ft.
OF
1
Yugoslavia's Bttmic conflict and its Regional Fallout
Yugoslavia, it is "back to the future" as the systemic collapse of Tito's socialist federation has given free rein to' nationalist and separatist forces. Even though federal military forces failed to follow through on their threat in late January to disarm the local ailitias in Croatia andmove that would have led tothreat of military intervention to prevent the secession of these republics remains. That continuing threat and imminent ethnic violence on several fronts make it likely that the country this year will suffer serious internal conflict, with important consequences for neighboring states.
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aggressiveness combined with the aspirations for independencethe other nationalities increase the likelihood that the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation will be accompanied by violence. The most likely flashpoints of ethnic conflict in'Yugoslavia would pit the Serbsost of perceived enemies that includes Croats, Albanians, other Muslims, and Macedonians. Yugoslavia, breaking up could draw neighboring states with ethnic or historical equities toas Greece, Bulgaria, andinto the
typescript was prepared by Analysis. Comments and querion arc we
Office of European nd
fray. Fipplehat could include large-scale refugor flows, requests for assistance, end- warfare would demand the attention of waat European statea. international agencies, crJ the United Statea.
This Memorandum aurvoys our thinking about the current etat< of play In Yugoslavia and puts the moat recent political criala pitting Serbia againat Croatia into the broader contextervasive ethnic conflict in the country that couldignifleant impact on US and European interests.
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Discussion
Democratization and pluralism in Yugoslavia have not ledeasing of political tensions. Instead, they have givenethnic-based political parties that are helping tearapart and give voice to virulent nationalistCroats, Slovenes, Muslims, Albanians, Macedonians, andof other peoples are fixated on the poet, with itsbetrayals, forced migrations, and "lost-passageere half century has not assuagedof World War Two,ugoslavsat the hands of other Yugoslavs. The best knownmost explosive hatreds are between the Serbs and The atrocities committed against each other byfascist Ustashi movement, Tito'a ethnically and the Serbian royalist Chetniks stilllife, especially in ethnically dividedand Croatia, whichmallercent) Serb
Such animosities would come to the fore in the most likely scenarios for conflict in Yugoslavia:
An attempt by the military forcibly to prevent the secession of one or more republics; or
Xnterethnlc violence within or across republic borders, pitting Serbs against Croata, Kosovo Albaaj^iji, other Muslims, and possibly Macedonians.
The Secession Scenario
The current political divisions among the republican governments appear irreconcilablenified Yugoslav state. Klectorates in Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-llnrcegovina last year all gave majorities to anti-Communist and national" parties. The Serbian hoartland of Serbia proper and Montenegro opted to stay with the Communist old guard. esult, Yugoslavie now is cleftaultline; on either side, societies are evolving inay that they would no longer
fit together, even If they were free of ethnic hostilities. Slovenia and Croatia are. mora or leas democratic and Market-orient.:; while, ant1-democratic and socialist habits persist In
two camps and are caught uncomfortably latweem-thn;
Serbia and Kontena^ro- Tha otLer reglone share attributea eaV'
Tae Serbian Engine of Unrest
reelection of Slobodan Milosevic as President of Ssrbla last December has reduced the chanceseaceful dissolution of Yugoslavia. His hardline Serbian nationalism fuels the nationalist passions and separatism in the non-Serbian republics and within the Serbian provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodine with their large Albanian and Hungarian populations. Milosevic's assertions of tbe claimsGreaterterritorial demands on itshis reliance on an iron fist to suppress the Albanians and other minorities in Serbia provoke fear as well as resentment in the other republioe. Milosevic is likely to respond to the recent massive antl-Comarunist demonstrations organized against him by the Serbia
unist aosonscrationu organized against nim oy tneition by beating even harder on the nationalist drum.
Milosevic and the other old guard forces [SEE BOX) view Croatia and Slovenia as the most immediate challenges to their idealentralized and authoritarian state. lovenian plebiscite last December overwhelmingly approved independence and has sst the clock tickingaximum six-month countdown to secession. The Slovenian legislature has begun to take steps to sever ties, ormal callof the federation issued onebruary.
Concurrently, the government of President Franjo Tudjman in Croatia hasew constitution that authorizes secession If an arrangementoose confederation modeled on the European Community is not worked out among the six republics. Despite Zagreb's lip service to the notion ofonfederation, all parties recognize that the feasibility of such an accommodation has all but disappeared.
Defenders of the Political ilitvn Quo
The Yugoslav people's Army (JKA). The leaders of the JNA
'hare Hilosevic's Communist tenate, and they are tha last chasplons of Tito's Idealugoslav state whichethnic nationalias. They have repeatedly threatened toorce to prevent the country's breakup. The JNA caawi within an inch of cracking down in January on the "illegal anted formations" (local militias) formed by Croatia and Slovenia to defend their sovereignty, and were deterred only by the last minute opposition of the collective Federal Presidency. Army leaders may not be amenable to such control in the future.
The orthodox communists who comprise the recently formed "League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia" are closely connected to the JNA and are realniscent of Moscow-sponsored "National salvation Committees" in the Baltics. Like the salvation Committees, this party could provide political coverove to impose martial law.
Premier Ante Maxkovio. Markovic,roat, presidesmall pan-Yugoslav party andederal government of diminishing relevance. Markovic has on occasion implicitly endorsed the use of force to bring Slovenia and Croatia into line, but also has sought toeacemaker.
4 m
NOPflN
SECRJfT
PotentialSerbs and Croats
In the end. Milosevic and the military hold theto Yugoslavia's future. Milosevic appears to believe Yugoslavia's days are numbered, even though ho continues publicly to insistn"ary Yugoslav state. He explicitly designed the new Serbian constitution last year to serve an Independent state, suggesting that at some point Serbia is ready to go it alone. ecision, however, does not necessarily preclude conflict Milosevic has asaerted that the dissolution of Yugoslavia"will put Internal borders, which he terms -administrativep forgrabs. something Croatia and Bosnia are determined to resist.
Serbian leaders have hinted that they might countenance tha secession of relatively small and ethnically homogeneous Slovenia. Croatia counts for far more in Serbia's calculations, in large part because its populationillion includesthnic Serbs mixed with the Croat population.
The most likely flashpoint between Belgrade and 2agreb wouldonfrontation over rebellious Serbs in Croatia. The Krajina
to
La
government and
22 tna* froMsta in Zagreb". ACroatian authorities and the -SOAK" has beenarmed clashes and the periodic blocXade of road andthrough tho area.
The most serious incident so far foreshadowsuture Jinovdown could develop. Federal troops, Croatian policeSerbian civilians briefly exchanged gunfire over the weekendarch in the Serb township of Pakrac after forces movod intoebellion against Croatian
JS2 I i ocfll,Serbs- This time there was nosorbs from outside the republic, but the mostin Serbia talkjiinnjjaramilitary unitstha Serbian minority,
If the JMA Moves
. the use of modest force to impose
he Serb areas of Croatia probably would prompt what it was designed torapid move to complete independence by Croatia and almost certainly by Slovenia as well. Leaders of the two republics say they have agreed to secede immediately if either republic is attacked by the Army. Tudjman has repeatedly vowad that Croatia would fight any army intervention; local clashes could quickly escalatearger conflict, which probably would be bloody and chaotic. is
KOJjfc*^!
Bosnia, and Macedonia
fighting were prolonged, the JNA itself probablythnic lines, adding to the cheoe. Ihe larg-st remnant would prc*ebly traruMorm Itself into The Amy of Serbia, opening the way to further conflicts wit'on behalf of pan-Serbian goals.
Bosnia
The even more ethnically heterogeneous Republic ofkilling ground that saw some of World War Two's cost brutal ikelyover Belgrade's claims to defend Serbian minorities' serbThird of the population and usuallyi?tCaiof Muslim% of the population) and. Tho results of the December elections there followed strictly ethnic lines, and the campaign was marked by confrontations between Serbs and Muslims. Should Slovenia and
anythe federation
rather than staying on toump "Serboslavie". in this
ou" attempt tothe republic and joinove that wouldat least interethnic communal violence andby Serbia and
Yugoslavia is also plagued by another major festeringAlbanians and Serbs. This conflict
could explode either spontaneously or in conjunctionerb-
fZTSfmZZii 5howdown-conflict between Serbs and Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo appears irreconcilable.
I ?Kingdom of Serbia and scene of
a heroic but failed battle against the Turks still commomorated
n Serbia'- history, Kosovo now lbanlan- -wstly Muslim. Serbian repression of
this Albanianbecome oven more draconian since members of the prorogued local parliament
MrU'TltVOJuly. By all accounts,
Albanian patience has about reached its Units in the face of measures ordered by Milosevic that include firing thousands of "Serbianizing" businesses, schools, and the media. Police killed attreet demonstratorsnd Albanians are speaking openly of armed insurrection. Local
yey
*"is li**ly to backfire and fuel the talSL aV separatism and, even
with Albania. ecent survey by
the most popular Albanian-language newspaper in the province found that most Albanians believe the solution to Kosovo's problems lies in merging with Albania, something which they think could happen very quickly.
Serbian fears ere already evident. In early February, tho Yugoslav Foreign Ministry summoned tho Albanian ambassadorressing down after demonstrations outside the Yugoslav embassy in Tirana calling for unification. If Albania reforms and breekc away from out ol the primitive authoritarianism under--which it has languished, it couldowerful attraction t" the downtrodden Kosovo Albanians. Representatives of the ethnic Albanian opposition Kosovo Democratic Alliance already have met with both thoTlrano regime and Albania's non-Communiat op p it ion. |^ p|
Tha reelection of Milosevic undercut those Albanian leaders in Kosovo who have been trying toodus vivendl with Belgrade. The above survey also indicates that only seven percent support dialogue with the Serbs whileercent favor an armed struggle. The chances have dramatically increased that Kosovo Albanians soon will turn to violent resistance,ownward spiral of repressionand guerrilla warfare that couldalkan intifada. J| |
The Muslim Factor
An Islamic threat extending beyond the Albanian community to oncompaes Muslim Slavs and Turks is an even mors alarming nightmare for the Serbs. Serbian anxiety about an International Islamic conspiracy togreen swath" into theYugoslavia is coloring current perceptions and policies. traw in the wind for the Serbs was the recent decision by the leadership of the roughly four-million strong Islamic community for the first time to denounce Serbia for its mistreatment of ethnic Albanian Muslims in Kosovo. The previously quiescent Muslim Supreme Assembly onanuary blasted Serbia for its human and civil rights violations and called on Muslims throughout the world to show solidarity with tbe Albanians. Many Serbs say feer that local Muslims have been energized by the Gulf war and that this actarbinger of greater Muslim political activism in the future. inimum, tha Muslim Supreme Assembly'ss likely to add to Serbia's siege mentality. M f
Serb anxioty centers on the Muslim majority in tho Sandzak region of Serbia, where the inhabitants have also expressed sympathy for their fellow Muslims in Kosovo and in Bosnia. The Serbs fear an attempt to cut Kosovo and theby the Serbs yet another historic cradle of theirof the Republic of Serbia. Some Serbs go further in painting nightmare scenarios and see the possibility of these two areas joining predominantly Muslim Bosniaew confederal order. Serb-Muslim frictions were intensified by last fall^lections, when police were called in to prevent clashes, afl B
According to the Bosnian press, Milosevic recently warned Alija Izetbegovic, president of Bosnia and leader of the Muslim party, not to interfere with Sorbia's plans nor to daro secede
SFCH WOSm*
iron the [adulation. Xn the latter case, Milosovlc threatened to crush Bosnia with tha Amy and brlnrj the republic under Serbian sway. The report is said to have alarmed the localwhose memory of the massacre of Muslims1 by the Serbian Cetniks is still^uiiM bus iry to arm theualves and prepare for P
Tbe Macedonian Question
Mationalist passions are on the rise in Macedonia too, and violence and terrorism could be in the offing there. The lergeot block of seats in December's election was won by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organizationhich traces its name and rootserrorist group notorious for Its violence in the early decades of this century. IMRO vows an armed fight for independence, if this is the only way it can be won. Macedonia has long been an object of competition among Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, none of whom acknowledgesistinct Macedonian nationality even exists. Thecall tha Macedonians
southernarticular grievance: they believe that Tito established the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia afterpo only to undercut Serbia's wolght in the federation. AMmX*
Alliances, however, are particularly difficult to predict in Macedonia. Macedonian extremists may find common cause even with otherwise detested Serb nationalist elements on the basis of their common hatred of the sizeable Albanian minority in western Macedonia. Albanians wonf the seats in the republic assembly and have aroused Macedonian fears that they will press for union with Albania if Yugoslavia breaks up. M
Macedonia would find it almost impossible to avoid becoming embroiled if Slovenia and Croatia move to secede. In this case, we believe that Serbia would press to keep the MacedoniansilBp Yugoslavia or try to incorporate the republicreater Serbia. Macedonians wouldmoderate Macedonian leaders have said that they are prepared to go It alone If Yugoslavia breaks apart and the Croatian, and Slovenian counterweight to the Serbs disappears. MM
international Implications
Events In Yugoslavia have tho potential to Jerail the prospectseaceful political evolution of the Balkans In the direction of the European mainstream. It cannot be excluded that Slovenia and perhaps Croatia will be able to slip unimpeded into that malnntroam, but odda are that some violence will accompany tho first breakupuropean state since the endT (War Mgressive andtuncompromising actions by Serbia will increase the chancesiolent outcome. In the worst case, civil war could turn Yugoslaviaitch's cauldron of
ethnic strife, whore violence spills over intoand beyond, to ethnicua inand even the United States.
whatever the level ofing Yugoslavia will quickly engage neighboring states with their ownto protect. Soate also will have axes to grind. Such states could include NATO allies and friends of the United States, like Greece, Italy, andhave already increased Military readiness Bj-JhTLlrwell as Bulgaria, Hungary, and Albania. I I
The ripple effectsinal Yugoslav crisis markedand disorder would extend far beyond those statesintervene. All of Europe and especially Italywould have to contend with large-scale refugee flowsoutset. The Slovenes and Croats would press their Western neighbors and the United States for political andsupport against Serbia. Guerrilla warfare wouldover international borders too. Such warfare,forced population transfers and communal violence andsuffering, would engage international mechanisms for
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