Memorandum of Conversation -C.
1. Enclosed are copiesemorandum ol* conversation
nd an Embassy officer.
2. This and similar memoranda aro bolng forwarded to
illustrate the attitudes and positions of individuals of possible interest to PBSUCCESS.
Memo as noted
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASEAS SANITIZED
Lt the Embassy this morning and identified "oraier private secretary toguel IDIGORAS
r'uentes, the conservative who <vas defeated by Colonelresidentialhe was educated
in the United 3tatcs and was now the ownerinca in Malacntan on the Mexican border.
he came in to ask if the United Sates was pre-
pared to do anything about Comunierr In Guatemala, which he described at some lengthrowing menace, lie aald tr.at he had cone ln to see Ambassador Richard C. Patterson during theloctlons to warn hlra of tho -Communist dangor IT General Idigoras lost, but Ambassador Patterson merely showedegulation which forbade the United States to interfere In tho af.'airs of foreign countries. How, he continued, the Communism of which he had wamod had obtained control of the country. Guatemalan antl-Communlsta wore too weak to act for themselves and unless the United States helped, all would be lost. Surely the United States must see the danger to the Panama Canal and its other interests, and he could not understandhe United Stater, seemed unwilling to act.
IAmbassador latteraon had boon quite correc
In pointing out the UTS, policyn-lntorvent.1on--vrhich waa still ourontinuod, he was quiten thinking that. was not suriously concorned about the Conrminist problem hero. Indeed, our countryven much to keep free countrlo? from "oing under Communist donination; Assistant Secretary Cabot and others had made our concern with "oovr;unlsre in "Junto rain abundantly clear inspeechoe; and we vere now seeking means to combat Communismemispheric basis through cooperation with the other Latin American nations at the forthcoming Caracas Conference. It war clear that ae wished to holp those OuolL^elans who did not wish their countrynder Communist domination within the limits of internatiorallaw. The days of landing *arlneowerc over. Guatemalans who optoae Communis; had to do their part, he ha^ told mo that the Idi^orlstaa did not trust CASTILL1 arnas. This showed the problem that confrontedhose who opposed ^OMunlM often seeded to us, as outsiders, to be nore interested in their own factional flghtln: thanoraton effort the job done. There was true: that. could do, short of violating lta policy o'" non-intervention, to support those elements who opposed Communist inlorvontlon, but it wos useless to discuss which of tho many waysans would be appropriate unless therenified 'Juate^alan movement with which tho Unitedould coonerate,
admitted that the anti-Communist movement was weak
and divided, and said he did not know how this could be overcome. However, he intended to report this conversation throughchannels to General Idlgoras Fuentes and would let me know the result.
In talking ln this veinltwia my intention
(a) ve him tho impnaslon thatad no concrete plan for intervention in the domestic affairs of Guatemala andits non-lntorvention policy, and (b) that unity ln the anti>-Communlat movomontwas en essential pre-requinlto to diaouaaion of any ways and means for. to cooperate in combattinf,Communist Influences in Guatemala. It wan my hope that this inaistance on unity would be passed on to antt-Cornmunist loaders.