Directorate of Intelligence
The Struggle
Russia's
Ah Intelligence Assessment
The Struggle Over Russia's Future
Tbe Struggle Over Russia's Future '
Judgmcnls
ai at II More* Wl
'! tfOI.
over tbe future of Ruaiia and the formation of new Russian institutions reflects vastly different outlooks among Russian political elites. The struggle has been fought in the republic's legislative bodies, the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies, but it is also being waged across the republic io many ciiies and regions where democratic reformers emerged in leadership positions after the0 elections.
Russian reformers, led by Boris Ycl'tsin, account for approxurutclyercent of both the republic Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. They are pushing an agenda that features rapidtoward pluralistic. Western-style institutionsubstantial degree of sovereignty from the center. They have drawn consistent legislative supporttrong bloc of centrist deputies.
Traditionalist opponent* of comprehensive reform control aboutercent of the Russian Congress of People's Deputiesomewhat smaller proportion of tbe Supreme Soviet. They draw their support from elements of ihe Communist Party as well as from blue-collar, agricultural, military and security, and nationalist circles. They hope locoter-dominatod union, they object to the reformers' insistenceapid pace of change, and they claim to support traditional Soviet values such as political stability, economic leveling, and social justice
Ycl'tsin and his supporters have been able to move reform tentatively forward on issues such as sovereignty that have appeal across the ideological spectrum. They have enjoyed success in other key areas and have gained approval for amendments that have moved the republic constitutionharply reformist direction. Despite intense Communist opposition, reformers alsoandmark bill that allows limited private ownership of land. Traditionalists have succeeded in watering down reform initiatives, however, and appear to have been energized by the center's crackdown in the Baltic region.
The debate over the division of powers between the center and the Russian Republic has become all-important. At stake for the center is its historical claim to administer the RSFSR and the other republics; one Soviet characterized it as the "centralighting for iuussia's ability to wrest significant concessions from the center would not
a>tix
1
only undermine the centcMtortiinated union but would 1U0 KaTously challenge Gotbachc-'t ability to ooatlauc in power. Al Make for Russia is ihe future ability of iu leadership lo run iu governmentigh decree of independence from the center and the possible development ofiratitutlons in ibe republic
The passage of the referendum* on preserving the union andopularly elected Russian president has laid the groundwork for further conflict between Russia and ihe center. Yel'Uin will probably try toussian Republic presidential election in the next fewhas already announced hi"would provide himlear demonrira lion of popular support. This prospect will raise tbe stakes for both traditionalists and reformers at the extraordinary Russian Congress of People's Deputies, which convenes onarch:
Traditiorsalisis are likely to intensify their campaign to discrerlii Yel'tsin and demand bis recall at the session. Failing thai, ihey will iry lo hamper Yel'Uin by supporting constitutional restriction* on Ihe powers of the presidency and on election procedures
Yel'tsin and bis supporters at the Congress are almost certain lo push for creationtrong executive presidency.
If the Congressepublic presidency, which is likely. Yel'tsin would be the undisputed favorite lo win ibe election and thus become an even more formidable challengerrbachev, who bas never submittedopular election
The Russian Republic's population has shown continuing support for democraticin the face of strong opposition from the center and deteriorating living conditions. Within tbe republic legislature, there have been sharp differences between reformers and their traditionalistut there has nevertheless been agreement on sorne important reform legislation. Moreover, the legislature's ability lo corrrpromise on some issues may be an early indicator of the development of adversarial no-lltlcai. behavior and ihe beginningussian multiparty system
Recent gains are endangered by intensifying political struggles at all levels,tikuliy ofew political system, and tbe fear of looming economic disaster. Confrontation between Russia and the center will contribute to near-term domestic instability, but successful development of Russian sovereignty could earn the republic substantial political and economic benefiu over ihe longer term. Democracy and institutional stability, which are only just emerging, should have tbe opportunity lo take firmer root in Russiaepublic constitutionederation treaty of ihe republic's regions can be negotiated and approved
Thc Russian rcfotm rnovemeot's heavy dependence on Ycl'tsin. however,otential weakness. Should Ycl'tsinerious political blunder and be forced from political ccnterstagc, there docs not now appear toeplacement with the same ability to capture popular support and drive tbe reform agenda. Even if Yel'Uin were to be martyred by assassination, the reform movement, rather than rallying, would almost certainly beby his loss.'
The center is likely to try to undermine Russian reformers by continuing to cast them as elitist* and "anti-Soviet" and "anti-Ccmmunist" agitators, despite the positive outcome of thearch referendum for Yel'tsin and his allies. It is also likely to increase its efforts to exploit the sovereignty claims of Russian autonomous regions in order to distract the republic leadership and split reformers. With the center resorting to harsher intimidation tactics, reformers could lose the support of the centrists' swing votes in the legislature, leaving their ability to stand up to the center heavily dependent on their appeal to the population
-Seeret-
Conlenls
Pore
Key
The
The
The Centrum
1 .eg illrcc
The YcI'ttJn
Moving Reform Tentatively
The Ttaditionalkit Restorac
The Chalkngc From Ihe
How Much Sovcrcigniyi
The Ccnlcr'a
A "Good Newt"
A GiOotTUcr
The Role of Ihe
The Emergence of Ruarian
Blent
The Struggle Over Russia's Future '
-Syean of peres'royka have rekindled age-oldIn Russia, the Soviet Union's largest and richest republic. The result! of the dcetions to tbe Ruiilan Republic legislaturehichisible sign that far-reaching political change was under way. rcswcacntcd oaiy the lip of tbe iceberg. The dcetions were the logical culmination of events that included the opening; of Sennet aocietj to outside influencea. the advent of gtosnost aad etpaaOon of human rights, aad the weakening of Communal Party control These changes have had ccosecoenco thai Mikhail Gorbachev did aot Intend, such at the undermining of traditions! Sovietarge in the strength and asseniveness of democratic forces, and theconfrontation between Ihe center and the periphery
The roots of the current debate over Russia's future run deep, even beyondh-century debates of the Slavophilei aad VVenermrers. to Peter the Orcat. Common threads that span the fenerations of debate include the issues of incderniratvoo versus tradition, openness versus isolation ism. and democracy versus authorita nanism
The Eanergeacr of Rassiaa Politics Aa emerging debate over the future of Ihe Russian Republic (RSFSR) and Ibe formalion of new Russian institutions leflects the vastly different outlooks among dements of the new Russian pdUical elite. Indeed, the debate between Russian reformers and their iraditloaalist opponents, primarily In thea Ccarunurust Partyas taken en the naturetruggle lor Russia's soul. The center of Ibis struggle has been the republic's legislative bodies, Ihe Supreme Soviet and its parent body, the Congress of People's Deputies
The Or mortals. Russian democratic reformers, led by republic Supreme Soviet chairman Boris YeVltin. constitute roughlyercent of the Ruiilan Congress of People's Deputies, the republic's supremebody. Their thare of the smaller Supreme Soviet
When the Pott, Was King
Until rtetnlly. the CPSU wielded undisputed control of the RSFSRariety ef formal and Informal mechanisms Communis! Fortyere the preeminent political figures In the republic, while republic executive and legislative leadership was subordinated to ihe party and composed af senior party figures with close lies to ihe central authorities. The large, ceremonial republic legitlaturt. precisely constructedeflect approved quotas of pony,and security officials, token workers,mattering of women, metear for two or three orchestrated days lo unanimously approvethat often duplicated laws passed by the center. The highly centralised system of government was complemented by an ornamental Judicial branchetwork of quasi-official organliailom for workers, farmers, youth, women, and Intellectuals.
has been augmented by supportariety of centrist parties and factions. They are pushing an agenda that features rapid movernent towardWestern-style institutionsubstantialof soverdgnty from the center. They have united
Unlike tliirens of the other union republics. Russians had no Intermediary republic pony organisation to represent ihtir interests until ike rcezstabtishment of the Russian Communist Party in0 Routine personnel decisions throughout the RSFSR typically were determined by the CPSU Central Committee apparatus and approved by Politburolevel of micromanagement thai maintained theand the party's firm grip on Russian politics. Indeed, party control of ihe republics politicalensured lhai Russiaoviet Union were virtually indistingulshabl
ia bd informal legislative coalition (hai hat egg res -lively pursued comprehensive republicemocrt uc coctftltuikwi. aadype ceonorny. They have pceaaed (or rapid aad thorough-going transformation of all Lruiiiuitona of power, using Wei!cm capcsicasce as iheir model
C"her rcfoemilt pryhtkieas. tweu aa Lenirariad Mayor Aaatoliy Sobchak and Moscow Mayor Gavriil Prjpov, have also achieved national recognition. They have taken advantage ofmayorities in theiro concentrate on reforming their constituencies and have worked in parallel with the republic-level reform leadership. Although they have had their differences with other leading reformers, they have tried to coordinate their actions with Ycl'uin, focusing on issues like localhiftarket economy, and political pluralism.'
Repablicwidc umbrella organiiaiions likecoalition of prorefocai parties, sorne of which arc represented la the republichave been active at the union lord. Dcnvocratk Rnasia hat had significantin raising popular demonstrations against the central authorities, its leaden oegaaized aofuscovites and many thousands In other Russian cities in support of Ycl'tsin onarch
Reformist parties in the Democratic Russia blocide variay cJprogra ,is. Social Democratk leaders like Oleg Rumytntsev, (or exampk. advocate the virtual dismantling of all Soviet and Cottununist Party (CPSU) institutions and replacing them wiih Western-style democratk Institutions. Democratic Party of Ratsia chairman Ntkolay Travkin espouses democratic reformimposing strict discipline op bis party, arguing thai the only way to achieve success against the wcll-orgaaired CPSU it to emulate iu Although (hear programs differ, however, (heare generally Baited behind (he kadership of YeTtsia. who haslignment with
any party.*-
e of his parly's principal obsectives is to persuade the center to negotiate with Ycl'tsin in good faith
leading /Tauten Political Pari lei
The Ruiilan polltltal spectrum has expanded In ihe last year lo Include parti ex ranging from Christian Democrats lo Anarcko-Syndicaiiili. Besides iheCommunist Party, which claims overillion members, the leading Russian parlies Include:
Party of Russialaims overled by Ntkolayightly organised, dedicated to direct competition wilh iheupports parliamentary democracy, depolitlcizailon of key Institutions.
Republican Party of Russia jRPRJ. .0figure Vladimir Lysenko describes RPR as centristriented toward social protection of ihe population, progressive economic policy.
Russian reformers have embraced an economicthai would move the country Qokkly. albeit painfully, toward market principles. The republic legislature supported the radical "WO Days"which provided for rapid prrratigauon, gradual movement toward free prices, and drastic reduction of meddlesome economic ministries; tbe plan waa shelved when Gorbachev renegedromise to apply it to the entire USSR. The Russianadmllled lhai its
Social Democratic Party of Russia0 members, heavyeading figures Oleg Rumyanliev. Alek-iandredicated lo parliamentary democracy, free market system, social ptolectloei
Russian Christian Democrat* Movementpproximately lifJOOled by Viktor Akiyuchits. Father Vyenthesiavpiritually opposed to Com mum imWorldupports eexmomlc decentralisation, private ownership based on Christian value.
reform plans include someand eco-DOtnic disruption, but haa downplayed them Yel'tsin promise* thai bh program will tuin Rusiia't economy upward wiihio three'
The Traditionalists.t opponent* ofreform draw tbeir greatest support from tbe Communist Party, but alto from Mac-collar, agricultural, military and security, and Russian na-tionalUt circles. They are united not to much by common potky goals as by shared objection! to what they view as the forced pace of change Many support tome change aa necessary, but Oppose reforms they believe uadcraine Sovietuch as poll ileal subtliiy, ecortomic ecrnuilsty. and social justice. They support the preacrvationnion derail*ted by the center and the CPSU, restriction* oa privateand continued leveling of living standards. Tbey are resentful of the reformers' rush to overturn Soviet institutions and believe that marjy reform Initiatives will cause, rather than prevent, social inslaMlily. Above all, however, they want to retain the preroga-tives io which they believe themselves entitled by their self-assigned rok as theanguard
The Russian Communist Party is the republicsbastion of political traditionalism. Party chief Ivan Poloilujv has been an outspoken advocate for the preservation not only of Communist Ideology but also of the union as II It presently constituted. Theof Russia (Komrasiiya) bloc, whose members ardently oppose Yerisin, is theaction in tbe Russian legislature, claimingf all Cong res* deputies
The Coenmunm leadership in the republic legislature appears to be dominated byncluding RCP Politburo member Aleksandr SokotQv. Lt. Gca. IiTarasov, and Siberian legal scholar Yuriy Stobodkln. They have supported Yel'Uinumber of major issues, such as sovereignty, that appear toreat deal of resonance in Russia, but Ihey have drawn tbe line on issue* ibai appear aimed at dismantling or creating institutions at the CPSU'* expense RCP control of many regional gov-emmenu has allowed the party to frustrate reform at the local level, but Yel'tsin's threat* to enforcethit prohibits local party leaders from heading
Thteclaration of Sovereignty
The declaration, oppeoved0oteoith mime abstentions, proclaimed "deter-mi nation loemocratic rult-af-law stateewed USSR.Us provisions contained several direct challenges to the historical prerogatives of hfoscow. Including:
RSFSR authority to determine which policy areas It "voluntarily hands over to USSR furisdlalon."
The primacy of ihe RSFSR constitution and RSFSR laws over their union equivalents 'throughout the lerritory of ihe RSFSR."
RSFSR representation, presumably embassies or their equivalent. In other Soviet republics and foreign countrlti.
Th* demandnion treaty that precisely spells out the sovereign rights of the Soviet republics.
The right to secede from the USSR.
Am assertion ihat the RSFSR Is empowered to protect Russian citizens residing outside the republic.
A multiparty system in ihe RSFSR.
The separation of executive, legislative, andpowers tn ihe RSFSR
the corresponding government apparatus could break tbeir atranglehold on reform, particularly in thecountryside.
Russian aeavcaaheec* ia the tradilion*list camp arc teas. concerned by the assault on Communist ideology than by what they perceive aa the corruption of Russian society by "Westernecent congress of the RSFSR Writers' Union, Valentio Rasputin and Yuriy Bond* rev. two of the meat outspoken and lenopbobic of tbe traditions lists, viciously attackedeasoundng Ibe "mob rule" of pcrtstroyka. Bondsensed democrats of killing Russianand of blindly imitating theenticing apple that it rotten on theasputin chastised hit fellow Russian writers for permitting the"destruction of Russian spiritual and national
order, iu traditions aod culture" as if by "fangbe actrophobes are little moreplinter faction
in the Russian legislature, having fared poorly in the
lections.
mall but Important center exists in the Russian legislature. Iu support has been crucial to reformers on several occasions. Including Vel'uln's election as Supreme Soviet chairman last May.In the Russian legislature have more in common with reformers than with traditionalists. They support wick-ranging political and economic reforms, but they are reluctant to give the reformers carte blanche. The
centrist tactions account for roughly one-third of the republic legislature, ' 1
The largest and most vocal of the centrist groups in the republic legislature has. been the Rossiya bloc, with upwarddherents in the Congress, Rossiya has supported Yel'Uin on many key pieces of reform legislation, but Iu leaders, Sergey Ba burin and Maj. Sergey Glotov, have accused Yel'tsin ofreform through the legislature. The Centrist bloc' chaired by Col. Gen. Dmitriy Volkogonov, generally voles with the reformers and has been especially critical of the center's repressive measures in the Baltic republics
alance
cmber republic Supreme Soviet andember Congress of People's Deputies have been the venues for sharp, partisan debate among the contendingoth are roughly balancedhardcore reformers and traditions litis, but support from thecentrisU hat allowed Yeltsin to gain backing for key reform measures. These successes reflect, in patt, advantages in the Russian legislature that progressives in the center tack: the Russian body wasear laterore reformistand there arc no reserved seats in the Russian legislature for traditionalist organizations, including the Communist Party
' Voiiesenov'i kftslaiive Centrist bloc thoeld ax be eanlascd -ith tbe eitrtput-imraurt "Cameos Bteeoln alliance of tradlilonaiifi CPSU frontuj ti ihe col) republic tkathe unlo* pattern ofeegeess rt People's Deputies, which prohibits direct election e<
N Sucrirnii "'
Many Russian legislators claim ihat theirs is thelegislature la the USSR In tbe opinion ofSupreme Soviei deputy, the ability ofSoviet members is equal to or betterof their USSR counterparU.
r
Tit iVfisia Faeror. Yel'lsin's election to the post of republic Supreme Soviet chairman hasey ingredient in the success of democratic reform in Russia, HU skillful manipulation of the pervasive antiestablishmcnt mood in tbe RSFSR and histoward the central leadership have elevated bim to ihe level of folk hero. Yeltsin's widespread popular support probably has in many cases eased the passage of reformist legislation. His sensitivity lo factional differences in Ihe republic legislature, his willingness to compromise on tome controversialand hit linking of reform to the sovereignty issue have facilitated the emergenceoalition ofand centrist legislators soffideniiy broad to gain passage of important reform legislation
Yd'uin has surrounded himselftronglearn that hat played an imporuni rolean effective politicalumberofficials have offered positive assessmentsperformance of his "brainnesaid ihat
the Russian leader has matured, has excellentand listens to them. Yel'lsin's team includes veteran bureaucrats, such as Prime Minister Ivan Silaycv, who have retained their ties to ibe CPSU while supporting political refoim in the RSFSR. The team also includes loyal subordinates, like Supreme Soviet First Deputy Chairman Ruslan Kbasbulatov, and young, enthusiastic intellectuals with littleexperience and few or no ties to ihe center.
-Store*-
Yd'uin abo ha* assembled ancoursci! ihal includes luch internalionally known reformers as economists Nikolay Shmclev. Pavel Bunlch, and Oiet Boeomolov. agricultural specialist Vladimir Tikhonov. sociologist Tatyana TxaUvskaya. Vedkoaonov. Popov, and Sobchak. Many of the council'* membersadvised Oorbachev. underscoring the shift ia Iho focus of reform from the center to the RSFSR-
Mating Reform Tentatltely Forward. Reformers In Ihe legislature have been aggressive in pursuing their goal of broad democratization of Russian politics and acciety. They were quick to grntp the Importance of using not only ihe Influence of Yel'tsin but also the forum of the republic Supreme Soviet Io speak out la favor of their policy goals and to organise themselves into cohesive blocs to propose, draft, and vote for legislation They have taken advantage of poorly written parliamentary rules,oophole in the legislature's rules and Yd'isin't apparent complicity, to stack important committees and subcommittees, including the key constitutional drafting eommtttee. thus gaining them an ability toecidedly progressive coloring lo draft republic legislation.
In0 the Congress approvedto the cabling RSFSR constitution that assert republic sovereignty, by the groundwork for economic reform, and liberalise civilhen it became clearajor battle was brewing betweeniu and traditionalist versionsew constitu-lion. Yeltsin prodded Ihe Congress to amend the rusting constitution article by article. The resultajor victory for reformers. The amended conslllu-lion dropped reference* to RSFSR subordination to the USSR constitution and repealed several article* that infringed on republic soverdgnty. Similar amendments removed clauses that mandated theof RSFSR institutions to CommunistOther change* augment individual rights of privacy, association, and free speech. The Congress aboandmark bill permitting theownership of land. Jbeit with restriction
lopsided vote* on sovereignty issue* suggest that,rge client, there Is consemvus across the political -spectrumtrong stanceis the center. In
The BaitU Ovtr ihe Russian Cdaslliailoa
Tht sharpest dtbate of ikt Dtetrnbet Congretierged over the luue of Ike republicfail prior lo Ike Decembernion, rtfcamlsts on ikt constitutional draftingpporenl lytll-organiirdlo drop discussion at iht Congress of their refer mi it draft, which featured provisions for Wertern-styie political Institutions,sovereignty,arket econom*
Tradlllonoliilt have argued ihat acceptance of the draft would promote confusion as Russia stem away from both the union and socialism: that It would pave
Ihe way for virtually unlimited personal rule,by Yeltsin: that II would necessitate new elections long before the incumbenis' terms ore up; and that II would require an uanccessarilprestructuring of tht republics present organs of power. The Communists of Russiaraft constitution of their ovm ihat made some concessions on ihe issues ofnerthlp. the separation of powers, and the depolillclsailon of society, but preserved limits on market activity and relations wttk tke center
Frodded by Ytl'ttin, the Congress compromised and decided to amend ike existing constitution. The amended consitiutlonictory for reformers. It dropped references lo RSFSR subordination lo the USSR constitution and laws and repeated several articles ihal infringed on rrpubllcemoved clauses that mandated the subordination of RSFSR institutions to Communist ideology
he Congress almost unanimouslya declaration cf sovereignly thai sutes the republic's right to determine iu roteutureupporting decree outlining which powers thewould keep for itself and which it would delegate to the center received the support of nearly
erceni of (he deputies. Separate decree* approv-int rapid marketization of the economy and inert!rig the primacy of republic over uaioo jaw* received overer oat of deputiei' votoi
The Tradltloadlst Response, Despite tugnificant re-forrnlil successes, tbe Ruulan leglilature bai aot been Yel'uln'. rubberstamp. Tho ocexnliioo hai luceceded la blocklai tome key legislation and watering down other rtfonniat uutiatlvcn The constitutionalpropoted lo December supporting creationopularly elected republk presidency, to whkh YaTuin aspires, receivedc* thirds of the votes cast la the Congress, but II fell eight votes ihort of (he required majority of the totaleltila and his lupportcrs succeeded In adding the qaetitonopularly elected republk president to the IT March ill union referendum on the uaioo treaty
As Gorbachev and the central goverameat haveore hardline stance, Komrosslya and other tradt-tlonaliil fictions have stepped up their activttks In the republic Russian traditionalists appeared particularly cnerglied by the center's repressive actions ia the Baltic repubbts- They were abk ta January loobstruct passageupreme Soviet reaotalion denouncing the center's actions in Ibe Baltk region when each version fell fewer thanotes short of the minimumrastically watcrcd-dowa ver-si on thai did not mention the Baltic republics finally was adopted. In each case Yel'tsta'g InitiativescNtpolled the opposition by wide margins but failed toufficient majority, in part because of tbe embarrassing absenteeism of many of bis potential supporters.
Of significance for the future, the gradual adaptation of "the obediently complianthlatoriaa Yurty AfaaasVc* labeled ir idnionilisi kglsliton at tbe unionparliameaury tactics has lamed the republk Supreme SovietoliticalCPSU members la the republic leglilature. In particular, have organired themselves beyond the point of merely voting against reform. They have
* Ta ba iganwaa, Wat is ta* ftwtaa kavtUart emu. rtaaha Bal iha total aasber at tananhnj even If iB BM pwastea tamnir. snwovol h, the Coasrwa of SuHitf> rsoWni iHS ww trt reevliDtf tor inan-t! b,ramt Soviet.lht Svprvrnt Soviet
ii'
lr/;rii and ikt Execali re Republic Presidency
Yd 'tstn af bfeei markedly /tern kit predecessor* In ai key respect he war eleeteat raker ikon appdnteeL to the port of republic Supreme Soviet chairman. The behavior of the Ruulanalewould have been more amenable to central authorities had dlher of YdrimaryPohtkov, the staunchly traditionalist leader af the the Ruiilan Communist Party, or Aleksandr Vlaaov. the modereldy reformist Russian Republic premier at thedietedEither, by comparison, would haveompliant tool ef ihe center. '
Currently, no offiee of president eiiils In ihe Russian Republic, allhouih iht chairman of ihe republic Supreme Soviei has typically been referred lo as luck. Russian reformers, savoring their victory In thed arch referendum, foresee the creationtrong republic presided with executive powersr to those wielded by Gorbachev al ihe union level. Their proposals, found In their draft constitution.resident who:
Serves no more thanear terms In office.
ead of state and commander In chief of Russian armed forces: nominates candidates for his cabinet, the Supreme Court, and other key poets: signs lava Intond represents the RSFSR In domestic andfordgn offal's.
Has the power lo call for national refrrtndumt, veto legislation, callote of confidence In the government,tate of emergency oelaw within the RSFSR, and mobilise troops and authorise military operations.
Can be removedfrom office fordangerous" state crimes
begun to propose alternative legislation of their own. denying reformist legislators their previous virtually uncontested agenda
Challenge- Fioso lbs Crate*
Tbe cca let ore-It lieale union If iiontinue lo exist and retain any credibility. Consequently, the debate between the center and Ihe Russian Republic has become aO-Lnpcetnnt. Al Make lor the center It lis historical dsLm to edrnlnbtcr the RSFSR and the other republics; one SovieiIt as tbe "centralt bring Torndeed, Rmiii ability to wrest ti ccrxKesskms from the centra wcoid not only undermine the cealcr-domlniied ualoa but would abo seiicaisly challcngc Gorbacbcv'i ability toower. At slake foehe future ability of its leadership lo run Its governmentigh degree offrom the center and the posiibte development of derrvaeratie liutituUcea In the republic.'
Umek S'arrtvfgary/ At the heart of Ihe debateextent of sovereignty Ihat Russia and thewill obtain. Citing constitutional rightsremained dormant for decades, theleadership has asserted that theretonion, but one io which thetheir own forms of government,en their lerritory. and delegate to tbe centerII will enjoy. The RSFSR's proposeddraft
onfederation based en the voluntary membership of ihe republics
To support its claims of sovereignly, theeadership has pursued since last summer precedent-setting policies separate from those of Moscowumber of key areas. The Russian Republic govern-meni and legislature have initiated independent courses ia republic foreign pobcy, bw enforcement, resource ownership and alloc*lico, taxation, and the development of telecommunication! facilities. Yel'Uin hat Initiated th* form*lionussian security service, parallel to but independent of ihe central KGB. and it acting at if he has tbe center'sIn the wake of the1 violence In Ihe Baltiche RSFSR leadership beganwith the center for arepublic say In military policy making
The RSFSR legislature ha* ignored many ofdecreet and eedorted focmublions thaiincreased republic authority andihe ability of the center to enforce iu of all
the rights currently demanded by the RSFSR"would leave Utile of subs ta nee to the txairal govcr
During Ihe republic Congress of People's Deputies session la December, Yeltsin announcedress conference that Russia was dbsaUtbcd withproposed union treaty, noting that the republic leadership prefersnion treatyreaty among sovereigncTuin's govercmenl ha* already coacfaded bilateral treaties aad economic agreements with most of Ihe otheryear Ueaty with the Ukraine that wat signed in November. Although their cuircot value issymbolic, Yel'tsin hat Uken slept touadripartite political and ccoooenic agreement among the four republics with ihe highest SlavicRSFSR, tbe Ukraine, BctoruxsJa, aad Kaukhaua. He aad his advisers have boldly characterized the agreement as the foundationuture union of sovereign repoblic*.
Desplle criticism by somef thetoourse independent of theappears to be substantial support ia thesovereignty. Accordingat least,
one Soviet poll Indicated ihal support In the RSFSR for "completeand economicincreased from aboutercent at the time of YcTuin's ejection lo overercent byhe RSFSR leadership will use thatand probably the support of other republics dltsatis-bed with Ihe center'! limitedpush the central authorities,inimum,nion treaty that prejvide* appreciably greater republic autorvcrny.
Jala* Treaty; Views From the Center aad ike RSFSR
Government Variant
president and vice president, directlyby secret ballot.
' Powerful Council of the Federation composed of republic leaders.
bicameral Supreme Soviet, with greater represento-tlon for autonomous regions
Constitutional Court to adjudicate center-republic and republic-republic disputes.
Republics determine own Internal structure.
Secession possible after tuny thirds vote In republic referendum: five-year tramit ton.
Center administers contlllutlon, borders, security, defense, customs.
Joint center-republic control of economicall-union market and budget, monetary gyp-tern, social programs, ecology, foreign policy,eeorutnuc oetMty, military policy, security strategy.
Republic administration of land end resourcesthose "necessary to fulfilling authority of union."
- Individual republics may cede greater authority lo center vta separate agreements.
Ruiilan Republicnot yet published,
Central president, elected by republic legislatures, to serveear term.
presidential cabinet. In addition to group of republic leaders,
Bicameral legislature with the power. In extreme cases, to remove president.
Union Court to adjudicate center-republic and republic-republic dispute/.
Republics determine own Internal structure, but must comply with "Bill of Otttenshlpstablishing minimum legal guarantees.
Secession possible after republic referendum: cme-year transition.
' Provisions for currentoi wUh lo secede and maintain ties as "associate members" of union
Center administers defense, nuclear energy, public security.
Joint center-republic control of transportation, ecology, defense industries, border.
Republic administration of alt policy areas except those willingly ceded to cenitr by separate agr cement.
enter* Respotie, The central Sovieiclearly it alarmed by the Independent and aggressivo action* of the RSFSR and Hi leadership. Gwbachev has sliibbornly asserted the need to pee-terve central control of key policy areas, such as defense, foreign and security policy, resourceand taxation policy, and be haaumber of decrees contravening Russian Republtc legislation.
turn lo traditionalistuch at the party, miliury, aad securityindicates that he intends to use the administrative means al bis dhtpesal to force Russian caampiiance with centralbe nations! Ministry of Internal Affairs, for exxunple. In January blocked the appointmenteform-oriented official as head of the Moscow Internal Affairs Administration. The KOB has harassed reformistSciali. and ia February oae of Yel tii n's key economic adviser* resigned after tbe KGB incriminated him withevidence of unethical financial dealings with the Went. The RCP also hasaluable tool ia ihe center's efforts to stymie reform la the republic legislature. Iu kadership has used dme-caxisumlng debate of partisan political issue* to delay work on aubsuntive legUlatlon. When that Uctic bat failed, the RCP has succeeded In watering down some reforms.
OvrtJoo*.
The future of Rustla will be determined by the outcome of iu internal debates and by its increasingly Intense struggle with the central authentic*.generated among refcratcr* over the successesi apparently maturing legislature is tempered by the cosu of battling the center andear of further economic decline Recent eveaU, however, indicate thai rcfornsers are building momentum behind their effort* to lecrease Russian sovereignty aad tbecy of theoverning institutions
Th* passage of thearch referendum* onihe union andopularly elected Russian president has laid the greendwork for farther ccoflvst between Russia and the center. In Raasta, thequestion polled nearlyercent republkwide and overercent In some urban areas, such at
Moscow and leningrad. Yel'tsin will probably try loussian presidential election ia the neal fewe has already artsvouaccd hiswould prr/ride himear demonstra-lion of popular support. This prospectraise Ihe tukea for both traditionalists and reformers at the extraordinary Russian Congress of People's Deputies, which convenes oaarch.'
at the Congress, with the Communist Parly In the lead, are likely to latenalfy their oaav palgn to discredit Yel'uin and derail his bid for the presidency by Initialing debate en the subject of has recall as Chairman of Ihe Surareanc Soviet, If. as seem likely, they fail locust Yd'u.n, they wiD try to hamper him by supporting constitutional restrictions on the powers of ihe presidency and on election procedures. Yel'tsin and bit ailiea arc almost certain to unveil Icspsuijo* providingtrong executive presidency. Sergeyel'tsin supporter who chairs the key legislation Committee, indicatedonstitutional amendment on ihe presidency has already been drafted and will be submit ted to Ibe CnagTtti If the Congressepublicwhich is Hkcly, YeTUin win be the smdispuird favorite to win lb* election aad thus become an even more formidable challenger to Gorbachev, wbo has never submittedopular decfioe. la addition. Yel'uin Isat the Congress or during the electionpush for new clcericant to the RSFSR legislature anden! governing bed in inrder to further utwJermine Communist influence.
n,inn Current treads,la Ihe Russian legislature, give Ihe republictome cause for optimism. Iu conrVdec.ce Is based primarily oa the Supreme Soviet's increasing political maturity and general effectiveness la moving political reforms ahead. The democratization aad rein vigors-lion of long dormant political institalioas havethe breakdown of the traditional Cccnmu-abt political hegernooy over the republic government. Ycfusio's top* tot leadership has rallied Russians la support of the principles of republic autonomy from the center and basse reform*ysfunctional syttem
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Irul living conditions. The spirited politicalio Ibe RSFSR Supremea indicator of growing; democratic trends In the republic. With some exceptions, and accounting for the newness of political debate la Russia, the emergence of debate among reformers, indUknalbta, andlga of political development Despite sharp traditionalist op-pcaiuoo that has made the paiiage of reform tcgisla-tkdo snore difficult, the legislatures ability tooo such issues as Ihe laadcrwnenhip bill, passed la December, may be Interpreted as aa early Indicator of productive adversarial political behavior.the two cods of Ihe spectrum define andto Russian political culture and could mark the beg inningsultiparty system. '
The development of Russian sovereignty could, over the longer terra, earn the republic substantial political and economic benefits Assuming thai willingeventuallynion treaty that provides for substantially greater sovereignty and excludesrepublics, the terms of center-republic relations will be more firmly defined. Ia such an environment, tbe Russian leadership will be better able to solidify reforms of the republic's political structure aadsystem. Similarly, democracy and institutional stability, which are only just emerging, should have tbe opportunity to take firmer root in Russia if, as optimistic offlciabepublic constitutionederation treaty ef the reoublica regions can be negotiated and approved *
A Gloomier PetilMlitj, These appealing prospects are endangered by intensifying political struggles at all levers, the difficulty ofcw political system, and the fear of looming economic disaster. Over the near term, the confrontation between Russia aad the central authorities will contribute lodomestic Instabilityouldurther raising of the stakes as Russia seeks lo establish precedents for the division of center-republic powers and as Gorbachev contemplates coercive measures lo gain Russian compliance
PopuUr anger over Ihe economy's disintegration isotentially asajor contributor lo instability. Since Yd*ttin pronounced0 Days"lally dead In November after Gorbachev rejectedrepublic leadership admittedly has had no plan to redirect Its energies toward implementing significant economic reform. Even if Ihe Yd"uia team caa get soother pita on track, serious reforms almost certainly win bring with them serious conic-jc-cooes, such as increased levels of unemployment andSpeakers from both cods of Ihe politicalin ihe republic legislature have warned lhai giowing economic uncertainty and frustration at the grassroots level, combined with high-level jockeying within the republic and between the republic and the central authorities, could manifest themselves vvaicatly
Tht Rolf of ikt Ctnltr. Encouraged by pressure from party aad military officials tnaccrand about theof the center's authority,rying to reassert control over the periphery. These efforts preseat formidable obstaclesepublic headerthip Striving for greater autonomy, but, Ironically.snobtllration of tbe central bureaucracy, which was intended lo erode the reformers' support base aad derail Yd'tslns efforts to become Rassian prcsidenl, has so far backered. The greatest danger to the nisccat Russian reform movement is the threat ef force by Gorbachev lo assert ihe center's authority. Recent decisions to increase the center's pressure on Russian referasers and at least plant the iced of forcible repression may eventually be able in fracture Yd'tsln'i current fragile reform coaliiloo
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Particularly because of recent ithowings of popular support for Yel'iain and reform in Russia.caal hope lhaicced without resorting to the crude maneuvers used In the Baltic rearioc. Already there are signs that the front oraanlration Centrist Bloc of Parties intends to actussian "national salvation coeruoittce" If the need arises.ikely to oootinuc to try to undcrmioo Russian reforsnen by painting them aa cliltsU and "anll-Sovict" or "anti-Communist" aglta-tors, despite the positive outcotne of thearch referendum for reformers. Thebo likely to increase its efforts to toratcjit tbe serveretanty claims of uutonotnous oniu in the RSFSR to distract the republic leadership. Wilh the center relying- ontactics. Including KGB provocationsmear campaign, reformers could lose the support of the centrists* swing votes ia the learisliiure, leaving their ability to stand up to the center heavilyon their appeal to the population
Original document.
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