CONTACT REPORT

Created: 1/25/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED

LINCOLN

CONTACTNo. 10

PLACE:*

anuary

PERSONS PRESENT:and Special Contact #1

COVERpersonal confidence

(Department of Defense)

DISCUSSIC*:

H,U, Special Contactho isyou and in whom the writer has complete faith and confidence aswas interviewed in his automobile atC

Jii" stated that since the initial contact with mm on XIu, he had made certain inquiries and hadersonal emissary to tha general areaof interest.

highest official of the Special Contact's organisationarea ia

according to this source, hadimilar posi-

tioncompletely with the

State -lepartmom, wiuirn or tuna teis convinced

that officials of the State Department were guilty oi violatinginformation furnished them or allowing it to fall intoof tho pro-Cossaunista. When tbe Con^unista interrogated

prior to his expulsion fromobvious that, wey

had full information on thou-at he haa furnished the Stato Department.

ii. esultexperience with the "official U. S.

e doesnot have any confidence whatsoever in theirability and has cited Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, China and Koreaof "official U. S. bungling." Although not namedquestioned the integrity and patriotism of certain highofficials and know that information furnished usuallyto these people with uniformly disastrous

although not adamant on the subject, probably will not be too cooperative with any U. S. agents unless requested to do so by his organization's highest authority.

-Mr 0

o. 10

There will bo no organisational support as such, or evenblessing to an endeavor in which the U. S. bar.Icing becomes known. However, individual members of the Hierarchy probably would cooporaiite if their identity could be discreetly obtained and the approach discreetly bandied.

Special Contact advised that no direot approach should C- Jfl* 'ieefuse to cooperate,ewawnec in both Guatemala and San Salvador, which is his The situation is so bad that there is reason to believeof his household staff report on his every movement andto make contact with him directly would Jeopardise notlife which he cares little for, but would jeopardise hisif it could be proved that he had contact with eithorof an opposing forco oreprosontative of tho

U.overnment.

to informed persons in tne conservativein Guatemala, it is Ute consensus thatmass of peoplehaveto the Arbenz propaganda, loe reason for thisdue mainly to two propaganda themes t an appeal foran undercurrent that they are the under-dog and all ofare doing everything they can to keep then fromand politically. The second theme is based partiallythat Arbenz isommunist and he has made someregard to social legislation and economic legislation. Inthe mass of tho people take the view-point that Arbenz hastried to do something for them and they are convinced thathave made greater strides in their behalf if lt hadn't been"Imperialistic cartels and vested American business intereststo keep themtate of starvation wages and dependency." words the propaganda has been effective.

6. Underscoring the fact they are not military men, it is their estimate that it wouldinimumell-armed and well-trained troops to take and hold Guatemala.esser force could probablyer-iporary coup d'etat, however, according to their sources, forces surrounding Arbenz are presently taking measures for such action and arc caching supplies and equipmentounter-action. It was intineted that Arbenz forces, if tho initial strength appears to be rather strong, wouldoken resistancetrong counter-actioneriodew days after their initial li: that manner, those attempting to overthrow the government will liuve exposed all of tho ant^-Arbens sympathizer a, etc.

Special Contact advised that the thinking at theamong those who would like to assist us if they could trustthat the United States willimilar situation to thatareas. They have actually pleaded with the leaders ofTtisaster" not to attempt this thing unless they hadand could achieve success. If an attempt is made andapparent that there was either official or unofficialthere will be most disastrous results in that notwill suffer, but the CoramunistB will gain prestige andin other Central and South American areas and might tipso completely in their favorajor military actionrequired not only in Guatemala but other countries as well.

Special Contact advised that in view of thewith regard to the United States, he did not feel itto ask specific questions which would reveal morehe would get. He stated that C Jl name was mentioned asseveral anti-government leaders jji exxxe, but thatC ikedoes not have popular appeal nor is he well enougn Known"grass root support." He stated that while he did notname, but would endeavor to within the next ten days, there isman in hiss or's in Guatemala City inpeople have respect and feel that he has the specialpersonality and resourcefulness to capture the Imaginationpeople. He would make no promise but stated he would attemptthis name.

RECatMEHDATIONS:

the purpose of developing this Special Contact,is submitted for your consideration and advice: It isduring the discussions that the Special Contact hasthe writer; however, it is equally apparent that he has somein believing that information as indicated above will bethe person or persons who will make the ultimate decisionto "furnishing unofficial aid or assistance to one or thethese groups.1* Therefore it is suggested that the writer becontact this informant and advise him generally that there is aof interest in his initial report and thatesult of hisand observations even more careful consideration isto the matter and that the writer has been requested to convey

the appreciation to whoever his contact happens to be and that additional detailed information willbe given the highest priority and consideration, and that under no circumstances will he or liis sources be put in any embarrassing position.

C 2

Original document.

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