GENERAL CONCEPT OF DISCUSSIONS WITH (DELETED) PREPAIRING HIM FOR FORTHCOMING CA

Created: 1/23/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

THIS DOCUMENT RA3^ FOR RKLKASB. AS SANITIZED, BY

23

Subjeetl QKKEBAI. COSCBPT Or DISCISSIONS VITV.

HTM PCS FOETBCOKTW CALIQERIS KSKTIKO

I. This memo la prepared forBSUCCESS priorconference, a* being thai- of planrdngeondoeted within th* rvnjact ln the [ Jfielet. Ittoward, settingen advantageous position lnso

far ea bis forthcomingwith CAlXJaSRIS le coc4arnedbe followed up in-OALIJXKHIS moating and Calligarie-

dlaouaaiooa to follow.

II.FACTORS DSmMlNlTO THE COKSIDSSED PIAK CP AOTIOHi

A. Pernor CfllXlOERIS planning haa been oonsldared carefully, and with the following exceptional the main context of PBSOCCESS thinking adheree aa nearly ea poeeible torior eoncepti

is ooneldared that axtreae core must be takanoall our assets into any situation, the coapromlBe ofseriously deplete tha forces of tbe movement. Per thatattempt is being made tc sauce the entry of outside forcesaa infiltration type entry than that of regular forces grouped

along main coaanniratioc routes. Coapartnentatlon of unite is sought, also.

thereason, the approach to Puerto Barriosoonsldared land-approach tc prwTont the obviouseasy destructioo of Calligarie forces In the eventof "at aks" to the opposition are more complete(an entirely possible situation).

a realisation that to allow this movement to become

a prolonged civil war would present major complications in addition to allowing opposition to strengthen its tactical situation while ours bogged down, it is considered that each possible strongpoint of the opposition should be accounted for simultaneously rather than place meal.

li. Utility of bombing tactics to neutralize any strongpoint has been eliminated, evensychological factor, in view of the fact that the very concept of the movement is that of release of parsons froa oppression and all actions must allow this dlaconteneed elaaent to participate ln the overthrow of opresslon or at least aid by sympathy. Our tactics must vere away froa terroriea of this faction and vera towards inviting participation.

echnlqna* of partisan varfar* will be appllad lo tba tasted andmanner to boat support aorn conventional allltary tactics. This techniqne of coKblnlng tha two types of tactics hae proven itself In reducing the noaber of personnel and tha auegultude of support neccessary to ovarwbela superior forcestiaas le history.

in logistics are being applied to ellsdnate theproblea sod its lladtatlons to Mobility and actions of norsal

tactics.

has bean broughtmxjjbjb of dependability.

of all potential personnel, eons of whichunknown, will through organisation be com "the thousand bee-akill the tieer" which Kao Tea Tung so successfully utilisedsoperior forces.

a. Realizationthere can be no failure, bothl -

GEE IS' standpoint and oars, and thatfrom known opposition tactics aod precautionary taeasures the third factor of being op against trained Coacticians ln the field of security, staybahind, subversion,

intrigue,ll of us involved mat overplan. ovorpre;>are, and be prepared to "drive the tack withn the event the

tack turns out toailroad apike.

H.LAKKDWi

a. Tba key targets under consideration, those felt neecassarily.to be controled to ooaplotely Insure total success arei

OuatsjBxl* garrisons, sir facilities, cowmo, (Ouatansla City) Puerto Barrios port, air facilities, eosssa, and carrlsonl Jutlapaoano, and air facilities aaeapaokao, /

Katatenango, xuesaltenango and Quiche garrisons, coano and sir facilltle

Coban air facilities, coano and garrison

Can Jose garrison aod pert facilities and ooeto

E. The Ideal would be slisnltaneouB eontelnannt and slesure of oontrol. of each key target using Irnovn and physically directed shock troops with supporting partisans ln each instance.

C, In all actuality, once tho entire assets of Calligorls are brought to the surface and evaluated and assigned Missions, tha approach to each target will be different but will follow one of tho following patterns1

the feasible targets with ehock troops and lunarwhile having pre-devaleped the othersoint ofeventual pre-planned aeseoftly with shock troopo and resulting recruits

her targets.

the feasible targets as above, and Sffi developtargetsoint of self sleeure, and block tha remainingspotting of aabataur teaaa along routes of agrees froa theami through organisation of blook arena in which snail equippedunits harraaa aid retard say desired military noroaentconsolidation can be attained at our strong poiate.

J. In ell eventualities target Mb teaiss at oosro at eaoh target, existing military air facilities, and at aay poaalbl* transportation tie-up situation. In all emsntoalltiee utilise all pertiaan units poseibla to bet any point in Cuatajaalaingle Calllgeri* on can be located.

OP PUHHIKJi

The kay to the country's survival is Ouataaala City. long as hondurea,Salvador, and rexioo saaaln reluctant topresentregiae) la tha port at Puerto Barrios. and Ceban should be controlled before penetration beyond thenreorganisation behind oor novsmsat and eventualShould be controlleddaaible substitute forenciroleaant of Guatemala City, andort of entry for our move raneventual amploymnt of prolonged hostilities, ^aietenengo,Cwlohe pose distance and logistical problamiereoonela reaoteossafar poeslbllltlas of the Mock wanner of

containment, that oauaes os to search for self-eieaure aod block prooeodnrea vhloh will control the situation until consolidation of other gains la oonplated.

pending receipt of Intelligence expecteds reeultHsotlnga (it should be brought cutall planning at, thla atage la baaed on rusor and that total/ ( .the reliability of vhldh la unknown, oonaista of eleron traineaa for

four trainees forit is felt that Inner organisation

of the GuAtaueala complex will bo ths sain source for immediate, physical

eeisure of control. It is estimatedfficiant ahocktroopa oould not

be ease fab lad outalde the country to accomplish tha Job. If discussion vith

Calllgerla proves that the inner assets in the Guatemala City area are

sufficient to attempt (with high percentage of success chance) striking

at Ouatemala city Instantaneously and in concurrence with sleeure of

Puerto Barrios, lacapa, Jutiapa and Ban Jose, tha major portionavailable

forces will be directed at Guatemala City, utilising the organisation of

Inner as nets and surrounding areas at tha other sitae to obtain control,

(control here means physical control, without assurance of which, Guatemala

City should be puteconaaryvbasis chronologically speak-lng and

man released*^. e.ln our planning to Insure this physical control).

reporta on our assets plus distanceellourse which calls for setting8ity inner organisation to tha point whoreove ia roadsGuatemala Central Comnuvl toartial force towardsPuerto Barrios, or Coben or Sen Jose, the innersake ita bid wnila partisan organisation arouad Guatemalaharassed and generally set uo the partial force forthe Zacapa, Jutiapa, Puerto tarries, Coban, se Poroos.

The Low* of being capable of taking over If auatesnla City forcee are depleted can ba proaoted to tbe point where thetj Consal win be detained, at laaat partially. Sab action against air facilities and ocean will be executed lgJtiai slaaltaasooeay, with pcaelbleaction at the saaa time against key flgoree. All other asaata within the inner organisation would remain covert, their plan calling for action on depletion of Central Ooaaaad forces deaignedl to take aontrol or recall the coaitted troops, or for action ones Callegeria' Zaoapa, Jotiapa, Coban, and Puerto Barrios and San Jose forces ware consolidated.

K. It is conteaplated that the terrain and distance situation along with professed Cealegerls assets and reported opposition OB, would allow shock troops to be applied against Juttapa, Zacapa, and Puerto Barrios. These shock troops would travel ln small coiepaat units utilising beak trails and prohibitive terrain to naintaln norv-detectl on insosrjch as possible, and relying on mobility and ooooealissat to die guise location if detection unavoidable. ay these three forces would beespective positions, the exact nature of vhlch to be dotarwirjsd following sore extensive terrain end intelligence studies. Present figures available,report the following situation,rsoi soaa of vhlch will be cleared upiscussion with Callegeriaf

opposition cons lotsfficers,nlisted Guardia

ellegeris assets TOO within Zacapa (nomilitaryarious localities approx Jutlapa..opposition eonelste of lUGuardia

Callegeriawithin Jutiapa

arious localities approx

Puerto rarrloe opposition

nlistedoverall vicinity

Opitceitioa (not extracting BaTlegerie assets repartedly

fficersnlisted Guard La,

Logei isreported costotDatioa

military and aarrounding

SanOfficersnlisted Ouardle

nllstad.assets 0 (reported by

isc-isaions)

P. While the above does not In any wayeliable estimate of tbe situation it does giveasis for planning and oonfirsntlon or rejection of portions of ths knowledge should be poaaibl* following the forthcoelnc Meetings. Tentatively, ths basis of thinking iUm for Zeoep* shock troops to sleae euntrol and dots out to appro*longto form aaeenbly with Cobaa forces soring down parallel to thehighway. It is tentatively planned to alans control of Cohen through reported Csllegarls'asset* within the Garrison and augment that force with pledged populaceoving throughon the journey to the assecfcly. On assembly, and In line with the existingove met towards Ouatecsila by thla force could be oomonood.

Jutiapa selaure would be affected In thn sano iwnnor froa astaging base Just across the Salvador border, upon co repletion of this oelcure it vould turn parallel to tha aalr. highwayoint sons five rdlaa east of Xaguna de aamtitlan to Join witv. foroea froa Sen Jcse and turn towards Guatemala City, The selaure of San Jose wo-tld be dependent on th* facts learned fro* tho coining Calligirla oaetinc as to tha true identity ofeported personnel In the area.

0. Due to distance, logistical problcns and need to - personnel at the foregoing projects the Ideal will be to organize hazel tenanro, Wuiial-tenango and Quiche to the point of self-seizure. tudy of personnel of those garrisons my disclose gi.-od.cka with which we can force key adlitary figures toatin-typo retardation, loaurinr Uiat thes* forcoe do not enter Into the tactical picture ino filter It. Ths probablewillcrlee of retardation events set up by organization of the area between tneee three ti'.sa and Guatemala City deigned to delayrant froa these three sites until consolidation of the other carpets as eon-pi* tad.

H. Contingency ^lanaid account for 1. eoploy-afnt of Guatemalatho aid of ourrgote(which contincenc has been generallyin tno above. retirementnXenilaii^ forcosaa has been reported to c* Ihe Ovate-alan plan, ir tnleIt laeing considered aost feasible to eo^ir te Vie capit-jktionCity sot eturred activitiesheand crplotonimation beforelioit would bo cr.nsicerud within ourtot vuezilteiian<-o stral-ht at'jic'.!, 3. y wo-'ld ho for Ouatemala Cityprrparetatein vhlcn ca36targsta

could betJngf-lty fren re-srrpviy or relnforcoraont.

TV. COK'SfKITj HOKt

A. Cocsunlratlins ren row eorwnelng.wo types of radio operators. On? type ia to be Cilledfl andieced In the vicinity of targetes yet unsoloctad points, for tha purpose of reporting lasthangns in OS. Ones ths tacticalpons up.

b'-r

w* will revert tos who have pnsrloualy been aarriad toshock troop units. Until the tactics! situation opens up Coarao will be processed throuet outside (rrar LUC), it lent-to-Cslligerls eervioe willour proaxtse. Once tho tactical situation opens up arraagenente have bean ssade for unlt-to-CaUigoris-to-unit-lnfo UNO servioa. the vast ages will be sent in coda due to the dependability of theet to be used on this oporation. a will have their radios delivered to thsa coca tbey are in position. Tacticalare expected to be paired aid will carryn packs.

7. LOGISTICS i

A. Tha logistical support has been broken down into three oatagorissieather-proofod kits of spproxiraBtelybs. weight, the con -tents of which are grouped to service partisans, saboteursa.he total of these kits will arrive by plane at fields nosr the staging areas for distribution as needed. The sua total of ecuipnont to be packaged is outlined

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