TOP GCCRfrf
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR.OaE
ESTIMATE
the probable repercussionss decision to grant or deny military aid to pakistan
im
4 PublUhedonuory
Tht Intelligence Advisory Oommtttrr concurred tn this estimate on. Tht FBI abstained, tht
tubfect being outside of tts turiidtetlan. The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Centralligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The Intelligence organizations of tht Departments of Statt. the Army, the Navy, tht Air Force, and Tht Joint Staff.
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THE PROBABLE REPERCUSSIONSS DECISION TO GRANT OR DENY MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the repercussions, particularly in India and Pakistan, ofS decision toodest amount of military aid to Pakistan andS decision not to grant such aid.
ASSUMPTIONS
a military aid program forvould be of modest proportions andealistic military view point would not threaten India's present militaryin the subcontinent.
That the military aid agreement would not involve establishment of US military basesormal US-Pakistani mutual assistance commitment.
That the US would (a) make everyto reassure India that aid towas not directed against it; and (b) undertake to discourage Pakistani military aggression against Indian-held territory.
ecision on military aid towould not be announced beforeanuary, when the Korean POW's will presumably be released from the custody of India in Korea, but would beshortly thereafter.
CONCLUSIONS
A US decision to extend military aid to Pakistan would have the following effects:
would increase the Pakistanprestige at home and tendthe government'srelations with the US.
would arouse grave concernin India and lead toin the subcontinent. USmitigate these reactions are unlikelyany significant effect.
would lead to an intensificationdifferences in US-Indianand possibly to more friendlywith the Bloc, but wouldnot lead to any major change inforeign policies.
d. Over the course of time the violence of Indian feeling would, In the absence of exacerbating circumstances, tend toHowever, thereanger that frictions and disagreements between the US and India might be aggravatedesult ol continuing resentment.evelopment would make it easier forto drift into an eventual position of isolation from Western friendship and support, in which it would be moreto Cornmunist pressures.
S decision no; to grant military aid to Pakistan would have the following effects:
a. It wouldoss ot US prestige, since India has protested violently against such aid and the USSR andChina have registered objections.
t would cause grave disappointment to the Pakistan Government, weaken the position of pro-Western moderatenow in control, and possibly lead to cabinet changes even including the Prime Minister. It would probably not.result in the present ruling group losing control of the government. The Pakistan Government would feel strong resentment toward India, since Pakistani leaders wouldegative USto Indian pressure.
c. The US would not bank anycredit with India, nor would there be any improvement in presentrelationships Moreover, Indian leaders might be encouraged to usetactics against the US on other
he reactions of other governmentsS decision concerning military aid to Pakistan would probably not be such as to involve any major changes in present policies.
DISCUSSION
PROBABLE REPERCUSSIONSS DECISION TO EXTEND MILITARY AID
A US decision to grant military aid towould be welcomed by the Pakistanwould bolster the government's prestige with the Pakistani public, and would tend to consolidate the government's friendly relations with the US. These effects might, however, be somewhat reduced byover the small amount of aidThe governments of Turkey. Ceylon, and Thailand have indicated that they would favorecision, and that of Iran would probably also approve. The UK has expressed certain anxieties but has indicated that it would go along withecision and is attempting to overcome India's fears and objections.
The USSR and Communist China have already protested to Pakistan against the granting of any US military aid. They would viewS decision with concern,it as one more step In the US policy of "encirclement" andrelude to the esublishment of US bases In Pakutanwe believe that they would confine their reaction to violent propaganda attacks on the
US. efforts to exploit neutralist and antl-colonlal sentiments in the area, and attempts to cultivate closer relations with India.
Afghanistan has expressed its concern, but indications are that this is largely for public consumption. It has indicated that it too would like military aid, and no change in the traditional Afghan policy is likely to result from aid to Pakistan. Reactions of the Arab States would vary. The governments of Iraq and probably Saudi Arabia would approve. Egypt probably would feel slighted unless it received comparable military aid.it would feel that Palcstan wouldbe unable to support the Arabs on such issues as Palestine and Nforocco. In none of the other countries of the Free World Is the reaction of their present government likely to have any adverse effect on relations with the US cr Pakistan,ome cases the reaction is likely to be favorable
The most significant reaction from the standpoint of US interests would be in India. India regards Pakistan as the country most immediately threatening India's interests and ambitions and believes that Pakistan'spurpose in seeking US military assist-
ance is to strengthen itsis India. India would, therefore, view theof such assistance to Pakistan with grave concern and indignation. The Indianwould consider the granting of mili-tary aid to Pakistan as the firsteries of steps leadingignificant increase Ln the military power o( Pakistan and an unwelcome involvement of South Asia in the cold war. India would regard the US action as anwedge in the return of colonial powers to the area andhallenge to India's concept ofhird area" of neutral nations in which India would exercise leadership. It would fear that initiation of US-Pakistan military cooperation would: (a) usherolicy of even greater US "favoritism" toward Pakistanis India on such issues as Kashmir; (b> leadangerous increase in Pakistan's military strength; and (c) sooner or laterestablishment of US bases in Pakistan.
efforts to mitigate India's fearare unlikely to have any effectMinister Nehru or Indian opinionSince the Indians object inany military aid to Pakistan, they areto be much influenced by suchdirect US reassurances to India, theof non-aggression pledges fromthe provision of the aid within thePakistan defense arrangements withand other Middle East states. Overot time the violence of Indianin the absence of exacerbatingtend to subside.akistanand the establishment of USln Pakistan would probablyIndian resentment toward the wholeof US-Pakistan militaryalmost certainly persist.
Effect on Indian Policies
resentmentS militaryfor Pakistan would lead atorsening of US-Indianleaders and the Indian press wouldcritical of the US and of USits diplomatic activities, both in andthe UN, India would probably be moreto undercut and embarrass the US.
India would probably increase its efforts totrong neutralist bloc Ln the UN and might be more difficult to deal with on Ko:ea and other Far East issues. In addition it might curb US information activities andto go ahead with negotiationreaty of Friendship and Establishment. American activities ln India, both official and private, would encounter increased difficulties with government officials and the general public.
India would tend to become confirmed in its attitude that the greatest immediatein South Asia comes, not from Communist imperialism, but from the "unreasonable" policies of the apparently military-minded West and Pakistan's identification with it; India might become convinced that its aims as an independent state are incompatible with those of the US. The possibility of eventual cooperation between India and the US inommon front againstpressures in Asia would become even more remote. There isanger thatfrictions between the US and India, if allowed to persist, would make it easier for India to drift into an eventual position of isolation from Western friendship andin which it would be more susceptible to Communist interna! and external pressures.
While India would probably be inclined to harass the US. it would almost certainly seek tolear-cut break with the US and its allies, to whom India looks for markets and for economic aid. Except possiblyesultumulative series of frictions andIndia would be unlikely to refuse US economic aid. However, thereontinuing possibility that India might be faced withloss of US aid through failure to comply with the Battle Act. and there is some slight chance tha; it might further risk loss of US aid by cutting off export of strategic mater" lis to the US. Despite possible irritation over 3ritlsh failure to oppose US military aid to Pakistan. India would remain in theat least for some time to come, if only to avoid further loss of influence there.
Resentment against tlie US wouldincrease Indian interest in trade with the Communist Bloc and strengthen India's con-
dilatory attitude towardCommunistChinaon such questions as Korea. However. It isunlikely that India would makepolitical concessions to theenter into arms agreements with them, or otherwise go further than it Ls nowto go toward associating itself with the Bloc. Such moves would strike at the very foundations of India's policy of
we do not believe that Indianand increased US-Indianby themselves, cause any majorof Indian foreign policies. As long asto pursue its basic policy ofand non-alignment ln the coldhas Utile additional room forIndia has already felt obliged toon the numerous international Issuesit dissents from US policy, there isno major act of reprisal Indiaagainst the US withoutits own Interests. This we believe thewould be unwilling to do.
Effects on Stability in ihe Subcontinent
India's reactionS decision to extend military aid to Pakistan would also lead to Increased tensions in the subcontinent.elements in India are almostln opposing US military aid for Pakistan. Within India, agitation against the USwould lead to an Increase in popular bad feeling toward the US and Pakistan and to an increase, possibly of dangerous proportions, in Hindu-Moslem communal tension and in anti-Christian agitation. However, widespreadis unlikely to break out unless the Indian' Governmenterious miscalculation ln Its efforts to demonstrate that it has pubbc support. The Communists would, bythemselves with the opposition to US military aid to Pakistan, have an opportunity to gain prestige and to pursue their united front tactics.
Existing strains in Indian-Pakistanirelations would once again be intensified. India would remain unwilling to accept any compromise on Kashmir, and its reluctance to cooperate with Pakistan on such other issues as that of joint development of the Punjab watershed would be reinforced. There might alsoew round of minor reprisalsthe two countries, but we do not believe that increased tensions would lead to aresumption of hostilities.
ii. PROBABLE REPERCUSSIONSS DECISION NOT TO EXTEND MILITARY AID
It is widely known that the US has been considering military aid to Pakistan. Since India has protested violently against such aid and the USSR and Communist China have registeredS decision not tosuch aid wouldoss of USIt wouldrave disappointment to the Pakistan Government, which has almost certainly come to believe that the US isto giving it military assistance.Pakistan's leaders would conclude that the US had decided that India's good will was more important than that of Pakistan and that it would be unwilling to offend India on other matters involving South Asia. These leaders might later try to reopen the aidbut they would be bitter at what they would consider relegation to second-class status in South Asia and in the future would have less confidence Ln the US and possibly also the UK. The Pakistan Government would feel strong resentment toward India since Pakistani leaders would ascribe aUS decision to Indian pressure. However, we believe that Pakistan would not abandon Its fundamentally anti-Communist and pro-Western outlook.
Within Pakistan, the effect of the decision would be to weaken the position of the pro-Western moderate elements now in control. Failure to obtain military aid would deprive the governmentajor political asset and would expose it to more severe attack on otheregative US decision would strengthen the reactionary religious elements which oppose close ties with the West andore militant policy regardingand might lead to cabinet changes,even the Prime Minister. However.
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the pro-Western moderate elements probably would not lose control ot the government.
S dental of military aid lo Pakistan would be looked on in Indiaeluctant concession to Indian pressure. While it wouldource of friction, the beneficialon US-Indian relations would probably be negligible. India would be pleased by theHowever, it is unlikely to bemore cooperative, and might actually be less so. regarding the various issues on which It now dissents from US policy. In fact, India would probably be encouraged to use similar pressure tactics against the US on otherIndia's attitudeashmirwould not change and Its reluctance
to bargain with Pakistan on other issues would increase.
egative decision with respect toaid lor Pakistan would probablythose Middle Eastern political elements which oppose close ties with the West, By the sameegative US decision wouldpolitical elements in the Middle East which are now Inclined toward closer ties with the West, and the government of Ceylon, which apparently wishes to avoid Indianin South Asia. However, the reaction Li most South Asian and Middle Easternin the longer run. would depend largely on the other aspects of US policy toward the area.
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Original document.
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