(ESTIMATED PUB DATE) ANNEX B; PARA-MILITARY; PARTS TWO & FOUR

Created: 1/1/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

AKMSC fi PAPA-KH.UA RY

PtXT TWO by Assistant FK Officer,

Dapartcrc fron LDICDLX uisearly ia June wttn severalr-L'i'. to ba aceoopllshed uponTray werei

the shock troopstate of jirepcredness whichtso initiation of the eaapal^r, at an early data and attiara vooldpcrire*store tprisinj mien wight

be cauael by ary ooeXer of act line within thecountry.

five-san "Horcet" taana for the harassnent ofIn localities far renwved from the obvious area of activity.

theesident radio operators to theirpoints.

Kova all shock troopto aalectad staging areas naar

the border.

- -hy all possible salhods, lace, aea and air, anas to the

-organisations,

f. Bring sabotage plana to tha final e'ageo, Beedy tha sab Naders for launchine to their tiaaa.

.;. rrvoare fc-

lauKhinz to hie laxr-tj.

h. Check tha final military plans ard nodify then to suit the latast analysis of the situ.-tion.

Open arrival, and after meeting

aa vail aa -it* all the leader*(MAjrai org-rueerfoo. itthat nuch of the stove wawld bo aery difficult tc aeeoeplishshorthich remained. Zi was apparaitASTILLO Arias hadknowledge of tha nunarlcal strength of his own oremlaaticn. tleae he elairado yx>It

-as ca tha be ;is of Lhasa florae that tha drclsior. to fore thewaa Mi, Duriag the etterpte to for. these groeps CASTOtca number of excuses aa to Wiy this could not done. It wasthat ho ondoubledlv did not have the van that he claimed toa llet of allde-ttTidad fcv nane- He wbitittad

a list of sen far below the neater that we htd hoped was present. The listanes. This not only did act permit "J* forautloa of tao rire-aaa taaxi, bat it also did not famish the retired or u* shoe* troop organisation. Tais inforeatior. caseeektheey.

Open Urn receipt of this InfonoaUoa, sj- rirst Inclination was to relay tbe ehocklnr. facts to LUKXW via, anlea to postpone the Initiation of tho carpal pi. Altar auch carefal eocslderaUon, however, it was ay oac'.sion that doe to the possibility of gathering considerable

SECRET

rimec*-Odireimned. elt that any relaj lug of suet) inform tioee tea effect of detracting froe end dampening Vie enthoslasri of theCanlsatlcn as well aa bavins ihe effect of possiblyampaign which night bog down bopolaoslj if not permitted to becln on schedule.

Mich of the preparation for the campaign waa rade very difficultturn of event* within tbe target country. The crack-down afterleaflet drop aide ares ingrssi almost tjpossiole. Em ofbroke down completely and wo hrdly on such rathed aa

and his plana delivering eras te Mo personal flnca. Weeble lo send ladlvldealo ecreoo the line vita arse la suitcases and It la net known at thla Um how neb of thai was affective. 'V tried every method imaginable and am aro confident -Jutof thea worked. Even the launehlne ef the radio operators was extre=?ly difficult and haiardoui for lher_ re oureusoor of thea utre plckod up and of those -ho did get to their respective areas,arta on tha air.

L Ohndine Job ef preparing the sabotage leadora andoaear io got in and begin thslr work. Basra rcaalnaC (he problectheulpeeit in for thea lo work -llh. Sew* was sentsoae uas takaa In by hard.Jj Wnile

It might be added that be had dam toncer* la orgaMiing C'.ITILIOtaff into Ita proper sections. All hands had the utaeii .eieect Tor Cvi ,1oaaand presencesal. hla Invaluable.

In lookln. over the final aMitary plans, it struck r. that the aovc-ront of ourf Jtrocps by way of Oualanot only five the encorf adequate warning of the sevesent but the conc:ntratlon of CoeaunUt oer-aonnel at Oualan would hinder our advance loagrei tnat the C neny forcea tightccc.isfel tosnler-atUck. incers soverr* on C ould be aore Ukely to scceed. Awas worked oet te bring an additional force froa Copan Suinaa Jew atsreaadi Cfasstaa and Jeeoten for an attack upon CMflui-aila andtdf he WasiOfi of this force wasto aid In the capture sfC vent thai Itaaa experienced difficulty, and 2) frail to go earl* toaoldly tVoogh thea to tho topltal/l> tho Utter case tlwJ rcei would proUcl the rear ofolunn. CASrilAQ Arnas1 staff teA to this plan with alaorii, and it vaa de-ldec that ttl CP would be vlth this grovp.

Hjcb Of ry tlaa vaa tahaa up with later, ow. ofane.a both ail-Ury and eirJiaa. Upon the arrivalaaa,n.-ervie-i ni,i

that he be-plsMd Int Tforr,,

I felt that Thud bsan la eomww. of th. glrlaonHff t*

tr-larWdof thisinportunt fo-je.

AnotherasT

-ith hi. forced boarlng andor son* HZZ?it was eo-mnd of the forcecress -ro* Bmwm Ocowpeqwe.

r

f* otUw-tam lews Tor harassment, ith.s. hadsost anxious

to do sco-thlni ether tfea.oine,U. to porfor- bortlng Is.ions with his Cessna ICO. asScal

SEW;]"

tbe accuracy of socb boBblng, but be convincedthat it mbbbono* of TW blocks surrounding, concussion grenades,

irneJ so tbat they vould detonate upon lnoact.off on his

Initial flight of this trpe, heeded H* bad vithW

forboobarilnr." lie fief in almost on the ground towardtanks at San Jose. Aa be approached the tanks, he palled Intosad the boabardier threw tha tori. Hie first attempt waahit and the tank burst Into flame. He then flew to Retaluehuetha sue thin? to the SHELL and ESSd tanks there. ran* out{ 3tanksadson goo, successfullyand then eet them afire with grenade*.another of

theae adssieas to C 3Hls audacity was illustrated by his calling the field tower atf Jsaylng that be was an air force plane wishing to land. The tower save bin the proper instructions and he cane In to his boshing

salon on the TEXACO tank. Ke received each AA fire as he triadhe runway of the field. In eluding tho fire he dived Intoof trees andranch of one of then in his controlhad to land at tbe first availableremove it.

C - Jvee very inxdoua to perfora very hotardous Rlaslonssod was invaluable .to our

oar safe house facilitiesa house whore tha

staff of CaSTILLO Armas could functionnit. There wo hadconference roens and briofincet there every

day early in the Horning and worked there all day wltb the staff. in another safe house, too, which servedtorehouse for He worked with his sabotage leaders there. The latterlocated high on the Mountainside outside of the city. Upon thethe iradio personnel, we activated another safe house aboutThis house was ideal for tie

radio station as it waa well Into the suburbs and coatings and goings were not noticed. After this house was opened,nt nuch of ourthere.

Upon the arrivalthe final touches ware put

on the plans end very shortly after his arrival ths campaign wasshould be noted here that the entire organisation of CASTILLOc-crepletad confidence inbis lssdershlp. So far as I

could tell, none of his decisions were ever ousBtlcsined and forneither were any of sane,cane. CASTILLO Arums nadoplea for strong air attacksbe had made provioualy

to ma. He was not given any assurance whatsoever that airldconing other than for air delivery of supplies, which we felta sure thing. AH of the personnel who cane out of the country to3 were of the fira opinion that, should powerful air blows be

delivered, en the city in the early phases, the campaign would not be a The concensus of opinion was that if several bombs were droppedthe OOardia de Honor, on La Aurora Air Field, en the Base rfilitarone other one onhe Go Vermont would Colonel rother f ^Insisted

that the Oovernnsat almost fell with the first leaflet drop.

Just before the arrival 3orEardier returned3

He had been captured by several soldiers who recognized hln

ormer association in ths aray. He was tortured but escaped to return with valuable infcreation. People wore coming and going along the border at this tims without interference, particularly in thtf land lareae.

Hap SECKt i

Cvxi of our big problems waa tbe movent .it el en uk) supplies

ooporatleorepresentative

oris lo the uUnl lhat be agreed torockload of timecountryHowever, this did not work out. Ua

did aend several loads of arns in epeetally constructed private automobiles with false compartmotB. had no cooperation froa the President there.

hoveseot of shock troops to the stag lag anas began la aaall menders. Receiving parties wan sect ahead and when we received word that the areasready, movement waa initiated. HoTeaent icu very slow aad In very small aumbere. Finally, when time became abortay approached, more speed was necessary aad troops vera moved la .Wger and less clandestine troops. This movementlood of nevspaiwraen to descend C , Baking operationsora difficult. Final movonmt of the shock troops brought Ihe ops ration fully Into the open as It beeane necessary to move the troops by oomnerclal,ch.-Ttored airplanes. This sua necessary in order tothe troops at the Staging areas at the proper tine for the attack.

Difficulty was encountered In tha plana for tha seaborne JSar which wo badoat at La Ceiba oa tha northHonduras. The boat was loaded with equlpaeat which was deliveredCeiba through the cooperation ofwho, incidentally,

waa of tremendous help In many ways.transported Iili1|inn1

for ua to oany points end into fields which were

not well-suited to his planes. roup was dlcpctched to laan the bosi bat dlscovorad It to be missing. Presumably the boat htdan to Un islands for cover purposes, finnlly the teen caught up with the boat and boarded It for the operation. Jt Is not entirely clear at this date what developed froa this operation. Itnown that -Ja beat wis picked op, bat more than thai le not known.

ComrnBicatlona were rood with the exception that at Bight allwas lost betveenC d SnTOCCC, thereby causing aof massages in the comingonsequent begging down of There was considerable USa lag bet-oen the sending oftha field and their reaction atf. or this reason, itto novabackin order to give more

adequate service to the field. With respect to answering son* nasaagas which ccma in fron the field, it waa frequently impossible le gain contact with Urt field stations for some hoars. More urgent messages would follow and some cf the original messages want unantuercd.

With regard to security, it l! obviousnany of themeasurei which would normally be eroUyedrulywere disregarded ia this instance. orderftssf inrecc of the clandestiniiy had to be abaodrsrd. Vc had toand from safe housos, thereby un-

doubtedly identifying ourselves with ihe organisation of CASTILLOt cai be said, though, that this aovenent was kept to an absolute rilrjaun and that site of it waa absolutely necessary to cccomplish the taak. The safe house where the FCP was located wsa by far the best ond kepsat clandestine.

the movementtho TCP functionedmore efficiently

and was able to offer the desired support to Ua field. The fact that the C iff worked right with the Air Ope facilitated this Support, In addition to keeping everyone informed as the tha fieldrnlch situation had not exlated prior taWhis time.

f

ccatoyrs

Other than tha rtasron small lassoes learned during th* campaign, there are. In my opinion, two main lessons to be learned fron tha overall First, at the very ootaet of the planning for an operation of thlaeclaion should be made as to the Importance of Its success

Boon Machine thla declaion, the amount of power to be utilised andv

method of employment of this power ahcold' also be decided. This power

(and in this ease it wae air bombardment) should not be withheld. It should

be utilised at the very beginnine of tha oparstlon. It Is sty considered

opinion that if the air power which was used in the final phases of the

operation had been used on the first day In tho samp manner, tha campaign

would not havo laatod u8 hours. ew lives vould have boen

lost in the hosting, but many more Uvea could have been saved by ehortcninfi

the cempeien. This opinion la based upon both tha reporta of persons who

caseny previous knowledge of the latin people.

elieve that that 3program could have beenwith that ^program. Byefer to the Tho react ice to tbes? drops was terrific. Tba results,definitely detrimental to thef ffort, aod the reaction ofof CASTILLO Aramswas one of deject Von. It was the

opinion of all of us, lnclcdingit aeeld have bean well it

tha field had bees consulted before the decision to sake the drop had Tha leaflet droparackdown within Ouatenals whichcoma eventually whan the moveaent of oor troop* to the borderbut It caneime when we wore still able to make deliveryradio operator! and sabotage personnel Into the country. Afterit waa virtually impossible to accomplish this.

pleaded with ua to permit BO more leaflet drops as every one reducedof his air operations. Tho overall effect of

activity cannot be underestimated, but it le roconaanded that ln the future they be coordinatod with that ctivity to that they can be mutually

With regard to ccrounlestiono, as ia operations inave been Involved in the military eervieu, such of tho planning is based upon split second contact betwaes unite and cosaeand by radio. ave never seer, this contact work out completely as planned, even with highly trained operators. Ia thie case, with indigenous operators aad difficult conditions, wmile the results were sjmiag, they did net work oat as planned. Only In the finalid the radio camao begin to work properly.

Finally, while an operation of this type la moat difficult to keep clandestine, it would have been much mora easily accomplished if th* enaa? bad not beef, fully alerted some weeksay. had net martial law been procleimed and tbe curfews, police patrols,ot been in affect, our movomant and sabotage plana would have bem such more likely to succeed. It la not known at this tine how mich of our sabotage was completed, bat so far not much of It has been reported.

- li -

^SECRET

AWOARA-MI LIT ART

y FK Operations Officer,

The followingnaanary of Ihe course of events fron an, tc the end

of activities against Guatemala.

The synopsis will attesspt to ebed light on ell phases, that Is: Training, organliation, eecurlly, oparstional natters and the effect which the overall training bad oa tha final prase aad rice ess of the proiort. This report is divided lata three phases: roa

departure to Ua White Paper; raining period;

etting up of the paru-odlitary organltatioe of CaSTHIO Araaa

3re considered tha most important

asare concarned. They deal mostly with

training and orgs relational setup,

PHASE I

arrivalI sent-organisation for para-

ndlltury activities had bean set up. otal of fifteen oven vera on hand as the advanced training element. The equipment had not arrived and selection of the training site had not boen settled.

Originally, tralninc was to begin by 1L, January but up to that date no facilities bad bean aide available.

After considerable negotiations witht uthor Italianto coanence movement of personnel and eoulpnent to

First difficulties encountereds of equipmentwhile taking into eor.ilderation tha most strict After an unsixxesafol atteapt to have C ^TurrdsJ-.for transfer and movement, negotiationsrivatemade touitable launch. Cover story was that aengineers were to work onmentssfhis

story was maintained throughout entire project.

On takingthe onlye available

arn and en inadequate Water well, omplete training site had to be constructed. Two living cuarisrs, cw-ss hall, sanitary units and showers were built along with development oi suitable areas for training activities. During this periodbservations, complete interviewsre nade of the trainees. Food and building saUrlels nere shispedaily basis and continued until approximatelyanuary.

On or aboutv food ahlpaentt wereunknown tot t thatleash flailyair droooed Stating all waa fine andnwas* tooat to enable th*

project to discoati-rat aaa^#Mka reatad launch, mo attempts

-

nade Vo pick up cur distress messages telling lhat absolutelywas available and that aonoua condition*

re-arranged method for pick-ups of nessagcs had been aade. ig had been constructed solely for this purpose.)

During thla critical periodC ad oo* seriousan appendicitisernia patient and Wo V? cases, itena had been included in the entire Shipment ofeffort was aade to Justify the conditions to thewas certainly one of the darkest periods as far as theconcerned and it is nentioned here only because!,. allowed to forget it by the trainees who had experienceda week of suchnall boat arrived vithof foodstuffs sod building

inquire about theed logistics.

On arrival. all newapapen were carryini the accents lhat CHACO DELGADO had passed on to the Cuatenalan goverrment.

As[ )was in tha United mediately began liaison with! J,ew location. ArrengeKor.ts were made and all equipment and personnel were evacuated that sane night without incident or problew.

Again, the new location was without adequate faciilliea end work was begu iaesedistely to consuitable billets, trslnlng sites, etc.

During the brief stayBone training had begun,

primarily tonail cadre for future use as Instructors.

A half-day training and work schedule had to be implenented. Labor units worked in the mornings and group instruction took place during the afternoon*. Individual instructions wore held alter supper.

During thla'early training period only one aajor problem was It had been reported that th* advance elenent wouldof CASTILLO Areas' top leaders who were to beexperienced, and to hear in siind that they were to be the Thla was truly an underestimate. In fact, of thetrainees arrivingfour had the possi-

bilities, or were considered capable, of becoxdng organisersleaders. This later slewed down noma! training operations because separate groups had tc be maintained.

Schedules were revised and instructions changed te neet the requirements for the conditions originally set up. Three .roups were established which consisted of officers, sab trainees and troops. Three complete running schedules, independent of each other, were drawn up. During the second phase of the training, sab trainees and troops were made interchangeable.

ecrrarrS:

Security prior toeen extremelythe part of th* personnel workingThis was prinarily

because no control was maintained over tne personnel. No serious precautions or attempts at compartmentation had been undertaken.

CeaepartAentatlon waa unheard cfhe principal factions and contacts In moat cases wore nade overtly. utout aystaa was never employed.

Ho adequate facilities were oolntalned for conplete security regarding lDccolng or outgoing ooitospendence. Safes were not made available and file folders were available for Inspection by anyone. All personal' folders ware madehanccableheTheprinciple waactlead. AH conversations, even those regarding the highest operaUonal matters, were discussedwith absolutely no regard for security.

It la felt that because of the above lax security DELGADO waa able to secure andarge number of decuacnts.

PEASE II

Or. receiving word to reactivate trainingtil

efforts wore then concentrated oo tbe training procran.

Bv the early part ofotal ofrainees were

The following schedule was adopted and carried out with full foreai

for officers were held0 toand00 hours.

for Sab personnel were identical.

C. Classes for the troops were the sane except for guard and CP duties.

During Use first three weeks, theory and blackboard problems and instructions were in orcer. as lea orgaalied for officers concentrated primarily on the following courses i

leadership.

and Staff problems.

reading and terrain evaluation.

infantry tactics.

of troops In guerrilla warfare.

tactics.

use of fire power.

problems and aerial resup^ly.

aid.

on, and control of, cities.

k. Security

1. ltomencleture, cere end cleaning of ell weapons, a. Tradecr*rt problems.

Subject* on -Web strewplaced were: Deployment of troops, effective use of fire power, aerial rcsupply, map reading, troop Icaderahip and guerrilla UcUcs. Security was stressed in trade-craft instruction, also included were lectures oo cutout systems, contacts,I, etc. After too theory andInstruction. live problems were conducted.

Officers wore then assigned definite Jobs and placed as groupontinual rotation to various duties was mandatory for each officer to femjllarlse hln with other duties io adclUoa to his

Senltation, Hew, Adjutant, First Aid (Medicalnstructor, Liaison, Staff Control,ave eachealth of experience.

During the sane period Sab training was also conducted in Ml force. Selected Sabotaled approximately JO, vithc-.tua. prospect of using theor operation*. Thatmmmenccd with prcliidnary theory instruction. During the course of training it waa discovered that most of the trainees were Halted in nathenatical calculationsianllfloallen method had to be enployed. Stress was on photograph targets, lather than Bathenatioal calculation. Included during this period ware simulated charee positions, actual handling of charges and detonators, electric wiring, banding and demonstralions of electric and non-electricm. calculations and improvised charges.

During the second week actual participation in sab problems was conducted by the trainees, persdttdsg the student to attain the necessary confidence in handling exploaivee.

The third weekontinual nightmare for theproblems were conducted mostly at night. Stress wasapproach and coordinated attacks. odel villagein the midst of theoxlmately six kilometerIt consisted of several small houses, rail tree!

secticr.s, small generators, automotive part* and gas and oil drums. Approach to target was consistently changed with simulated action being conducted while trainees were at work. Observers wore always on the ^spot for checking of sab personnel or teams.

Tha third element, the feet soldiers, were instructed in care end de-nine of weapons, firing techniques, patrol and reconnethods to overcome terrain difficulties, security, individual survival, first aid, nap study, etc

ByMarch and early April the tare* group* were working

together in aa effort to establish coordinated attacks. Constant

critique; rder. For finalhree day CFI was conducted,

student tactical radio cperatcrt

were utilized in training, sab aod field problems.

s

V

were extreaely eagerUlng to learn. Their willingness to endure tha hardship of trainlne and their constantor, aao* iTLtroa.ly eotv to handle and instruct the -

majority had been at one lima or another political prisoners or tortured by the opposition.

.ltook advantage and exploited thelatin trait, at every opportunity,

were aede to feel "highly Superior" inthe opposition troops by constantlyin the fact that they would be bettersuperior weapons and fire pouar. and were ledefficient officers.

during the period of training uas alwayseffort to attain tho best recreationalnode. re the nen were reforre= to

f d were always settled by boxing

llojan waa "We were born to die for Cod he prenise by which the menlived ond trained and which was kepttheir mlno* day and night.

PHASE J

Afterto UwCOLrf for reorientation,

instructions and further preparations before departing to rejoin the CASTILLO Armas orgenltation

On Kaytt,C eparted with instructions to act as ^advisor and assist CASTILLO Ansas in every possible way.

first few dayo were spent 'n lust staking observations andpossible. amatenent, no seW-milliary organ-

liatlon bad bean established. eouoot to correct thisforwarded to CASTILLO Anus and ha was asked to asnetop miliary aides toC n order to begintaff. assigned and node Chief of

Staffefinite nilitary organitatlor. was

then established,ections to insure the preliminary workine stage for staff study, assignsenta, etc. Job assignments were then gi*tn lo all officers lo Insure that all available resources were put to use In the best interest of ihe aovenent. Up lo this tine no such orgar.itatlon had existed despite repeated assurances by CASTILLO Anui.

Other sectices organised were. raining tenter for We Instruction of new arrivals, security section, and CI and CE uorldns units.

*

Shock troop units, as well aa Sab and instructor assignments, were ortaniied.

Operations forwarded by LlhCOLH were Studied and neceaoary changes made because cf rapid and constant changes in the internal situation In Guatecala,

Several separate operations were established which latertrong bearing on the success of ihe project. These operations were those at Copan Buinao, Nueva Ocotepeouc, Morales and "Laor coments on results see Attachment 1.

It le extrenely difficult toomplete and full report of the successes and defeats of all adlitary operations aa well

S3

Onll shock troops were in position. Those 3andf. andUwif. roop*.

Each of the above operations will be dealt with separately in an attempt to focus soau light as to their successes or fillers a.

1.1 hock raoops.

The assignment of Shot* troops uas to striae on the nightay with the ultimate goal of completely Realm* tha exit of aorernaent troops that wight attempt to assist or to control the rail line betueenf. "janCt 3

As far aa can b= determined and ln the debriefingt*of that force, that roops arrived at and did block the tunnel Iocs' ted approximately elx kilometers frornC 3and alao satlock at Plerda Farada located or. tne Atlantic Highway Prom reports, everal small guerrilla groups were sent to the outskirts olC jfor harassnent purposes. Thesee maintained for approximately three days.

Information received fron monitored calls confirmed thattroops had been conUnuously flown from Gvitemela City tc with the primary objective of re-establishing tne ceeneetior. between g; ^forces with those ofC 3

ur daysucable enemy force counter-attacked end disorcanited thot ock troops. The troops dispersed and eomneaced retreating which eventually terminated at Los Corrideroa, honour as.

II. t DOROUP

This group consiated of aporoximately yo organised unthe alssioa of taking andbetween C 3

and C 3

The group uas quite successful anday cspturadC Bananera, holding both for three days until tha *reak-throughenemy foreea fromC. urine thisleader, had

orisnlxod and reinforced his group totallingan.

Failure to achieve further success, according

dua to the lack of supplies. elayed action the group gaveretreated, but not until theyconsiderable csmagelo the enemyto his jumping off ba=e,

Los Tarros, Honduras, withen.

Kia request for mere supplies was franted and imow-i'stetaken to consolidate that 3ohoek troopo with the

with the primary object ofhas an airfield, by 30

June, and ccmmonclrie movementwith tho objective of attacking and capturing it.

'I. nam

Cm the ere ofune this force was oa tha outskirtsest) read* to attack when word was seat of the

peace negotiations, and to remain la position an til further notice.

m. C Ocnoup

This group totaled v; nan who sailed fron

to an area approximately above Santo Tosus which la located teiow and Southwest oft. heir prlxerj Mission was to harass! 3This action "aa planned and coordinated so that they landed.

According to nanitored radio reports the group nade alanding. The ship was discovered and captured on the daybut sinus its cargo and nen. Hsports further indicatedgroup waainning battle against th* eaescy forcesthe aneeyC Colonel Balance, wasodditioral relnforcenents free Cuatenala City to copesnail force. It was not until nine days later that it wasgroup bed finally been defeated and that nine nembers

had been captured. It was also reported that all vera executed.

This group did notSO. Se.eral attenpin wore nade to localise thla group fron the nonltored reports but every one failed. It wes therefore inpossiel* to give then en aerial r* supply or to aid the= with air *upcon.

It Is felt that this group waa the most courageous andthe enemy, limiting their objective in reestablishing the C andt ^connections by continuously defeating and harassing th* city and keeping those elements occupied during the other battle phases.

PS

The priaary elsrloo of this groupccordance with original plana. Only one cnange was made and that was to bypass Cualan bymall group and blocking the snail eleiwnt that isted In Cualan.

According to th* debriefing ofO. thisr. orderattle began between th* enemy forces and the snail dttachaawit. The detachment requested sic fron th* shock troopho, with bis force, was on his way tot he troop leader pe-ranly changed his plan* asd returned to Cualan and captured sen* onlyiere* battle.

On taking Cualan, th* shock troop staff amvede euartel to reorganise and build up their troops for continuation of their torch tot 3

Daring this parted, it was presumed by, thatreinforcements had been dispatched to f y the Cualanto hla defeat, because the followinelseable forcecoming from the direction of attle connencedfor approximatelyours vith the complete annihilationArmas' forces in Gualan. The only force net caught indetachrent which had been deployed southCualan near

Choyo.

the tro was asked if any blunders were committed that night hare resulted in the defeat. Subject stated Wat it was his tl lhJJ,ifhadWat circumstances nigh, have been different. He further stated that the trek across the mountains and the continual push by the conjunderto moot his

fatigued troops, They *erc com-

pletely exhausted, even before ecawencing the fight, and the fighting continued for three straight days without them having the benefit of rest or sleep.

The later successesbe attributed to the

tremendous losses sustained by the enemy due to both th, battles of Oualar. and the last ditch stand of

v. co pan auiNAs aiid mueva ocotepequt;

heMorcM canndWed in the same novement,their Junpoff points were distinctly apart. Both forces rojrgld at Quetaltcpcquc for the eventual attack of Chiquimolt.

tinr,. mtu, IS?be attributed to nany situa-

tions, withew aentioned here;

The successful aerial re supply of these forces, the fact that thecp -as here and the majority Of the high level staff were W-

plncer jwYemsnt by enemy forces coaing from C 3to CMoulmula and s

art of Castillo Armes-

maintained constant enemy OB situations fron, mon-

ispatched troops to this erea toear attack of the Chiquimula forces.

The capturingonsiderable quantity of munitions, weapons includine. Jlnr, norurs intact with large quantities of shells, ikdoodthat the najority of troops had been dispatched frok 3earS attempt to defeat troops there rather than at the strategicC 3

ThoC ^movement never developed because of the interventionThese forces were merged with the Cueva Ocotepeque

saw*

attackest n

sab ACTrrnr

During tha action, Sab activitya action at the

and ccrsoinlcatioos between Entre Rlos and Tenadorae.

and ccmasunlcations between Tenedorea and hebetween La Llbertad and rfarales.

e. nail end communications KG of Gualan and IIW of Gualan. 4. Rail and conenmlcatiooo HE ofC Jaad K, of C . The Sen Francisco Bridge, located belov Tenedores. The above aab actliitj waa coordinated to aaalet all troope. Other Sab operations were aa follows i

t uas reported that destruction of the oilwhich was to hare been the signal to begin activities, didD-Day at approximately ?CtfOust tan ainutar before theof plans.

It waa never reported whether an attempt or actualoccurred against IQH. Although the station continued toit was reported that TOR and other hookups had been groupedtbe continuation of broadcasts also utilising the

possible teleccomunieationa in or around the capitalseparate teams".

and coamnlcetlons leading to Rl Salvador.

The Sat activity successes have bean tha moat difficult to Whether attempts or actual action was accompli .hod oa selected targets is problematical because of the inaccurate reports, the tight security, maintained by the enemy forces during the atage, and because of lack of information.

Original document.

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