou BitUtui plan olactios onjjh ol HUTI- .
lnd hla [roup. Forvariety of Teaaoca Ibia
v-.itii- '. meanwhtl* RUFUS haa received financial aidtotareala. Ha allegedly coolroliandaetlna element*lhln Guatemala;( In* abo re. mentioned operation woulddepended (or It* auccea*pull 1
upport ef RUFUS and all ra*olutlooarlaa. bacVed byMll'laWa of aa amanilva underfiound raaiiianc* orjanlaallon and certain outlyia.
ranya eoon aa RUFUS and hie oun aalarad the country
r
Laondition* ia Csilamali.Oi*unt:,:
atraalag It* poaiGoa.eppotltlonrl|laal RUFUS plaa ia now conelderad aubatantiaUy obeolefc. lalurbtnc thii report* fromCLAeer Indicate that uuleie Uta RUFUS arret la operationally sctivatedery abort tlmai will b* (ubjecloderiou* morale problam, and RO( US' all* fad clandaatln*orrajuaaUan -unit Guatemala la0 disintegrate aloaj with other go-ernnicnt cpFoeitloa.
Vadentliteelly Ibara arc mitnt aad waya af maintaining tha RU>*
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- fcurm pi*--
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vould, caae haveb* radically readjusted leenettuatlaa. Aleo. any major action oa lha panUFUS aad hi*would have la baj preceded by elaborate levariolitical anion.'elmtlar operation* that wouldime-toneumlrir,
boild-up of Ageaicy eeeeto of varltnj* Vlnde. Including the placement of
Qualified personnel in tho field.
In thia connection, it vould ho tho primary concorn of CIA totho erjatence, *cope nnd note-trial of alleged Guatemalannd all* fed cXaneleatlne contact*able for paycho-loglcal warfare and political actiona wutt aa for poealbl* active supportara-military effortater data.
*
Thereeneral feeling of urgency In reapect to action againat Guatemala oo the part of State and Agencyonnected with thiak. butrowing realisation ofactg opera* tional aaaete do not permit any optimisticelative to apeedy auceeeeelatively abort period of time.
It la recognlaed that tha taak headed by CIA call*eneral, over-all plan of combined overt and covert action of majorome atep* have already been taken to initiate certain preparatory meaaurca in regard to supporting overt action and other US government aponeorcd prceeure aimed at offsetting the leading politico of Guatemalan militarytreogtb lft Central America*
A general outlineontemplated courae of actiona) Military Aid to other Central American State*. In order tohe target countryilitary aid agreement* will bewith Nicaragua.ndSalvador. Implementation of auch aid program* will be expeditedriority baai* and US military mi**lou* will proceed to th* counirle* in que at ion to eupcrv.ee de -tlvorie* of military equipment and offertance. with Nicaragua are(ACTION: State and Defeuae).
end iirreted that-rill commeavce
(ACTION elenae and FOA), Preliminary etep* teto fuDow euit are la progreaa (ACTlCeNi OA.andnd El ^ndar la expected to joU up(ACTION Stale and
fb) Coae alion oi hiUltarr Aid to US military rnleelon* mrtU bo withdrew* from Guatemala at an appropriate time. f irmi, heavy equipment and other lnduetrlalf military uee haveopped (ACTIOH: Defease and State). Efforte abould be made to curtail or atop elm liar eWieerie* from foreign aoorcee wherever poeafble (ACTION: Stale).
gupporHog Official Pre aor at Toe US Covemrnent meat from here Introng. critical attitude toward* the Guatemalan Arbena Government. Every opportunity lo crach down hard on Ouatemala io reepeevee to official correepoaadeace or rtaiemeate anet be fully exploited and eubeecneaxly followed up by active moaeuree wherever feaelbl*. (ACTION;
Official Placrodltlng oi Guatemalan The threatonference of OAS or of foreign Mini ate ra abould be rnade and reiterated ha duehe objective of the coniereace la to conevidence that Guatemalaenace to Hemlapkerlc eoUdarity aod the imeroal aecurity of friendly nation* through aggreeeivv Communlat eubveralocu (ACTION Stale). Collection of evidence, or fabricationnte, will be on ended to accordingly (ACTION; CIA and State).
Econornlr Preeeure: Conefderlag that Guatemalan Government economy la aueceptlble to preeeuree. eovert economic war (are methoda targeted agalaat oil euppl.ee. ahJpping end vital export* andhere feeaibie, will be epplled. lo thla connection, an already cleared group
m
*xten>lv* explicatetlft American banking,ublic-ty. generaland ell. will b* eaalgned lheflan oJ cavart action. TfaJa will ba augmented by advice from
by three af hla meat truaied edvlaera In ece-nomlc
whojuat arrived from Guatemala for tonsultaUeo. There mea occupypoaltiona ia Guatemalannd ln4vatriai life.
RbaJ, ot.wban aeeeaeary fabricated evidence re. tggrraalon and aubveratoo, will ba uaed al an OAS conference to obtain approval of tba American Statee Cor multilateral economic actionuatemala, particularly In raapact la toffee, ludy la under way to determine what pberea of tba coffee indeelry may be attacked which will damage lb* Arban* iovirun.il andapport err without ecrtoealy effectingelement(ACTION: CIA andf) PaYCbolollcal Warfare: Peywir actlvlUce
but targeted agalaal Guatemala, will ba 'tapped up forthwith through the evploLtnllon of anile froupo and internalmmunl#t
atloniactive operiliona [ACTION. ClA).
A completertere campaign for internalGuatemala la Injuaingthe Chief ergaaixcr
ef an eaienaWeie* reeleiaiice movement, recently joined RUr'UJ
Inafiarled from Guatemala. y lu current
Intelligencecontrol over lubatential aiicU
that would be capable oJ covert Paywar activities end blace operation*
fi contacts wtthie tha prei*. radio, church, army aad other otxeniicc elamenta anaceptible te paiBphlaTaarlng. porter campaigns ana
Other eebveralva raaeatly in -eeh.agtea
La prapareUoaa for Paywar activity end political action, tt will be
f
ti> atrengthea thatatioe
In order to auperviee tha lauzKhlng oi atnd
eerily tho capabllltlee ofeland, .tine
uUoe lay and(ACTION: CIA).
(l) ction: Preparation* (or aulwereioo and defection olm. aifficial* and political peraonallUcaprer.ro**. Boroand altering capabUitia*
(or operational (ACTION: CtA).
(h) Par*-Military Act loo.- A* daacrlbed In too foregoing. RUFOS and hie
. mill revolutionary group In Hondurae (JOQ) la the ry nu>
around whlcb Uat rear"operational plan fonnnlalad. Suceci* depended entirely onpopular lupporl In.id. Guatemalanooih-longm pair" gaining motoentumftiei ol complicatedand retidea-eow* climaxing la aa iraaault on OUatamala City. Thla plaa la now considered obiolale; howover.lUl contamplatrd to make properoiU5 aaaet la appropriate coordination with an overt *nd-.oIicbSc^daacrlbed In the foregoing.
Currentualamala City aa tha Lay target upon which all effort* moat be concentratedwtft. climactic military action aparkedeinforced RUFUS group with aaacallalopport Iron defected elemcnle of ta* City garrleoa and actio*Lilian
realatance groopa backedarloa of well-prepared uncooeejulonal warfare operation*. Thia muat Include the neutral! aatloa of key military and control o( power and coarmunicactonock preparatory work haa already been completed to eneure log.eUcal aupport o! RUFUS. He and bia group ahoOd take early
ofolierod neeilitary
_aoa available la Ova Carrboult:
ba aaal lar*aid without delay lo euppoat aa aaiaa.ua cw-erl RUFUSal oavcap* lo
strengthen Ibclr force by arranging lor tafillrat.or. ol additionalpcraooacl from Guatemala; leader and orgamterb* eelecled Initially loraining, and eonia olbe ra-toilltrated 10 elamenli within Guatemala.
RUFUS' baric nuctcua ebuiild eventually bt bu'Jl up lo match al cloeuly aa pt. . he numerical strength ol the garrison ol Gualomala Clly.
Tbe propoaod expaaaioa of tha RUFUS (roup would in Itself provide Erooeanx* of evidence aa toaad
of control of re alliance elementsependabW In Guatemala Farther proof of the oaaaUncs of orgejaiaed clandestine TallalsOf
should be obtained by the (radual actlvallaa al one eeleeled (roup ilur
another within Guatemala comrnesaur-1th th* development and lal-creasing momentum of the psychological warfare and pdnlcal action campaign. Soma aubvoreive oparailonas
further teatlfy to the xin.net oi tha alleged ItUrUo-
...
bllltlti IneUU the target country, and in order to stimulat* pupvlai
Intersil and aupport. (Suitable target for one ol Iheae op*atlotit:
dlsrMpclooS-cnan comrounlat delegation echadulod touatemala
C if ony rjo-nmereleJ air carnalHMfjM
Labor Coaigrees In Vienna. 1
Stop* will ijnPMdUuty be taaan to review th* RUFUS plan according to concepts sot forth in the abova end progressively geared to take advantage of operational developmente resulting from the bafore-inantioaed overt and covart conrae of, action, (ACTION: CIA supported by State and Defense aar^nfthenlng of CIA Station In Onatemele; Aa previously Indicated* CIA aaaeta In the field peraonneleiUa and otherwiae ara nagligtbU. No time should be loot In order to reinforceat ionperator and an experienced aenlor PP operator. Tho cor rent PP end FI effort ia considered far abort of even beginning to tackle the
teak at hfvl* Iixp-*rt leadership ia required to supervise the clan-
destine build-up la GutimiU without which no RUFUS plan involving
revolutionary action sparked from tba outside Cantplemented
easonable chance of eocceee. (ACTION: riority.)
It la esttrnated thnt tbe contemplated operation can be mounted andriplet ederiod of not Tees than eight months. rovisional estimate of expenditureS,CU. na per attached epecifi cation.
Original document.
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