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SUBJECT! INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS SITUATION REPORT (MONTHLY) IDI IN JANUARY1
PART 1 Op 2
THE IHTERHATIONAL NARCOTICS SITUATION REPORT, ONTHLY SERIAL, WILL HOW BE CABLED TO ALL RECIPIENTS. THE HARD COPY WILL CONTINUE TO BE SENT VIA POUCH UNLESS VOLT INDICATE OTHERWISE.
NARCOTICS SITUATION REPORT1F 2
in
DATE:3
Page 1
CONTENTS:
1:
ITEM 2:
THE INTERNATIONAL DRUGIH REVIEW AND CHALLENGES AHEAD
SOUTH AMKRICA f
NTERNATIONAL DRUG0 IN REVIEW AND CHALLENGES AHEAD I |
INTENSIFIED US AHD FOREIGN ANTIDRUG EFFORTS0 PRESENTED PARTS OP THE INTERNATIONAL COCAINE TRADK WITH THE MOST DETERMINED CHALLENGE TO DATE. THE INTERNATIONAL HEROIN TRADE RECEIVED LESS ATTENTION AND BECAME MORE ENTRENCHED, HOWEVER. TN BOTH AREAS, THE TRADE'S ENORMOUS FINANCIAL RESOURCES AND POWER TO CORRUPT IN KEY SOURCE AND TRANSIT REGIONS AS WF.LL AS TTS FLEXIBILITY IH RESPONDING TO NEW ANTIDRUG PRESSURES MEANT THAT EVEN WITH TRAFFICKERS' INCREASED CONCERNS AND RISKS, LARGE QUANTITIES OF DRUGS CONTINUED TO REACH US AND FOREIGN MARKETS. THE DRUG TRADE IS VULNERABLE TO KORE SERIOUS DISRUPTIONERIOD OF SEVERAL YEARS IF WESTERN ASSISTANCE IS SUSTAINED TO KEY DRUG SOURCE AND TRANSIT NATIONS TI-TAT ARE WILLING TO ACT AND EXPANDED FOREIGN CCUNTERNARCOTICS PROGRAMS APE FOCUSED ON KEY PROBLEM AREAS. ABSENT MORE CONCERTED AND INTEGRATED COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS INTERNATIONALLY, HOWEVER, THE DRUG TRADE THREATENS TO STRENGTHEN ITS OVERALL POSITION IN
NARCOTICS PRODUCTION AND DEMAND
THE KEC'TARAGE DEVOTED TO THE PRODUCTION OF BOTH COCAINE AND HEROIN SHOWED THE FIRST SIGNS OF LEVELING OFFC AFTER MOREECADE OF CONTINUING GROWTH:
COCA CULTIVATION IK Till. WIDLAH Kli^lUN UKO.-'fED rUK i'rit FIRST TIMEERCENT DROPESULTECLINE IN
REPORTED VOLUNTARY ERADICATION OF MORE THAN
[MOKE LEAF 15 BE INC. HARVESTED THAN PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT, HOWEVER, WITH LEAF HARVESTS EXPANDING INC AND LIKELY TO EXPAND AGAIN NEXT YEAR AS HOPE MATURE COCA COMES INTO PRODUCTION.
--OPIUM PRODUCTION DROPPED WORLDWIDE BY JUST OVER 10 PERCENT--FROM AHETRIC TONS IN9 TO LESS THAN TONS WHILE LESS THAN OPTIMAL WEATHER IN BURMA WAS THE CAUSE FOP THE BIGGEST 5INGLE COUNTRY DROP-OFF, OPPY BAN IMPOSED BY TRIBAL LEADERS IN AFGHANISTAN AS WELL AS NEW ACTIONS BY THE 1A0 GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTED TO THE DECLINE.
--DESPITE THESE DEVELOPMENTS, WORLDWIDE NARCOTICS PRODUCTION IS STILL MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO MEET US AND INTERNATIONAL DEMAND. MOREOVER. DEMAND FOR COCAINE IN EUROPE AND HEROIN IN ASIA ROSE
TRAFFICKING DEVELOPMENTS
WE BELIEVE SOME PARTS OF THE COCAINE TRAPP WERE PLACED OKTNOST
OF DOING BUSINESS FOR THAFF1 I'KINU (JHOLTS WENT UP; PECOTiTrSBIZURESAND ASSETS AND NUMEROUS APPREHENSIONS, INCLUDINGTRAFFICKERS, OCCURRED. OUR ANALYSIS INDICATESTHE QUANTITATIVE GAINS LAST YEAR, THE TRADE REMAINS AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING RECORD QUANTITIES OF DRUCS TOFOREIGN MARKETS. WE BELIEVE MORE SIGNIFICANT, HOWEVER, HAS INCREASE IK CONCERN SHOWN FOP COMBATING THE TRADEAMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE. IN COLOMBIA AND MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES BENEFITS FROM GOVERNMENTS COMMITTEDLONG-TERM STRUGGLE AGAINST TKE DRUG TRADEATTER OF
THE INTERNATIONAL HEROIN TRADE EXPANDED IN UNAFFECTED BY PIECEMEAL ATTACK OH ITS MOST EXPENDABLE ELEMENTS, SUCH AS DRUG COURIERS AND GENERALLY SMALL QUANTITIES OF HEROIN HIDDEN IN COMMERCIAL CARGO. ETHNIC CHINESE, NIGERIAN, ITALIAN, TURKISH, SOUTH ASIAN, AND LEBANESE GROUPS ALL APPEARED TO INCREASE THE SOPHISTICATION AND EXTENT OF THEIR TRAFFICKING ROUTES AND METHODS. THESE GROUPS WERE PARTICULARLY ADEPT AT EXPLOITING TRANSNATIONAL TIES BETWEEN EXPATRIATE COMMUNITIES THAT OFFER UNIQUE AND DIFFICULT-TO-PENETRATE INFRASTRUCTURES FOP SMUGGLING, MONEY IAUNDERING, AND OTHER NARCOTICS-RELATED ACTIVITIES. NC SERIOUS ATTACK ON THE INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF ANY OF THESE GROUPS OCCURRED IN
AHEAD
WHILE PROSPECTS FCR MORE INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRADE IMPROVEDANY FOREIGN G< TRANSLATE STATED CONCERNS INTO ACTION. EVF.N
,NTS HAVE YET TO NATIONS NOW MORE
TO US GUIDANCE WILL EXPECT INCREASED US AND OTHER WESTERN AID NOT ONLY TO BEEF UP TKE SIZE AND QUALITY OF THEIR LAW ENFORCEMENT-ORIENTED PROGRAMS BUT ALSO TO HELP REDUCE THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COSTS OFRUG TRADE THAT HAS DISPLAYED ITS CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO PRESSURE WITH ESCALATING VTOI.ENCE.
MCREOVEA. MORE EFFECTIVE ACTIONS BY DEVELOPED NATIONS AGAINST BOTH Df-llt; CONSUMPTION AND FIRMS THAT SUPPLY FINANCIAL SERVICES, CHEMICALS, AND WEAPONS TO DRUG GROUPS WILL BE EXPECTED SY DRUG SOURCE AND TRANSIT NATIONS IF THEY ARE TO SUSTAIN THEIR OWN EFFORTS.
WE BELIEVE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS GENERALLY HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THE GREATEST GAINS BY FOCUSING ON SEVERAL KEY AREAS THAT HAVE BEEN NAGGING PROBLEMS IN THE PAST AND REMAIN SO TODAY:
--INCENTIVES BEHIND NARCOTICS PRODUCTION. CROP SUBSTITUTION AND ERADICATION PROGRAMS IN THAILAND, PAKISTAN, LAOS. MEXICO, AND BOLIVIA HAVE SHOWN THAT FARMERS' INCENTIVES TQ GROW DRUG CROPS CAN BE CONSTRAINED OR REDUCED BY SERIOUS FOREIGN PROGRAMS SUPPORTED BY THR UNITED STATES. FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN THE PAST HAVEENDENCY TO LET UP AFTER ACHIEVING SOME INITIAL RESULTS, HOWEVER, PARTICULARLY IF THEY BELIEVE WESTERN SUPPORT FOR THEIR PROGRAMS IS INSUFFICIENT OR FLAGGING.
--DEMAND FOR DRUGS. WE BELIEVE FOREIGN DEMAND REDUCTION PROGRAMS -ESPECIALLY FOR COCAINE IN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA AND HEROIN IHYET TO CONTAIN THE PROBLEM. SOKE NATIONS HAVE HOT EVEN ACKNOWLEDGED THEYROBLEM. GROWING DEMAND FOR DRUGS EL5EWKEHE MAY OFFSET AT LEAST SOME OF ANY IMPACT THE REPORTED DECLINE IN DRUG USE IN TKE UNITED STATES MIGHT HAVE ON THE PRODUCTION OF NARCOTICS.
--CORRUPTION. NOT ENOUGH FOREIGN LEADERS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL HAVE FULLY APPRECIATED THIS THREAT. ITT LARGE-SCALETRAFFICKING AND SPILLS OVER TO OTHER PARTS OF SOCIETY BY CORRODING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND WEAKENING THE ABILITY OF GOVERNMENTS TO REGULATE AHD TAX ECONOMIC ACTIVITY.
DRUG GROUPS. ENHANCED FOREIGN ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS WILL HAVE LIMITED IMPACT UNLESS THEIR INFORMATION GATHERING AND OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES ARE COORDINATED WITH THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER NATIONS. OTHERWISE, MAJOR TRANSNATIONAL DRUG GROUPS WILL DEFLECT PRESSURES IN ONE NATION BY SHIFTING THEIR ACTIVITY TO OTHERS, AS THEY HAVE IS THE PAST.
--INTERDICTION. SOKE GOVERNMENTS STILL SEE THEIRFORCEMPMT PROGRAMS LARGELY IN TERMS Of SEIZING DRUGS. WHILE SUCH EFFORTS ARE VALUABLE IH DENYING TRAFFICKERS FREEDOM CF ACTION AND MAXIMUM PROFITS, MOPE GOVERNMENTS NEED TO FOLLOW THE EXAMPLE OF COLOMBIA IN FOCUSING MORE ON THE LEAST EXPENDABLE ELEMENTS OF THE KINGPINS, THEIR KEY LIEUTENANTS, MAJOR ASSETS, AND COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENTS.
--DRUG SERVICE SAFEHAVENS. SERIOUS DISRUPTION OF THE FINANCIAL OPERATIONS OF MAJOR TRAFFICKERS AND REDUCTION OF THEIR ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL CHEMICALS WILL DEPEND ON PASSAGE OF STRONGER LAWS IN MORE NATIONS AND ON THE ABILITY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES TO IMPLEMENT MEASURES RECENTLY PASSED IN OTHER NATIONS, THEREBY REDUCING THE NUMBER OF CONVENIENT SAFEHAVENS PROVIDING SERVICES TO DRUG GROUPS.
AID PROGRAMS. AS DEVELOPED RATIONS IMPLEMENT
ITEM 2l SOUTH AMERICA
ON BALANCE, COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS GAINED GROUND IN SOUTH AMERICA LAST YEAR, BUT PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINING THESE GAINS IH THE FACE OF MOUNTING COSTS, ESCALATING RISKS, AND EXPANDED TRAFFICKING APE UNCERTAIN. EXPECTATIONS OF GREATER HEMISPHERIC COOPERATION IN THS DRUG WAR--ARISING FROM THE CARTAGENA ANTIDRUG SUMMIT INND THE SPECTER OF DRUG VIOLENCE SPILLING OVER FROM COLOMBIA PROMPTED VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE SOUTH AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS TO GIVE HIGHER PRIORITY TO ANTINARCOTICS POLICY LAST YEAR. ALTHOUGH CCUNTERHARCOTICS EFFORTS KEPT PARTS OF THE INDUSTRY ON THE DEFENSIVE THROUGH MUCH OF THEY DID NOTUNDAMENTAL DISRUPTION OF THE TRADE. THE INDUSTRY'S NUMEROUS RESOURCEFUL GROUPS, AS WELL AS ITS OVERALL SIZE, WEALTH, AND INTIMIDATING INFLUENCE WITHIN KEY DRUG SOURCE NATIONS ENABLED IT TO MAINTAIN HIGH LEVELS OF COCAINE DELIVERIES TO THE UNITED STATES WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY EXPANDING OPERATIONS TO EUROPE AND OTHER MARKETS. WITH THE STAKES RISINC IN THE DRUG WAR, ALL OF THE ANDEAN GOVERNMENTS ARE REEXAMINING THEIR DRUG CONTROL STRATEGIES, OVE WHICH WE BELIEVE PORTENDS GROWING DEMANDS ON WASHINGTON IN EXCHANGE FOR THEIR COMMITMENT TO SUSTAIN ANTINARCOTIC3 EFFORTS, f
INITIATIVES
WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOUTH AMERICAN COCAINE TRADE IS FACINGDETERMINED OPPOSITION YET- ALTHOUGH DEVELOPMENTS INY BOGOTA'S CONTINUED FRESSURE AGAINST THE TOP ECHELONMEDELLIN ORGANI NATIONS, SOUTH AMERICAN ANTIDRUG FORCES ACROSS ALL FRONTS. BOLIVIA'S COCA ERADICATION PROGRAM, GROWERS ARE COMPENSATED FOP VOLUNTARILY ERADICATING ATTRACTED RECORD PARTICIPATION LAST YEAR, IN PART BECAUSE PROLONGED SLUMP IH COCA LEAF PRICES. DRUG CONTROL GAINS HAVETANGIBLE IN PERU, ALTHOUGH US-SUPPORTED ANTIDRUGINCREASED IN THE HUALLAGA VALLEY COCA HEARTLAND SINCETOOK OFFICE IN JULY.
WE BELIEVE THE SOUTH AMERICAN DRUG TRADE CONTINUED0 TO FEEL THE EFFECTS OF BOGOTA'SMONTH-LONG ANTINARCOTICS CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE TOP MEDELLIN TRAFFICKERS. THE OVERALL COUNT ERNARCCTIC5 POLICT, FORMER PRESIDENT PARCC FOLLOWING THE ASSASSINATION BY TRAFFICKERS OF PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRANT UIS CARLOS GALAN IN IS BEING CONTINUED BY BARCO'S SUCCESSOR, CESAR GAVIRIA, HHO TOOK OFFICE IN AUGUST IN OUR JUDGMENT, THIS CAMPAIGN MARKS AN IMPORTANT TACTICAL SHIFT AHAY FROM PREVIOUS EFFORTS THAT EMPHASIZED PIECEMEAL, POORLY PLANNED
INTERDICTION OPERATIONS AGAINST EASILY REPLACED TARGETS. WE BELIEVE IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TOUMBERADVANTAGESOCUSING ON THE LEAST EXP2NDA3LE ANDELEMENT IH THE COLOMBIAN TRADE: THE PEOPLE WHO MANAGEIT.
ALTHOUGH THE IMPACT OF THIS STRATEGY IS DIFFICULT TOBELIEVE IT IS OF SIGNIFICANT CONCERN TO COLOMBIA'S UNDER BARCO, THE MILITARIZATION OF SEVERAL MEDELLINOTHER TRAFFICKER STRONGHOLDS, THE EXTRADITION OFTRAFFICKERS TO THE UNITED STATES, AND THE EFFORTS TO LOCATE KINGPIN PABLO ESCOBAR ANDCAUSED VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE TOP TRAFFICKERSP- to av:>il: arke:-t death,THIS, IN TURN, CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED COORDINATIONPROBLEMS THROUGHOUT MUCH OF THE TRAFFICKING CHAINTHE SERIOUSNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT CHALLENGE ESCOBAR SPENT MOST CF THE YEAR CN THE RUNMASSIVE ASSASSINATION, KIDNAPPING, ANDAIMED AT UNDERMINING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THEAND ERODING SUPPORT FOR THE CRACKDOWN. HE AND OTHERARE NOW TRYING TO BRING THIS PRESSURE TO BEAR ONASSEMBLY, WHICH WILL CONVENE IN FEBRUARY WITH THEBAN EXTRADITION, REFORM THE JUDICIARY, AND REWRITE
ELSEWHERE IN TKE REGION ANTINARCOTICS EFFORTS GAINED SOME GROUND RELATIVE TO CONTROLLING COCA CULTIVATION. NOT ONLY DID OVERALL CULTIVATION REMAIN RELATIVELY STATIC BUT DEPRESSED COCA LEAFON BY OVERPRODUCTION IN PREVIOUS YEARS AND IMPROVED INTERDICTION EFFORTS THAT DETERRED SOME BUYERS AND CAUSEDFAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR LONG-STRUGGLING ERADICATION AND CROP SUBSTITUTION PROGRAMS TO TAKE ROOT. BOLIVIA, ESPECIALLY, BENEFITED FROM THESE CONDITIONS: CULTIVATION ACTUALLY FELLECTARES AS GROWERS FAILED TO KEEP PACE WITHECTARES ERADICATED OR REPLACED WITH OTHER CROPS. THE INCREASE IH COCA KECTARAGS IN PERU WAS NEGLIGIBLE, WITH CULTIVATION EXPANDING BY LESS THAN i PERCENT, MOSTLY ALONG THE FRINGES OF THE HULLACA VALLEY GROWING AREA- THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU. MEANWHILE, BEGAN ERADICATING COCA SEEDBEDS IN THE UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY, RESUMING OPERATIONS THAT HAD BEEN HALTED IN EARLY FOR SECURITY REASONS. ALTHOUGH THE RESULTS OF THESE EFFORTS REMAIN FAR SHORT OF CARVING BACK COCA PRODUCTION ENOUGH TO CURTAIL SUPPLIES, THEY MARK ONE OF THE FIRST MEASURABLE SIGNS OF PROGRESSEY FRONT IN THE DRUG WAR.
FORCES
SECURITY FORCES MEANWHILE PRESSED TKEIR EFFORT AGAINST THE ELUSIVE PROCESSING AHD SHIPPING ASPECTS OF THE TRADE ID TO CUT PRODUCTION AHD RAISE TRAFFICKING COSTS. IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE, TRAINING, AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT HELPED OVERCOME SOME OF THE PIANNIKG AND SECURITY PROBLEMS THAT HAVE CHRONICALLY HAMPERED OPERATIONS AGAINST LABORATORIES, AIRSTRIPS, DRUG CACHES, AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE TRAFFICKING INFRASTRUCTURE. TKE COMPLETION OF THE FORTIFIED SANTA LUCIA BASE CAMP IN PERU'S UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY. FOP EXAMPLE,RITICAL ROLE IN BRINGING THAT COUNTRY'S ANTINARCOTICS
ICLOSER TO TARGETS IN THE VALLEY.
Page 6
THIS, KFi BELIEVE, CUT LOGISTIC PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITHOPERATIONS TH THIS REMOTE AND HOSTILE AREAIGNIFICANT
INCREASE SIHCE'JULY IN POLICE OPERATIONS AGAINST COCA PROCESSING SITES AND AIRSTRIPS. IN COLOMBIA, MEANWHILE, MORE PRECISE STRATEGIC TARGETING AND IMPROVED TNTERSERVICE COORDINATION WERE REFLECTED TN THE PETROLERASTRIKEAJOR JUNGLE-BASED DRUG TRANSSHIPMENT CENTER IN WHICH AUTHORITIES REPORTED SEIZING NEARLYONS OF COCA PRODUCTS. |
THE MAGNITUDE OF THE COCAINE TRADE AND THE PROSPECT THAT ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IN COLOMBIA, BOLIVIA, AND PERU COULD CAUSE IT TO SPILL OVER INTO NEIGHBORING STATES HAVE INCREASED THE LEVEL OF CONCERN OF MANY OTHER SOUTH AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS. THE COUNTRIES FACING THE GREATEST ECUADOR, ANDINTENSIFIED THEIR ANTINARCOTTCS EFFORTS IN VENEZUELA AND ECUADOR, FOR INSTANCE, ARE FURTHER INTEGRATING THE MILITARY INTO THEIR INTERDICTION EPFORTS; BRAZIL IS DESTROYING ILLEGAL AIRSTRIPS ALONG ITS BORDERS WITH VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA. AND EVEN THE LESS THREATENED COUNTRIES, SUCH AS ARGENTINA, HAVE PROPOSED HEW LAWS-RANGING FROM TIGHTER CONTROLS OVER CHEMICALS TO STRICTER MONITORING OF BANK PART OF THEIR FIRST STEPS TOWARD IMPROVED ANTINARCOTICS EFFORTS.
TRAFFICKING DEVELOPMENTS
THE COMBINED IMPACT OF THESE MEASURES, HOWEVER, HAS NOTTO ERODE THE FUNDAMENTAL STRENGTHS OF THE SOUTH AMERICAN AND THE RESULT HAS BEEN THAT OVERALL PRODUCTIONCONTINUED LARGELY UNABATED IH INDEED, WETRAFFICKERS AT LEASTICH LEVEL OF EXPORTS TOSTATES, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE INCREASINGLY ACTIVEEUROPE
CONTINUES TOROWING MARKET FOP SOUTH AMERICAN THIS IS AN ESPECIALLY OMINOUS TREND BECAUSETHE INCENTIVES FOR PRODUCTION AND AFFORDSNEW ORGANIZATIONS TO ENTER THE TRADE.
SUBSTANTIAL OVERPRODUCTION OF COCA AND THE EXCESS REFINING CAPACITY OF LABORATORIES SITUATED WELL BEYOND THE REACH OF CENTRAL AUTHORITIES CONTINUE TO BE THE INDUSTRY'S GREATEST DEFENSE AGAINST ERADICATION AND INTERDICTION -THE CORNERSTONES OF MUCH OF THE REGION'S ANTIDRUG CAMPAIGN. WITH LASTECTARE COCA CROP YIELDING ENOUGH LEAF TO PRODUCE ATONS OF COCAINE, TRAFFICKERS HAVE GENERALLY ABSORBED EVEN THE LARGEST LOSSES WITHOUT LONG-TERM DISRUPTIONS IN OPERATIONS. ANALYSIS OF AIR AHD OTHER OPERATIONS, FOR INSTANCE, SHOWS THAT TRAFFICKERS INCREASINGLY DIRECTED EXPORTS THROUGH MEXICO LAST YEAR DESPITE RECORD COCAINE SEIZURES IN THE CALIFORNIA AND TEXAS ENDS OF THIS PIPELINE.
COCA PROCESSING ACTIVITIES, THOUGH STILL DOMINATED BY COLOMBIANS, PROBABLY EXPANDED LAST YEAR, INCREASING THE INDUSTRY'S OVERALL PRODUCTION CAPACITY AND FLEXIBILITY TO COUNTER ANTIDRUG OPERATIONS. INDEED, THE DISCOVERYOCAINE HCL PROCESSING OPERATION IN LIMA UNDERSCORES THE EFFORTS OF PERUVIAN TRAFFICKERS TO BREAK THEIR DEPENDENCE ON COLOMBIAN BROKERS AND DISTRIBUTORS. IN A
ve:ATE: 3
7
MOVE THAT WE BELIEVEONG-TERM TREND IN PERU, AT HEAVILY TARGETED PERUVIAN ORGANIZATION HAS REPORTEDLYSTREAMLINED ITS OPERATIONS DESPITE INTENSIFIEDIT HAS BUILT AN EXTENSIVE
BASE OF OPERATIONS TO COLLECT, PRCCES5, AND DISTRIBUTE COCAEFFICIENTLY, USING EXTENSIVE NETWORKS OF CORRUPTTO SAFEGUARD ITS ACTIVITIES. THROUGH THESE EFFORTS, HAS APPARENTLY WON THE EXCLUSIVE TRUST OF BUYERS OF COCAINE DERIVATIVES.
THE EASE WITH WHICH COLOMBIAN TRAFFICKERS RECOVERED0 PETROLERA RAID HIGHLIGHTS THE SCOPE AND CONTINUEDTHE PROCESSING AND SHIPPING ASPECTS OF THE TRADE.
ITHE ADVANTAGES TRAFFICKERS HAVE
IH HASlHi> FKOCESSiNG AND SHIPPING OPERATIONS 3EYOND THEOF THE CENTRAL
DRUG INTERESTS MEANWHILE APPEAR TOATCHETING UP THEIR USE OF CORRUPTION, INTIMIDATION, AND VIOLENCE TO OVERCOME INTENSIFIED ANTIDRUG EFFORTS. LONG USED THESE TECHNIQUES AT THE LOCAL LEVEL TO GAIN ACCESS TO DRUG CONTROL PLANS, ABORT GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, AND DEFLECT ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS ONTO RIVALNOW APPLYING THEMIDER SCALE. THIS HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY EVIDENT TH THEIR ABILITY TO THWART SERIOUS POLICE OPERATIONS IN THE HUALLAGA VALLEY. GIVEN LIMA'S VIEW THAT THE PROLIFERATION OF SENDERG LUMINOSO INSURGENTS IS THE GREATEST SECURITY THREAT TO THE VALLEY, SOME MILITARY OFFICERS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN WII.LTNG TO COOPERATE WITH TRAFFICKERS IN ORDER TO DEPRIVE THE SUBVERSIVES OF REVENUES, WIN SUPPORT FROM THE COCA GROWERS, AND GENERATE RESOURCES FOR TKE VALLEY'SINANCIALLY STRAPPED(
OFFK
INTENSIFIED, TRAFFICKERS HAVE HEIR OWN AT SENIOR-LEVEL ARCOTICS CONTROL POI
TO MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE INDEED, WE BELIEVE ONE REASON
VSIMILAR MEASURES AIMED AT SUPREME COURT JUDGES. KEY ISGTSTJVPORS, AND CERTAIN CABINET-LEVEL OFFICIALS HAVE, IN THE PAST, WORKED WELL IN COLOMBIA. HOWEVER, THE INSTALLATION OF NEW ADMINISTRATIONS IN COLOMBIA AND PERU, IN PROBABLY REMOVED FOP NOW WHATEVER HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL PENETRATIONS TRAFFICKERS HAD MADE IN THESE GOVERNMENTS- STILL, "JTRAFFICKERS THE
CONTACTS WITHIN THfl SECURITY FORCES. THAT BOGOTA HAS NOT EXERTED MORE PRESSURE ON CALI TRAFFICKERS IS
ECENT APPEAL TO PRESIDENT CALI TRAFFICKERS, THE REGION'S
GAVIRIA FOR TOUCHER" ACTIONGOVERNOR LAMENTED THAT the LACK OF LOCAL POLICE COMMITMENT MADE HIM VIRTUALLY POWERLESS to INVESTIGATE DRUG ACTIVITIES.
]
GROWING VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH THE COCAINE TRADE HASOF THE MOST THREATENING OUTGROWTHS OF INTENSIFIEDIN THE REGION. EVEN THOUGH DRUG-RELATED VIOLENCEA BREAKDOWN IN THE WAY TRAFFICKERS PREFER TO OPERATE, THEY ARE GENERALLY USING IT EFFECTIVELY TO COMPLICATE, UNDERMINE, COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS IN ALLANDEAN NATIONS. IH COLOMBIA, MEDELLIN BASED TRAFFICKERSVIOLENCE CAMPAIGN ALIVEUMBER OF FRONTS EVENGON1ALO RODRIGUEZ GACHA--AK ALLEGED PARAMILITARYKILLED IH AT THE HEIGHT OF MIDYEAR OPERATIONSPABLO ESCOBAR, HE HAS STILL ABLE TO MOBILIZE SCORES OFWHO, BY ASSASSINATING HUNDREDS OF POLICF. OFFICIALS, RE PORTS. VIRTUALLY DESTROYED THE PUBLIC'S
CONFIDENCE TH THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN MEDELLIN. THE ASSASSINATION CAMPAIGN, WHICH ENDED SHORTLY BEFORE GAVIRIA'S INAUGURATION IN AUGUST, SERVED, IN PART, TO FOCUS PUBLIC
VIOLENCE THAN ON REDUCING DRUG TRAFFICKING PER SE.
FORCES
jrnment. |
with CALTT
TRAFFICKERS AND DIRECTED BY FORMER COLOMBIAN
COLOMBIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST LOCAL INSURGENTS MAY MEANWHILE BE PROVIDING COMMON GROUND BETWEEN SOME DRUG GROUPS AND THE GOVERNMENT. AMfiNEj
MILITARY COMMANDERS RECENTLY USED ARMYAH
EFFORT TO DRIVE LEFTIST GUERRILLASEY COCAINE REFINING AREA. IN ADDITION, IN SOUTHERN COLOMBIA, TRAFFICKERS AND LOCAL MILITARY UNITS COOPERATED ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS LAST YEAR TO REPEL FARC INSURGENT ATTACKS ON DRUG PROCESSING AND TRANSSHIPMENT CENTERS,
OUR JUDGMENT, THE COMPLEX MOSAIC OF DRUG VIOLENCEFORESHADOWS THE EMERGENCE OF SIMILAR PATTERNS ELSEWHERECONTINENT. THE PROTECTION THAT PERUVIAN TRAFFICKERS RECEIVEMILITARY UNITS, FOP INSTANCE, IS ALLOWING HUAMJKGA INCREASINGLY TO IGNORE, OP CHALLENGE, EFFORTS BY INSURGENTS TO FIX COCA PRICES AND DEMAND HIGHER OF THE LARGEST
TRAFFICKING GROUPS TTJ THE VALLEY HAS RESPONDED TC GUERRILLA THREATS BY PROCURING HIGH-CALIBRE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS THROUGH ITS COLOMBIAN CONTACTS. ATTEMPTS BY TRAFFICKERS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST INSURGENTS ARE LIKELY TO REINFORCE THEIR ALREADY STRONG RELATIONSHIPS WITH CORRUPT SECURITY FORCES, EVEN AS THE DRUG INDUSTRY'S ACQUISITION Of MORE POWERFUL WEAPONS WILL ENHANCE ITS ABILITY TO RESIST GOVERNMENT COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS. AND IN BOLIVIA, WHERE THE DRUG TRADE HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN IfSS VIOLENT, THE RECENT REACTION OF NARCOTICS INTERESTS TO ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS SUGGESTS THAT TRAFFICKERS ARE WILLING TO SUPPLEMENT CORRUPTION WITH
P*qt> 9
INTIMIDATION SHOULD CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS DECIDE TO TAKE MORE COERCIVE ACTIONS AGAINST KEY NARCOTICS TARGETS. OVE TNAT REFLECTS GROWING OPPOSITION TO US INFLUENCE ON COUNTERNARCOTICS PROGRAMS, SOMERAFFICKERS ARMED WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONSOINT US-BOLIVIAN OPERATION, S DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION OFFICER AND FORCING THE EVACUATION OF THE TEAM BY HELICOPTER.
CHALLENGES AHEAD
CERTAIN COUNTERNARCOTICS DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AMERICA OVER THE FAST YEAR HAVE GIVEN THE FIRST REAL GLIMPSE OF PROGRESS--ALBEIT"HE NEAR DECADE-LONG STRUGGLE AGAINST THE COCAINE TRADE. IN OUR VIEW, THIS INDICATES THAT THE POTENTIAL FOR HEADWAY IS CURRENTLY GREATER IN SOKE AREAS--SUCK AS ERADICATION EFFORTS IN BOLIVIA AND PURSUIT OF SOME COLOMBIAN DRUG KINGPINS--THAN IM, FOR EXAMPLE, TAMING PERU'S HUALLACA VALLEY COCA TRADE OR DISASSEMBLING COCAINE REFINING OPERATIONS IN EITHER COLOMBIA OR BOLIVIA. TN OUR JUDGMENT, THE FRONTLINE STATES ARE BEGINNING TO DEVELOP AN APPRECIATION FOR THE DAUNTING SIZE OF THE PROBLEM AND THE SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL, PHYSICAL, AND POLITICAL COSTS INCURRED INIMITED CONFRONTATION. IN COLOMBIA, FOR INSTANCE, BOGOTA IS ESTIMATING THAT THE FINANCIAL COST OF LAST YEAR'S ANTINAPCOTICS OFFENSIVE WAS APPROXIMATELY SI BILLION, WHILE IN PERU, THE FUJIMORI GOVERNMENT VIEWS COUNTERNARCOTICSESS PRESSING PRIORITY THAN THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC AND INSURGENT PROBLEMS.
GIVEN THIS SETTING, WE EXPECT TlfAT THE FRONTLINE ANDEAN STATES WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY CAUTIOUS TN1 ABOUT HOW THEY CHOOSE TO FIGHT THE DRUG PROBLEM. IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE PROMISE OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM WASHINGTON AND OTHER DONORS WILL KEEP THEM COMMITTED TO CERTAIN ANTINAPCOTICS PROGRAMS, BUT THE SPECTERS OF DRUG VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL BACKLASH WILL DETER THEM FROM STRICTLY COERCIVE MEASURES. WE BELIEVE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT GAVIRIA'S CURRENT STRATEGY REFLECTS THIS CONCERN. IT SEEMS AIMED, IN PART, AT BUYING TIME TO IMPLEMENT HIS LONG-TERM GOALS OF JUDICIAL AND OTHER GOVERNMENT REFORMS BY GRANTING CERTAIN TACTICAL CONCESSIONS TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION, DISSUADE TRAFFICKERS FROM PURSUING VIOLENCE, AND PERHAPS EVEN DIVIDE THEM OVER HON TO RESPOND TO THE GOVERNMENT. I
THE OUTCOME OF COLOMBIA'S CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, SCHEDULEDFROM FEBRUARY TO JULY, WILL RITICAL TO THIS ENDEAVOR. TO NARCOTICS, GAVIRIA INTENDS THAT THE ASSEMBLY WILLREFORMS AIMED A? MAKING COLOMBIA'S LEGALENOUGH TO CONFRONT TRAFFICKER PRESSURE AND POWER. HE HOWEVER, TO FACE POWERFUL OPPOSITION FROM WHO SEE THE ASSEMBLYNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TOLANGUAGE THAT CCULD ELIMINATE EXTRADITION, ROLE OF THE MILITARY, LIMIT STATE OF SIEGE POWERS, AND INCRIPPLE ANTINARCOTICS INITIATIVES,
WE ALSO EXPECT THAT THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES WILL TRY TO COPE WITH THE ENORMOUS COSTS OF COM3ATIKG TKE DRUG TRADE BY TYING THEIR ANTINARCOTICS COMMITMENTS TO THE LEVEL OF US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, OSITION THAT, FROM WASHINGTON'S VIEWPOINT, REVERSES THE CONDITIONS
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OF THE ANDEAN STRATEGY AGREED TO AT CARTAGENA. THE BASIC GOAL WILLO FOCUS FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE HEED FOP ECONOMICPOINT WHICH PERU AND BOLIVIA 3ELIEVE WAS THE CENTERPIECE OF THE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT. THESE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN VOCIFEROUSLY OPPOSED TO "REPRESSIVE" CROP DESTRUCTION
PROGRAMSARE SEEKING
ONUMIC INUiN'l IVES" TO PERSUADE GROWERS TO ABANDONBEFORE EITHER GOVERNMENT COMMITS TO AEFFORT. PERUVIAN PRESIDENT FUJIMORI, IN PARTICULAR, THE MOST RELUCTANT TO CRACK DOWN OH PEASANT CONSTITUENTSRULED CUT THE USE OF CHEMICAL HERBICIDES, CLAIMING THATLACK ECONOMIC
WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE ANDEAN NATIONS PROBABLY WILLTOOWER AND LESS MILITARISTIC PROFILE INCOUNTERNARCOTICS STRUGGLE. FOR MANY SOUTH AMERICANS, ON MILITARY ACTION CARRIES THE STIGMA OF HEAVYHANDEDIN THEIR AFFAIRS. WE BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENTSEPTEMBER REJECTION OF THE US MILITARY ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTWAS BASED IH PART ON LIMA'S CONCERN THAT THEA MILITARY SOLUTION AT THE EXPENSE OFDEVELOPMENT- ALTHOUGH COLOMBIA HAS KEPT TKE MILITARYSIGNALED BY ITS ACCEPTANCE OF US MILITARYGOVERNMENT REMAINS PROTECTIVE ABOUT ITS REPORTING, FOR INSTANCE, INDICATES THAT COLOMBIANDELIGHTED THAT THEY PLANNED AND CONDUCTED THEWITHOUT US MILITARY SUPPORT, THOUGH THEY DID DEPEND ON INTELLIGENCE, TRAINING, AND EQUIPMENT. MOREOVER, PRIMARY MISSION WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY CONTINUE TO E FARC ANDRR3IVES CONTINUEGOVERNMENT PEACE OVERTURES, THE MILITARY IS LIKELY TO INCREASINGLY INTO WIDER, MOREOVE THAT WOULD LIMIT the NEAR-TERM AVAILABILITYRESOURCE FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS. BOGOTA, PROBABLY TAKE INCREASINGLY OBSTRUCTIONIST STANDS WITHSUCH POLICIES AS OFFSHORE INTERDICTION OPERATIONS, WHICHCHARACTERIZED IN THE PRESS AS BLOCKADES THREATENING
THE ANDEAN STATES ARE LIKELY TO BOLSTER THEIR DEFENSEOPE CAUTIOUS ATTITUDE WITH NEW CALLS FOR THE UNITED STATES AHD OTHER "CONSUMER" COUNTRIES TOREATER SHARE OF THE BURDEN FOR REDUCING THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG PROBLEM. IH THIS REGARD, THEY ARE LIKELY TO MONITOR CLOSELY EFFORTS BY THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO CURB THEIR DEMAND FOR DRUGS AND TO REDUCE the INTERNATIONAL FLOW OF CHEMICALS, MONEY, AND WEAPONS ASSOCIATED WITH the DRUG INDUSTRY. HE EXPECT COLOMBIA, BOLIVIA, AND PERU TO CONTRAST PROGRESS IH THESE AREAS WITH THEIR OWN SUPPLY REDUCTION EFFORTS, POSSIBLY USING THISEASURE OF THEIR ANTINARCOTICS COMMITMENT AND JUSTIFICATION FOR DEMANDING INCREASED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.
THE NEAR-TERM IMPACT OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IS LIKELY TO PROMPT TRAFFICKERS TO try TO STREAMLINE AND EXPAND THEIR OPERATIONS - WHILE this is NOT LIKELY TO ALTER FUNDAMENTALLY THE COLOMBIAN-LED COCAINE TRAFFICKING THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, IT COULD FACILITATE EXPANDED TRAFFICKING THROUGH SOUTH AMERICA TO
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EUROPE AND OTHER MARKETS. IT IS ALSO LIKELY TO PROMPT FURTHER DIVERSIFICATION OF OPERATIONS INTO "SPILLOVER"' COUNTRIES. AT THIS POINT, NE BELIEVE THE TRAFFICKING INFRASTRUCTURES IN THE KEY "SPILLOVER" COUNTRIES ARE SMALL AND WEAK ENOUGH TO BE VULNERABLE TO SERIOUS COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTION. SUCH AN OFFENSIVE SEEMS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, SINCE THESE STATES ARE RELUCTANT TO DIRECT SCARCE RESOURCES AWAY FROM PRESSING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELFARE NEEDS TO AN EXPENSIVE COUNTEPHARCOTICS PROGRAM. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THEY COULD IMPROVE THEIR START AGAINST THE DRUG PROBLEM BY DEVELOPING INTELLIGENCE ON EMERGING DRUG PATTERNS TO FIND THE MOST VULNERABLE AND LEAST COSTLY TARGETS TO ATTACK- MORE VIGOROUS USE OF ANTINARCOTICS TOOLS ALREADY IN PLACE COULD, IH OUR JUDGMENT, PRODUCE NOTEWORTHY GAINS AND PAVE THE WAY FOP ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE THAT WILL BE NEEDED TO MAINTAIN COUNTERNARCOTICS MOMENTUM, I-
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