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OF INTELLIGENCE
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Fotentii
ivil War
ics of a
appears headed towardrocess thai will spark at least some violence- The scale of conflict is unpredictable at this point: unrest most probablywill be localized in several republics at first, hut violence could quickly spread. Although civil war isoregone, conclusion, itistinctecent explicit threats of violence by both federal and republic authorities.
believe neither side could quicklyivil war, andar would be bloody, disjointed, and protracted. Lightly armed republic forces could not defeat the more heavily armed, mobile national Army, bid the federal forces could not pacify the republicsuerrilla war, and their combat capabilities would decline over time. In addition, theArmy itself is likely to fracture along ethnic lines in the face of serious violence.
A sizablfi conflict will likely have effects beyond Yugoslav borders andEuropean"problem. Refugee flows probably would be substantial, and emigre groups could become active in supporting cross-border violence. Because neither federal nor republic forces are likely to prevail on the field, both will look beyond Yugoslavia for support and assistance. An outside political solutioniolent breakup probably would be necessary, either through CSCE or other forumsf
Introduction
Yugoslavia's political fabric is badly frayed and This process will likely be accompanied byof violence, particularly if, as we expuct, federalon maintaining central authority and final say on koy In public and private statements, sone seniorhave already advocated force to reverse the republics'of federal powers, particularly over defenseflexibility
widespread, brutal conf lTTrcToyTraTepoT^icar passions. Nevertheless, full-scale waristinct possibility and several recentthe0 electoral victory of Serbian Communists, Slovene political brinksmanshipis the army and federal authorities, the growing possibility of Albanian unrest in Kosovo, and nrmod violence in Serb-domlnatod regions of Croatia-highlight the centrifugal forces at work in Yugoslavia. M
Yugoslav Military Forces
We believe the dual nature of Yugoslavia's military structure, with its federally based army, navy, and air force and regionally organized militia forces, has unintentionally laid the groundwork for civil war in the current crisis. Por more thanears Belgrade has based its military policy on the doctrine of "All People'sshort conventional defense against an invading force followedrotracted guerrilla war. The regular Army,ederal force under the corrmanderb-dominated officer corps, traditionally has had the mission of conducting initial armored and air operations against an invader. The more numerous, but lightly armed Territorial Defense Forces (tup), under republic command, have been organized, equipped, and trained for guerrilla warfare. The keys to Belgrade'suniversal military training, mass mobilization, redundant command and control structures, widely distributed weaponry, and on operational approach reminiscent of Tito's concept for partisan".ire society for war and has created two potential contenders.
Historically, both tha national forces and thaDefense Forces have been subordinate to nationalcoeponenlj of the Yugoslav People's Amy, or JNA after it-q
rade's^ofTtlHlTnaTTTlllfv*. rol
over-me territorial forces now ranges from little to none,the region of the country.
National Forces
The Yugoslav People's Army consists of separate ground,and air defense forces. The ground force component, with onventional amorod force organiredullarms and support services, it is equipped with ainventory, lacks modem weapons and support equipment,logistic and communications capabilitiee, and has little offensive capability against its neighbors. It is, however, armed, more mobile, and better equipped and trained thanforces.
Tho national air and air defense forcos have0 personnel and are equipped withoviet and domestically produced fighter, ground attack, and reconnaissance aircraft. The bulk of Yugoslavia's attack helicopters are also under air force control. The air force alaost cortainly is incapable of establishing air superiorityetermined attackATO air force or tne soviet Union, but It has ground attack capabilities that could be employedivil war. IB
Territorial Defease Forces
Despite Belgrade's efforts to disarm and degrade territoriale.?K heae UnltBtoiable military force,PP? k and llQht anti-armor and anti-air weapons. iV^liased,TDFrimarily are small infantry units organized by municipalities and factories. Trained in hit-and-run warfare, TDF units wouldapable guorrilla force in urban sottlngs or in Yugoslavia's rugged countryside. Although these units lack armor and air assets and have only limited mobility, the existence of the TDF is worrlnoae to senior JNA officers, who have come to regard them as rudimentary republic armies. JNA leaders moved last spring to disarm
NOFO
S *tock* at the republic level. These ly depleted TDF arms stocks, although the degree varies' the independence-minded republics ofCroatia have engaged in vigorous arms acquisition.
NOFOj
Disposition sod Composition, of Federal end Republic Foroas
National i'crfoi^ The reoBjlaf Arrv's str-limi powoi combat vehicles, anddispersed amongrigades and Independent regiments deployed throughout the country. As political tensions have increased, theso units have been ordered toigh state of combat readiness. He believe coounanders have made particular efforts in the Fifth Military Region encompassing Slovenia and most of Croatia (seeecause regular army officers have come to regard TPF forces there as republican armies threatening both national unity and the Army.
Two regular Army corps, comprisingrmored, mechanized,brigadea and four infantry regiments and support unitsstationed in the Fifth Military Region. nf the conscript force Inforces arc among the
Army's lost caparTTennTrts^Trno: Ihey likely could seize key republic facilities, such as government buildings and communications facilities, within hours. unitn are dispersed
authorities would prefer to rlfTyonTeavrryTra^loTrcl'unltsMinistry control to maintain order in trouble spotsprovince. These units ore now bogged down in Kosovo, undercut by Slovenia and Croatia's decision lastwithdraw their nationals from the force,
Tare it grl.fll_fQf.rcfiRj. According to multiple sources, Slovenia and Croatia have bolstered their dofenses in organizing new units and acquiring substantial numberson the international arms market. Croatia'sforceshe0 arms authorities there are
un
facilities.
Dynamios within the Military
We believe the regular Army retains the military capability to act against the republics, but political developments in recent months have undermined its effectiveness as an armed force. Yugoslavia's longstanding system of parallel command structures at the federal and republic level, with both tho regular Army and TDF forces ultimately answering to the Federal civilian presidency, has collapsed. Rising
NQ0TJX> CONTRACT
ethnic friction, nationalIsn, and declining federal authoritythe responsiveness and discipline of the troops andquestions about how long the Arssy would renain intactivil war.
The aray is neither wholly unified nor arc its troops unquestionably reliable. The senior officer -orps is nominally balanced along ethnic lines, and theaa officers retain eorientation. Serbs, however, have long dominated the middle and lower officer ranks, making line officers, at least, broadly sympathetic to the Comunist government in Serbia. Although Serbs make up onlyercent of the population, they and their
the officer corps. aasHamaHBHSBBBB^BBMBBBJ nationalist fissures exiiit within nid-leverono^in^or^rrTcer^inks^ between Serbs and other nationalities. At lower ranks', the bulk of the Army consists of0 conscripts whose ethnic makeup more closely reflects the composition of Yugoslav society. Their principal loyalties are likely to remain with their own ethnic group and native republic (aee graphic).
we believe the cohesion and discipline of enlisted men wouldtested by orders to fire on civilians or even on TDFthe contextimited military action we believe theinflict and receive limited casualties without breaking. if the army were used to seize Slovene draft records or asof force to end ethnic fighting and restore order in Bosniaor Kosovo, the units likely would respond to authoritytho government's policy. Sustained or largo-scalewould likely occur in fighting against Slovene or Croatian in our view, shatter the troops' discipline.
A conflict serious enough to fracture the Army would turn it essentiallyump Serbian army, with the breakdown of unit cohesion and discipline that would likely accompany organized violence, the Army would probably fracture along ethnic lines, leading to wholesale desertions andnlt violence. Some troops probably would take their personal weapons and join the TDF or paramilitary forces in their home republics. We believe officers and troops sympatheticercent oferbian TDF might combine with the remnants of the regular Army, givingizable military force.
Factionalization of the regular Army would, in our view, markedly decrease its military effectiveness, it probably would retain control over most, but not all, of its heavy equipment. However, with ranks
novo
* The Array, which couldercent of its active duty and ready reserve strength followinq factionalization of the force, miqht totalivil war. He estimate the Serbian TDF to be. Effective republican forces in Slovenia and Croatia might, we estimate, be Inange, although Croatia's Januaryeservists could eventually expand this number.
5-A
thinned by desertion, combat units, as well as coiubat support and service support, would all be ineffective until they were reformed. Logistic support and maintenance capabilities would probably decline, which would likely urrfercut air operations by either the regularr the air force.
Military stalemate Likely
Whetherar In Yugoslavia, in our view, would be bloody, disjointed, and protracted, with neither side able to Impose its will by force of armo. Republican forces could not prevail in fixed, large-scale battles against much more mobile and better-equipped regular Army units, but the Army also could not completely pacify the republicsuerrilla war. Whatever the dimensions of the conflict, the regular Army Is likely to hold sway over those areas of the country In which its military strengths can be employed effectively, control over the northern plains, containing the nation's principal cities, much of its industry, and the bulk of its rail lines, highways, and lines of communication, would almost certainlyey Army objoctive, and would probably be within its grasp. Wo would expect the Army to make forays against, or be in uneasy control of, major cities, and to be hunting for republic units. Republic armies, drawing on popular support and active in the hills, mountains, and lowlands beyond the -if the regular Army would attack Its units wherever possible.
SlOVenia and Croatia, Although the nationalenjoy decided military advantagesonflict limitedand Croatia, we believe the two republics haveand nonmilltary means to resist armed intervention andpolitical solution. Both Slovenia and Croatia havearmies, based on their police and Territorial Defensea late0 politicalanking Croatthat if the Army moves against Croatia, republicimmediately call upon Croatian troops to desert. Wein Slovenia would trigger similar calls. Instoppages, economic sabotage, and interruptions of powerwould be highly
Even after its transformationump Serbian army,Army still would be stronger and better equipped thanfunctioning as republican armies. Moreover, geographythe regular armyonflict against republican armiesand Croatia. The northernacrossSerbia, Croatia and Slovenia, encompassing Belgrade and Zagreb,almost toare suitable for mobile warfareoperations (see map). The extensive road networkguerrilla operations of the sort for which the TDF and the Army's air power could be more effectivelythe open
W s
K'ri'AcTi
|
The republic forces, on the other hand, would have the advantage
ofedicated irregular forceefensive battle on
hose terrain, and we believe republic units would fare reasonably
well, especially in areas unsuited to araiored operations, such as tne
western regions of Slovenia and Croatia. The regular Army is clearly
more capable militarily, but it would find itself fighting guerrilla
bands, an opponent entirely different than the massed Armor formations
against which it has been trained to mount defensive operations. Tho
Army also is heavily dependent on land lines for command, control, and
communication, and these facilities would be especially vulnerable.
Moreover, taking and holding entire cities in hostile republics could
be accomplished, but only at the risk of heavy losses. Urban areas
strongly favor the defensejin built-up areas even armor is vulnerable
to guerrilla attack. M W
A Wider War. If federal intervention in the republics flares into civil war, the violence will reverberate throughout both Yugoslav society and the military. Organized conflict anywhere and on almost any scale is likely to trigger bloody, widespread communal violence. With tensions running high within and between republics,ocalized conflict between federal forces and the republic armies will take on tho character of an ethnic quarrel and could spread rapidly to other areas. IB
We believe the Army would lack the capability to assert simultaneous military control across the length and breadth of Yugoslavia. ull-scale civil war, involving JNA operations against Croatia and Slovenia, intervention in the face of communal violence in Bosnia and Hercegovina, fighting an Albanian uprising in Kosovo, and moving to control Macedonia, the military equation between the national and the republican armies would be more nearly equal. Transportation difficulties, logistical shortfalls, and the presumed impact of desertions and casualties would all tend to limit operational areas. Manpower limitations alone would tend to force tho Army to choose its military objectives carefully. Moreover, Yugoslavia isountry of hills and mountains; unsuitable conditions would restrict mobile armored operations in BO percent of the country.
implications for Europe and the united states
NOFORK
If conditions in Yugoslavia degenerate into civil war, the United States and European nations almost certainly will come under pressure to take sides and provide military and political support to the combatants. Croatian and Slovene authorities would likely repeat their requests for military assistance, portraying their strugqle as one of newly democratized, independent states against an aggressive, Communist Serbia. ivil war in Yugoslavia also is likely to reopen similar issues of nationalism and ethnicity in other Balkan states.
A Yugoslav civil war, in our view, will quicklyEuropean" problemoliticalnegotiated under international auspices. ajor conflict almost certainly would lead to substantial refugee flows and raise international human rights concerns. Emigre groups might become involved in an attempt to provide cross-border military support for their compatriots, and there is an additional dangerpillover of violence into neighboring states.
NOPORN
Any European attempt toolitical solution could become the first real test of the effectiveness of CSCE institutions. He doubt, however, that CSCE would prove itself up to the task. Conflict resolution mechanisms are voluntary for the partiesispute, and moral suasion is the only means of enforcement. Nonetheless, CSCE members undoubtedly would try to use the forum to help Yugoslavia, through arbitration oreacekeeping force.
Original document.
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