copt no. 3
TATE
security
m '
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT
se-51
approved3 published3
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in thu atimate on IS The FBI abstained, the
tubied being outside oj IU lurudiction. The foUovtng member orjar.uattom of the Intelhoence Advisory Committee participated with the CentralAgency in the preparation of this estimate: The Intelligence organizations oj the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT'
THE PROBLEM
to estimate the significance of the newly established government in indonesia with particular reference to indications of probable future trends.
conclusions
indonesian cabinet which took office3 is more leftist than any preceding indonesian government. although there is no evidence to indicate that any of the ministers are subject to direct communist, discipline and control, eight important ministriesotal ofre held by individuals who will probably respond on many issues to communist influence.
the new cabinet's program follows closely for the most part programssupported by more conservative elements in parliament. we believe that the cabinet will proceed cautiously with its moderate program and will avoid the adoption of radical policies.
we believe that the present cabinet will remain in office for at least six months. however, as time passes, the tenure of the cabinet will becomemore uncertain because:
1 Thisaddie-taw LUelf solely to the sie-niflcance ot the Indonesian cabinet which tonic officeor an estimate of the general couise ol IndonesianeeProbable Developments Lnhich was published on
a. the pro-communist inclination of certain members of the cabinet and the tendency they will have to place their supporters in key positions in thethe armed forces, and thewill probably aid the anti-communist opposition in its present efforts to solidify and may cause conservative members of groups now represented in theto recognize more clearly thedanger.
he present cabinet must sooner or later cope with controversial issues such as economic problems, internal security, foreign policy, and army reorganization. in view of its slim majority in parliament, the government will run the risk ofan adverse vote which would cause its fall any time it seeks to deal with these issues.
c. either through inexperience orpressure, the present government might not deal effectively with developing economic problems. failure to halteconomic trends could cause the fall of the government.
n the basis of present indications, we believe that the Communists will increase their influence in Indonesiaesult of the tenure of the present cabinet; we do not believe that during the next twelve months they willominating position either through armed force or political action,'
DISCUSSION
end Position of the New Cabinet
he Indonesian cabinet resigned. This action was largely the result of an Intensification of the political conflict between the two major Indonesian political parties, the Nationalist Party and the Mas jumi, both of whom were represented in the cabinet To help counter the popular strength of the Masjuml. the Nationalist Party had for some time cooperated with the Communist Parly. On the other hand, the Masjuml, alarmed by this growingsought to relegate the Nationalist Partyess dominant position in the newThis struggle for power delayed the formationew Indonesian cabinet for nearly eight weeks, during which time the Nationalist Party sought to achieve arole in the new government In order to enhance its political position beforeelections were held.
The Nationalist Party won the struggleugust when the President accepted alist headed by the Nationalist Party. More leftist than any preceding government, the cabinet Is dependent on Communist votesarliamentary majority. Eightministriesotal ofre held by individuals who will probably respond on many Issues to Communist Influence.there is no evidence to Indicate that any of the ministers are subject to direct Communist discipline and control, and there are no known Communist Party members in the present cabinet For the first time, an Indonesian cabinet does not include thethe party with the most Parliamentary strength and the greatest public support.
Prime Minister and theof Foreign Affairs. Economic Affairs,are members of the Nationalist
Party. Except for Prime Minister AU, all these ministers belong to the Party's lelt-wing. The Ministers of Defense, Finance, Labor, and Agriculture will probably beto work with the Communists on many issues. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Justice,nd Education will probably work with the Communists from time to time. However, thetendencies ofabinet members will be held somewhat in check by the Prime Minister and the otherembers of the cabinet, who can exercise considerableby threatening to resign. Suchwould probably cause the fall of the cabinet. Under these circumstances, there appears to be no Immediate possibility that the Communists will attempt to use thisto force adoption of radical policies.
he parties represented in the cabinetotal ofotes outctive Parliament members Votes of thepartiesMasjuml, Socialist, Christian, Catholic, andight out ofndependent votes will probably go
Special Assistant foi Intelligence.ofonsiders both the scop* of this estimate and the evidence presented insufficient to permit the assessment here made ofcapabilities In Indonesia over aperiod. The Special Assistant considers the following assessment ol Communist capa-bUlUes In Indonesia to be more In accord with the subject and scope of IT* present estimate:
Ashe present cabinet remains la power, lb* Coaimur.lsta will beositiono Increase their Influence. On the basis of present Indications, the Communists arc not likely toominating position In Indonesia during the espected life of thiseither through armed force or pollUcal acuon.
'Since 1AC action on this estimate, Mr. Ablkusno resigned as Minister of ComnvjnjcaHons.
to the government, giving the governmentotes shortajority. The Communist Party of Indonesia and the Communist-dominated labor federation (SOBSI) have already indicated that they will support the government with theirotes. Thus, the cabinet must rely on Communist support to win Parliamentary approval of any controversial measure The Communists, while unable to insist on all measures which they may desire, probably will press forand conditions conducive to expanding their influence while avoiding any radical policy which might split the cabinet and cause it to fall. Parliamentary support for the cabinet is uncertain due to the lack of party discipline, althoughesire to remain in control of the government may tend to tighten party obedience. It Is quite possible that themight gain sufficient votes to cause the government to fall.
Policies of the New Cabinet
program announced by the newIs similar lo the programs of itsThe program stresses domesticthe importance of holding generalan economic policy based on theof the common people, anpolicy,evision of thebetween Indonesia and the Netherlands.
First place in the government's program was givenledge to settle the internal security problem along military and political lines Tbe government's statementall armed dissident groups andquick action so long as It had the support of the people. However, it is likely that only limited action will be taken against any armed dissident groups because: (a) an all-outwould cause further strain on theeconomic resources, (b) theof whether or not to take drastic military action against the principal armed dissident group. Darul Islam, is an extremelypolitical and religious issue.
The program calls for the holding ofelections for Parliament and lor aassembly in accordance with thelaw passed by Parliament Innd the governmentimetable to enable the elections to be held byn the meantime, attempts arc likely to be made by various political parties to establish control of election machinery.
he cabinet's announced economicprovides little definite indication of the government's intentions. Little change is expected in agricultural policies. No definite statement was made regarding foreignor nationalisation of estate or other foreign holdings, but the new government will probablyolicy less favorable to foreign investors, particularly with respect to labor legislation. Certain governmentindicate the possibility that the previous cabinet's stringent importdesigned to conserve foreign exchange, may be abandoned and that furtherand further credit facilities may be made available to Indonesian businessmen. These policies could leadarger balance of payments deficit and to inflationary
he new government has indicated that it will in general follow the existing foreign policy but will give even greater emphasis to Indonesia's "Independent" position. Stress has already been laid on the Importance of establishing closer relations with the Soviet Bloc in order to counterbalance those now existing with the West Arrangements will probably be made soon to open an embassy in Moscow, an action approved by theunder the previous cabinet Attempts will probably be made to increase trade with thec. but significant results are not likely. Concerning US aid, the foreignhas announced that the agreement to receive technical assistance will be continued but will be reviewed in order to determine how advantageous it is to Indonesia Otherpolicy objectives are likely to be: (a) the negotiationilateral treaty with Japan to supplant the San Francisco treaty which the Indonesians signed but did not ratify;evision of the relationshipthe Netherlands and Indonesia, dis-
iv
solving the netherlands-indonesian union and replacing the existing bound9 with normal international treaties; andenewal of demands that western new guinea become part of
probable developments
he new cabinet's program fellows closely for the most part other programs previously supported by more conservative elements in parliament. we believe that the cabinet will proceed cautiously with its moderate program and will avoid the adoption of radical policies. its parliamentary support is too uncertain to risk quick or decisive action on longstanding controversial issues, such as action against dissident groups, armed forcesand implementation of the election law.
a. an all-out attack on the darul islam, would probably have some support from the public, the armed forces, and those political groups represented by the nationalists and the communists. however, such action would probably cause the moslemin the cabinet and their parties into withdraw their support of the government, thus precipitating its overthrow. it is probable therefore that only limitedaction will be taken against the dissident groups in general while attempts to negotiate an agreement with the darul islam may be made in order to mollify the masjumi opposition.
b the present government will avoiddecisive steps to resolve the controversial issue of reorganization and modernization of the armed forces. any sweeping changes in the armed forces command, particularly if they involved appointing communists or communist sympathizers, would probably be strongly opposed by the bulk of the armed forces and the national police mobileit is probable, however, that thewill attempt to make gradual changes in the leadership of the armed forces and will probably be successful in weakening opposition elements therein.
c. although implementation of the election law is promised by the cabinet, we believe thats the earliest dale that the election could be held. attempts will probably be made during the tenure of this government to establish control of the election machinery to enhance the prospects of government parties in the elections.
we believe that the present cabinet will remain in office for at least six months. the opposition in parliament does not havestrength to defeat the cabinet,so long as the communists continue to support the cabinet. the opposition isarticularly difficult position because it hasimilar program and where it does disagree with the cabinet, it is advocating policies which have little populareasures to attract foreign investment and increase economic austerity.
however, as time passes, the tenure of the cabinet will become considerably morebecause:
pro-commurust inclination ofmembers of the cabinetand thethey will have to place their supporterspositions in the bureaucracy, theand the policewill probably aidopposition in its presentto solidify and may causeof groups now represented into recognize more clearlydanger. internalplitovernment party,adverse vote in the parliament mightthe government to full, it isoup might be undertaken byelements in the bureaucracy andarmed forces.
present cabinet must sooner orwith controversial issues such asproblems, internal security,and army reorganization. in viewsum majority in parliament, thewilt run the risk of incurring anwhich could cause its fall any timeto deal with these issuesinaction in handling theseprobably also lead to the fall of
17
^JfrmiT
Indonesia's economy is in precarious condition at present. Either throughor leftist pressure, the presentmight not deal eflecUvely witheconomic problems. Failure to halt adverse economic trends could cause the fall of the government.
s long as the present cabinet remains in power, the Communists wiU beosition gradually to increase their Influence. They will continue their attempts to strengthen their position by (a) Increasing theirIn the Nationalist and other parties represented in the cabinet; (b) placingand Communist sympathizers inpositions In the various ministries and in the armed forces; and (c) improving their chances for popular support in theelections. The Communists will be able to exert considerable influence over thebecause of the latter's dependence on Communist support in Parliament. However, we do not believe that through such measures the Communists will be able to gain control over the government during the expected life of this cabinet. On the other hand, if this cabinet remains In power for an extended period of time, the Communists maybeosition to dominate Indonesia.
n the basis of present Indications, we believe that the Communists will increase their influence in Indonesiaesult of the tenure of the present cabinet; we do notthat during the next twelve months they willonilnaUng position either through armed force or political action.*
Special Assistant tor Intelligence.of State, considers both the scope of this estimate and the evidence presented Insufficient to permit the assessment here made ofcapablllUes in Indonesia over aperiod The Special Assistant consJd-ers the following assessment of Communistla Indonesia to be more In accord with the subject and scope c! the present csUrr.ate:
As long as the present cabinet remains In power, the Communists will beosition gradually to Increase their Influence On the basis of present Indications, the Communists are not likely toominating position In Indonesia during the expected life of this cabinet either through armed force or political action.
Original document.
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