Created: 1/7/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible


FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Selection of Site for Propaganda Broadcast

exhaustive study has been made to determine the bestfor the propaganda broadcast. Technical feasibility and otherinvolved in the 3election of the site were carefully considered.

the selectionite, thereery definite Standard rare broadcasts are not possible doe to th* factbroadcast transmitters coverilsew odd hours during the day. To make broadcasts that canin the ttrget area, any tine during the hours0 andtto broadcast inC broadcast band during the daylighta shiftC during the late broadcast hours. As springwill ba possible to broadcast continually inE band duringhours.

To nake broadcast* aa indicated in the above paragraph, lt la absolutely necessary to belios fron the desired target area. Technically, we are United aaelaotlon of the site to Kicoragua, the eastern tip of Honduras, Yucatan, and the ocean areas that are covered by the circunferonceircle drawn on the target city andadiusiles.

I.. Santa Fe, which waa originally planned as the broadcastoes not meet tha exact distance requirement. In addition, it was found that there are fifteen technicians stationed on Santa Fe, nunerou* regional and headquarters weather bureaus, and CAA personnel who would be aware of the prograa if it were baaed on Santa Fe. In addition, lt woo Id be possibleiano to fly from the target area to Santa Fe making direction finding, fixes, and pin-pointing the broadcaat as originating from Santa Fe. Because Santa Fe is U. S. Government owned, and there are only. Government employees on the island, the broadcast is proven as. Government sponsored.

5- Another possible broadcaat site would beIA sponsoredwould cruise in tbe official areas within the distance requiredbroadcaat. The procurement either by purchase or loan throughS. Navy, the logistical problems involved, and the fact that ittwo equipped ahipa to keep one on the station for themonths operational period, rule out this choice. The coat andinvolved are both undoalrable, as were all security aspects.

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example, the security clearing of crews, etc.

Consideration of island baaes other than Santa Fe was limited due to inadequate information. The practical problems of shipping approximately seven tona of broadcaat equipnent, logistics, supporting Islands without attracting undue attention, makes tba choice of an island impossible within the tine limitations imposed by the operation. Given tha necessary months to make reconnaissance and planning the use of an island would be possible.

The possibility of basing the broadcaat unit ln Nicaragua waa given much study. This broadcast site lo both technically feasible and politically tenable. Tbe president of Nicaragua has agreed to the basing of this unit in Nicaragua and is willing to provide an isolated finca where the installation will be made. Ha will also provide guards and logistical support for the installation.

6. The danger of Somoza'a sponsorship ia realised. However, it nust also be realized that any site that is selected for the broadcast unit can be locatedetermined effort is made by the opposition. Therefore, the broadcast cannot be made. S. area. This means that themust be locatedon-U. S. Government area and must have theof tha local government.

9. Soaoza'a sponsorship thusecessity and is no worse and is, in nany ways, better than the sponsorship of any other Central American presldont. Somoza is the strongest anti-Communist leader in this area. Because of Nicaragua's cooperation with the u. S. Government, which has been strengthened by the recently concluded military mission and military aid agreement, it la believed that Scans*ponsorship will be firm and that he will meet his coasiitaent*.

ofponsorship, no Nicaragaan military orwill be utilizedearch to pin-point the broadcast site. search could only be oarried out'by GuatemalanCommunists, or by Somoza'a opposition. While it must beto pin-point and to capture the broadcast unit, it la notthis armed assault against Somoza's military guard would be Without actually capturing equipment and simple program material,

it would be extremely difficult toose against the broadcast unit.

The actual broadcast will be beamed by specially construe tad antennas so that radiation will be maximum near the target area. It ia believed that the broadoast will not be heard within Nicaragua exceptmall area surrounding the broadcast unit.

General securityicaraguan aite is believed better than either the proposed Santa Fe or shipboard installation. There will be fewer

lndivlduals who will bo Involved In the operation than would be Uie case in either of the shore two. The security drawbacks Involved in the logistical support of the boat and the island installation are greater than those in the support of tho Nloaraguan site.

13. after consideration of all the above factors, and considering tha time limitations Imposed by the operation, it Is believed that Nicaragua offers the best possible site for the broadcast unit. It is reccecaondod that the selection of this site be approved.


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