NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SOVIET CAPABIUTIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US7
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SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US7
To estimate the capabilities of the USSR to attack the continental US by open or clandestine means,
This estimate Is concerned solely with Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the continental TJS during the periodt does not attempt to assess whether the USSR intends to attack the US during that period or what courses of action the USSR would adopt before, along with, or after such an attack.the paper estimates Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the US withoutto any commitments of military forces which the USSR might make elsewhere and without reference to any advantages which the USSR might gain for an attack on the US by previously occupying territory that Is not now within the Soviet Bloc.
. PART I
.. GROSS CAPABILITIES
SOVIET MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS Nuclear Weapons
eneral. The Soviet nuclear energywill continue7 to have one of the highest priorities ln the allocation of Soviet resources. The program, which lsto expand, emphasizes weaponand aims at reducing the relative advantage of the US both ln weaponand production. By the end3 the USSR hadubstantialproduction capacity and achieved the production of weapon graden the basis of data obtained fromoviet explosions detected lo date, wethat by the end3 the Soviets hadoint ln weapons technology at
which they were capable of producing weapon types with energy yields ranging from the equivalentew thousand tons of TNT up to the equivalent of one million tons of TNT. The numbers of these weapons would be limited by the supply of nuclear materials available rather than by technical limitations
eaponshile there is no clear evidence as to thc specific types and the numbers of each type of nuclear weapon lhat the Soviets will actually stockpile, we believe the weapons stockpiled will probably have the general characteristics and explosive powers of the models already tested. There are many courses of action which the USSR might adopt in establishing its stockpile of nuclearThe tables which follow are based upon four alternaUve hypothetical examples.
STOCKPILE EXAMPLE ONE
(Based on the assumption that the USSR continues stockpiling composite and pure plutonium flsslon weapons as tested in IBM and yieldingthe equivalent0 tons ot TNT each.)
End Mid Mid Mid3 4 5 9 7
Un boostedtons each) Yieldof
STOCKPILE EXAMPLE TWO
(Based on the assumption that tbe USSR usee all its fissionable material with thermonuclear boo*linglested3 totockpile of plutoniumweapons of mediumons of TNT) and small0 tons ofndeapons yielding one million tons of TNT each.)
End Mid Mid Mid3 4 5 6 7
illion tons each) oosted plutonium
Total Number of
Total Yield (Million
tons of4 0 MS
STOCKPILE EXAMPLE THREEBated on the assumpUon that the USSR uses all Its fissionable material to buildstockpile of large yleM boostedeapons yielding the equivalent of one million tons of TNT each, and pure plutonium weapons yielding the equivalent0 tons of TNT each.)
End Mid Mid Mid3567
18 34 54
eaponsillion torn each) Beoited plulonlumons eaeb) Total Number of
Weapons Total Yield (Million tOOl TNT)
STOCKPILE EXAMPLE FOUR
(Based on the assumption that th* USSR uses all its fissionable materia! totockpile of small yield boosted weapons,omposite and pureweapons yielding the equivalentons of TNT each.l
End Mid Mid Mid3 4 3 6 IBS7
Total Yield (Million
3.'Maroin of Error in Estimate. While the figures given in the tables above represent the most probable estimates for the examplesthe actual figures for weaponsat tlie end3 may be as much as one-third lower or higher than those given. The uncertainty as to amounts of fissionable material produced increases proportionately as estimates are projected Into the future. Thus the actual figures? may be as low as one-half or as high as twice the figures given in the tables above.
r i" * future Development: The USSR will probably conUnue work on small-yield and small-dimension weapons, and furtherof this type of weapon could be tested The possibility cannot bethat the USSR will develop nuclear warheads for weapons other than bombsthe period of this estimate. The USSR will probably also continue work onweapons with energy yields In excessillion tons of TNT. This program possibly could resultrototype weaponf this research Is successful and as athe USSR develops weapons in which thermonuclear reactions contributeajor portion of thc energy yield, the energy yieldortion of the Soviet weaponcould be multipliedactor offive without any Increase In fissionable material production or ln numbers of weapons. It Is Improbable, however, that conversion of weapons in stockpile in this way will take placeubstantial scale during the period ot this estimate.
Is most unlikely, for technologicalthat the USSR will have the capabilitymilitarily significant quantitieswarfare agents during thethis estimate. However, the USSRavailable small quantities of grossfission products which mightas RW agents.
Soviet Union is In possession of allbasic knowledge for themost BW agents. If they chose to dowould be able to construct orfor BW. producUon and weaponscould be available InHowever, there is no evidencethat such weapons are beingSince It Is not feasible toquantities of most BW agents Instorage, operationalhave to be supplied largely fromproducUon.
USSR can probably engagearge scale. Wc assume thatof standard agents andduring World War II hasand will be available for usethe period of this esUmate. Thethe faculties and scientificto produce at least one of theand could employ nerve gasesperiod of this esUmate.
DELIVERY OF CONVENTIONAL AND MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS BY AIRCRAFT
oviet Long-Rangethe long-range striking forceUSSR. It consistsir Armies. 1Far Eastn the western USSR,corps of undetermined subordlnaUon InUSSR. Theediumwas copied from theonly Soviet bomber known to be in opera-
tional' use and capable of carrying nuclear weapons to distant targets. Asotal ofU-4's wasto be available In operaUonal units. (Table of Equipment strength of Soviet air regiments known to be equipped with or ln process of being equipped withircraftircraft, but theegiments are currently estimated to be at only aboutercents4U-4's (six regiments with antrength) were located in the Far East It is "believed that deliveries of TU-4's to operaUonal units are continuing.
Turboprop Heavy Bomber. We have very little InformaUon on Soviet development work on new types of medium or heavy bombers. No medium or heavy bomber other than thes known to be in series producUon In the Soviet Union. At the Moscow Air Showingle four-engine aircraft considerably larger than theas observed in flight and was designated by Allied intelligence as thenlsUncUvewith tails reported as being5 feet higher than Uieere seen on the ground by competent observers. This and other information (Including the sighting at.Kazan Aircraft Factoryircraftlarger than theuggestomber larger than theay haveseries producUonhis aircraft couldeavy bomber similar to thend It could be powered by turbopropThe status of Soviet production of turboprop engines is unknown, but the USSR has developed andrototypeengine based on Uie design of
Jet Heavy Bomber. Part ofingle new large aircraftwept-back vertical tall was observed at aexperimental establishment Innd designated by Allied Intelligence as Uiehe aircraft appeared to be larger than the7 medium jet bomber and could fall within the heavy or near-heavy bomber category.
Medium Bomber. Based onwork stemming fromIn the medium Jet bomber field.ew Soviet bombers ofwill appear ln operational units byThere Is no indication that lt IsIn production.
Toote. The foUowing tablestrength and composition of the
bomber force of Soviet Long-Range Aviation
ts based on the assumptions:
series productioneavyturboprop engines began in
series productionediumwill beginnd
o. that series productioneavy Jet bomber will begin
ESTIMATED STRENGTH IN OPERATIONAL UNITS January IBM End IW
Turboprop ew) f
these mightSHP engines)
hehender normalconditions, is estimated toombat radiusautical milesombat rangeautical miles0 pound bomb load. Under cruiseconditions necessary to reach distantareas. Its speed would benots at an altitude of0 feet. However, It is capable ofaximum speednots at0 feet for short Intervals. Although there Is
'Should the USSR be able lo shorten the period necessary toong-range Jet bomber, the USSR might noturboprop long-range aircraft in this quantity.
no intelligence to Indicate that It has done so, the USSR Is considered capable oftheo Increase Its range ln tbe same manner that theas stripped to produce. ThisInvolves removal of defensiveexcept for the tall turret, and Increase In the fuel capacity,etounds in take-off weight Soould have markedlydefense capabilities against Interceptor aitack, but its combat radius wouldautical miles and its combat rangeiles0 pound bomb load.
urboprop Heavy Bomber.urbopropeavy bomber of thelass couldombat radiusautical milesombat rangeiles, with combat speeds upnots at an altitude0 feat By the end7 technicaland Improvements, particularly ln the engines, oneavy bomber mighta combat radiusautical miles,ombat rangeautical miles, with combat speeds upnots at0 feet
et Heavy Bomber. Available Information on the Soviet Jet engine program ls notto determineoviet enginefor useet heavy bomber may be available. Based on an assumption0 pound thrust power plant believed to be underet heavy bomber couldaximum speednots0ombat celling0ombat radiusautical miles,ombat rangeautical miles0 pound load.
et Medium Bomber. It ls estimated that thc Jet medium bomber which the USSR could have operational byouldombat radiusombat rangeautical miles0 pound bomboviet Jet medium bomberthese characteristics could reach targets in the United States only from the Chukotski base area. ne-way mission it could
ummary Table. The7 maximum performance characteristics oflong-range aircraft are surnmarlzed in the following table:
Combatax Combat Rangeod/Alt0 lb. load (kn/rt) (feet>_
(with one refueling) it) Jet Heavy Bomber (with one refueling)
Combat Rady Max Combat RanRepd/Ait0 lb. loaa ff%jgy
It should be noted that the performancegiven for all aircraft -are based on calculations which in turn depend on
Baio^Arcos for Direct Air Attack on Iheeneral. Three base areas, thearea in northeast Siberia, the Kola area ln northwest USSR, and Soviet andterritory along the Baltic and InOermany, are the closest to the United States.1 The Chukotski and Kola areas are particularly advantageous as bases forattacks since great circle routes would avoid Initial overflight of nations friendly to the US. The extension of bomber ranges by the end7 will not be great enough to allow the enemy to dispense with these areas If important targets In the whole of the United States are to be reached on other thanmissions. It ls therefore reasonable to suppose that at least until the end of the period of this esUmate any large-scale attacks would involve the use of these areas. From any of these base areas the stripped-downith one Inflight refueling, and thelass and the Jet heavy bomber, on one-way missions, could reach any target ln the US. TU-4's havingauticalile range, and thelass could also operate from bases In the Interior of UieUnion on one-way missions against the
rea. Of the three base areas mentioned, the Chukotski area is nearest to the United States. The standardwo-way mission (with no Inflight refueling) could not reach the United States. ne-
'Seeor maps deplcUng Soviet long-range bomber cspaMUUes far attack on the con-Unental United States (rom these bases.
ould reach targets roughly north and eastine from Charleston, South Carolina, through southern Oregon. From the Baltic area,ange would enable TU-4's to attack targets north and east of an arc drawn from Charleston, Souththrough Montana. All of theIndustrial centers of the United States could be reached from either area. Thelass heavy bomber, on two-way missions without refueling from either-the Kola or the Baltic area, could only reach the northern Up of Maine. On two-way missions with one Inflight refueling, thelass,from the Kola or Baltic areas, could reach targets in all of the US north of an arc drawn from Charleston, South Carolina, throughet large bomber operating from these areas could not reach the United States on two-way missions without refueling, but with one Inflight refueling could reach the New England area.
perational Conditions in Kola and Baltic-East German Areas. There are 2estimated to be capable of supporting medium and heavy bomber operations for atimited period from this area. Inthereirfieldseet or more in length, some of which could probably be improved and extended to support long-range bomber operations. Both Alakurttl andare favorably situated logisti-cally, and great circle routes" from this area would avoid Initial overflight of nations friendly to the United States. The BalUc-East German area has adequate bases tolarge numbers of medium and heavy bombers. The Leningrad area contains atirfields which are presently suitable' for long-range operations. Improvements of other airfields In the area could providefacilities during the period. Thc area Including Poland and the Soviet Zone ofhas at leastirfields that could be used for long-range bomber operations. These bases are favorably situated with respect to communications and weather and areserved by existing transportationajor disadvantage is that great circle routeshe United States from these
way mission lt could reach targets within an arc drawn from San Diego to Lake Superior. The stripped-downwo-way mission could reach Seattle without Inflight refueling. With outbound inflight refuelingwo-way mission, this type of aircraft could reach targets within an arc drawn from San Diego through Lakene-way mission, without inflight refueling, would permit the stripped-downo reach targets ln all parts of the United States except Florida from the Chukotski base area.6 theSovietlass turboprop heavy bomber, operating from thephukotski areawo-way basis with Inflight refueling, could reach targets anywhere in the US, andrefueling could reach targets northest of an arc drawn from San Diego through Lake Superior. The Jet heavy bomberfrom the Chukotski areawo-way mission with inflight refueling, could reach targets north and west of an arc drawn through Dallas, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh, and without refueling, could reach targetsnorth of an arc drawn through San Francisco,
Ond en. and Bismarck,
- 'Operational Conditions in the Chukotski
Area. Long-range afr operations from the Chukotski area would encounter manybecause of basic logistic limitations and adverse climatic conditions. Logistlcally the area is served principally by sea-lift limited lo the ice-free months of the year. Moreover, there are no known airfields which could be used for sustained operations from the Chukotski area, although it is estimated that the area contains four airfields capable of supporting limited medium bomber staging operations. There are additional airfields which could be improved to support long-range bomber operations. It is also possible that frozen surfaces might be employedthe Arctic winter to provide staging air strips or assembly parkingola and Baltic-East Cerman Areas.ircraft sortled from the Kola and Baltic-East German areas could not reach the United States (except the northern tip of Maine) and return to their bases, even with one outbound refueling. From the Kolatripped-downne-way mission
pass over portions of Western Europe off Scandinavia, and any attempted air strike might be detected early enough to provide warning, V
argeting and Bombing Accuracy. Soviet long-range aviation has available through open sources virtually complete target and navigation data on North Americat is even probable that In the eventurprise attack, certain Western electronic navigational aids would beat least during part of the flight.meteorological reports, including profile data at all altitudes, arc regularly broadcast In the United States and Canada in simple cipher. We estimate the Sovietand navigational radar equipment lsof at least equal or better performance than the US World War II equipment which the USSR acquired. It Is also possible that clandestinely placed navigational beacons may be used for aircraft homing. ThcSoviet training program points toImprovement In air crew proficiency. In view of these factors and Soviet ability toime of attack with respect toroute and target weather conditions, there can be little doubt that Soviet air crews would have the ability to navigate withaccuracy to reach the major population and Industrial centers of the United States and to achieve bombing accuracy, by either visual or radar means, generally within the effective radius of the weapons available,the effectiveness of attack delivered by radar alone could be materially reduced by defensive-electronic countermeasures.
vailability, Abort Rate, ReplacementMaintenance of Soviet aircraft, although below US standards, has Improved since World War II and Is considered adequate. By the end7 the Soviets should be capable of achieving In the forward stagingerv. iceabllity rate ofercent for an Initial,prepared surprise attack against North America. The sustained serviceability rate for bombers is estimated ator normal operations. Cold weather operations might cause some reduction in the
foregoing figures. In addition, we estimate that up tooercent of the aircraft taking off would fail to reach target areas for reasons other than our air defense activity. In view of the fact that most US target areas could be reached only by one-way missions or on two-way flights employing range extension techniques, aircraft losses would be high. No appreciable reserves of TU-4's are believed to exist at the present time.anker fleet Is created, or TU-4's are converted.for otherpurposes, appreciable numbers of, phased out of operational bomber unitsthe period of thisould probably not be availableeserve. There will be no appreciable reserves of any new types ofintroduced during the period of this estimate. ^
Weather. The USSR has consistentlyconsiderable emphasis to both short and long period meteorological forecasting.techniques for upper air research and Improved synoptic methods are beingfor use in weather forecasting for periods longer than one month, although we cannot estimate the degree* of success which will be achieved during tbe period of this estimate.5 it is believed that the USSR will havehort period prediction capability in at least the European USSR ofercent reliability as compared with the presentofercent. This predictionplus extensive experience Inresearch in the extreme northerngood weather reporting facilities ln Siberia, availability of records of weatherwhich have prevailed throughout North America for many years, and constant access to current North Americanonditions and forecasts should enable the USSR to predict both route and target weather with reasonable accuracy.
Electronic Countermeasures. The USSR has had accesside variety of USradar and to some US jammingThe USSR is apparently well aware of the lactical advantage to be gained bydefensive radar and otherWe believe that the USSR Is nowcapable of producing limited quantities
of ground based and airborne Jammingto cover frequencies0 megacycles, and that the USSR can seriously disrupt long-range radio communicationsthe continental US and Its overseas We further believe that the USSR will increase the effectiveness of its Jamming equipment as well as the proficiency andof its trained personnel throughout the period of this estimate. Airborne counter-measures are likely to be available for use against defensive radars and ground/aircontrol communications ln use at thetime for the defense of North America. The effectiveness of the futurewill depend on the degree of successfrom Soviet analysis of signaland from other means of obtaining technical data on thc defense radar that will then be In use. It ls believed probable that the USSR has produced sufficient electronic countermeasures devices to equip someircraft. It Ls not known whether Soviet TU-4's have in fact been equipped with such Jamming equipment, or how effective those devices would be against US defensive radar. Use ot effective Jamming equipment probably would require the employment of extraequipped specially for this purpose.
stimated Scale ot Air Attackoviet gross capabilities for air attack onin the continental United States arelimited by dependence on theomber, by thc apparent lackeveloped inflight refueling capability, and by theundeveloped character of the Chukotski and Kola base areas. Nevertheless, it isthat the USSR,aximum efiort, could launchircraft from the Chukotski and Kola areasurprise attack against the United States. If tbe bulk of these aircraft were committed to one-way unrefueled missions,ight reach target areas, not considering combat losses. If, however, approximatelyircraft were refueled Inflight, requiring the use as tankers off the aircraft launched, the number reaching target areas mightot considering combat losses. Some of these aircraft reaching the target probably would not be bomb carriers,
umber would be used for electronic countermeasures, escort, or diversionary tasks.
stimated Scale of Air Attackhe Soviets could,ajor efiort, havefacilities toaximumircraft Ln an Initial air operation against the US by the endf their entire heavy and medium bomber force were employed. The number of mission aircraft In this total would vary considerably, depending on the types of missions employed.ombination of missions designed to achieve optimum weight of attack,izable part of the attacking force were employed,ircraft could be mission aircraft withsed as tankers. (Thisaximum capability under the stated conditions. Its exercise would involve very difficultand logistical problems, particularly those pertaining to thc creationanker
' The Direcior of Naval Intelligence and theChief of, Department of the Amy, feel that available Intelligence on over-all Soviet capabiliUes for long-range air altack Istoinite esUmate of the number of aircraft which might arrive over target areas In IM UShe; therefore baUeve that paragraphhould read as follows:
Soviet gross capabiliUes for air attack onIn the continental United States arelimited by dependence oo theomber, by the apparent lackeveloped Inflightcapability, and by the relaUvelycharacter of the Chukotski and Kola base areas. The SovieU have lufndent TU-4'a to attempt the delivery of allubstanUal port of their atomic stockpile (the number depending upon types of weapons stockpiled) against thc United States from bases In Soviet-controlled territory. This capability Is dependent upon their willingness to accept the loss on one-way missionsubstanUal portion of their long-range aircraft and to risk the loss of surpriseortion of the attacking force by launching an attack fromerman bases, and upon their employment of range extension techniques. Such an attack might be launched without de-tecUon, although aircraft launched frombases would ln all probability be detected while transiting non-Soviet territory. Some of the aircraft reaching target areas probably would not be bomb carriersumber would be used for electronic countermeasures. escort, or diversionary tasks.
and the training of both tankerfission aircraftould arrive over target areas, not considering combat losses. If the USSR should decide not toanker fleet, and to commit the bulk of its forces to one-way unrefueled missions. It Is estimated that the magnitude of the attack might be on the orderircraft reaching target areas, not considering opposition or combat losses. Some of these aircraft reaching the target areas probably would not be bomb carriers,umber would be used, asor electronic countermeasures, escort, ortasks.
DELIVERY OF CONVENTIONAL AND MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS BY OTHER MEANS
General. There is no positive information that the USSR now has any guided missiles in series production. It Is known that the USSR has been conducting an intensive research and development program, and has made certain developmental improvements onndtype weapons, which were usedby the Germans during World War n.
haraaeristics. The USSR hasdevelopment oningle pulse-Jet version couldound warheadangeautical milespeedwin pulse-Jet version has been developed which couldarhead upounds for shorter distances. There ls no positive evidence of Soviet experimentation In the field ofguided missiles; however, it is estimated that the Soviet Union couldumber of submarines for the launchingype missiles, it Is probable that such missiles could be given some guidance upange ofautical miles, although accuracy limitations would probably preclude general use against other than area targets.
haracteristics. The USSR hasforward the development of theype ballistic missile. This missile,could nothreat against theus during the period of this estimate.
eneral. The USSR is. capable ofnuclear weapons which could beInto the US cither as complete assemblies or as component parts or subassemblies. The assembled devices could range from small-yield weapons (equivalentons of TNT or less)ew hundred pounds to larger-yield weapons (possibly up toons of TNT) weighingthousand pounds. Their size could range from thatackage small enough to fit Into the luggage compartment of anto thatacking case large enough to contain an automobile. All of these weapons could be designed to break down into aof relatively simple and readilycomponents. Those designed toelatively low yield would not require much labor or technical training assemble. more labor and training would beto assemble weapons designed to give high yields, and, once assembled, they would be more difficult to transport. It lsthat only the fissionable material, in small pieces, need be smuggled Into the US, since other components could'be fabricated or procured ln this country. This scheme, however, would require careful advanceand coordination by supervisorywith engineering skill and familiarity with the US sources of needed components, and wouldonger time to carry out. It would probably resulteduced yieldiven amount of fissionable material. It wouldubstantially greater security risk than Uie clandestine introduction of all components.
Z^XMethods otariety ofof clandestine delivery suggest themselves. Assembled weapons could be dropped byfriendly aircraft, could be detonated in the holderchant ship, or could be sown as underwater mines. Eitheror assembled weapons could be brought in under diplomatic immunity, smuggled across land or sea frontiers, Introduced through normal import channels, or brought
In as bonded merchandise awaitingThe selection of the method ofand of transport and assembly within the US would depend on tho Soviet objective and the risk of detection which the USSR was willing to
ecurity Considerations. Considering the known limitations of the means of physical detection, it Is probable that the USSR could introduce into the US and detonate inonsiderable number of nuclear weapons by clandestine means. However, the USSR would have to take Into account not only thechances of detection, but also theof possible detection ln forfeiting the element of surprise ln any Intended overt attack and ln provoking US counteraction. As the number of weapons clandestinelywas increased, the risk of compromise would Increase. This Increased risk would beunction of US capabilities for physical detection then of the scope and complexity of the clandestine operations, particularlyas larger numbers of Soviet agents became involved. Considering the consequencesreach of security, the USSR would probably be unwilling to risk the use of even selected and trained agents ln such numbers as would be involvedlandestine attackcale comparable to that which might be delivered overtly bye conclude,-therefore, lhal, although clandestine attack with atomic weapons might occur against speciallytargetsupplement to overtby air, such an attack,caleto that which might be delivered overtly by air, would probably be precluded by security considerations.
of Evidence on ClandestineWe have no evidence toor not the USSR has actuallyplans or preparations for theof nuclear weapons.
-x" Biological Weapons
BW agents are peculiarlyclandestine Introduction. Theof small amounts of BW agents wouldto detect or identify as to source, but
Soviet operatives would be required for theirarge number of people would be required for extensive dissemination of BW agents, and Soviet securitywouldimiting factor in the scale and timing of such an attack.
T 'Chemical Weapons
W agents are not easily adaptable to clandestine use. In addition to thenoted above as applicable to BW attack. CW agents are easily identifiable hy theireffects and lt probably would not be feasible to build up sufficient supplies or to procure the means clandestinely for their dissemination against large populationThe most practicable use would be against personnel In key installations, but even this would be difficult. We have noto indicate whether or not the USSR ls developing the means for the clandestineof chemical weapons.
ATTACK ON THE US WITH CONVENTIONAL NAVAL AND AIRBORNE FORCES
Airborneoviet capabilities for airborne attack upon the continental US (except Alaska) are also very limited. Attacks would require the use of TU-4's adapted for troop-carryingand operating at the same ranges and un-
der the same conditions as theomber. We have no evidence to indicate whether or not the USSR had made any plans for the dropping of airborne forces In the US, but the USSR could, if It chose, drop small specially trained assault and sabotage forces for attack upon Important but difficult bombing targets.
CERTAIN FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET EMPLOYMENT OF THE FOREGOING CAPABILITIESOVIET DECISION TO ATTACK THE US
he Soviet rulers wouldirect attack on the United States to precipitatewar. Inar the Soviet rulers would expect to have an Initial preponderance of military power on the Eurasian continent, but in their attack upon the continental US would be concerned to prevent: (a) US air attack on the Soviet Union with nuclear(b) mobilization of the superior war potential of the Western allies, particularly that of thc United States; and (c) USof anti-Soviet forces In Eurasia.
ne Soviet rulers have demonstrated their sensitivity to the danger of US air attack with nuclear weapons by the high priority .which they have given to the development ofagainst such an attack. Despite the substanUal progress already achieved Inup their defenses, it is unlikely that they would regard their defensive capabilities as adequate to prevent substanUal numbers of attacking aircraft from reaching strategic targets in the USSR. It is likely, therefore, that in initiating nuclear warfare the USSR would be concerned: (a) swiftiy to destroy or cripple US capabiliUes for retaliation In kind; (b) to deliver such an attack on Industrial and psychological targets ln the United States as would prevent, or at least hinder, the mobilization of the US war potential; and (c) to retain the means to counter any USof Europe. Moreover, In anyon the United States It Is consideredcertain that some portlon'of the nuclear
stockpile would be employed against other objectives outside the continental limits of the United States, or retained against 'other"
'among the available forces andfor attacking Uie continental US,highest capability lies In openattack with nuclear weaponslong-range aircraft, for the
a. the limited capabilities of conventional naval forces and airborne forces;
he security difficulties Inherent ln" the delivery of comparable numbers of nuclear weapons by clandestine means;
insufficient development ofof delivery of nuclear weapons onscale; and
insufficient development ofdestruction weapons, or handicapslarge-scale use.
The Soviet rulers might, however, employ other methods of attacking the USwith or immediately following an open and direct nuclear attack. In the cases of guided missiles, airborne attack, submarine bombardment, chemical and biologicalSoviet capabilities appear to be relatively limited.
Clandestine attack In the form ofor small-scale biological warfare might occur at any tune, and without an overt attack
ever being launched. The USSR must weigh the timing and value of the sabotage Into their complete plan of attack and Its effect upon the capability of the United States toetaliatory military attack. Clandestine attack with nuclear weapons might occur against specially selected targetsupplement to overt delivery by aircraft.
Subsequent to an overt attack, clandestinebi any form could be expected to the maximum practicable extent,
e believe that the considerationsSoviet employment of their capabilities will remain throughout the period of thisessentially the same as those outlined above.
Range Capabilities ot Soviet Long-Range Bombers,o
L From Chukotski Area
Map I tandardodified
0 ESIIP engine)0 ESHP engine)
Map 3 Jet Mediumet Heavy Bomber
II. From Kola Area
Map 4 tandardodified
Map 5 0 ESHP engine)0 ESHP engine)
et Medium Bomber Jet Heavy Bomber
Ul. From Baltic-East Oerman Area
0 ESHP engine) 0 ESHP engine)
Map 9 Jet Medium Bomber Jet Heavy Bomber
The estimated capabilities of aircraft using Inflight refueling are based on an assumed single refueling, point for attacks launched from each area. Thearea coverage ls thus subject to considerable error.