VIA:
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DISPATCH NO
10 hi of, 3
FROMhief of Stetion, Guatemala SUBJECT: UMnu- PBSUCCESS splciik - ESQUIRE
1, Attachedopyemorandum for the Ambaaaador prepared by Mr. Andre* B. Wardlaw, Klrat Sac rotary of the Embassy, datedhlchInformation received from an unidentified source.
2. It lo definitely known that Ur. Yfardlaw's souroo ia tho aubjoct.
S. Givloch
3
Enclosurei aa noted
Dlatrlbutioni
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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
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OFFICENITED STATES GOVERNMENT Date: December The Ambassador
FROM : A. B. Wardlaw
SUBJECT: Conversation Regarding Possibility of Attempt against Guatemalan Government
Recently an invidivualelieve to be reliable informed me in the courseonversation that he hademberroup planning an attempt against the Guatemalan Government when the Salama uprising occurred in This uprising, ho said, was premature end was not launched by the leaders of the main anti-Govemment groups. In fact my Informant belie ved that the Government hadand in setting it off. Nevertheless, most of the people arrestedto the uprising were actually involved in the groups seeking to overthrow the Government.
Tho particular group wl th which my informant was associated had for itsurprise assault on the National Palace in which the chief figures of the Guatemalan Government were to be liquidated on the spot. This assault was to have been coordinatedurprise attack on the military base at Zacapa and an invasion of the country by the forces of CASTILLO Armas and YDIGORAS Fuentes. The leaders ln these groups believed that the Army could be neutralized by the sudden attack on Zacapa, by Army officers willing to assist the movement actively and by the voluntary or enforced'neutrality of other Army officers.
In preparing for this attempt the anti-Governraent forces had collected0 with which they had purchased arras. They also wereosition to lay their hands on considerably more money. The system of colle ction was to get persons willing to help to pledge funds and to keep as cash on hand-the funds pledged. Thus it was contemplated that thegroup would never have large funds on hand but would be able to obtain readily money needed.
Of the arras purchased approximately one half were lost with the captureruckload of them which-nas en route to El Progreso which is hear Zacapa. The other half is cached away in the country where the assBsW
anti-Oovernmont forces can presumably lay their hands on them.
One of the great difficulties in launching the attack on the Government was that of coordinating the activities of the various interosted groups. The group in Guatomala would send Its representatives to Ydigoras Fuentes and Castillo Armas with their plans, but these leaders would always consult with their advisors and would insist upon modifications of the plans. These modifications would then have to bo taken back to Guatemala for approval by leaders there, and before this clumsy program could be carried to conclusion the Sal ana uprising occurred whichdisrupted the anti-Government organizations.
My informant felt that it would be difficult but not impossible to rebuild an anti-Government movement and he said that If he couldgleam of hope" he would be willing to attempt it. plained thatleam of hope he meant indication of some kind of support from outside which would eliminate some of the problems of the collection of funds locally and particularly would give members of theooling that they were not alone. He said that ho could not estimate how much money would bo needed since this could be determined only after the organizational program was under way.
Regarding Ydigoras Fuentes and Castillo Armas, he said that he thought they would both beWilling to cooperate with another movement and that while Ydigoras Fuentos couldertain amount of popular support in Guatemala, Castillo Armas would be of much more valueilitary leader. He said that he felt fairly confident thatas would be willing to enterovement in which he knew thot he woulii not be the supreme leader and he thought possible that Idigoras Fuentes might also be willing to joinovement. He regarded Castillo Armas as the more valuableovement and he said that Ydigoras wished to have someone else overthrow the Government and present him with the Presidency.
Ho seid that since he had net been in on the portion of the previous planning which dealt with Army officers, he did not know whom the groupreliable. Howebar he stated that personally he thought that Colonel MOtJZOK waa an individual who might prove of value, citing that Colonel Monzon had
recentlyeighbor of hie that while he waa an anti-imperialist he hated the Communists thoroughly. Colonel Monson woe also quoted as having said that he had done more than anyone to hold the bulk ofrray loyal to President AREVALO at the time of tho uprising following the ARANAbut that he had never been given the rewards which he thought were due hlra for this aork.
My informant also suggested that.Colonel MSNDIZABAL, the Commander of the Air Base misht be well-disposedovement against tho He said that he had recently held awith Colonel Mendizabal at the home of tdr. J. H. Wilson In the course of which the Colonel had told him that heew days earlior informed President ABBENZ that he considered that affairs in Guatemala hadiaaatroua turn and that the situation could be retrieved only by eliminatingeaders. He said that he had offered toquad of soldiers and do the job personally. President Arbenz had rejected his offer explaining to him that the situation in Guatemala was much more complicated than he thought. Apparently the President did not clarify this statement to the Colonel'e satisfaction.
Original document.
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