ANNEX XII
AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF ASIAN COMMUNIST EMPLOYMENT OF THE POLITICAL TACTIC OF NEGOTIATIONS
Summary
This Annex discusses the Asian (particularly Chinese) Communist practice of negotiating, focusing on the motives which, in the past, have impelled Asian Communists toand the signs they have given when they were prepared to talk. It includes an analysis of the fight-talk tactic used in the Chinese civil war ins welletailed examination of the Korean experiencend the Vietnamese experience. Finally, therehort discussion of implications for Vietnam today.
Findings
the two occasions when the Chinese Communists have initiated negotiations during military conflicts, their
forces were either
s were eiuier
and in danger of annihilation, as in thecivil war, or
hurt in the field, as in the Koreanthey negotiated, they continued to fight. Thistactic was formulated by Mao Tse-tung0 as
a means to preserve his weak forces from being destroyed by Chiang Kai-shek's militarily superior armies. Subsequently, it was used in Korea by the Chinese and North Koreans, at firstxpedient to shield their badly hurt armiesnd then,1olding tacticthey could extract terms enabling them to disengageostly limited war.
In Indochina, however, the decision to beginwas imposed by the Soviet and Chinese leaders on Ho Chi Minh when they feared American involvement andof the war more than he did They urged Ho to close out the war, which he was by no means losing in tha field, and persuaded him to make concessions to tha French after talks started and to try to seize Vietnamrocess
of low-risk political subversion. Even after Ho had been induced to begin negotiations, his desire to use Mao's original fight-and-talk tacticrotracted period was subordinated to the larger interests of Soviet policy (to split the-_Western alliance in Europe) and Chinese policy {to prevent the US from establishing alliances inhe Soviets and Chinese viewed these interests as being best servedpeace" offensive and hindered by continuation of the Indochina war. Ho made concessions, particularly on the matter of partition, which were later viewed by him and his lieutenantsistake not to be repeated.
b. The CCP-KMT Civil
Constantly maneuvering to preserve the badly depleted ranks of his Red Army from complete destruction by Chiang Kai-shek's militarily superior forces, Mao in7 finally induced Chiang to establish, onCP-KMT united front against Japan. But within the context of this paper alliance, Mao expanded his military and political forces in the northwest and even directed quick-decision thrusts to be made against isolated KMT units. attern of limited armed conflict and political struggle emergedao avoided major military operations which woulda major counterattack andactic of limited-fight, limited talk: "After we have repulsed the attack of the (KMT forces) and before theyew one, we should stop at the proper moment and bring that particular fightlose. In the period that follows, we shouldruce with them." (Mao's statement of. In this way, Maoeries of small victories without running the riskeneral civil war, while expanding hisholdings behind the Japanese lines.
While fighting continued on the local level, CCP-KMT negotiations went forward on the national0 Represented in Chungking by his brillant negotiator, Chou En-lai, Mao used various lulls in the civil war to increase his regular forces, ande permitted the American Army Observer Mission to operate in Yenan because its very presenceoliticaleffect on Chiang. Recognizing the strengthened military and political position of Chiang after the surrender of Japan inao tried to settlealf-waylegalization of thethe road to an eventual seizure of national power. Chiang refused to facilitate thistakeover. Onhortly after KMT planes bombed Yenan, Mao dropped the talking half of his dual tactic
and began to fight the all-out civil war, which his forces decisively won in
c. The Korean
Initial Chinese Communist military successes fromthrough0 increased Mao's confidence that the UN forces could be driven from Korea if military pressure was sustained, and Chou En-laiease-fire asreathing spell" for the UN. eries of manpower-killing advances by UN and ROK units in March and early1 followed by tbe blunting of the Communists' big April and May offensives, which cost them anen, left the ranks of Mao's best armies decimatedf thehinese Communist divisions which had initiated the April and May offensives,ad suffered aboutercent casualties.
These disastrous defeats impelled Mao to begin, but there were no prior indications that he wasto drop his previous political conditions for a When, onoviet UN delegate Malik for the first time called for talksease-fire, he merely avoided raising the preconditions that the US must withdraw from Taiwan and that Peking should be admitted to the UN. Mao seized upon the military breathing-spell to improve the badly impaired combat capabilities of his forces in the field.
Mao's strategy at the armistice negotiations1 toas toprotractedombining tactics of political attrition with limited military pressure. But this strategy did not break the determination of the us negotiators to defend the principle of voluntary repatriation of war prisoners. The death of Stalinthe developmentew Soviet attitude toward East-West tensions in general and concluding an armistice in Their pressure on Mao and his own recognition that further resistance was purposeless, and even harmful to his economic program,inpelled him to retreat and accept voluntarymove which opened the way for the armistice agreement of
d.
The same considerations that lad the Soviets and the Chinese to negotiate an end to tba Korean war inade tham look with favoregotiated settlement of
XZI-3
the Indochina war. At the time, however, the fortunes of the Vietnamese Communists in their eight-year fight with the French were steadily improving and Ho Chi Minh gave nothat he would be willing to accept less in asettlement than his forces could seize on the-
The first indication that the Communists might consider negotiations came from the Soviets, who began in3 to quote with approval demands in the French pressPanmunjom" in Indochina. By September, the Chinese had alsoillingness to discuss Indochina at the conference, table. But Vietnamese Communist propaganda made it clear that these Soviet and Chinese initiatives were being madeime when Ho was still resisting the concept of The attitude of tho Viet Minh leaders at this time is illustrative of the generalization that Asianhave been unwilling to begin negotiations when they have been in an advantageous position militarily, or'have not been badly hurt in the field.
As the French Government was being subjected topressure from many members of the National Assembly and from the French public for an end to the costly war, Moscow and Peking acted to convince Ho that he could make major gains through negotiations. One finally took the initiative in proposing negotiations, but itedged proposal that, in effect,omplete Fronch surrender
Premier Laniel was able to resist the strong domestic pressure for immediate bilateral negotiations with the Viet Minh by agreeing to discuss Indochina at the Genevain Although Ho clearly preferred bilaterals, (in which he would have beenuch stronger positionthe French than he -was ate was againby the Soviets to agree to international negotiations.
At Geneva, Molotov and Chou En-lai moved adroitly to avoid any impasse that could be used by the US as an excuse for intervention in the fighting. Ho, whose delegate, Pham Van Dong, started with maximum demands after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, apparently calculated thatcould continue for some time without leading to American involvement. His tactics of protracted negotiations, which would afford him more time to solidify his military position, ware similar to those of Mao in Korea. But again
and again, ths Soviets and Chinese acted to undercut hismaximum demands at Geneva for French politicalin exchangeeasefire.
The Viet Minh certainly had not expected to have to make as many political concessions as they finally agreed to at Geneva. Ho wasosition to negotiate from strength and to do soong time, but he found himself caughtino-Soviet political web and was persuaded not to use his growing military capability to force major concessions. It was clear at the time that the North Vietnamese were far from completely satisfied with the Geneva compromises. As time has gone on, they have probably become even more convinced that the political concessions they made thereistake. The clear awareness that they were impelled, primarily by Moscow and Peking, to stopalf-way station on the road to total military victory has made them all the moreto fight on in the present situation.
e. Implications for Vietnam Today
North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist officials have indicated privately that the compromises madethe Viet Minh with something lessotal takeover of Vietnam,istake. Ho's determination not to stop half-way again, even in the face of increased US airstrikes, is bolstered by Mao's special need to keep him fighting. Mao's special need, which stems largely from an image ofas "leader" of the international Communist movement, is to prove Soviet and other doubters wrong regarding theof revolutionaries to defeat the USrotracted small
war
Discussion A. The CCP-KMT Civil
Tha badly depleted ranks of Mao's Red Army, whichinto the sanctuary of northwest China in5 after the punishing attacks of Chiang Kai-shek's forces during tha Long March, were incapable of resisting an all-out KMT offensive. Aware of this basic fact, Mao repeatedly appealed to Chiang to end the civil war andCP-KMT united front to expel Japanese forces from north China. Chiang was unwilling to comply primarily because Mao insisted onhis military unit3 for use in the revolution: "It
goes without saying that we shall never allow Chiang toinger on the Red Army." (Mao's statement of. But Japan's large-scale attack on China in7 provided Maoew opportunity to move Chiangnited front against Japan. Mao took the first formal stepi on7 the CCP declared that its armed forces would be under the "direct control" of Chiang. Actually, three days after this paper statement, Mao made it clear that "direct control" was only an anti-Japanese political facade and that units and their weapons would remain undercontroli
It is necessary to maintain the CCP's absolutelyleadership in what originally was the Red Army as well as in all guerrila units. Communists are not permitted to vacillate on this principle. (CCPof
Mao used the mythical anti-Japanese united front to deter the KMT forces from attacking his new sanctuary in theand to expand his military, territorial, and political holdings. Most of the CCP effort was directed towardits assets, some was directed toward guardingMT attack, andittle was directed toward engaging Japanese armed forces. Negotiations for the reorganization of the former "Red Army" units moved very slowly7nd clashes continued on the local level between some Nationalist and Communist forces. As friction increased, Mao began to formulate his political-military tactic. , he directed that the CCP's main field work should be in the relatively secure rear areas of the Japanese forces, calculating that the political-military vacuum behind the Japanese lines would shield the CCP from superior KMT forces until the foothold in the northwest could be expanded. Mao enlarged his armed forces as quickly and efficiently asbut he always stopped just short of provoking an open break with Chiang and the retributionajor KMT
Calculated restraint, intended to provide Chiang with no pretext for an offensive, was designed by Mao to be atactic to gain vitally needed breathing spells prior to
xii-6
-TOP .'ifJdRET
the openingevolutionary advance in tha future. Mao indicated the "positive" role of reducedactic in advancing the revolution:
Our concession, withdrawal, turning to the defensive or suspending action, whether in dealing with allies or enemies, should always be regarded as part of therevolutionary policy, as an indispensable link in the general revolutionary line,egment in the curvilinear movement. In short they are positive. (Mao's statement
That is, defensive or suspended action was part of Mao's policy to expand his armies and the CCP membership behind Japanese lines with the aim of seizing more territory at the expense of the KMT. But quick-decision thrusts were never abandoned. For example, in the springommunist forces moved quickly into Shantung Province, and in the winter, they decimated KMT forces in Hopei These clashes were fully concordant with Mao's policy of expanding holdings by armed struggle within the context of the CCP-KMT paper united front.
A pattern of limited armed conflict and politicalemerged in CCP-KMT relations in the spring Mao began to refine his fighting-and-talking tactic. Militarily, he limited the offensive operations of the Communist armies, which were still considerably inferior to KMT armies;he worked vigorously to indoctrinate workers, peasants, and intellectuals. In this fashion, he groped his way, seeking out and exploiting the soft spots in Chiang's military and political armor.
Mao systematized his.tactic. One set forth the unique position that there was noolitical-military struggle against Chiang whilenited front with him. The struggle half of this dialectical policy was intended to demonstrate to Chiang that Mao's forces could not bethey would fight back against any KMT offensives. The unity half was intended to deter KMT attacks and to "avert the outbreak of large-scale civil war." Mao depicted the partial struggle against Chiang aa "the most important means for strengthening KMT-CCPis calculation having been, as he pointed out0irective to ccmmunist field commanders operating in east China, that clashes with tha KMT forces were necessary
so as to make the KMT afraid to oppressnd compel them to recognize our legal status, and make themtoplit.
That is, Mao, on occasion, used military action in certain areas rather than direct political concessions to sustain the united front on paper.
He correctly estimated that small CCP military thrusts would not provoke Chiang to move beyond limitedbecause Chiang did not have the military capability0 toation-wide offensive against CCP forces so long as the war against Japan was being waged. Mao's estimate0 was that
The present military conflicts are local and not nation-wide. They are merely acts of strategicon the part of our opponents and are as yet not large-scale actions intended tothe Communists.
In this way, he defended the general plan for limited civil war which he had enunciated on0imited-fight, limited-talk tactic. Mao had set forth tho important tactic in considerable detail:
First, we will never (sic] attack unless attacked; if attacked, we will certainlyecond, we do not fight unless we are sure ofwe must on no account fight withoutand without certainty of thehird, the principle of truce. After we have repulsed the attack of the die-hards ha KMT forces] and before theyew one, we should stop at the proper moment and bring that particular fightlose. In the period that follows, we shouldruce with them. We must on no account fight on daily and hourly without stopping, nor become dizzy with success. Herein lies thenature of every particular struggle. Only when the die-hardsew offensive should we retaliateow struggle.
This became the basic tactical principle of Mao. His practice indicated that his forces were directed to fight, close off the particular battleefeat of KMT forces, and thenruce and ba prepared to negotiate in the hope that Chiang would notocal and limited defeat as the
reasonarge-scale offensive against all Communist armies. This is the tactical principle designed to advance Mao's protracted war waged with initially weak forces,their actions to safe proportions.
In this way, Maoeries of localreat risk of general civil war. At the same time, ha seized territory by expanding the base areas behind the Japanese lines and by controlling the actions of his field commanders, whose forces sporadically chopped away at small KMT units. For example, the First Contingent of the Communist New Fourth Army commanded by General Chen YiKMT forces in northern Kiangsu in0 and, in the second halfeveral Communist victories were won in the lower Yangtze valley. Mao had directed that the New Fourth must be expandeden; by the endis generals were successful in expanding this army tothat number of combat regulars.
While fighting continued on the local level, CCP-KMT negotiations took place on the national level in the second half0 as Mao implemented his fighting-and-talking tactic. Even when vastly superior KMT forces unexpectedly surrounded anden attached to the New Fourth's headquarters as they were withdrawing to the north of the Yangtze River, Mao refused to consider this setback ashis principle ofimited war. Inhe intermittent negotiations between the KMT and CCP reached another major impasse in Chungking, just as they had in9 and in Chiang asked Mao toonclusive reply to his demands to relinquish the independent CCP government and to incorporate CCP forces into Nationalist armies. Chou En-lai, the brillant Communist representative in Chungking, deflected these demands and charged the KMT with increasing their forces along the northwest border base areas. Chou attained some success in his political effort to depict Chiang as the obdurate element in the united front.
The failure of Chiang to launch large-scale attacks against Communist forces3 was attributed by Mao at the time to the political success in arousing domestic and international opinion against Chiang's policies. (Liberation. Two additional factors were Japan's east China offensive against KMT forces and US efforts to stop Chiang's attempts to suppress the Communists. That is, Mao
adroitly used political pressures to compensate for military weakness: "The Communists are not capable of much, if any, offensive action." {Report of Colonel Depass,
Expediently,3ao used the lull in the CCP-KMT protracted war to further expand his armed forces, which increasedegulars by The Wallace mission to China in4 resulted in the dispatch of the American Army Observer Mission to Yenan, which Mao favored because of "its political effect upon the KMT":
Any contact you Americans may have with us Communists is gold. Of course, we are glad to have the Observer Mission here because it will help to beat Japan. But there is no use in pretendingto now at leastchief importance of your coming is not itseffect on the KMT. (Mao's*remarks to John S. Service, interview of
That is, Mao exploited the US desire to end the civil war and get on with the war against Japan, adroitly using itolitical shield against the potential offensive-power of Chiang's superior military forces. He was capable then of considerably more tactical flexibility than he has been in recent years.
By insisting on policies which made the KMT appearMao deflected Chiang's demand that, toegal party, the CCP should disband its armed forces. In aworded proposal, which Mao maneuvered Ambassador Hurley to sign with him in Yenan onao agreed only "to work for" the unification of all military forces while insisting on the formationcoalitionnited national military council." His intention was to exploit the generally held view that the CCP wasin refusing to disband its armies before tha formationoalition government. However, in order to keep thealive, he directed Chou En-lai in Chungking to join Ambassador Hurley in pressing Chiang to accept the proposal. Chiang insisted on disbanding tha Communist armies, and Mao was then able to "expose" Chiang as recalcitrant inreasonable" negotiationsa coalition. The widespread domestic and international appeal of the Maoist programettlement, the rapidly expanding military-political power of the CCP, and US anxiety to bring about
unity put Chiangonsiderable disadvantage in tha talks. Mao's success with dilatoryis, hisof talks about "working for" unified armed forces in the place of action taken to disband CCPisolated Chiang in China and internationally.
All along, Mao had continued to expand his forces, and bye claimed that theyegulars and moreilitia. Maoajor move shortly before Japan's surrender, ordering CCP troops to link up with Soviet troops driving southward in. As CCP and KMT armies raced for control of various Japanese-vacated areas and as Chiang prepared to strike at Mao's forces, the Communist leader accepted Chiang's invitation to accompany Ambassador Hurley to Chungking, arriving on Mao was still anxious toeries of breathing spells. Two days before flying toMao drafted an inner-party policy line on negotiations, in which he indicated that the CCP should be prepared to make somesome reduction in the size of those base areas which were indefensible and in the strength of CCP armed forces:
Without such concessions, we cannot explode the KMT's civil war plot, cannot gain the political initiative, cannot win the sympathy of world public opinion and the middle-of-the-roaders in China and cannot gain in exchange legal status for our partytate of peace.
But there are limits to such concessions: the principle is that they must not damage theinterests of the peopleCPof the base areas and the armedMao's statement of
Mao in Chungking recognized the strengthened military and diplomatic position of Chiang after the surrender of Japan and the signing in Moscow of the Sino-Soviet treaty. In private talks, he dropped his demand (to which he lateroalition government and high command, buton retaining not less thanivisions as well as exclusive control of the base areas in north China. He wanted toalf-way station ofon the road to an eventual seizure of national power, inasmuch as his armies were still smaller and mora badly-equipped than Chiang's. "The Communist armies do not possess
sufficient strength to directly oppose the KMT armies in positional warfare; butong period of time as an occupying force, the KMT cannot hold out even with US5 report of Colonel Yeaton from Yenan) Chiang accurately summarized Mao's position as equivalent tothe CCP to carry on its political revolution without opposition or hindrance while professing to end the KMT-CCP military clashes by negotiating. Actually, while Mao was talking, CCP forces were consolidating their control over newly taken territory in the north, and when Mao returned onfter refusing to disband his forces, he justified in the context of protracted revolution, his willingness to negotiate.
Mao made it clear to cadres in Yenan onctober that reducing CCP forces toivisions would not mean handing over weapons. "The arms of the people, every gun and every bullet, must all be kept, must not be handedHe then reminded cadres that his strategy was toongwar:
Was our party right or wrong in deciding at its 7th Congress [inhat we were willing to negotiate with the KMT provided that they changed their policy? It was absolutely right. The Chinese revolutionong one and victory can only be won step by step.
As both sides raced to seize Japanese arms and fill the territorial vacuum, Mao directed the Northeast Bureau of the CCP to expand its holdings and use theommunist troops to hold the rural areas remote from the existing centers of KMT control. Between the truce of January and. both sides took territory in During the whole period of the Marshall mission in5ao tried to disgrace Chiang politically byoderate program of "peace, democracy, and unity" while his armed forces expanded. He relied heavily on their ability to avoid decisive engagements, to prolong the stop-start fighting, and to counter-attack against small KMT units.
In the final series of negotiations of Mao's longwar, he gave priority to the goal ofeasefire and an extension of the Manchurian truce. He was also concerned in6 about US aid to Chiang's forces. On the one hand, he relied on General Marshall's
mediation to gain an immediate cease-fire, to ameliorate Chiang's demands, and to state his own settlement terms. Chou En-lai, urbane and persuasive, ably discharged his task by appearing conciliatory, moderate, and reasonable. On the other hand, Mao's press and radio in Yenan criticized US policy with increasing vehemency in an effort to dater Washington from giving further aid to the KMT. Byao demanded that the US stop all military assistance to Chiang and withdraw all US troops from the mainland) his concern with the modern equipment sent to KMT forces had been deepened. "Let them know that whatever happens, if we are faced with mechanized war, we shall fight on if necessary with our hands and feet." (Mao's statement to Robert Payne in
Although his armies were still numerically inferior to Chiang's Mao issued an inner-party directive onuly warning his forces to prepare to smash Chiang's offensive by an all-out "war ofhich required-the temporary abandonment of indefensible cities and the opening of mobile warfare. Mao had no alternative but to fight against superior forces and onhortly after KMT planes bombed Yenan, Mao was impelled to drop the talking half of his dual tactic and prepare for all-out civil war, which his forces won in the straight, forward contest ofstrength waged between6 and
In drawing an analogy between the Chinese civil war and the Vietnam war today, CCP propagandists emphasize thenature of both conflicts and the evolution of weak into strong Communist forces. But they deliberately de-emphasize, or avoid any reference to, the talking-half of Mao's tactic and the temporary half-way station he tried to obtain. Unlike tha Soviet propagandists, they insist that talking should take place only after the US withdraws its forces from South Vietnam.
B. The Korean
Military developments in Korea in the spring1lear-cut example of the Asian Communists having been impelled to switch to the talking phase after they had been hurt in the field. That is, they viewed the large losses
of Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) combat regulars as the sufficient causa for drastically reducing the fighting phase. The military struggle was subordinatedhe intention being to wear down Western negotiators.
When.-in late Novemberhe CCF entered the war in force. North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) combat casualties were already very high, estimated by the United Nations Command {CSC}n additionrisoners. The NKPA had been virtually destroyed and never fought again above corps strength in the Korean war. The initial CCF successes against UNC forces from November through0 increased the confidence of the Chinese Communistthat they could drive UNC forces from Korea if CCFwas sustained. On0 and again onhou En-laiease-fire, describing iteans to gainreathing spell" for UNC forces, and demanded that prior to any halt in the fighting all foreign troops must be withdrawn from Korea, US armed forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan, and Peking's representatives must be admitted to the United Nations. As UNC forcesfrom the Yalu River, however, theyeavy toll of CCF combat units. For example, betweenovember andecember,0 men of the eight divisions committed by the 9th Army Group, Third CCF Field Army, were estimated by the Marine Corps to have0 combatittle over half of them inflicted by ground forces and the rest by air attack. The 9th Army Group was so damaged bythat it disappeared from the Korean battlefield for three months. ByNC forces had stopped the CCF all along the front.
General Ridgway directed UNC forces to comply with his dictum of "inflicting maximum casualties on the enemy" rather than gaining ground. The dictum was put into practice in tha months following the UNC offensive which started in late ebruary, OPERATION PUNCH hadatCF {body count) and when, onebruary, CCF infantry for the first time in Korea attacked in mass waves, UNC forces killed thousands of Chinese at Chipyong-ni. CCF mass infantry assaults resulted in further heavy Chinese casualties onh and again ont with the start of OPERATION KILLER. arch, the entire Chinese front south of the Han River had collapsed and UNC
units moved to withiniles ofh parallel. CCFand equipment losses continued to be "heavy" after the start of OPERATION RIPPERarch, and onarch, Seoul was retaken as CCF and small NKPA forces fell back. eries of manpower-killing advances launched by UNC and ROK units in late March and early April moved the allied forces acrossh parallel. The ranks of the bestPiao's 4th Field Array and Chen Vi's 3rd Fieldtheleaders used in the first massive assault against the UNC forces had been seriously depleted. "Now the best troops are annihilated; this forced the CCF to send replacements from the 1st and 2nd field The CCF suffered high casualties and its faith in victory had beenFrom interrogation report of Assistant Battalionh Army, 4th CCF Field Army)*
General Van Fleet met the first Communist spring offensive, launched onith the manpower-killing tactics of General Ridgway, and directed his corps commanders onpril
Expend steel and fire, not ant so many artillery holesan can step from one to the other.
Because they used massed infantry assaults againstUS artillery, automatic-weapons, and air firepower, units of six CCF armiesotal0ndpril and were forced to end their first spring offensive. Their second spring offensive was even
more destructive to CCF men and materiel.'/
. -
Onay, CF divisions, flankedotalKPA divisions, opened the second spring offensiveile front using human wave tactics against strongly fortified UNC positions. Although gains ofoiles were made along most of the front, the Communist offensive was completely spentay, and UNC forces, which had recoiled only slightly, lashed backajor counter-offensive, depriving the Communists of the opportunity to place screening forces between their main armies and the
prisoner reports that are referred to in thia Annex are, in almost every case, the reports of prisoners captured and interrogated in March and Aprilis, after the collapse of the1 CCF offensive and before the even more costly defeats of the spring
UNC units. UNC counterattacks quickly carried into CCP and NKPA former assembly areas, where large quantities ofwere captured as many dumps were overrun. une, tbe CCP and NKPA lost moreen, and of the 21
CCF divisions which had initiated the offensive,ad
suffered aboutercent casualties. The following table, which is based on US Par East Command estimates, indicates the magnitude of the Communist losses:
Strength Strength Strength %2
Central Front
o
attack)
CCF Army
27th CCFh CCFh CCF Army II NK Corps
Corps
Central Front
10th CCFh CCFh CCFh CCFh CCFd CCF Army
Western Front
64th CCFh CCFK Corps
Corps
TOTALS:
11
ii _
The table indicates that ashehadoss ofercent of their totalay strength in Korea. oune, they suffered an0 casualties (not included in the table above).
Most of the CCF prisoners were taken during tha last week of May in frantic efforts to escape, indicating that the political-control fabric of many CCF units had been shattered, primarily because large numbers of political officers and non-coms had been killed. UNC ground pursuit endedune after all of South Korea exceptmall part on the Western flank had been cleared of Communist forces, enabling fortification of the UNC line in depth to begin in the vicinity ofh parallel.
The combined heavy losses to the first wave fieldthe CCF 3rd andthe second wavethe CCF 1st andsignificantlythe quality of the forces which the Chinese leaders could put in the field in Many of their best combat officers and political cadres had been killed or captured, partly because of the Maoist practice whichthat they take front-line positions to lead their troops. Many political officers were killed in combatthey spent much of their time with the men in the front line to lead the battle themselves" (fromreportrivate inth Division, 4th CCF Fieldnd in some companies all officers including the company commander had been ordered to the front line to raise the men's "fighting spirit" (from interrogationof the Company Political Officer in the HBth Division, 4th CCF Field Army). "The casualties among the commanders wereecause they took the lead at the front" (from interrogation report of Battalionh Army, 1st CCF Field Army). The massed infantryfor the first time by the CCF in Korea in mid-Februarythe destruction: "We fought only with human wave tactics; great numbers of men have been sacrificed; it was indescribably miserable" (from interrogation report ofd Army, 4th CCF Field Army). Tho Maoist doctrine of "defeating the enemy's firepoweruperiority inilitary idaa which is no These views of mine were shared by most lower-level leaders and the men in the CCF, though they could not dare to make them public" (from interrogation of Assistant Battalion Politicalh Army, 4th CCF Field'Human wave' tactics are aupposod to overwhelm the enemy's firepower with predominance of manpower and thus win tha victory. From my first experience in thisound that this tactic had no sense and no in actual combat, it was nothingass loss of lives and defeat"
(from interrogation report of Squad Leader and CCPh Army, 4th CCF Field Army). The quality and number of CCP cadres who were lost to the four CCF field armieswas the sufficient cause for the Chinese Communistwhose forces comprised aboutercent of tho Communist combat units in Korea, to switch to the talking phase. Hea' .losses of_ NKPA officers of the l, Ii, and III Corpi
in the disastrous offensives ofhe CCF and NKPA sustained anasualties frompril toune. Byune, the Chinese casualties since the CCF entered the Korean war were, including0 non-battledue torisoners. (NKPA casualties as early as November0 had already been very high, estimatednrisoners. No data ishere on NKPA total casualties since
The war was increasingly costly for the Chinese in other ways. It forced the regime to modify its program of long-range economic development and to place the economyar footing. The war also subjected the regime to economicimposed by the West, increased inflationary pressures, and strained economic relations between urban and rural areas. The Chinese Communists became increasingly dependent on the USSR, partly because the Chinese were unable to replace from their own resources the stocks of material being expended in Korea.
The first step toward ending the commitment in Korea was to begin negotiationsease-fire, the calculation apparently having been that political concessions could be gained by combining protracted talks with propagandawhile the fighting was kept limited.
eries of statements made by American and United Nations' officials in late May and earlyhe UNC's willingness to end the fighting withouta surrender of Communist forces, the Chinese Communists and the Soviets apparently decided toreathing-spell. Prior to theune radio speech of Soviet United Nations' delegate Jacob Malik, there apparently were no indications that the Chinese were willing to accept these Western On the contrary, the indications continued to point to Chinese intransigence. (For example, early in
Vict Foreign Minister Chang Han-fu had beenalk with Indian Ambassador Panikkar in Peking and insisted that the war must bc Battled onlyilitary way.") Unexpectedly, in his radio speech, Malikhange in the Communist position when he avoided linking the Communists' proposalease-fire to their earlier demands that the US must withdraw from Taiwan and that Peking must be admitted to the United Nations. "The Soviet peoples believe thatirst step, discussions should be started between the belligerentsease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces fromh parallel."
The Chinese, too, wtit careful not to admit they had dropped preconditions. Onune, the Peking People'r. Daily frontpaged Malik's proposal without acceding to truce talks. The Chinese did not accede to truce talks publiclyuly, anduly they rationalized the change in their basic position without acknowledging explicitly that it had changed. That the Chinese were anxious to deny that they were operatingosition of weakness is suggested by their statements to Burmese embassy officials in Peking shortly after Malik's speech. They insisted that "China and the USSR are confident of their joint strength, as none is equal to them." The Chinese also indicated to the Burmese that they had moved into the war's political phase in order tois, "to brand" the US and its allies asand to create dissension in the Western camp, their strategy having been toow-risk, high-volumewar in order to gain concessions at the truce talks. The Chinese later formulated their switch to the talking phase as follows:
After the five great campaigns ffensives from0 to, the Volunteers switched over in good time to the strategic line of "engaging in protracted warfare while conducting positiveand strictly subordinated the military struggle to the political struggle. (ncna commentary
The Chinese used the military breathing-spell to improve their impaired over-all combat capabilities. By the time the armistice negotiations startedhe Chinese had improved their artillery and nnal1-arra stores and had replaced their manpower losses while the NKPA divisions were rebuilt. Politically, they had already exploited the theme of seeking peace and of opposing American "warmongering" with considerable
success, gaining face internationally and placing themselvesavorable propaganda position as the initiators of the truce talks. They were unwilling to move the talks alongutually acceptable conclusion within any short period. On the contrary, they used Mao's tactic of wearing down UNC negotiatorsprotracted struggle" (Peking's phrase in order to extract major concessions.
This tactic of political attrition succeded inUNC negotiators, but it did not gain the Communists major concessions. Small-scale but sustained UNC military pressure on Communist forces in Korea, in1 was reflected in the talks. Onctober, the Communists in effect dropped their demand that the demarcation line be moved down to correspond withh parallel. On the other hand, theyday de facto cease-fireoecember, enabling them to further strengthen front-line defenses and to augment unit strength.
The Chineseolitical victory togetherilitary truce, and as the talks centered on the prisoner issue, they adamantly refused toolitical setback. The major deadlock on the matter of voluntary repatriation of prisoners prolonged the talks from2 toas the Chinese insisted on the forcible return of all CCF (and NKPA) prisoners in order toajor propaganda defeat if large numbers were to opt for the West. Thewould not recognize the UNC stand onalid principle and argued that it was ln conflict with the Geneva Convention whichompulsory, all-for-all exchange. As an alternative, they calculated thatelatively small number would resistthat is,0otalCF and NKPAcould tacitly agree to the UNC screening process.
Both the Communists and the UNC were shocked by theof the screening process after about only half had been questioned. 0 of0 prisoners screened indicated that they would resist repatriation to China and North Korea, but the UNC had given the Communist negotiators an estimateilling to return of therisoners. When, onpril, the Communists were informed that0 would return without the use of force, the CCF Colonel Tsai was speechless, askedecess, and on the followingon instructions from
said that the UNC's earlier estimatear cry It was "completely impossible for ua to consider" and "you flagrantly repudiated what you said Because the Communists had been stung once by the screening procedure, they indicated they would have nothing more to do with it.
Small, division-scale battles continued in the field, but the Communists were still unwilling to change tha nature of the war into that of major offensive actions. They tried to deflect politically damaging charges of inhumanity on the prisoner issue byoncerted propaganda campaign, accusing thein late Februarywaging "bacteriological warfare" in North Korea and Manchuria. More importantly. Communist-instigated riots in the pow camps were intended to undercut the UNC position on voluntary repatriation by discrediting the entire screening process. In the POW camps, the Communist soldiers shifted theirfrom military to political.goals. Close coordination was established between the POW camps and the Panmunjom truce talks. Onfter forcing aconfession ofcompulsory screening" from General Dodd, who had been held prisoner by the prisoners of the Koje-do camp, chief negotiator Nam II charged that
The commandant of your prisoner-of-war camp could not but confess before the whole world your inhuman treatment and murderous violence against ourpersonnel, and the criminal and unlawful acts committed by your side in screening and re-arming war prisoners by force. (empnasis supplied)
The Communist negotiators adroitly used the Koje-do incident to discredit the UNC figures and insisted that theyrisoners' in exchange0 prisoners held by them on the principle of an all-for-all exchange and forcible repatriation. Neither side conceded, and at the recess of talks onear of negotiation had produced anords of discussion andours of formal meetings. The prisoner issue was the only remaining agenda item.
On theilitary stalemate continued. Mao had confronted the US with his limited-risk protracted war. He apparently believed that Washington would continue
to avoid pressing for an all-out military victory because of the potential manpower lossesictory would ByCF and NKPA ground forces strength had almost doubled since the start of the talks in. He also apparently believed that he could deter the US from initiating airstrikes against the China mainland because of Washington's uncertaintyStalin's reaction to such strikes. As part of his deterrent effort, Chou En-lai and the Soviet ambassador in Peking told Indian Ambassador Panikkar that the USSR would with
Mm both Chou
that "an air attack on Manchuria would cause the aid agreements he Sino-Soviet treaty) between Peking and Moscow to become operative." Panikkar was used to convey Communist warnings to the US and in this instance, thewas to deter the US from changing the "ground- rules" prohibiting bombing of China.
While Stalin lived. Communist negotiators at Panmunjom refused to retreat from their demand for forcible repatriation. New Dehli's efforts to smooth the wayompromise were rejected when Foreign Minister Vishinsky on2 and Chou En-lai on2 attacked the Indianon repatriation as unacceptable. As late asn an interview with Indian Ambassador Krishna Menon, Stalin avoided advancing new proposals on Korea and showed no real interest in the Indian compromise effort. Mao, too, remained adamanteclaring that "however many years American imperialism prefers to fight, we are ready to fight (speech. Stalin had raised East-West tensionsigh level, and Mao wasto sustain those tensions.
On the battlefield, small-unit actions continued in localized struggles for hill positions and, although the Communists had taken losses in2 that had cut their estimated total strengtht the end of the month, their total began to climb slowly again in November as fighting tapered off. Both sides made the same calculation, namely,ajor offensive would leadery high casualty rate butilitary.
The death of Stalinermitted theof an entirely new attitude among the Soviettoward East-West tensions in general and toward concluding an armistice in particular.* Moscow now appeared to be more anxious touick enc to the war than did Peking. Soviet statements in March following Stalin's death were more conciliatory toward the West than those of the Chinese. of the Council of Ministers Malenkov stated onarch that "there is no disputed or unresolved question that cannot be settled peacefully by mutual agreement of the interested countries." For the first time since the end of World War II, Moscow Radio onarch admitted that the US and Britain hadole incommon victory" over the Axis powers. This followed Foreign Minister Molotov's unexpected agreement onarch to intercede with the North Koreanto obtain the release ofritish diplomats andinterned in North Korea since the start of the war, urther indication of the change in the Soviet attitude was Malenkov's depiction of the Korean war-defensive"in hisarch message to Kim II-sung onoviet-Korean agreement. Significantly, it differed imilar message to Kimhen Stalin had described the warstruggle for liberation of then which any cease-fire would be conditioned on the withdrawal of US forces from Korea.
Three days after Chou's return from talks with the post-Stalin leadership in Moscow, the Communists unexpectedly agreedoutine UNC offer for an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners which General Clark had reiterated in his letter ofebruary. In suggesting that the exchange of the sick and wounded might be the first step leading to the "smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of. war, thereby achieving an armistice in Korea for which people throughout the worldhe Communists indicated
'The death of Stalin provided the Soviet leaders with the opportunity to jettison Stalin's more senseless andpositions and to use methods of flexibility inariety of goodwill gesturesiminution of doctrinal hostility to Western governments. Stalin wasabout the international situation leadingeneral war, but for reasons of doctrinal obsessions and personal prestige, he refused to moderate the Soviet attitude toward the West and toward neutrals, and refused to make concessions on important international issues dividing the Wast and the Communist bloc.
onew and real interest in solving the last crucial problemease-fire agreement. This was the first indication that the Chinese might be willing tooncession on repatriation.
But Maorotracted political struggle as he prepared to make his retreat on forcible repatriation as small as possible. The Chinese used ambiguous and face-saving language in an effort toeries of fallback positions, which they surrendered only after it was clear the UNC would insist on the voluntary principle. An ambiguous proposal by Chou En-laioth sides
should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insist upon repatriation and hand over the remaining prisoners of wareutral stare so as toust solution to tho question of thoir repatriation [emphasia
left unclear tha matter of final disposition of prisoners who were unwilling to return to China and North Korea. The Chinese propagandists described Chou's proposal ashich it waa, as the point thatwho were unwilling to be repatriated should be handed overeutral countryhinese retreat. Chou had been deliberately vague in not stating Chinese demands for forcible repatriation, but Chinese propaganda returned to the demands by insisting on the principle of totalby wayeutral state. That the Chinese hadoncession in fact while insisting on theto cover their retreat is indicated by the statement of the senior Soviet member of the UN Secretariat, Kas-sanlev, whoember of the Norwegian delegation onarch that Chou's declaration on prisoners was "the real thing" and that only "technicalities" remain to be worked out.
The UNC appraised this concession as indicating no change on the substantive matter of voluntary repatriation^ and they pressed the Communists to clarify their position on where screening would take place, on its duration, and on whether the voluntary principle would be part of aagreement. After manipulating the language of their counter-proposals throughout April,ay the Communists
made two more key concessions. They dropped thethat no repatriates should be sent physically to astate and reduced the explaining period from six to four months. Finally,une, the Communists' chiefNam II, using language designed to conceal thecapitulation on forcible repatriation, stated thatording to the application of each individual, those who elect to go to the neutral nations shall be assisted by theNations Repatriation Commission and the Red Cross Society of India." That is, men who refused to return to thecountries could reach non-Communist countries through the channeleutral-nations commission stationed in Korea, if explanations failed to persuade them to return noma. In this way, Mao accepted voluntary repatriationisguised form. His propagandists stated that ex-prisoners may go-to "neutralithout making it clear that they were in fact free to go wherever they chose.
Mao was anxious to stillegree of political prestige before the cease-fire agreement was signed.. Face-saving offensives were launched in June and July by theto achieve several objectives: (a) to move the line farther south, (b) to give ROKloody-nose in order to convince Rhee chat his forces could not "Marchnd (c) to convince international opinion that the CCF and NKPA were not weaker than UNC forces and that themotive in seeking an armistice was not that of avoiding military defeat. Although suffering heavy losses between April andn estimated total ofwere over one million CCF and NKPA forces in Korea, well-fed adequately clothed, and effectively supported by massedby the time of the signing of the armistice onuly.
Mao's capitulation on the principle of forciblecapitulation which provided the Westajor propagandastemmed from several major considerations.
1. One was pressure from the post-Stalin leadership. The Soviet leaders were clearly anxious to consolidate their internal position and to relax international tension. They were alert to the harder policy taken toward the China mainland by the new administration of President Eisenhower. Neither the Soviet nor the Chinese leaders could be certain that the new administration would keep the war limited in tho event that truce talks remained deadlocked. Chineseover the possibility of an attack, or ateries of substantial raids, from Taiwan was reflected in
the resumption of recruiting in Shanghai in February and3 and in defense activity along the south China coast. Implicit warnings. officials thatwould not accept an indefinite deadlock and Secretary of State Dulles' explicit statement to Nehruruce could not be arranged,. could not be expected to continue to refrain from using atomic weap-gns^-further increasedM*M
aaership^^
ae^Wea^tornoveiTgreate^^aistance from the brink ofin the Korean war than Stalin had believed necessary; they were .unwilling to risk an escalation on thewhich might well have provoked extension. air-strikes to the China mainland. -
2. Mao could perceive no further advantage inthe limited war. He was aware that thehe war of politicalto reduce the staying power of the UNC on the voluntary repatriation issue-had failed. The blackmailis, American "warmongering" and "bacteriologicalhich were components of the talkingnotNC concession. His plan of attrition, requiring policy critics in non-Communist countries to soften up theof enemy governments (while policy critics in thecountries were effectivelyid not provide him with the advantage he calculated would beinajor retreat. Despite his efforts during the talking phase, the UNC prevailed on the issue of repatriation, announcing onuly0 Koreanshinese would return to Communist control,oreans0 Chinese would be non-repatriates. (Earlier, onune, Rhee had0 Korean Obviously, these figuresolitical embarrassment to his regime which the new Soviet leaders had to convince him to accept.
3. Mao wanted to get on with the job of industraliza-tion. Although political and economic conditions in China and North Korea probably were not exerting compellingon the Communists to conclude an armistice inhe war was probably viewed as injurious to long-term economic development programs. Politicalhad been increased in China during the war and the
economic strains on the Chinese were probably less severe in the spring3 than they had been0ut Mao was anxious to begin China's First Five-Year Plan of economic development, and the North Koreans were aware that they would have to start virtually from scratch to
To sum up, Mao moved into the talking phase in Korea because his best field armies had suffered very heavy losses and were retreating under UNC military pressure. Heviewed the enormous loss of human lives withcallousness, but was forced to draw back because the military capability of his armies had been greatlyWhen confronted with the UNC's demand that noshould be forced to return to Communist control, he engagedprotracted struggle" in the hope ofajor concession from the-western powers by combining division-level battlefield pressure with politicaltactics. But he decided to end the Chinesewhen UNC presistence and Soviet pressure convinced him that further intransigence was purposeless and even harmful to the mainland's economic construction.
C.
Near the end of the Korean war, Viet Minh prestige was steadily increasing, and its military successes andeffectiveness bolstered Ho Chi Minh's confidence that he'couldecisive military victory. He was determined therefore, to prosecute the revolutionarywar more actively and felt under no real compulsion to move toward the talking phase of his long-term effort against the French. On the other hand, lack of Frenchsuccess and increasing domestic political pressure to reduce or close out the commitment in Indochina made aof French premiers and cabinets pessimistic about everilitary decision over Ho's forces.
Even after General Navarre assumed command in Indochinahe French were unable to revise their losing strategy in the fielduch touted (but neverplan for mobile warfare drawn on paper. The forceietnamese0 Vietnamese0 Laotians,0 Cambodians that Navarreproved unable to take over effectively the job of static defense, so Navarre was impelled to fall back on the
old losing policy of tying down and dispersing French and French Union regulars toeries of key strongpoints. Outotalegulars and0 auxiliaries, there were only seven mobile groups and eight parachuteequivalent of threewere notto'immobile, defensive duties.
In contrast, the Viet Minh was not tied down to static defense and with0 full-time regional and provincial troops,art-timeshort, the operating equivalent of ninefreely through the countryside and chose the place to attack the enemy forces. For example, strong Viet Minh guerrilla elements together with two Viet Minh divisions sufficed to containegular French Union forces in the Tonkin Delta. The Viet Minh skill in guerrilla warfare and in infiltrating into areas under French control seriously reduced Navarre's ability to take the offensive.
While the French were cursed with the necessity ofa number of politically important but militarilypoints, Navarre was also under political restraint from Paris. Because of domestic criticism of the war in Indochina, the French government had directed its commander in the field to incur the fewest possible number of French casualties. The Viet Minh, on the other hand, was receiving strong support, both military and political, from its allies. The armistice in Korea had enabled Mao to Increasehis aid across the southern China border to Ho's forces, strengthening their unit firepower and overallcapability. All along, Viet Minh regular forces in northern Indochina continued their gradual evolution from lightly armed guerrilla bandsegularly organizedforce with Chinese and Soviet equipment.
For all these reasons. Ho clearlyomplete military victory and gave no indication that he would beto attain lessegotiated settlement than his forces could seize on the battlefield.
The post-Stalin Soviet leadership, however,ofter policy toward East-West military conflictsecessary element in their long-range effort to dissolve the Western alliance in Europe. They tried to temporize on every major East-West difference in order to increase
pressure against the US by its allieselaxation of trade controls, for great power negotiations, and for delays in rearmament and in European integration. The Sovietcalculated that such pressures and frictions would- reduce the West's capability for united action, as witness Malenkov's statement of the Soviet strategy in his speech
If today, in conditions of tension in international relations, the North Atlantic bloc is rent bystrife and contradictions, the lessening of this tension may lead to its disintegration.
This strategy formed the basis of the Soviet campaign of the pivotal slogan of which had been set forth by Malenkov in his statement that "there isingle controversial or unsettled question which could not be solved by peaceful means on ths basis of mutual agreement of the interested countries." (Speech of But Ho apparently was unwilling to end the war for Sovietinterests, and Moscow was impelled toistinction between the need to settle the Korean war and the need tothe Indochina war.
Shortly after Stalin's death, thehadistinction between the Korean war,be settled, and the Indochinese fight for "nationalwhich should continue. (Pravda article They insisted that the Soviet Union cannot beto "retard the Liberation movement" of colonialeditorial of But the Soviettried desperately to deny that their position oncut across their "peace policy and seized uponwith approval Churchill's remark that the Vietinto Laos was notnconsistent" with the attitude of the Sovietand suggested that tha chances for mutualbetween East and West would be improved ifleaders would recognize the real causes of themovements." (Pravda editorial ofaymade it clear to the Soviet leaders, who did not havewith him that they had had with Kim Il-sung,distinction between the peace movementbe
Moscow's European policy, particularlyime whenaid delivaries were averaging as muchonth and Viet Minh forces were moving closer to theobjectiveomplete military victory.
Ho was also aware of the demoralizing effect that French political disputes were having on French troops in Indochina and almost certainly viewed this development as improving Viet Minh chances in the field. The Frenchinitiative in Indochina was constantly being tempered by political considerations in Paris, andenior-French official in Soigon stated privately that the confused state of French politics and tha political issuesin handling the Indochina war were complicatingNavarre's task of-restoring morale and confidence in the French officer corps. The Viet Minh continued to insist inflexibly on their hard-line demand that the basic condition for negotiations was the complete withdrawal of French troops. By latehey had gained effective control over more than half of the Tonkin population and were believed to have the military capability of occupying the entire delta.
The signing of the Korean armistice in late3 provided the Soviet leaders with the opportunity to maneuver activelyegotiated settlement of the Indochina war. During the first two weeks after the armistice, Moscow's statements directed in large part to the French, established the line that the Korean truce demonstrated the "victory of negotiations over force" and that this hasnew stimulus" to the struggleeaceful solution to the "dirty war" in Indochina. Whereas prior to the truce,had attacked suggestions for East-West negotiations concerning Indochina, by3 it was quoting with approval demands in the French pressPanmunjom" in Indochina. By contrast, Viet Minh broadcasts in3 warned that the armistice must not affect the continuation of the war against the French, who will not seek an armisticehortnd that "we mustrotractedntensify our fighting so as to annihilate more enemy troops; this is the only way to compel the enemy to accept peace in Vietnam."
As tha Soviet leaders began to maneuver for asettlement, they acted to impress the Chinese leaders with the political benefits which would accrue to China in the event of high-level talks. They gave increasingto the big-power status of the Peking regime andthat "serious current problems" in Asia could not be resolved without Chinese Communist participation. (Soviet note to the Western powers
The Chinese, who had been working for several years to gain wider recognition as the only legitimate government of China, welcomed this Soviet line. Indicating that Chinese Communist position was closer to the Soviet position, their delegate to the World Peace Council called for "step by step negotiations" of East-West issues. (Speech of3 by Kuo Mo-jo) eptember, Peking specifically cited the Indochina issue as one which could be solved "only bythe principle of negotiatednd Chou En-lai in mid-September privately informed the Swedish ambassador in Pekingig-power conference on Korea could alsosignificant change in Chou's previousthat Indochina could not be discussed at such a.
By late summer, the Soviets had begun to contactFrench officials privately; in early August, Ambassador Vinogradov indicated to Foreign Minister Bidault Moscow's desire to begin "general discussions" and openly hinted that the Indochina issue could be included. By early September, the Soviet leaders had indicated to the French ambassador in Moscowoviet mission was to go to Viet Minh"to study conditions under which the Viet Minh can undertake peace negotiations." These Soviet initiatives were madeime when Bo was still resisting the concept of negotiations: thend American propagandawhich has the "semblance ofs advanced in the "vain hope of weakening the will of our people, who ask only toowever painful and long." (Ho Chi Minh speech Ho continued to insistprotractednasmuch as his forces had not been hurt in the field. On the contrary, in the falliet Minh military capabilities wereew high pointesult of the marked increase in Chinese aid, thelight casualties suffered during the previousseason, and the excellent state of Its intelligenceFrench troops dispositions and tactical plana.
The attitude of the Viet Minh leaders at the time is further confirmation of the generalization that the Asian Communists have been unwilling to begin the talking-phase of their dual tacticsime when they are militarily in an advantageous position and have not suffered highin the field.
French operations to counter expanded Viet Minhwarfare in the southern Tonkin Delta area had metlimited success in3 and at the cost of After an area was "cleared" by theViet Minh reappeared quickly and Navarre's men,of Stalin, his defensive-minded predecessor,down and dispersedtatic defense ofwaiting for the Viet Minh to come at themthe night. As the French waited for the Vietoffensive, reliable reports indicated that they hadbattalions in their mobile reserves in Tonkintheir military position was "grave." The Viet.aware of this French weaknessietwhich was believed bythe French high command;
ledge of the complete order^tTsa-ttle of the
Vietnamese national army, detailed reports of Frenchand information on the deployment and plans ofrench-Vietnamese forces.
As certain French cabinet officials and many members of the National Assembly increased their demands thatLaniel and Foreign Minister Bidault move to end the costly war by negotiations. Ho apparently was broughtincreasing pressure from Moscow and Peking to agree to enter tha talking-phase of the Viet Minh effort in Indochina. Quoting Izvestiya in its Vietnamese-language broadcast ofeptember, Moscow Radio declared that there exists no international misunderstanding which could not be settled peaceably.
Inenior French official had indicated to American State and Defense Department officers that the French were fighting in Indochina toosition of strength from which they could negotiate an "honorable" settlement and that the French government was convinced that France could not win the war in Indochina any more than the US could win the Korean war. In earlyhis theme was taken up againrench Foreign Ministry spokesman who Indicated to American officials that
tho only way Franco saw of ending tho war lay through asettlement with the Viet Minh.
Accordingeliable sourcectober, French cabinet ministers agreed to ask Foreign Minister Bidault to suggest to Washingtonive-power meeting,Communist China, should take up the matter on how to end the war as soon as possible. Onctober, Chou En-lai accepted the US proposalseeting to discuss the time and place for the Korean political conference, and Peking's propaganda continued to point to the need tointernational problems through peaceful means.
Ho was clearly reluctant to switch to the talking-phase, but because of Soviet and Chinese pressure as well as domestic pressure on tho French government to agree to bilaterals, he apparently believed thatedged offer to talk would improve his international prestige without hindering Viet Minh military initiatives. In their note ofovember to tho Western powers, the Soviet leaders had indicated their desire to prepare the wayive-power East-West foreign ministers' conference at which Communist China would be present, and they apparently insisted that Ho should at least appear to be less adamantly against talks with the French than ne had been. (Politburo member Truong Chinh had declared on1 that peacewould be "illusory" and that the French would have to be expelledecessary condition of peace, and Hostated3 that "We know that only tho resistance, however painful and long it may be, can give us victory and restore peace to us.")
When, in latao began to bring hisa step closer to that of Peking and Moscow, ho accepted the principle of negotiations but insisted on the practice of continuing military methods toettlementto the Viet Minh. He conceded through his spokesmen that "every international problem can be settledctober) and that "to stop the Vietnam war through negotiations is completely necessary and alsoovember). But in his reply to questions posed by thopaper, Expressen, Ho onovember in effectomplete French surrender. He asked tho French to begin bilateral negotiations byeaceHo was only prepared tostop fighting, to recognize
the Viet Minh regime, and, by implication, .to withdraw from Vietnam. Ho implied that, in return, he might not continue his war until the Viet Minhomplete military Actually, he continued to fight, and despite some displays of Prench aggressiveness, the military initiative was with the Viet Minh, whose forces in late3 included divisions in Tonkin so disposed as to permitagainst northwest Tonkin, against the northwest corner of the delta, or against Laos.
Ho's hedged proposal ofovemberhree-pronged exercise of considerable political skill. dvanced the Soviet and Chinese "peace offensive, furtherthe Laniel government from the National Assembly and the French press,evived and deepened Vietnamese distrust of the French, who were viewed as being at the brinkpacifist trap" and who might decidereater military effort in thet the same time. Ho had his own paramount interest to protect,omplete military victory, and in the first Viet Minh comment on his proposal, it was made clear to Moscow and Peking that peace could be attained only throughmilitary struggle and that the Viet Minh had no illusion that peace could be easily won. (Viet Minh news agency broadcast
In France, Premier Laniel, supported by Foreign Minister Bidault, rejected immediate negotiations with the Viet Minh in the illusory hope that future negotiations could beon more favorable terms after military successes in the field.
Ho's generals continued their highly successful strategy of dispersing French forces in static defense positions while moving into areas of their own choosing. When, ineneral Navarre made the recently captured Dien Bientrongpoint to prevent moves into northern Laos, some Viet Minh forces began to move artillery into thearea and, in late December, other Viet Minh forces swept southward into central Laos.
*Ho stated that "if the French government wishes to. have an armistice and settle the question through negotiations, we will be ready to meet the French proposal."
This invasion of Laos by the Viet Minh was treatedby Moscow and Peking, who muted reports of the new development in their commentaries and stressed the demand for an end to "the war. The Soviet leaders, who were searching desperately for "proof" that Ho really intended to negotiate, centered their commentaries on this proposal ofovember. "The recent statement by President Ho Chi Minh on historench proposal on an armistice, shouldroposal be made, constituted striking proof of the peaceful intentions of the Democratic Republic ofMoscow Radio commentary ofhile initiating little independent comment, Peking-to rebroadcast foreign statements alleging that only US pressure prevented Paris from seeking an and to thewar.
i
By contrast, the Viet Minh generally avoided the matteregotiated settlement and reminded its forces that real peace could be won "only by pushing forward the armed struggle and by dealing deadly blows at the enemy until he is compelled to demand negotiations." (Viet Minh radio broadcast of Byhen at least six battalions of Viet Minh were maintainingon French forces in central Laos and moreere blocking all avenues of exit from Dien Bien Phu and bringing in artillery for the siege, the divergence between Ho, on the one hand, and the Soviet and Chinese leaders, on the other, remained clear-cut and reflected his reluctance to enter the talking-phase when his forces were consolidating portions of northwest Tonkin. By insisting that Parisormal proposal for talks to the Vist Minh, Ho had placed the onus for avoiding negotiations on the French government, which continued to equivocate on the issue.
His forces held the initiative throughout Indochina as the result of widespread simultaneous offensive aotions by the time the four-power Berlin conference convened on The drive into northern Laos of an0 Viet Minh troops, continued encirclement of Dien Bien Phu, the capture of small French posts in southern andLaos, and extensive harassing operations in the Tonkin deltaurther overall dispersal of French regular forces. ebruary, the American army attache in Saigon
reported that staff thinking and procedures at Frenchwere of9 vintage" and that Navarre's strategy was identical to that of the defense-minded Salan. Navarre tied upattalions of regular troops at Dien Bien Phu, only to be by-passed by the Viet Minh, who had moved into portions of Laos but had not been engaged even where the Frenchhree-to-one advantage. French patrolling from strongpoints was "the exception rather than the rule,"apparent instructions from Paris to Navarre that he mustminimum-casualty holding action"iew to eventual big-power negotiations.
As domestic pressure to end the war increased on the French .government in the absence of victories in the field, two alternatives to bilateral negotiations with the Viet Minh were considered! TH an international "internationalization" of the war through
, Foreign Minister Bidault reported from the Berlin conference onanuary his intention to work for "joint discussion of the Indochina question by those principallynd suggested an approach toMinister Molotov to try to end the war. Bidaultthe hope that he had convinced Secretary Dulles earlier that the reasoning behind American acceptance of an armistice in Korea was even more valid for Indochina. Military prospects were dismal. rench officer in Sai-
military attacheeb-
ruary that the situation in the Tonkin delta wasrench military victory there was impossible, and that the population was turning increasingly to tbe Viet Minh. According to Ambassador Heath, who spoke withNavarre on the same day, the General's main concern was the effect any losses he might incur would have in Paris, and when the visiting French air force chief of staff said that France could take its officer losses for only one year more, Navarre replied that if that was the spirit in France, it had better pull out now. General Le Blanc, chief of staff of the French army, also stated in Saigon that France should use its officers and troops for NATO and appeared to catalogue the reasons why the war could never be won.
In short, well before the fall of Dien Bien Phu, French government officials and army staff officers regarded apeace as the Inevitable solution to the war.Bidault indicated at the forthcoming Geneva conference
The time and the conditions of the negotiation, or, negotiations, which are likely to be necessary to to end the Indochina war are left in large measure' to our initiative. The Americans have committed themselves to sit by our side at the time of themination of the problem in Geneva with the Chinese, but it will be our responsibility to say howesire to orient the continuation of the talks.
.* V
Despite Bidault'sebruary promise to Secretary Dulles Berlin to pushtrong military offensive tothe Viet Minh drive, it was clearly impossibledispersed French forces to concentrate in the springaximum*
, almost all French spokesmen hadopposed internationalization of the conflicts. Speaking for himself, Pierre de Chevigne, Frenchary of state for the army, told the American consul in Hanoi onebruary that he would not be averse to He said that American equipment alone could not alter the situation, implicitly rejected the build-up of the Vietnamese armyubstitute for American participation, and said that nothing was to be gained byolitical arrangement with the Viet Minh. His opinion, however, was atypical.- By contrast, French officials in Paris, largely for fear ofretext for Chinese intervention, continued to rebuff firmly any suggestion that American troops would be necessary.
The Communists hit hard at the possibility ofinvolvement in responding to speculation in thepress, reflecting their own calculation that theViet Minh initiatives in the field might impel "direct intervention" by Washington. One of Molotov's
chief aims at the Berlin meeting in agreeing to the Geneva conference was to block any possible increase in American military assistance to the French. The Chinese Communists, satisfied with the Berlin agreementirst step in gaining general acceptance by the international community, warned that increased American involvement in Indochina was making the issue of Geneva more complicated. Ho Chi Minh expressed his concern when,arch, ha accused the US of "another step" toward direct intervention in "allowing the American air force to participate" in the Indochina war.
Soviet plans to end the waregotiatedat Genevaove to convince Ho thatinternational prestige could be derivedn [ndochina,
mm y"
ffeHer^STmeeting that "all parties
concerned" should participate in the Geneva conference on Indochina, Just as both Koreas should take part inon Korea. Praydaarch attacked Foreign Minister Bidault's public statement that it was notto invite Ho's representative to Geneva and insisted that "it is impossible to solve the Indochina problemconsidering the lawful right of her people." As Soviet propaganda continued to press for Viet Minh participation at Geneva, Ho waslear insight into his prospective political gains: unprecedented international prestige, inten sification of French-Vietnamese frictions, demoralization of French forces in the field, and reduction of the risk of direct American involvement in the war. Nevertheless, he clearly preferred bilaterals with the French (in order to> prevent US pressure on Laniel to remain intransigent) and considered the attendanceultilateral conference would reduce his position of strength. He finally agreed, however, to multilaterals.
-
Moscow and Paris began to set forth their positions before the Geneva conference was convened. oviet embassy official in London told American officials that if the US and France object to an amalgamation of the Vietnam and Viet Minh administrations, "they can agreeivision alongh parallel." This first Soviet comment on Geneva suggested that Moscow was the most active advocate of partition which would deprive the French of the heavily populated, strategic Tonkin Delta and open the way
hillt around Dien Bien Phu, saying: "They shoot up and we shoote apparently calculated that loss of Dien Bien Phu would reduce Vietnamese army morale, already lowered by talk of an imminent truce; seriously discredit the "new""strategy of Navarre; give the Viet Minh aboost in prestige immediately prior to the Geneva conference, thus increasing the incentive for defection by Vietnamese nationalists; and increase French domesticfor direct negotiations with his representatives..
rniy units tothroughout Indochina to insure the^strongestthe Viet Minh at the conference. Command order that^^ntenseJicxioTr^*
l^^rrried out until the end of June, thedate for the end of the Geneva conference." This was the most explicit known reference to Ho's strategy of fighting while in the talking-phase.
As Laniel and Bidault parried domestic demandsiet Minh negotiations, they were alsoto increasing Soviet pressure before the Geneva con- -ference began. Soviet officials in Washington insisted to French officials onarch that direct talks between French and Viet Minh representatives should be held "in order toease-fire prior to Geneva." Thereturned to the matter of bilaterals even after the conference began, anday, Molotov told ForeignEden that the French and "Indochinese" should work out an armistice "themselves."
Moscow and Peking were anxious to disparage American foot-dragging and used Secretary Dulles' speech onarch, in which he suggested that the West should take "unitedtoommunist seizure of Indochina, to spur Paris into bilaterals. They were particularly fearful that the American preference for the French to fight would stiffen Bidault further at Geneva and make French concessions more difficult to extract from him there, flanked by Secretary Dulles. They were also concerned about American statements regarding eventual if not immediate involvement: Pravda onpril claimed that the real target of US threats was China, and the Peking People's Daily declared onpril that "faced with armed aggression, the Chinese people will certainly not refrain from doing something about it." On
pril, Chou En-lai made another noncommittal deterrent statement: the Chinese "most emphatically will not tolerate aggression against us by any country" and the US is lookingnew world war." At the same time, the Chinese stepped up their already large military and medical aid shipments to the Viat Minh for the Dien Bien Phu siege.
Tha series of assaults on Dien Bien Phu throughout April indicated that Ho intended to take the strongpoint evenery high coat. Despite murderous losses, which in late April and early May were variously estimated at about two.divisions0o's forcesto attack in intermittent phases. Their estimated strength was0 infantry plustroops, as compared with less0 French Union Troops. Thererench and Vietnamese regulars in'the Tonkin Delta, but the greater part of this number was still tied down in static defense, leaving thefew mobile units to counter the increased Viet Minh activity.
By the start of the Geneva conference on4 the overall military situation in Indochina and theserious situation at Dien Bien Phu had provided Ho, and his Soviet and Chinese partners,osition of considerable strength to use to offset American warnings about possible internationalization of the war. Sovietprivately made various suggestionsettlementas partition, nation-wide elections, and an immediate cease-fire. Calculating that the Prench would be moreto some sort of partition thanoalitionSoviet diplomats on the opening day of tha conference privately suggested to American officials that the idea of partition would meet China's requirement that its southern
border should be bufferedommunist regime.
.
The Soviet-Chinese effort to soften up the French on the issue of partition was made in the face of theof Ho, who like Bao Dai, claimed sovereignty over all Vietnam. As earlyoviet official hac suggested privately to American officials that partition
tarallel"to Moscow.
>listed corrections for the book
iugust RevofuTlon, printed in Hanoi The corrected
version was to include the statement "there cannot be any separation at the 1^
commented"
but the Viet Minh was toits "previoushat is, nonpartition.
At the Geneva conference, the Viet Minh delegate, Pham Vanried to use military developments in Indochinaackdrop in demanding major French concessions. Dien Bian Phu fellay, with Viet Minh losses estimated atf which about one-half were killed and French Onion losses of0 men. Onay, Pham Van Dong set for maximum conditions in the form of an eight-point resolution, the main points of which were political which were linked with military provisionsease-fire: French recognition of the independence of the three Indochinese Communist-sponsored states, withdrawal of "foreignlections in each state,otal cease-fire involving occupation by each side of unspecified areas, no reinforcements,ixed control commission. Partition was not mentioned. By tying the French-desired cease-fire to political concessions, the Viet Minh putin the position of using the military weapon toa French political retreat.
onference deadlock was threatened by French determination to deal with military matters first. toease-firel and Viet Minh insistence thatand military questions be dealt with together, Chou En-lai and Molotov, playing major negotiating roles, moved adroitly to avoid any impasse that could be used by the US as an excuse for intervention in the fighting. In his major speech ofay, Molotov had explicitly rejected the French terms for an armistice because Bidault's formula did not deal with political questions. However, at the secret session onh, he conceded that military questions could be discussed first. Chou En-lai also retreated;rivate conversation with Eden onay, he stated that theand political aspects of any Indochina settlement must be dealt with separately, with priorityease-fire. These concessions strongly suggested that neither Moscow nor Peking desired protracted talks; they undercut Viet Minh intransigence and policy to prolong the talks.
Ho calculated that negotiations could continue together with the fighting for some time without leading to American
involvement. iet Minh commentary of mid-May seemed to bo directed at reminding the Chinese and Soviets that there was no pressing need to end the war:
We still remember the Korean lesson which taught us that one could negotiate and fight at the same timetwo years.
Ho was clearly determined to protract the talking-phase to gain as much territory of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as the French were willing to concede. As the Viet Minh augmented its forces in the Tonkin Delta with units from the Dien Bien Phu operations, helping to compress French-controlled areas there, Ho's delegate at Geneva apparently was instructed to insist again on political concessions in exchangeease-fire. He hardened the Communist position, which Molotov and Chou En-lai had boonncreasingly more flexible.
Pham Van Dong onay insisted on French political concessions before agreeing to end the fighting. He linked any cease-fire prospect with arrangements for "Khmer Is-serak and Pa thethe Communist-contrived regimes in Cambodia and Laos, and in effect denied that military and political questions could be separated. Dong alsoard line on the Soviet-Chinese* concept of partition,the "readjusting of areas under control of eachaking into account the actual areas controlled, including population, and strategic interests." Inasmuch as Chinese Communist maps showed the Viet Minh as holding most of Vietnam, about half of Laos, and parts of Cambodia, the Viet Minh proposalemand for considerablethan its units held on the ground.
Onay, however> an agreement was reached to have representatives of both commands meet at Geneva to study the disposition of forces priorease-fire. Molotov and Chou apparently ware the prime movers on the Communist side in making this concession. Moscow and Peking, whose policy was centered on splitting the Americans from the French andystem of alliances from forming in Asia, were apprehensive regarding the demands of most French military leaders and some Laniel cabinet members that the US enter the war. Accordingly, Molotov and Chou worked hard to attain some kind of agreement at Geneva and toan abortive conference from leading toof the war. Militarily, Ho was keeping up the pressure:
a captured Viet Minh document of late4 directed Viet Minh commanders in the Tonkin Delta area to continue their harassing and guerrilla activities for an unspecified period "pending commitment of the battle corps."
Opposition of the French to the idea of partitionto weaken as they pressedease-fire with controls, andune, tbe French minister for the Associated States told Ambassador Heath in Geneva that he favored partitionolution at abouthat about the line suggested by the Soviets earlier.
The negotiationsew turn as the Lanieltried to survive the National Assembly debate onwhich beganune. On the preceding day, theindicated that they would use the weakenedposition to gain their maximum demands;ard line, similar to that of Pham Van Dong as set forth onay. Molotov demanded independence _for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, free elections in these.states, and withdrawal of all foreign troops. He seemed to believe that the Laniel government would either move toward the maximum Communist position or be replacedovernment pledged to negotiate an immediate end to the war, andoviet Pravda writer told an American journalist in Geneva that no progress on Indochina was possible until after the French government crisis was resolved. Onrench official in Saigon told the American charge there that all members of the endangered Laniel cabinetthe Premier, Bidault, and Schumann had "written off the war" and were anxious to end it. Onune, the Laniel government fell, losing the vote of confidence in theAssembly after the debate on the war; onune, Pierre Mendes-France took over as the new Premier, and he promised to close out. the fighting byuly.
In the military conversations between the French and the Viet Minh in Geneva, the latter asked for direct control of about three-fourths of Vietnam, half of Laos, and much of Cambodia. In tha field. General Ely stated privately onune that the military situation in the Tonkin Delta was precarious and that French and Vietnamese troops were "very, very tired." The Viet Minhapabilityull-scale attack on the delta.
XII-44
The ever-present prospect of American involvement again impelled Molotov and Chou to keep the conference alive with small concessions. Onune, Molotov tried to break the deadlock over the composition of the international truce supervisory commission, and on the same day, Chouettlement proposal which implied withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Laos and Cambodia. Under pressure, Pham Van Dong also suggested postponementolitical settlement for those two states. Thus by the time the Genevaterminated its Korea phase and temporarily adjourned, the Soviets and Chinese seemed to have moved back in effectositionartition of Vietnam and aLaos and Cambodia. When Pierre Mendes-France took over as the new Premier pledged to seek an end to theuly, the road was openedinal settlement.
onversation at Bern onune, Chou told Mendes-France that an armistice should be reached in Vietnam as soon as possible, andinal political settlement should be reached thereafter. This broke the linkby the Viet Minhilitary truce andsolution. Regarding Laos and Cambodia, Chou said that all foreign forces, including the Viet Minh, should beand that there must be no American bases in either state. When the new French Premier complained that thestaff talks between the French and Viet Minh at Geneva had been stalled for several days because of Viet MinhChou agreed to intervene to speed the talks. During the conference recess, Chou, in discussions with Nehru in late June In New Delhi, apparently set forth arti tion plan.
i
Chou then moved to apply pressure on Ho to drop his demands for retaining troops in Laos and Cambodia andartition line as far south ash parallel. He met with Ho at Manning on the China-Vietnam border in early July, on his return from India and Burma, to discuss with him the termsinal settlement. lear sign that Chou had insisted that Ho give some ground in theViet Minh position appeared in the remark made by the Chinese deputy foreign minister to the French delegateulyt Chou hadvery good meeting" with Ho, theof which "would be helpful to the French." When the Viet Minh tried again at the reconvened conference to gain permission to retain their troops in Laos and Cambodia and to settle onh parallel, Mendes-France complained to
Chou that this was unacceptable and out of accord with Chou's position. Chou replied that both sides must makewith the Viet Minh making the larger. Onuly, following Chou's statement to the French premier, Pham Van Dong changed his position and told Mendes-France that he was prepared to compromise onh parallel. The French stilline betweenhh parallels, and rejected Viet Minh demands for control of some part of Laos and elections in all three Associated States.
The final settlement onuly indicated that thehad retreated on three points. They accepted theof Vietnam (they had insisted on "unity" of Vietnam)the line ath parallel (they had wanted theagreed to withdraw from areas south of that line in
Vietnam and from all of Laos and Cambodiaj and they6 as the date for nationaltwo-yearcontrasting with their demand forix-month delay.
Pham Van Dong had come to Geneva with the apparentthat the Viet Minn's increasingly strongin tha field would enable him to extractconcessions from the French to open the way forforces to further penetrate Laos and Cambodia andeverything aboveh parallel inSoviet and Chinese pressures, stemming from largerand fear of American intervention,hope for maximum French concessions. Although Hocertain advantages in ending the militaryhis forces could take territory by politicaltherefore, his effort would be less costly in termsand safer in terms of non-involvement by thehad not expected to have to make so many political These concessions were later viewed by himlieutenantsajor mistake. His forces had notin tha field, as the Chinese armies had beenin the spring1 when Mao moved to theof the Korean war. He probably was concernedprospect of US intervention, but Moscow andclearly more concerned about the consequences toof internationalization of the war. He was in ato negotiate from strength and to do soong
6
years" aa his radio declared in mid-Hayhe found himself caughtino-Soviet political web and was persuaded not to use his growing military capability to force major concessions.
French military and intelligence officials agreed that Viet Minh forces in the delta following the fall of Dien Bien Phu were capable ofamaging full-scale offensive, but it never took place. In mid-July, onejournalist stated that he assumed Chou had pressed Ho to keep the fightingow boil when the Genevawas in its last phase. The Chinese indicated their national interest in settling the fighting-phase when, onuly, one of their journalists at Geneva declared "He have won the first campaign for theof all Southeasthe implication being that only Thailandrobable area for the establishment of an American base. Chou in late July, after the Genevawere concluded, stated on two occasions that Asian states must work out their "own" security arrangements, and Pravda onuly emphasized that the area will not be permitted to join any "aggressive groupings."
By contrast, the North Vietnamese leaders were far less categorical in priasing the Geneva conference Pham Van Dong declared at the closing session on
July that the problem of Vietnamese unification remained: "We shall achieve this unity, and we shall achieve it just as we have won the war." This contradicted the Pravda statement ofuly that Vietnamese independence had been "won." On
July, Ho renewed his exhortationslong and arduous struggle" and declared that the division of Vietnam wasemporary and transitional arrangement: "Central, South and North Vietnam are all our land, and our countrywill be unified, the compatriots throughout our country will certainly be liberated." The Viet Minh ambassador in Peking, Hoang Van Hoan acknowledged to Indian correspondents onuly that despite the strong military position of the Viet Minh, it had to compromise on several vital points, notably the timing of elections (put off for twohe question of French troop withdrawal, and the location
of the temporary demarcation line ath parallel, in order to secure peace in Vietnam. The leaders of theistance Government Khmer and Pathetepeated Ho's view that the agreements arefirst step" and calledong, hard struggle.
Neither Moscow nor Peking revived propaganda support for these resistance phantom-governments. Moscow made little effort to describe the agreement on Vietnam as "temporary" or to stress that portion of the conference declarationany intent to permanently partition Vietnam; that is, the Soviet leaders were satisfied with partition. Peking stressed its own new international prestige and the boost to the cause of "collective peace in Asia" provided by the agreements, whichanifestation of Chou's five principles as declared jointly withu, and Ho.
To sum up, the Soviet and Chinese leaders induced Ho to enter the talking-phase of the Indochina war becausei
Itajor problem which stimulated Western defense efforts and threatened toockery of the "peace offensive" designed to impede these efforts. Soviet policy in Europe, devised to produce schisms and paralysis in France and to split Britain from the US, required that an end be brought to this war, just as the Korean war had been removedefense-stimulating conflict.
Peking as well as Moscow feared that any further military advances in Indochina by the Viet Minh might have led to the formationtrong anti-Communist alliancesome of the previously uncommitted Asian states. Chou En-lai informed Indian, Pakistani, Indonesian, and Burmese leaders in his talks with them that their security could be guaranteed by his "five principles." At the
same time, Peking insisted that the Geneva agreements barred all three Indochina states from any military
the example of Korea before them, the Chineseleaders could not"ignore the possibility that aoffensive in Indochina would greatly increase the
risk of American interventionlobal war. Theya far lower level of risk, namely, politicalcarried out by the Viet Minh. They "paid off" Ho by continuing (in violation of the Geneva agreements) tomilitary equipment to make hisodernizedforce.
The developments34 have influenced the attitude of Ho and his lieutenants toward the current war. The clear awareness that they had been impelled, primarily
XII-48
fteStfiBBBei
by Moscow and Peking, to stopalf-way station on the road to total military victory in Vietnam, apparently has made them very reluctant to stop half way again.
D. Implications for Vietnam Today
. Jt is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this historical lesson for Ho. It sustains his hostility toward any suggestion that he again stopalf-wayon the road to control of all Vietnam. An official of the DRV embassy in Havanaeftist journalistay6 that
We thought we had achieved something with the French by compromisingnd it turned out to be shaky. Only through full and unconditionalcan we achievee are determined to continue to fight until we achieve total victory, that is, military and political, and the Americans leave and accept our four points. (emphasis supplied)
The Chinese leaders, too, apparently believe that they hadistake ln pressuring Ho to stop Chou En-laiisiting youth delegationanuary6 that
China will continue her absolute support of Vietnam. To tell theersonally signed the Geneva agreementegret that my having done so istrouble for our comrades in Vietnam. m not going to be deceived by the American peace campaign this time.
Actually, it was the Soviet-Chinese (not thepeace offensive that required an end to the war, andwas Chou's partner in persuading Ho to make concessions to the French.
Ho is nowtronger position to reject any Soviet suggestions that he should close out the fighting, andinfluence on him is as strong or as weak as Moscow's positive support for the war. That is, when Moscow avoided involvementhen Khrushchev decided to stand clear
of providing important political and military aid tooviet influence waa at an all-time low. On the other hand, when Moscowegree of commitmenthen the post-Khrushchev leadership decided to supply Hanoi withaid.and political support against theovietincreased. However, it will never be as great as it had been
The Chinese leaders have helped to make this In contrasthey are now the opponents, not the partners, of the Soviets. Ho's militancy is bolstered by Mao's support, which itself stems from special personal requirements. That is, Mao is personally far morethanwitness the current irrationalities of the Mao curt inwith increasing neuroticism insists that his unique doctrine of "people's war' should legitimatize his claim to be the successor of Lenin and Stalin as theof the international Communist movement." Unlike Ho, Whose sights are centered on his own national war, Maoarger anti-Soviet doctrinal point to make: small wars are effective in all under-developed areas and must be the main strategy against the US.
Maoonsiderable personal stake in proving tothe Soviets, the East Europeans, the neutrals, and even men in his own party and militaryhis principle of protracted small war will work against tha superior American military capability anywhere. Vietnam is the main proving ground for this thesis. Chou En-lal told Japanese Diet membershat if the Vietnamese Communists continue their military operations
will make the Americans admit their defeat
and drive themhe most importantis to prove this by actual deed. Unless we defeat tho enemy, we will not be believed, supplied)
Any sign, therefore, from Hanoi that Ho is willing oven to consider the matter ofease-fire or aof US air strikes against the Northotal withdrawal of American troops occurs is criticized by Peking. For example,ouble-edged statement, intended for neutrals and for the North Vietnamese, Chou En-laiarned that: "As long as the US does notits troops, it can carry on endless talks with you so
XII-50
I
that it may hang on there indefinitely." (emphasis supplied) That thislear warning to Hanoi is suggested by the fact that Chou made the statement to the DRV ambassador at the North Vietnamese embassy in Peking.
Despite the constant concern of the Chinese leaders that Ho might agree to negotiations before US troops are withdrawn from the South, Ho continues toigh priority to prolonging his reactivated war. He and his lieutenants have absorbed Mao's own view on protracted civil' war. When, inao said that "to wage awar for ten years, as we have done, might bein othere was rejecting modern Western and Soviet military doctrine onar. He made his point emphatic inoting that the Spanish civil war was "fought for three years, but we have fought for twenty years." Ho declared on6 that
The war may still0 years, or longer. ; Hanoi, Haiphong, and other cities and enterprises may be destroyed, but the Vietnamese people will not be intimidated.
A similar statement of North Vietnamese determination toin the event of air strikes against cities in the North was madeRV embassy official in Havana "The imperialists may well do soomb Hanoi andut we are ready to accept thisas we have accepted the others and it will not change our position or determination one iota."
Ho apparently believes that he can continue the war primarily because, despite losses in the North and South, he is still able to put forces into the South and to supply them for operations. On the other hand, the Maoist doctrine he has absorbedtrong ingredient of opportunism. That is, there is no fixed principle that determines when and in what situation negotiationsease-fire should be accepted. The deciding factorery practicalinability to keep fighting. In the event that US air strikes were to continue to increase his problems, his willingness toessation of the strikes would not be blocked by any doctrinal consideration. The Chinese leadersare aware of the ever-present prospect that Ho might view negotiationseans toreathing-spell from US pressure and are attacking not only the matter of talksotal American withdrawal but also the matter of talks touspension of air strikes against the North.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: