CONFERENCE BETWEEN CALLIGERIS, SEEKFORD, AND HINGMARSH/

Created: 11/21/1953

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UA HISTORICAL REVIEW PWGRAM

SUBJECTi Conference tetwoen^CALUGERIS, SEKKFORD, and HINDMAR3H/

TO : ARAB TOR : BARKA ROJA

I explainedXIOERIS that his plan had been received andreliminary atudy. resulting in the eleven questions that he had received. int further atudy and questioning would be necessary andaa here to act as liaison between tho group and himself. We then proceded to discuss his plan. This report is sub mltted ln question and answer lorn, the question by me the answers by CULIGJUS/

la Before goingetailed discussion would you giveener review of your proposed operation?

ay my forces in Mexico,Salvador, and Honduras will cross the frontier with the mission of drawing the government forces out from the Capital and pinning them down. At the sameill, well armed foi ce will enter the harbor of Puerto Barrios in boats and capture that city and Livingston. Immediately followingillorce in email boats across the take Isabel snd up the Polochlc River to that pointtho river Joins the road leading to Coban. These boats will carry the arms and supplies which will be used to equips the force assembled in Coban. They will be met by trucks which will carry the supplies to Coill enlaree the beach-head at Puerto Barrios and move up the railline towards 1'rogrope as soon as possible. ill take over Immediately the radio station in Puerto Barrios and use it to coaoiunicate with my troope throughout ths country and, to talk to the people of Guatemala. Mywill carryout bombings of the key installations in the Capital and throughout tha country. ave asked for flame-throwers for theeffect they will have on the government troope and the people. My basic idea ls to be ao equiped and to hit with such shock action that the government, its troops, and the people will feel that we have everything and that our force is overwhelming. ope by this means to reduce thoir "will to realet" rapidly.

in Cobanay. That is Correct.

Why have you selected Cohan as the area in which you will assemble your major force and from which you will move on the Capital? It would appear that man the frontiers or even the Valley of the River Motegua would provide better routes of approach.

not

Ky reasons for Delecting Coban are several;

have been assured of complete support hy the people of thismen, trucks, and supplies. xpect to raise0 men here.

petrol, and other supplies are sore readily available.

government anticipates and ls prepared to cope with anythe frontiers or up the River Hotague. To our bestthe government does nothreat froa thenor are they as well prepared to resist it.

ii. What trucks are available ln the Cobah area and what will be your needs?

There arerucks ln the area,ons, though some are ill require Local petrol supplies are sufficient to meet ey needs.

ill not the terrain and limited road net favor the. the government In your advance on the Capital from Coban?

Prom Cobah to Salami we will be going uphill over the mountains. Prom Salami to the Capital we will ba going down hill and the terrain will be ln our favor and against the defense. The road from Coban to the Capital Is serviceable and passable all the year round, rtveill make the movementays.

6. In your estisma ofyou anticipate the governmentits forces out from the Capital to resist your forces crossing the frontiers. What do you propose to do if if th government decides to fall back, await your arrival, and defend the Capital?

I will encircle and isolate the Capital from the rest of the country. By aerial bombardment and directill force it to capitulate. Inave considered thie possibility andill have no difficulty in doing this. Incldently, if this situation dovelopes Itha present govemsent to ask for and receive help from il Salvador. This help will be in the form of air rwsuppiju eceive theave askedill be able to prevent this. Actually,ave . sought to provide for everyelievehe acts of sabotage and armed revolt that will accompany my invasion will cause the government to fall quickly anda fighte Capital will he unnecesr-ary.

7. Have you considered the problem of communications?

Xes. Prioray each commander will be throughly briefed and will be prepared to act independently. ave established Puerto Barrios as my Supply Hose andill use the radio station there for communicating with my commanders. As soon as possibleill

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distribute, by Beans of ray aircraft, radio sets to each of my commanderb. In any event the cowanders will know their missions and act Independently unt.il such timean contact tham.

o you have any force now in existence? If so, what is its degree of organization and level of training?

At the presentave no force in existence. The inherent problem of security and the cost of maintainingorce prevents this at thisore of somermy officersew IKOs, all former members or the Guatemalan aray, aroundntend to build my forces. These men have already been selected and placed in Guatemala and in the neighboring countries. Each has received general instructions as to his mission and each knows the men he will call together on my signal. After we cross thexpect others to joinave kept my initial striking force small for rapid movement.

9. Will you outline your plans for assembling and equlping these men just prioray.

I am in constant touch with the leaders of the various groups in Guatemala and in the frontier areas. ay has been decidedill have selected individuala report to me for final briefing and instructions. This will require about three weeks. Just prioray the men will gahter ln tha assembly areas and receive thoir oqiipment. ay each commander will procede to carryout his instructions.

The more difficult, but by no means impossible, part of this phase will be the distribution of arms and equipment to the assembly areas. In Mexico we can buy the necessary arms and it will therefore not be necessary toam into the country, ln El Salvador aod Honduras smuggling will be necessary. If you will deliver the arms and equipment to me in northernill assune the responsibility of delivering to the proper areas in Honduraa and El Salvador. This will requireays. ave the men and the means of doing this. As for the water bourne force for the invasion of Puertoad considered ttiat it could be based on some small uninhabitaed island off shore or perhaps on tho mainland.

COMMENT: It was obvious from the questioning that followed thathad not throughly worked out this phase of Uve operation. He had noisland in mind Dor any particular spot on the mainland. ensed that he expected help from us on this matter. He mentioned LCI's, and though he did not definitely soelt that he had in mindis force would embarkarger vessel into LCI's for the movement on Puerto Sarrios. You will note further disoussion of this point under question

soft

COMMENT! Considering the general question of landing and moving equipment throuph Honduras HIMDhARSH believoo that President Calves of Honduras can and ahould be approached on this matter. Galvez has some knowledge of CALLIGERIS' activities and ia aware of HIHDNARSH'e desire to help him. HIND&LABSK has offered to Galvez again to lay the matter before him and ask his help, elievea however that it would be betteran fros

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our Hoadquarters came down and spoke to Calves. R| believes thatan or sufficient preetepo would come down and speak frankly to Gal-Smear*uce#Mfulcuring the President's help. illing to pave tho way foriat by calling on theay or two prior to our man's visit.

10. Do you have pilots to fly the planes you aek for?

No"to help. Perhaps your people could

contact him on this matter.

11. What else naval craft did you have in mind?

Forgerad In mind vessels0 tons. For the smaller ones veeeele of about UX> tone with not. draft.

12. Do you have crews to man the larger vessels? No.

COMffiKT: Here again CaLLIGcHIS Is apparently looking to us for help.

13. If the supplies and equipment you require were landed on the north coaet of Honduras (best of Cortes) and your striking force for Puerto v. Barrloa embarked from there would not several small schooners of the type at preeent ln use on the coaet meet your needs.

elieve do.

U. Do you have someone who knows the north coast well and le familiar with the shipping in the area? If eo, could he prepareeport?

avean, and he could prepareeport.

nstructed to take no actionaek-

ed to do by ue.

avo you considered tho amount of cueh you will noed in execu?inp your plan?

ave. ill need funds to purchase arms ana km supplies ln ieh to pay each of myall sun Just prioray. After we assume control of Guatemala we will need fundo to carry on during the period of re-adjustment, we could uae some funds right now.

COMMENT: An estimate of the cash needed is attached to this report.

MHH

COMMTl Subsequent to theiecuseed with HIKDMkREH theof nuking an inmedl.te advance to CALLIGERIS*' Heshould be done. If Headquarters approvoo HINDMABSH eaid he0 (US)an past* on to CALLIGERIS. HI KUMARSthat whether or not he was re-imbureed by our Headquarters At the conclusion of my mooting with CALLIGERIShim somo money which CALLIGERIS said he noeded to takeof his KCOe. sosm weeks ago WWDKAR3H handed CALLIGERIS

CALLIGERIS handed it back with the request that HIMDKHlSli glveTt tohe needed it more. HWDMARSJl has complete confidence ln

ntegrsty. HIKMttRSH also feels that funds should beto keep him going. KIKDKARSH reported to ee JrVcentl/told him that hehib controleaiisa he cannot use until the invasion starts,eoney continues to coaw in.

ln his report that he believes the invasion must take

place not Inter than the lest two weoks ln July. What is your opinion?

I agree that it should tnke place not latterugust if we are to take aaxlaum advantago of our own forces and organisation and the current political situation. An extended delay will unquestionablyradual deterioration of our organisation and an increased pressure on us by the present government. We must act as soon aa possible.

n recent weeks there have been increased attempt? at sabotage and attacks on the police. Will these increase or can you control them and ask your people to wait?

I can, and have, sent wore in asking everyone to "sit tight"ive the signal. ave told them that we are preparing and that help is coming but frankly their patience is wearing thin. It would help considerablyould send ln nord giving eorae tentative date towards which we could all work. annot hold them indefinitely particul rly if the governmentits activities against us.

Snd of Conference with CALLIGLR1S

Attached to thla report you willeport on the airfields ineport on troop and depot dispositions wlrf given to me at ay next

1 was impressed with the manner in which CALnswered all ny questions Obviously time did not permit complete coverage of all phaees of the plan. The briefing will continue during later meetings.

I so not intend to see CALLIGKRIS againaveeply from Headquarters and BARBA ROJA on thie report with any new

I appreciate tnat Headquarters is notosition toilitary operation in July and yet there is the problem of maintaining CALLIGiRlS and his or.anization until such time as we may desire to useouldetailed report explainingilitaryis not desireable at this time and at the same time include some general ppopoaale for action. Thia would assure him of our good faith end give him something to hold his own follower? in check.

1 wouldelegraphic reply to HINDHAR&H's suggestion to ad-

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