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CCNMUN1ST SUBVERSION OK GUATEMALA
A. Introduction
The steps by which Cccnunism seeks to capture free nations mayvaxy.in accordance with Local conditions, but the organizational and operational techniques used by Communist Parties everywheretriking resemblance to each other. To those people who would belittle Communism's chances for success in areas of the world remote from the Soviet orbit, the story of Guatemala should emphasize the dangers Inherent ln any countryarefully conceived and cleverly executed program is not effectively opposed by that majority of the people who are non-Comnunlst.
It should not be forgotten that in all free countries ofthe Communists seek to gain popular support not throughown platform, but by espousing non-Communist Ideas; by strivingpeople believe that Communism stands for the abolition of thingsbad; by precising to abolish whatever may beation. lt be overlooked that Communist operational techniques areeffect tbe greatest degree of control over tbe most Important ofnecessary to achieve political controlountry. Itnecessary for the Communiste to achieve strength in numbers; itnecessary for them to be able to control and manipulate In suchthat their influence is assured and opposition is effectively The story of Cuatemalaexcellent example of thisCommunist.
Although small and ineffective Communist groups existed lnpriorh. It was actually the popular overthrow1 of the Ubico-Poncc dictatorship that facilitated the spread of Communist influence within tbe country. The political, economic, and sociaL upheavals and re-groupings which took place during and following this revolution afforded the Communists those opportunities for Infiltration and organizing tactics which had heretofore been closed to them. They were quick toopportunities. Their agility attests to the Conmunist ability and readiness to exploit situations ofas those posediberal reformto utilize the usually dispersed strength of non-Communist groupspringboard for their own concentrated drive for power.
The present extent of Communist influence in Guatemala, however, did not burst forth full-blown after the revolution. It was achieved in the course of several years andesultultiplicity of Communist tactics designed to subvert and to neutralize sogments of Guatemalan national life so that the Communist Party could be rendered the major force within the country.
Since the Communists hod hud virtually no status in Guatemala prior to the revolution, it became necessary for them to move into both the political and labor spheres as quickly as possible. Their techniques followed classic Communist tactics and afford interesting examples of the application of such tacticsanner andinTing calculated to solidify Communist influence, both openly as well as clandestinely, within the moat important elements of Guatemalan national life.
Major developoents ln the pattern of this Comnunlst subversion were usually heralded by visits either into Guatemala by foreign Communists or by Guatemalan Communists traveling into the Soviet orbit. While efforts will be made In tbis report to present developments in chronological order. Communist activities In various spheres naturally overlopped. Indeed, it isesult of parallel developments that Communist influence lnhus reached its present peak.
h. Tiie Beginning
Because Communist movoB to dominate the Guatemalan labor movement were comparatively immediate and direct, initial Cctamunist successes in this field represent tbe most obvious first step in the pattern of Communist subversion. After the resolution, the emerging labor situation lneasily lent'itself to Communist manipulation. Whereas* no labor unions had existed except for the controlled workingaen's mutual-aid societies, under tbe nev freedama brought by the revolution the country's first Labor unions appearedhese fledgling unions were incorporated into the first national labor federation, thede Trabajadores de Guatemala (CTG).
The raoct potent seeds of the future Communist Party were initially planted within the CIO. This new labor federationecognized need for experienced labor advisers to help ln Its establishment and progress; such advisers were not to be found in Guatemala. Into this breach quicklyroup of Central Americans with Communist backgroundsh experience In organizing labor in other countries. They becametne advisers to the young CTG and, through their efforts, the CTG began early torowing group of Communist-oriented young labor leaders. Tbe moat successful method of indoctrination utilized by these CommunistsTG school whose ostensible purpose was to train labor leaders. Instead, this school was successfully usedommunist indoctrination center until forced to close6 because of opposition to Its strong Coanunlst orientation.
At the same time that Conounlst Influence was spreading In the laborore subtle Communist infiltration had begun within Guatemalan political movements. The "students'rentc Popular Libertodornd the "teachers'enovacion Hactonal (RN),
were revolutionary parties formed to support the presidential candidacy or Arevalo. These two parties fusedt5 to form the Partldo Accion Revoluclonaria (PAR) and then later withdrew, leaving all three parties in existence. Communist and Communist-oriented figures managed to exert an influence in the indoctrination of these political parties at their inception.
Again, Communists from neighboring countries cam into Guatemala to work with these political groups. Practically all of those affiliated today with the Guatemalan Coamunlst Party were active in these three "revolutionaryor the growing number of young Guatemalan Communists were content for several years to work within the leftist Administration parties and did not emergeeparate political entityore propitious time. esult of both tbe doctrines taught by the CTG school and the efforts of Communist figures within theparties,ears afterkroup of young Guatemalans had crystallizedermanent Communist organizationclandestinely within the revolutionary political movement.
C. Tactical*
Meanwhile, CommunlBt efforts to dominate the Guatemalan labor movementlight setback, but not one which seriously threatened the eventual Communist control. It is possible that this lesson of the labor movement wae well learned by thc.'Communists and contributed to their selection of more subtle techniques to-"he applied to political.
The CcoBiunist orientation of tbe CTG school so alarmed theunion and certain other unionsactional fight split the CTG., these antl-Communist unions withdrew and formed another national labor federation, the Federacion Sindical de Guatemala (FSG) and, at the same tine, the CTG school was shut down by the governmentiolation of the article in the constitution forbidding "political organisation^oreign or international character." The FSG, however, came under leadership and pressure that gradually returned it to tbe Communist he FSG had affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)the Confederacion de Traba.1adcros de la America Latlnat was finally re-absorbed by the CTG- As on anti-Communist organization, the FSG was unable to produce the unity of purpose, the militant membership, or the political support achieved by the Communists in the CTG.
To some extent, however, the withdrawal of the anti-Communist unions from the CTG may have accelerated tbe complete domination by the Communists of the remaining CTG organization. Of the early member unions, that of the school teachers, the STKG, had shown itself particularly
SRrfep
susceptible to Communist Influence. For Instance, thla union had strongly supported the Comnunlst-orientated CTG Indoctrination school. With tbe withdrawal of those unions which formed tbe FSG, tho STEG remained as the most militant union within the CTG and came to dominate it. It was largely from the ranks of the STEGroup of young Communists emerged to dominate the entire CTG movement. The most outstanding of these, Victor Manuel Gutierrez, rose rapidly to become STEG Secretary General and later Secretary General of the CTG.
After tbe re-absorption of the FSG by the CTG, this sole labor federation of Guatemala became known aa the Confederacion General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG). Gutierrez became Secretary General and the organization was under complete Communist domination. All key positions ln the CGTG are beld today by members of tbe Guatemalan Communist Party. Throughout the period when the CTG and later the CGTG wore being brought under Communist control. Gutierrez and his group received extensive aid from Communists from outside the country; theseather large Influx of trained Communists who helped to advance the ideological and organizational capacities of tbe local group.
But Communist participation in Guatemalan politics continued for same time to be conducted behind the facade of other parties. he end of the Arevalo administration, the existence of any Communist political organization in Guatemala wou denied. Tbe "revolutionary parties"the FPL and the RNad formed the principal support which installed Arevalo as President In 1QM. Gutierrez had been an early member of tbe FPL and, after the formation of the PAR, laterember of that party. Jose Manuel Fortuity, who was to become tbe Secretary General of the Guatemalan Communist Party, wasember of tbe PAR.
hereeries of Communist moves which culminated in the eventual emergence of en open Communist Party, the most virile and flourishing of the four allied parties controlling the government of It is an interesting story of Communist tactics designed toavorable political climate, legitimate participation in government, and the effective neutralization of any remaining non-Communist groups not already broken up by Communist maneuvers.
utierrez resigned frctn the PAR. ortuny andthera also resigned from tbe PAR andrankly Communist newspaper entitled Octubre, whose Initial subheading wasreat Communist Party, Vanguard of the Workers, the Peasants, and theonth after the appearance of this paper, Gutierrez founded the PartMo Revoluclonnrio Obrero de Guatemalaorkers' party for Marxlst-Leninist indoctrination of political and labor leaders. To work in0 presidential and congressional elections, leaders of the Octubre Communists and of the PROG, together with the labor unions under their
influence,oint committee. This committee had severalfor Congress, including Gutierrez who supported Arbenz'for the .
It was not untilowever, that Fortuny signed a" press statement as "Secretary General of the Partido Comunlsta de Guatemala" (PCG). Here, at last, woo the first known avowal that an organizedParty existed in Guatemala. ew weeks later Fortuny admitted publicly that the Communist Party of Guatemala had existedecret organization since. Inn the first anniversary of Octubre. the partyublic rally, announcing that lt would seek to be registeredecognized party under the electoral laws. The principal political leaders of Guatemala attended this rally to hear Fortuny formally launch the PCG. This attested to the degree of Influence already obtained by tbe Communists in Guatemala and emphasized that their political support in0 elections of such candidates as Arbenz, the new President, was paying dividends.
Cooouniat political twists were not quite over. Inutierrez, head of tbe PROG, admittedress interview that heommunist. He was also tbe head of the CGTG and had kept thatand the CTG before that, firmly in the WFTU camp. After returningFTU Congress in Berlin, Gutierrez, inannounced the dissolution of the PROG and advised its members to rollow him into Fortuny's
he PCG became increasingly important within the Guatemalan political movement. Fortuny and other representatives of tbe PCG began to be reported ln the press as sitting in on President Arbenz' political conferences with the representatives of the other Administration Parties.
Inrompted in part by protests againstCommunisthe PCG used the occasion ofecond Party Congress to change its name. It become the Partido Guatemateco del Trsbajo (POT). At the same time, it decided to makeaily paper,et of statutes modeled on the standard organization of the Stalinist Communist Parties, and confirmed its Intent to register the party in the Civil Registry. It also announced that it would Join the PAR, the PPG (which replaced the old FPLeries of interpartynd the PRember of the Administration's "Democratic Electoral Front" in the3 congressional elections. Inrior to the elections, the PGT was registeredolitical party, despite some anti-Communist protests that it should be burred under the constitutional prohibition on "political organizationsoreign or international character." The opposition was not strong enough and was too late. The day of legitimate political power for the Communists had arrived.
D. The Open Party
Ae One of the four parties controlling the government of Guatemala, the PGT began toniquely favorable position. The threenon-Communist government partiesPAH, PRG, and RKcontinued to be aggressive supporters of tbe nationalist and leftist goals of the revolutionary movement vhich began. The PGT, of course, claimed similar objectives and became the most Insistent exponent of stronger unity within tbe Rational Democratic Front, urging not only political alliance among the government parties and labor groups but also analliance to Include mass organizations and all other manifestationsunited front program." Thislassic Communist tactic. There was, and is, no obvious difference in principle between the threepartieG and the PGT which .would hamper the forgingtronger government under POT leadership.
Furthermore, as the PGT emerged an an open and major politicaluccession of events brought the organized antl-Communist opposition in Guatemala to virtual extinction. As the PGT grew In strength and prestige, the non-Communist elements in the other revolutionary parties found themselves unable to consolidate their forces to block the PGT's path to preeminence. While the PRC, RK, and PAR have In turn been wracked by internal dissension and scandal, the PGT bas suffered no such weakening, and the Ideologies and programs of the other parties have tended toreplica* of Its own. Hone of the important Don-Communist political figures remained free or in the country following "revelations" of alleged plots against the Government in3 andt>- The PGT took tbe lead ln protesting alleged "intervention" and in demanding suppression not only of opposition political activities but of the independent press In Guatemaln.
Communist allegations that "anti-Communism" Is equivalent to Fascism has found acceptance among the other parties. The PGT has been successful In gaining adherents to the international Soviet llne^flnona. influential leaders of the revolutionary organizations. In particular, the PGT ban led the other parties in an increasingly strident propaganda campaign against foreign,Intervention" ln Guatemalan affairs. The PGT has skillfully exploited national discontents and han offered itself, in typical Communist fashion, as the Instrument to abolish the worries of the nation und to safeguard its "revolutionary reforms."
The extent of Communist influence ln the leadership of the other political parties in power in Guatemala restsore tangible basis thanommon program of nationalist and leftist objectives. It should not be forgotten that most Communists were initially members of the other parties. Communists arc still there. When Gutierrez dissolved the PROG and took withumber of PROG members into the Communist
Party,thers who had received the ease Communist indoctrination in the PROG returned to the PAR in responseublic Invitation to do so.
There is considerable evidence that Communists within the other parties are carryingactical maneuver to further the "national front" and "popular acceptance" of the mounting power of the PGT. this evidence suggests that the separate political entitles of the other parties, are fast disappearing. When Fortuny was nominated ascongressional candidate by the Communlat Party ino was introduced with warm praise by the Secretary General of the RN. e was formally endorsed by the PARoint candidate and, soon afterwards, the PRG also endorsed him.
Again and again, representatives of the other parties have supported. Joined with, or defended not only the PGTarty but also its candidates for elections. Perhaps the most striking example of this was the statement by tbe Secretary General of the PAH In3. The PARransitory party like the other revolutionary parties, which are destined to disappear and become part of the great world Communist Party." upport tbeupport above all the Communist Party." The extent of this political affection Is further illustrated by the fact that the PRG elected Fortuny, head of the PGT, and Alvarado Konzon, the PGT Secretary of Organization, to the Presidium of the First Congress of tho PRG, held in; they were tho only members of the Presidium who were not TOO. members.
During the period when the Communists were thus moving sotoward political domination, their control of Guatemalan labor wassolidified. The CGTG came under the complete control of tbe Political Committee of the PGT, with all key positions In the CGTG held by PGT members. With the exceptionery few independent local unions, the COTG came to represent all organized industrial, transportation, and commercial labor la Guatemala, and has obtained very considerable strength ln agricultural workers' unions. This strength is estimated to be_atigure which compares significantly with tbe totalotes cast ln the last congressional elections and with the totalotes cast in0 presidential elections.
There has been no serious challenge to the Communist leaderuhip of organized labor since Gutierrez- and his group, aided by Communist advisers from outside, assumed control. hort-lived revolt against Communist control of the railway workers' union was easily put down and its leader apparently forced out of the PRG. Also ina new, tiny labor federation was formed and challenged Gutierrez to Justify his international Communist affiliations. Gutierrez did not bother to answer; in Januarythe leaders of the little group were arrested by the police and reportedly expelled from Guatemala.
skoiIet
AUted with the CGTG ia an organization of small formers and tenants called the Confederacion Nacional de Guatemalaedormer associate of Gutierrez in the STEG. The CBCG, also affiliated with tbe WFTU, has" constantly proclaimed its solidarity with the CGTGeven to the extent of the Communist theory that rural workers should be guided by the urban proletariat.
The political nature of the Guatemalan labor organization is well established. Political-action committees have directed labor participation in elections', and the CGTG and CNCG Joined the fourparties as formal components of the "National Democratic Front."
E- Adjuncts to Power
1- The Agrarian Hcform
Within the framework of their power in the political and labor spheres, the Guatemalan Communists have pushed their influence through many other related activities. One of the most important of these Is the agrarian reform movement, which the Communists have recognized to be one of the most powerful instruments availableinority seeking state power. In Guatemala, the Communists have gone far ln gathering the force of this reform Into their own hands und, indeed, shrewdly participated In lt at its Inception. Fortuny spent the greater partears studying the agrarian-reformof the Satellites andajor author of theAgrarian Law.
Communists, both in and out of the Government, showed their interest in adoption of the Agrarian Reform Bill when the Administration sent lt to the Congress The Agrarian Law created, as instruments of the reform, the National Agrarian Department, the National Agrarian Council, .Peparjj-mental Agrarian Commissions, and local Agrarian Connntttees. The low assigned three of the nine seats on the Council to the CGTG and the CNCG. These two labor groups were each given one of the five seats on the Departmental Commissions, and they share three Of the five seats on the local agrarian committees. he law was amended to provide thatercent of the local Agrarian Committees should be composed of representatives of the CGTG or CNCG, that one of the three members of the Departmental Agrarian Committee should represent the CGTG and another the CNCG, and that one of the nineof the national Agrarian Council should represent the CGTG and two others the CNCG- Communist predominance in the local and departmental committees was thus guaranteed by the temu Of the law.
Furthermore, the Communists have heavily infiltrated the Notional Agrarian Department (DAN) where they hold key positions. The Chief of the Land* Section la on avowed CccBunlst and assumed charge of the department ln the absence of the Director. Tbe Secretary General (Chief Clerk is the wife of Fortuny. Four of thegrarian Inspectors are avowed Communists andre probubly membera ofPGT. In addition, another dozen DAN employees are known members of tbe PGT- The CGTG has been especially active among rural elements since tbe agrarian reform was enacted, and has created forurther key role by giving effective assistance to applicants for agrarian benefits.
Nor have the Communists missed any opportunities to Impress upon the public their importance ln agrarian reform. There have been prominent Communists wbo have participated ln all public ceremonies concerned with the reform program. There has also been reported at Least one case in which Communist leaders of the CGTG took advantage of the strength of that organizationarticular district to incite the peasants to numerous disorderly seizures of land which had not been duly applied for and apportioned under the terms of the Agrarian Hcform Law. Communist-inspired agrarian unrest could undoubtedly Leadignificant peasant movement disposed to violent nctlon--whlch would give the Coamunlsto even greater control over agrarian reform and, accordingly, over state power.
Communist support of the ugrarlan-rcforn programypical example of their drive for power by espousing non-Communist ideas. But, as Fortuny himself has written in discussing the. The Communist Party is not now fighting for the step toward tbe power of the proletariat, but, aware of historic conditions and because of these ^con-ditions, lt must support whatever steps will lead to the definite liquidation of feudalism and the giving of part of the land to the peasants, and it must champion the present aspirations of the great peasant masses and the workers of the country, which pointapid and less costly road toward bourgeois development in Guotemola.ur goalociety without exploitation, the Canmunist Socialist Society
2. Propaganda Bedla
The Guatemalan Communists also recognized at an early date the importunt attribute to power which lies In the control of public Information media. Even while the major efforts
of the Coittn unlit to were directed toward the firs entrenchment of trained Communists at the top of the national laborand the constructionell-knit Communist Party firmly interlaced with the allied parties of the left, their propaganda campaigns were underway and were effectively furthered by fellow members Of the then-secret Communist Party who had acquired important places in the field of mass communication. For example, the present Secretary ofof the POT formerly held the poets of editor of an FPL newspaper, announcer on the government radio station, and editor ln chief of the government's Dlarlo dc Centro America; later he became director of Octubre and helped to form the Communist Party. Another present leader of the PGT was employed ln the President's Office of Press The present Secretary of Organization for the PGT had, before the public emergence of that party, served on the FPI. newspaper, on the daily Diarlo de la Manana, and as special reporter for the government's paper. The PGT'a Secretary of Education is yet another who worked in the President's Office of Publicity and Propagandahen he publicly avowed his Communist affiliation. And as these and other Communist leaders turned from journalism to management of the Communist Party, they left others well qualified and well placed to carry on their work.
*
Today an avowed Communist is Director of the national Radio Station as well as Director General of Hatlonal Broadcasting, with Jurisdiction over all the radio stations ol* theell-known Honduran Communist remains oneditorial staff of the government dally newspaper, which gives copious and favorable publicity to Communist-front activities andreflects Comrnunist-line viewpoints in Its editorials. There are faithful propagandists for Communism remaining in the President's Office of Publicity andther similar-minded men advance the Communist line in the daily newspapers Kucstro Dlarlo and Dlarlo del Pueblo, the latter actually being the PRG party organ. And there la also tbe mouthpiece of the PGT'itself, Trlbuna Popular.
The Communis ta ln Guatemala have continued to be uniformly successful ln gaining wide circulation of ths Ir propaganda in the pro-Ccaounlst press of the country, particularly under the "peace" tag. Their propaganda development has followed the familiar International Communist pattern, adapted to the geographic, economic, cultural, and political conditions of the country. While eulogy of the Sovietmi policies has Its part, the dominant tone is set by utturkn on propaganda
targets carefully selected to build up antagonism and
hatrod tovard free world influence, to diocredit the leaders
of nations opposing Communism, and to undermine domestic
ant1-Communist leadership. All this is approached, of course,
by the Communist technique of Identifying Communism with
nationalism.
. to Front Organizations
Coupled with thla Communist influence in the publicmedia are the Communist-front organizations which serve as sounding boards to echo and re-echo the Communist line. More Importantly, these mass organizations afford means of cadre recruitment, general indoctrination, and agitation, while providing organizational and other links with parent international Communist organizations.
Tbe creation of moss organizations is an Integral step In the familiar Communist pattern for penetration and seizure of powerree country, and in Guatemala thehave followed the usual practice of creatingorientated associations among the social and cultural groups Into which society can moat readily be divided. It has not mattered that Guatemalareat distance from the rest of the Soviet worlds. The Guatemalan Communist Party has triad to identify Itself with many of the aspirations and hopes of the Guatemalan people and has formed thosewhereby it hopes to Influence an increasing number of citizensorm of political awareness that leads the* to identify themselves with the objectives of tbe Communist Party.
Apart from tbe labor organizations, the most powerful and Important of these mass groups are: the Natlonal_Peaxaw Committee, the Alliance of Democratic Youth of Guatemalahe Democratic University Frontbe Guatemalan Women's Alliancehe Confederation of Post-Primary Studentsnd tbe SafceraTl Group of Young Intellectuals and Writers. Guatemalan maan organizations virtually alwaysGT member, under tho discipline of the Party Political Committee,ey position, usually as Secretary General or Secretary for Organization. Moat of theseare affiliatedecognized internationalorganization, paralleling the affillotlon of the CGTG with the CTAL and WFTU.
Analysis of Communist Influence
Although the growth of Communist influence in Guatemala dotes froa the revolutionkr its acceleration stems from the advent of the Arbenz administration, which came to power It has been said that the key to the Communist success is tbe attitude of theof Arevalo and, particularly, of Arbenz "toward Communism. Thl6 Is true insofar as the tolerance of and collaboration with the Communists has permitted their activities to flourish virtually unchecked. It Is also true when one considers the fact that, politically speaking, the Guatemalan executive has had the power to wipe out tbe Communist movement and has refrained from doing so- But this is only part of the answer to the Communistorganizing abilities, theirtechniques, their clandestine training, and their concentration of purpose equipped them to make the most of their opportunities.
Today, as active supporters and collaborators with theCommunists and pro-Coonunists are continuing to increaseand prestige. They can he found in ail departments ofof theeputies in the national legislature are Communists,other legislators ore fellow travelers and crypto-Conmunists. one pro-Communist sits on the Supreme Court. The executivefrom the office of the President to various ministries and theAgrarian Department, is honeycombed with Communists and Although the Ccanunlets <bavc yet toabinetpro-Communists have held the post of Foreign Minister and oneIs at present Minister of theommunists andfellow travelers hold key positions in the- Social SecurityNational Agrarian Department, and the Ministry of Labor. TheCommunists, Fortuny and Gutierrez, have ready access to Pro-Communists hold important diplomatic posts abroad and inN. The Deportment of Press, Propaganda, and Tourism is heavilyby Communists and fellow travelers, and, as previouslyare the official press and
Yet despite all this, and despite, too, the important positions which still-hidden Communists and pro-Communists hold within the non-Communist administration parties, tbe PGT is small and the Communist movement hoc no real mass support worthy of the name. Communists ln Guatemalaisproportionate influence in national life. The Cocaounlst subversion of Guatemalaubversioninority. The countryopulation of. The PGT national Conference in3ercent rise in membership, but this would give it onlyfficial members. Even adding to this the probably substantial numbers of Communists who have not openly identified themselves with the Party, the fuct remains that the PGT has obtained its position of influence withouteal rank-and-file following
dedicated to Communism. labor isat's-paw and blindly follows the Communists, who mouth its own immediate aspirations and inflame itsthe peasants are following the same road. Within the other parties, the Communists have apparently concentrated on positions of leadership, without paying obvious attention to the lower echelons. There seems no reason to believe, however, that they will not continue toand solidify their influence.
The story of Guatemala also shows how international Communism is at work in areas of the world remote from the Soviet orbit. Localin Guatemala have not achieved their power without continuous aid and support from Communist figures from outside Guatemala. Mention has already been made of the several foreign Communists who initially advised the young CTG; the principal foreign group consisted of Salvadoran exiles. During the years when the CTG and FSG were veering toward finalurther large influx of Communist visitors from abroad helped advance local capabilities. These visitors were Communists from Chile, Cuba, Brazil, Mexico, and Costa Rica, many of whom were leaders of theirparties or important figures ln the CTAL. ouis Saillant, Secretary General of the WFTU, and Lombardo Toledano of the CTAL came to Guatemala and helped to achieve the unity of labor under Communist control.
During the early years of the revolutionary parties, theirwas influenced by other foreign Communlstc from neighboring countries. urther upsurge of contacts with the international Communist movement occurredhen Fortuny and other PCG members were reported as participating in the Administration's political conferences. There were more foreign visitors to Guatemala, as well as trips by some PCG figures to Moscow and Peking. Even before this, however, there hadontinuous flow of Guatemalan Communist leaders to the Soviet capital, including Fortuny, Gutierrez, Pellecer, etc.
There have continued to be frequent visits by Latin Americanleaders to Guatemala which, today, hasocal pTJint' oTfor neighboring areas where there are conditions leas favorable to the development of strong local Communist groups- And the PGT leadership is in contact with the main current of international Communism through participationariety of international conferences and congresses, sponsored by the WFTU, the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students, etc. Indeed, the story of Guatemala shows that it ls not necessarily required that the Communistsull-fledged People's Democracy in the Westernin order to advance toward their objective of destroying Its united opposition to Soviet, world domination.
Original document.
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