If-
RENAMOrossroads!
Tnp aihuiui
Mozambique: RENAMOrossroads I
Aaptr
RENAMO Crossroad*
at0
tuiJ la Mi nren
Mozambican National Resistancehich has wagedwar against the ruling Front for the Liberation ofhas come under strong pressure from many quartersonth* toeace accord with Maputo.effort*9 by the United States. Catholicand West European and Africannd the war.as Presidentggressive political and economicand waning external assistance to the rebels, have helpedto the negotiating tabic. While progress ha* been halting,and RENAMO have conceded that negotiations are theto resolve the conflict. If negotiations prove successful.go to the poll* later this year to ultimately decide the winner ofstruggle between FRELIMO and RENAMO.
peaceful resolution so the war between RENAMO andnot onlyositiveon regional stability andbut would alio place new financial demand* on the Unitedbelieve lhat once peace is achieved, both RENAMO and MaputoWashington to help (und much of Mozambique"*effort. The rehabilitation or Mozambique's importanttransportation routes undoubtedly would facilitate economicin ihe region. Regardless of the degree of potslble future US aidwe judge ibat Washington's extensive diplomatic effort*the war will help ihe United Slate* improve relations witha* well as its credential* in the entire region.
RENAMO hi* entered negotiationseak political position. The insurgency's relatively narrow ethnic base among Shona ethnic groups, iu birth as an agent of the white minority Rhodesian Government, and history of abuse of civilians have limited iu popular appeal beyond some segment* of the Moiambican peasantry; wc estimate RENAMO now number*00 people. Despite RENAMO leader Afonso
Dhlakama'* efforts to curb these human rights
Jthe insurgents Hill regularly brut-Iiic and
kill civilians. Dhlakumn has failed idpecific vision fcr postwar government or what rote be sees for himself and RENAMO Inovernment. Instead he has espoused only vague political goals that include democratic ruleestern-style economy. In addition, most
RENAMO iiHurgcnu appear less motivated by their political aim) thanpersonal grievances against ihc government and by ihcenrich themselves. Meanwhile, the government ha* began toof in unpopular socialist policies thai renamo exploited tofollowing: these moves probably have further undermined theappeal, specially aincng those Opposed io FRELIMO'.
RENAMO's political organization remains plagued by widespread faction-alism. corruption, and often incompetent leaders. The external politicalsmall group of RENAMO exiles who engage inandprone io squabbling and ia distrusted by mow rebel military commandctt. The internal political wing is small and underdeveloped and lacks any substantial administrative network in areas under RENAMO's military control. In our view.umerous personnel changeshich were intended to strengthen RENAMO politically have led to little improvement.
While RENAMO dot. not appear capable oftrong, largely self-sustaining fighting Torce that has exploitedof the Mozambiean Army and substantially destroyedinfrastructure. Dnlakama serves as RENAMO'sleader and is highly reipccted by his troops, tietaffofficers lhat attempts to coordinate nationwide insurgentinsurgent* are lightly armed and routinely operate in smallihcy sometimes form group* of several hundred when
it-ano-run rains on poorly defended economic facilities or military Installations, as well as in occasional attacks on larger cities. While the rebels take care to avoid engaging ihc well-trained and effective Zimbabwean forces, ihey do conduct cross-border raids into neighboring Zimbabwe and Zambia in retaliation for Harare's and Lusaka's military support to the Maputo government.
Although RENAMO captures much of its equipment and supplies from the MonmbKan military sod civilians, ammunition and supply shortages since9 suggest that RENAMO's main sources of external
^ MVe[cl>Th* South Africanraditional supplier of arms and logisticcertainly has signiflcandy reduced its material aid to the insurgents because of Pretoria's gradual political rapprochement with Maputo and its new regional policy of loitering closer tics to its neighbors. Nonetheless. Pretoria is maintaining close contact with RENAMO in order to retain
tents
Note
Politicalnd Limited Popular Supcort 1
Base or Support
Popster Baching
Political Ltadefihip
Euemat Wing
laurnal Wing
Military Force &
Chain of Command
Key Rote
and Discipline Problems
and Weaponry
Collet.ion
R.idi
Sabotage
External Ann.-net
South African Ties
and Private Support
wan Assistance
aid
Arab Asili lance
Suppou
for the Region and the United Stales
ear, of fighting, both the Moumblun Oovernracnt and the
Moiambican National Romance (RENAMO) have begunngage inka aimedegotiatcd iclllemcni. Thu paper closely examines Ihe RENAMO organization ai it face, new and unprecedented challenge* associated with the peace process. It analyze* RENAMO'. effort*mprove iu -cak political organization and aniure iho continuedof its military structure. Ii also reviews RENAMO'* external sources of assistance. Finally, it examines the challenges to RENAMO posed by formal negotiation lnd ihe implications for the United State*olitical settlement.
i
he Morambican Nationalhit been engatcdbe ruling Front for the Liberation(FRELIMO* ItselformerRENAMO-formed by thegovernmentollect intelligenceMugabe's Zimbabwean guerrilla forcesfrom bases In Mozambique, tut grown loJ.0OO-man Jnwrgeney operating inhe largelyMozambiean miliary ha, raited loRENAMO from frequently .Hackinginwallations. civilian population centers,facilities.ihe wppor, ofZimbabwean troop* alaceforce, have secured provincial capital.,aa larger town* and uan.portaiion corndori.military unit mi it ho* con hundred,Uvea. Copied Mozambique*caused widespread hunger, populationand human rights
Vagi* PeUrlcal Coab sad Unsited Poyular Support
RENAMO'* iDilial popular support, in ouricmraed from it. status a, the only alKcnative to the unpopular rule and policies of the Moraai FRELIMO government folto-ing independence.umine power in IMS. FRELIMO alienated man, Mozambi-cant by forcing them to live in communal village* aid so-called rc-educailonuppressing tribal cus-loma and the authority of tribal chiefs, banning political oppo.it.on. and prohibiting religious worship. Still other* -ere alienated by FRELIMO'* often mismanaged economic and aBrarian politic* thaicollectivization of small farms and OutrUbi seizure of private land and businesses, p
RENAMO. however, has always had little popular appeal beyond some sc.meni. of the pea tan try be-cauae ol tt. tainted brrihool of theor.ty Rhodeslaa Government-and later of Somh Africa-and becausepolitical goal*and remain underdeveloped. RENAMO leader Afonw Dhlakama ha* demanded an endarxism in Mozambique and ihe withdrawal of foreign ircopsc making vogue calls (or multipart,estern-style economy, freedom of speccfa and rcli. gson. and political alignment with the West Despite
> PoWiiealRELIMO. Dblak.ma hasnota specific visionostware sec. for himself and RENAMO in suchFor their pan. met RENAMOand troop, appeal less motivaicd bya.m. than b> specific personalthe government and by ihe Opponuniiy
The rebels' popular appeal probably hasarther decline8 as Maputo has begun reforms thai have undercut RENAMO*tance. FRELIMO has dropped Marxist-Leninist rhetoric from ihe party plairorm andeneral electionew constitution in0 that premdesultiparty state and directand leaislaiivc election, by secret ballot and lhat limit* theoeor terms. Other ehanics include ihe separation of Icaislative and executiven independent .udioary. ,uarun. ice* or individual and Lumen rights, and eapanded right* to own prrvate propwlyOFRELIMO's reform program, along with imcnilvc diplomatic pressure lac*y^.peei.|iy by the Mozambiean
Origins and History
RhNAMO was farmed6 by Rhodesiana&iccrs androduct of theoiid diversity of posiindependcnceMaty of the disparate group* thaihod Utile in wnmon beyond theirto the matRELIMOpairuns saw theehicle for tatteringozambkan-based ZimbabweNational Liberation Armyool to harTo accomplish theie aims.officials kepi the groupnder Rhodesianalisbury etlablilhed rear bases forin Rhodesia and provided them Hithlogistic support after MozambieanMaehel Impostd economic sanctionsRENAMO launched Its first otiaeksin early
RENAMO suS'ered some setback* widerMozambttan Armed Fortes, foroverran RENAMO's mam tamp In theregion of Mozambique titmiurtenti'first military leader. AndreA nine-moml, leadership siru$$te ensuedonly when Afonso fihlakama gaineda shootout between rival factions at abest tamp,
support for ihe African National Congresspen-source reporting from lhe period indicate' that South Africa transferred RENAMO's rear bates lo norihern Transvaal Province, assumed resporaiOiliiy for irolnlng ond equipping the insurgents, established radio links between RENAMO units, and helped move insurgents in and out of Mozambique. Under South African sponsorship. RENAMOargir. better organised, and more cffeelive military force thai expanded its area of operations.ENAMO was operating in nine of0 provinces and disrupting economic activityihe country- f ]
Maputo's Inability to contain the Insurgencyachel's decision to concludeaccord MH Soulh Africa in Marchpact called for South Africa to end Itstraining support for RENAMO. whtttpromised to terminate Us military assistanceANC. Nevertheless, the insurgents wereable to capture arms during successfulvulnerable Mozambiean military targets. In
provided the Insurgentslarge quantities ofand equipment shortly before the agreementconcluded and that South Africaassist RENAMOeduced Kale in theperiod.
support of ihc insurgency poised jrvm Rhodesia to South .Africa jun be/orecan independenceO. Pretoria tWedof the groupounter to Motambicon
Church, ihc United States, and Westand African governa peacefulto ilic war pf obublj were lhe keyhc negoiloiing table.
Kihmc II.v,ink RENAMO almost certainly contains members liom all ol ihe0 major clinic groups, lheNeau. lhe Sena, and ihe culturally
related people ol ihciver valleyranks.
1 key military and political leaders, Including and many RENAMO recruits belong io the central Mouir.bican ethnichich consti-tutc approximatelyoercent ol* the country's
ponrialion.hcio people haveethnic groupswell ii (heoJlen morembican elite lliaithe FRfcLIMOhas had,
alespriji-.in.> bet-ecn the backward peasantry and FRELIMO. which it portrays as embodying- the nontraditioaal, overbcarinf characteristic, of thePortuguese colonial government.!
Although RENAMO'. domination by rural-based Shona-speaking groups provides the rebelsegree of cohesion- it has hindered thebility to gain sappott from other ethnic groupslhe central provinces of
slgaihcam .upport among the
6
ethnic(he ImportantIhe south and among theYao In Ihe far nonh. Anti-RENAMOreinforced by ihe rebels' frequent looting andof civilians in these
MohlUalng Popular Baching
While REN AMO's leadership has sought to improve its image and broaden ita bate of support, iu efforts remain rudimentary end ineffeeilve.r
Recent pcTiiii oy the governmcat, nowever. probably are undercut-liag RENAMO'. efforts, especially among those op-pcaed to past socialist policies. RENAMO bas sought to downplay these reforms, calling them nothing more than FR ELI MO window dressing, according to press reports. In an attempt to reach the people. RENAMOobile, clandestine radio transmitter iluu broadcas^niigovernmcni and anti-Zimbabwean
f radios in ruralave curtailed the effectiveness of
anil in
i to rely on
i du ion to extract supplies and ensure loyalty
from much of the copulation under its control.1
RENAMO* Atyinut Haman Righn /record
While both Ma.-om^an Government farce, ond RENAMO have commltled teriou, human right, violations. RENAMO', 4Di.fr of civilian, op/wow io be an Integral pan of It, war Urategy. In addition lo allocking govtrnmtmt tnnattuiiont ond economicENAMO frequently raidsnd refugee center, tn learch of clothing-food. *rap-om,nd informally. The village, orelaid noire, with crops ond livestockor stolen and young men preu-gangtd Mo RENAMO rtrMc. RENAMO ha, alio targeted go,-rrnmrnr ichool, and htalth clinics. Thu lyitemolic violence is among the princwal cauut of the High, of sewral million Moiambican civilian, to iajtr urban area, or to neighboring countries.^
During ihest attaeki. ihe Insurgent, typically kill, br-laHjc. and dufig.re civilians. |
t
Insurgent,ighof theemploying axes, knirei. andmachHe, rather thanoften dlinlay bodle, and body pant. While some of the violence I, targeted againitFRELIMO official, anrf rutprcieduch of it I, limplyto lubjugate the local population and maintain RENAMO control over an ana,
whiteoffices in Lisbon,and Washington.I
Troubled Political Leadership
Factionalism, cft-ruptioci. poor leadership, and aon the military rather than theof the struggle hive left RENAMO'av.eak and
The External Wing
RENAMO't external politicalsmall body of exiles primarily eaiaaed in fundralslng andlargely ineffectual, in our view. Thesemixed-race Mozambicant or
forms, belie
Open-source report mihat the external wing evolved in theixture of ofien self-appointed RENAMO pubticius who sought toerbalance FRELIMO propaganda. Thesehowever, are often inarticulate in presenting the group's position, and have proved ineffective al coun-lerlng recent FRELIMO political and economic re-
1arrnsneoiBterniikinal image
Kerns largely from the lailurc of the external wing to affectively promote the insurgency's cause.
fence Negotiations: lhe RENAMO Delegat.on
talk, between the Motambieon Government official, nnd RENAMO', ihree-mun delegation aimed ateaceful resolution toyear-old civil war
have been undir way cff-and-o* in Rome time
I . aputo ami RENAMO have made substantial progressan effective dialogue, but that both sides continue to questionsincerity.Maputo and RENAMO were able to agree onceasefire accord Inhich calls for theto end all offensive operation* in Moiambiuue and pull back to theLimpopo transportationoint Verification Commissionin Maputo, is charged with monitoring the accord. Chaired byAmbassador to Mosamblque. the JVC comprises representatives fromRENAMO. Zimbabwe, the United States, theUmied Kingdom, France. Portugal. Congo. Kema. ond
Major obstacleseace settlement remain. RENAMO appears to be hating difficulty ntaklng the transition from military to political issues andncreasingly insecure aboui the talks
Meanwhile, the governmem continues1XISJOSI PaVJ il political reform, despite ihe rebels' ob/eeiiotu lhat they art being left out of ihe process. Although lhe government probably is willing to accept some RENAMO involvement, itincreasingly reluctant to make signifieani concession* to ensure lhe insurgents' participation. Moreover, repeated violations of the limited ceasefire by both tides are likely to eioud arptpecls forfuture peace talks, f
ItiiiorkaUy, DhUkama and ihc mi ofIcatjctthlp have nirMruiicd ihc gtoop'tseeing, idem as oat of touch,given to *clf>p. emotion I
1
rr
meeting ai tbe iniurgent heady gaiters in central Mozambique In9eview, modify, and strengthenolitical organization, la key personnel shift, ai iho meeting. DMakamaRaul Domlngos-hi. principal aide since theo the highly visible post of foreign secretary and replaced REN AMO'sepresentative to the Unitedjs Serapsao, wiih Julio Sefu. according Itreportiag. In December
Km Joao Almirante. chief of the RENAMO cabin anda confidant, to Portugal to assist REN AMO's "Lisbon representative Manuelthese changes. tKrrTST-lng remains -eat, and largely
ineffective, in our view.
fb* Internal Wing
Ins-de Mozambique, the insurgents' nascent political structure remains the poor stepchild to the military -leg of RENAMO. despite Dhlokama'a attempts to makeore effective tool of tbe insurgency.
ntlie internal politicalcq oyriu^riKmBef Nitional Council, representing all ofrovinces, with Dhrakaon as iuour-man presidentialrovides Dhl.kama with counsel andMpport, while departmenthave responsibility for foreignnformation,und other functionalDhla-kam> and execute political
The Shattered Motambica* Economy
Despite itrong economic growth in recem years. Moiambloues economy remains badly crippled by th, war. RENAMO attacks affect all sectors of ihe economy, nor only by damaging productive facititte, but also by forcing th* governmentse costly and inefficient armed eomoy, to move export craps, food, and consume- goods throughout much of iho country. Agriculture has traditionally provided employment for SO toercent of Mozambique ', lobarut the war hat forced many formers off their land ond has made thim refugees dependent on food Old for survival, Mozambique', principal foreign ex. change earner used to be the tranllhlpmtnt of good, between tts three port, and Us landlockedut Ihts tKtMiy ha, been uverely curtailed byfre-auem RENAMO atlatks; Motambican port, ore operating al onlyercent of capacity, according to the governmtnt. The insurgent threat has scared away badly needed foreign iavettmem.arge-scale plan to rehabilitate Moiambique's Cahora Batta hydroelectric project. Finally, the counttrlntuttency effort has bootted defenseto more thanercent of total budgethus diverting funds from iociai and capitalprojects, r
ieiernal wing iMOTn
HLNAMO'a military arm, almosi certainlyause DbJuhama, who holds the defense portfolio, ensures coordination. Nevertheless, then the mosi basic resources andnecessary torassroots organization, andas yet to establish 'liberated zones" inside the country. Instead. RENAMO has tried to garner popular support by turning over the administration of areas under its military control to local tribal chiefs.
Effmitt Military Core*
Oscr the pastears. RENAMO has developed inioa nearly self.sustaining miliury force that has managedeep largely inept and poorly supplied
goverament tercet off-balance.adrehundred ai iu formation in thegrew rapidly0 at iu peak inlosses,nd recruitmentsince kept RENAMO'* miliury forceand iO.OOO and reduced it* effectiveness.tome Mozambt-
can* jean vo*aniarily out Of hopelessness or In search of food and staller. RENAMO relies heavily on abduction and forced retiulimcnt cf the localmaintain ju rank*.
flit typical
Kf.ruAMO iteruil isndear, old.
Centralized Chain ofKit Rett. UMibmi lincca .Jutted taciiclea, highlyby ho troops, and RENAMO'. topFrom ihc insurgents' headquarter* inmountain region of centralcoordmntc* dnityinwgent activityall major opcrniions.r which it usually abouten.icall> establishes camp* in temtwooded area* near food and water source* aed frequently raialc* camp location* to avoid detection. |
:
In uddtnon lo this formatted structure. RENAMOumber of battalion* directly lubordinaie lo the General Staff, and numerous specialized oniu. probably underirect control. For caaav
|eacb province ha*
we] iti_o. iJumm.ndj-lypc forces thul njgmenl reiular umts during Important atuck* on towns and Mozambkan Army outposts. These unit* usually contain specialists in tribal dialects and Portuguese for interrogation of captured soMicrs. in addition to radio operator, for cemmanicaitng with lhe provincial
low morale at
lower ranks due to loots,ndam munition shortages, inadequate elothing. aodisease.
mender* are well rt>otivaied|
intergentt-small number of crudehospIiaTs suffer frequent ihoriagc. of medkal supplies and trained personnel, thereby further undermining
While most obierver* describe RENAMO as *righting force, shortages and general war weariness are fueling desertions, insubordination, cor. mption. and drug use that have reduced RENAMO's
mPhary effectiveness in recent years.
^widespread use of marWana and
mciruq.ijioTic. tn KfcNAMO troops before
Capabilities
Although RENAMO possesses only limitedit ha* consistently demonstrated iia abilitystrong military pressure on theforvc* since the
CommiisiciiriUai aid H'eaptinry.
_|Junsor crnccr* often lack radio* and communicate with one another Ha written messages curried by couriers who sometime* use motorcycle* captured (torn government forces. ("
RENAMO troop* ore armedodgepodge of weapons, most of which have been captured from Metanibioan Army outpost* Although many unit* suffer from per iodic shortage* of wcaportry and aea-munition, ibetc that have firearm* arc typically armed villiariety of oiher Soviet-model and Western-made assiult rifles and lub-mochineguna. RENAMO'* arsenal alsoccutllcss antiianhm andunndntipersonnel and antrvehiclc mines, andanUaircraftack of wheoWd trans-pori capability usually limits RENAMO'l use of
heavierorcing ihc insurgent* to usetbey can
lin laic I
'sa-/surra.
renamo cawureeTmneirhile lheould dramatically improve RENAMOs antiaircraftthere it no evidence that RENAMO ha*ddue lo Ihc lack of instruction. I-
The Insurgents have alw obtained weapon*Moaambican Governmentrom foreign 1
Intelligence Colleeiion. RENAMO appear* toa fairly good inidligefice networkon Information thai would help its
iaiargcms1 rciy on iniormanit in lhe Mozambican Army and from local village* to obtain advance warning of governmentfrcquently |
government troops arc easily "bought off" by RENAMO.
iVreis eTiWimvnowCTcrTaTccerecting intelligencebetter trained and disciplined Zimbabweantypically has less warning of Zimbabweanair operations.
Zimbabweanl,ensent in Mozambique
Zimbabwean forces wteejirrt deployed loitt2 toprotea lhe Beirafrom ihe fori eiiy of Beirain easternattacksinsurgents andSt>uth AfricanInarare assigned ato provide protection for truckalong the Tetr road linking ZimbabweUntilS. Zimbabwean forcesnever exceededactivity io providing security along theseroutes. Moreover, theapparently hadodus Vivendiiho, kepi mtereuptians on theow
Concern over Mozambique's deterioratingand appeal, from ihen MozombicanMachetfor Increased military assistanceleaders inS lo Increase thescope of their military commliinem. Byhad0 iroopt In centralundtnaking offensive operationsMO forces. Ineveraltroops started protecting lheof the Limpopo rail line, which runson lhe Zimbabwean border to theMaputo. For the past fen-years. Harareupozambiquethe Beira. Limpopo, and Trieand to undertake Joint andoperations agatntl RENAMOcentral pan of the
O typically- Operate, in small unils.forming largeruplaunching mayorgorntutuW^fet^dod towns. .. engage
in hit-and-run raids on small government,rattoporiaiion arteries, and oiher poorly defended economic target! RENAMO unit, largely avoidthe well-trained and eiTcctivc Zimbabwean
forces, but when the two (ides have clashed the Insurgem* have usually fared poorly. The Beira corri dor-the road. rail, and oil pipeline network connect-lag Ihe Mozambican port city or Beira toa priority target for ihe insurgents. The timpopo railway, connecting Maputo with southeasternIi abo frequently aiucked, as is vehicle trafllc
along the Tcieread running (tornthrough Tele Province toother economic targets, such as large agricultural estates, cooperatives, and development projects. RENAMO activity it usually heaviest during the October through May rainy season, when fresh tall grass rnd dense foliage provide cover, and abundant rains slow government cc^ntetirtsuzgerrjyor^raiioeis.r
Rotas. RENAMO regularly carries Ihe war across Moeambicwe't borders. Saccialiredwaits conduct fraquer. cross-border raids into eastern Zimbabwe, killing tuiliars and lootingin retaliation for Zimbabwe's mililaiy support foi Maputo. RENAMO also periodically penetrates up toltomeiera into ZambsaQ territory in search of food and supplies.|
'^tosl reeemtj. RENAMO increased thei " bushes
of commercialretaliationanibian Armyr on previous RENAMO cross-burn
RENAMO does not have
a capability (or sustained urban sabotage, theoccasionally carry oui isolated attacks in larger cities to disrupt industry, harassmbarrassrrrrent These attacks appear to occur la cycles, often in rctakatiun (or government <fltn.ivsi in the countryside Maputo and Its suburbs are the prime targets, with ihe insurgents attacking key roads and rait lines. |
Vtacka on Maputo's dec trie power-
lines have resulted in prolonged pouicr outagessections of the city.substantial cutbacks, forcing the insurgentsto other friendly governments, such asprivate groups for limited, albeitof
Soulh African Mrs
We .. frica's
supphts of arms andee havedecreased over the pastsaid last year thai Pretoria has notmateriel to the insurgents sinee NovemberRENAMO's reportedly severe0 tend to confirm lhal insurgentdwindling The apparent reductionit almost certainly the result ofto sieadily improve relauesu withand the ether Frontline States, at wailri's desire topre.iojs regional policy of military
off-cial
In our view. South Africa's once considerablever RENAMO hat diminished at itsanes and strains in the relationship emerge. Tension between RENAMO and Pretoria became evident in
seniorean
KhNAMO could no longer depend on official support from Pretoria. The decline in mutual
pressed RENAMO to enter into peace talks
RENAMO has evolvedargely self-sustaining insurgency, limited external aid appears to have been critical in bridging past supply shortages, especially oT ammunition. Even this limited external assistance, however, has sharply declined sincehis reduction probably has lessened RENAMO't overall military effectivencis. Longtime RENAMO supporters, such as South Africa, have
FlftS. ffeff SUv >aAnijvrftlSAHO
moved hii family fie South Africa to Moiambique In nrly November
RENAMO continues io tcccivc private South African aoarcet. In our view,!
Despite recent strains in the relationshipand RENAMO. some current andAfrican military personnel havewith the insurganis.l
io me of iti*
outhflercd financial and other kucs when they fledindependent MozambiqueS have long beer aiding RENAMO. At preset, their aidconsists of limited financial support and small amounts of Clothing, medicine, and other not-lethal supplies funnded through RENAMO representatives abroad or through supply networks in Malawi. Pre-tuna almost certainly is aware of this assistance, but has jet to crack down on this acii.ity b> Itscommunity^
I
3",
Regional and Prl.nle Support.
niiloKct. Despite Malawi*dcnubJ-!
IRENAMOcfniial*
and thatIniurgent* usef Irantil andwellource of tupolio. In return (orassistance. RENAMO hat largely refrained tiam attacking vital Malawian transportation route* that pan through Mozambique. Although RENAMO ha* no permanent camp* In Malawi, the insurgent* arc abte to move freely acroi* tbe border [
L shlpmee
9 shipments of military equipment from unidentified suppliers in South Africa were flown into an airstrip controlled by Malawian police and then trucked into REN'AMO-conirollcd tonctof Moiambiquc.
arms ana
Army soldier*
">ENAMO lis also purcb.scd ammunition from individual Mnlawian
individual Malawianblack market.
c or -villi
The relationship between RENAMO and MalawiMcnd* tonC PrcsvCcnl bands.
Banda hat fullcontacts with
band; himself met
hciau.ijrtcr* to an area near the Malawian bolder.
oint Zimbabwean and governmentagainst RENAMO's Corongosaalio make it mote difficult for Motambicanground and airin central Moaambk|uc and easternattack ihc new base.
Kiin Officialsllie-fle
In exchange for Malawi's support, the insurgents agreed in9 to end their attack* on the Nneala railwoy, which connect* landlocked Malawi to ihe Mozambican port of Nacola. The railway is Malawi's primary transport at ion link to Ihe lea snd is protectedOOQ-nianrmy
IHaUT wTih RENAMO by
orTeiingmedical and othersupplies.
Kii,,r. .lid. RENAMO also receive* limited support from the pro-Wcitcrn and conservative Kenyan re-gime largely because of Nairobi's hostility toward the lefilit FRELIMO government. As one of the original mediators in the peaceenya has had Ire-fluent publfc and private contact with senior RENAMO officials. Including Dhlakama. and ha, acted on lhe insurgent**in pan because of Nairobi* cool relations with Maputo. Overl year. Kenya has provided RENAMO with an unknown quantity ofedicine, and food.
Uhlekama io9 when the latter traveled (hraugh Malawi on hit way to Nairobi.
iddiiion. I
RENAMO's access to Malawian territory became easier In0 when (he insurgents transferred thend administrative pontons of their
Humurtd Arit Aniumntt. Rumors of aid to RENAMO from conservative ArabM Saudi Arabia. Oman, andcirculated since ihe latarab aid to RENAMO it alltgcdly intendedefenduslim community of tomeman, of .horn -era ikeELlMO'a antircligiuui fervor ,foMoanauj
upport. WeRENAMO receive!financial and some maienai aappariumber of privale sources worldwide.
ondition likely to limitlo negotiatesutisfacicry political lots for itselfnew
believe that RENAMO't political ludersho tua-pafli OhlaUma't rfons toeace sciitemeni. but ihe inexperience and divisions withso the pcihical organisation arc hktlyhe imuiccois' atsttity
peaceful rcsotsstson of the conrtsct it probably afor REN AMO's farernaltba* for internal rebel leaden, who have tonh ihr ravage* of the -ar. REN AMO'swisuj. for iu pan. it unlikely to perm ioverseas representatives an active rolepeace process, funher circumscribing RENofaciotiaton. Although peace talks arc hhelyRENAMO with Increased publicity,and irtefleciive externalalmost certainly keep the organizationwider international
We bclssve Dhlakama will coatlnue to pursue the war vsgorouily whether aagotiatioat continue or break he and other insurgent leaders realize that they cannot defeat Mi militarily. Dhlakama is likely to ptriodically
around the capital and in an attempt toa the unlikely evunt that Ibe itceatadhLUama mightcatc-Rrc to buy time, to favorable puNiestsj^
laths with Maputoewchallenges for RENAMO leaderunlike their FRELIMO lounicrparu who negotiated independence fromlink eaperience In striking political dealt. RENAMOt vague goats and lack of vision lor itoveinma tbe country are likely to slow proaressomprehensive settlement Although insur-lent leaders have spelled oui some demandseace agreement, many ofultiparty poliiscul system, free elections, and movesree marketalready beers announced by Maputo. Aa FRELIMO moves forward on us political initiatives. RENAMO probably will find it increasingly dimeuit to broaden lit popular
In our vsrw. Dhukama will continue to enjoyaid respect of bit military commanders,at some personal risk due to the war andto negotiations outs.se Mozambique. InDhlakama were killed in combat orwe believe RENAMO's military effect ivebe temporarily disrupted a* insurgentfor position Although the deathprobably would not cause RENAMOit would almost certainly alowa settlement at Ibe new insurgentu> consolidate iu power.
Although RENAMOargely self-sustainingmg asternal lupporl i* ii* sl>ensify1 supply shortages South Africawill allow linUied support to teach tha miuriirii in orderetain seme eicasire of lafluenct. but Pretoria it vnlikal) La resume Mrac-seal* official auiaiaace i* iha near icm. and the insurgents will probably increasingly look toother sources, >uch aa Malawi, Kanya. contervative Arab countries, and private supporters, for lupporl.P
any postwar reconitruction effort. Maputooa foreign exchange earnings fromtrade ihipmcnia through Mozambique andfrom Mozambicant working inMoreover. Maputo apparently believes* close economic relationship withIs criiical to its future and probably -ill lookfor economic and technical assistance, asa source of foreign
implicative, for ib< Reg ae and Uat Ualfa- Slala*
a unlikely protpcci in the aborteaceful resolution ioyear-old civil wavr wouldsgossVaai and aesnti**on regionaln end to the oar weald nee only perrmi economic recovery in Mozambique but also vaatly improve prospects for regional economicthrough ih* rehabilitation of key souihern African iraniporiation routes Mozambique's ihree major railways have the potential io tarn foreign exchange for Maputo from shipments by ntxghbors through Moumbieaa ports aad facilitate economic growth in Malawi. Zimbabwe. Zambia, and Botswa-r* Peace also would alienate the widespreadand fanunc In Hon in brave by permitting in--creased humanitarian iss-i'arcc and allowing Ihc return or moreillion refugees fromcountries f
The possibilityolitical ictllemcm in Mourn-bique at so fields new opportunities and challer.gr> for ihe United States- As In the uase of the key US rola ioAngoran-Naaiiblen-South African settlement. US dieaueaqlscncourage bosh RENAMOEO to end Ihc war will almost certainly help Washington to impior* lelatiom withand generally furincr improve its standing in )he region Peace would create opporiuniilc* for US private Iniestineni in areas such as the relIi icf farming,ndustry, and osl refining Although0 million in US aid last year- -inducing irrvcrgcicy foodMozamMque is currently the largest IS aid program in Sub-Sahiran Africa. Maputo undoubtedly would look lo Washington toeading role inions by Making additional financial assistance I
the preeminent regional powerountry with extensive historic and economic tiei to Mozambique. South Africa is well positioned to take advantage of
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