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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE1 USSR: INITIAL MILITARY REACTION TO DESERT STORM (U)
Summary
Early military public commentary on Operation Desert Stormcoalition operations in the Persian Culf War will significantly influenceSoviet debate over the future oftheir armed forces. Wliile the
Staff has yet to intensively analyze Desert Storm, we expect that the impact of
high technology on coalition battlefield successes will be used to reinforce/)
forhe militarybudget. Coalition successes will
Soviet calls for negotiating limits on naval farces and cruise missiles, and could be used to support the Soviet interpretation of the CFE Treaty.
Soviet proponents of defense reform will probably use the Gulf War to ar smaller, professional military saturated withMore traditional officers will probably argue that several
circumstances affected the outcome ofthe war and that the existing structure and concepts ofthe armed forces-which stress armor, aniUery, and mass- remain decisive factors in future wars. Minister of Defense Yazov already is to shield the Soviet military, arguing that Desert. not a
whose experience can be takenearl (of wisdom).'" (CgpW)
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WiU Tanks Save The Day?
An analysis of NATO Allied Forces command and staffn the Central European TVD (theater of military operations) shows that the Air Force is the basis of strikingna is given the deriding war role both with and without the use of nuclear weapons.
Major General Ye. M. Amooov Miliiary Thought9
Operation Desert Storm has begun to thunder across the ongoing Soviet debate on defense reform and the future structure of thc Soviet mibtary.3 Februaryhe traditionalist military newspaper Krasnaya zvezda. Chief of the General Staff Moiscyey said that the General Staff hadpecial operations group to monitor the course of the war and to study the impact modern weapons and command-and-control systems were having on the battlefield. Interviews of other senior militarv officers in the Soviet media in the first weeks of Operation Desert Storm, while purely descriptive suaecst that they see the Persian Gulf War as the first modern war pointing potentially to a' revolution in military concepts and operations:
o The Air Force Commander-in-Chief, Colonel General Shaposhnikov, claimed in Krasnaya zvezda onanuary that the iniiial coalition air campaign was aimed at achieving victory at the very outset of the war. He asserted that the coalition was using the most modem weapons systems and new methods of warfare to achieve this end.
o Ll Generalaculty chief at the General Staff Academy, commented in the moderate newspaper Izvestiya onanuary in an article entitled Tanks Will Not Save thehat the coalition-combining advanced technology weapons, electronic warfare, and operational-strategic surprise--paralyzed Iraqi air defenses and command-and-control, thus attaining air superiority at the outset of the war. In bis view, the outcome of the war at that point was already determined.
o General Lobov, Chief-of-Staff of the Warsaw Pact, however, white noting the danger of making final conclusions before hostilities end, cautionedadio broadcastebruary that the final outcome of the warin oast wars-on the ground battle.
o Major General Filatov, Chief Editor of the bard-line Miliiary Historical Journal has actually predicted that the coalition will lose the war because Iraq hasecisive advantage in ground forces.
o The Chief of the General Staffs Ope rational-Strategic Research Center, Major General Bogdanov, was more circumspect, noting1 January Krasnaya zvezda interview that the coalition was using the latest military technology much of it not combat-tested prior to the outbreak of hostilities. He claimed that this has required coalition commanders to develop new methods of
warfare. (
las reqi
High Tech and (he Revolution in Military Affairs
War outcome will be deternunedingle massed strike by precision-guided conventional weapons. Consequently, the traditional role of conventional armed forces equipped with infantry, tanks, andirtually eliminated.
Major General Slipchenko, Chief. Military Science Department, General Staff Academy, NDU-General Staff Exchange,0
Soviet military commentsone-standing debate within the military over the impact of advanced technology oo the battlefield. The fundamental issue is whether thetecfinology and conventional weapons systems has broughtevolution in military affairs akin t0 the revolution wrought by nuclear weapons and
S- ?SUChasfundamental stmcture
!-rTftnce(ls,IO(be,Ba,nined:aslwls thirty years ago-to determine if it is appropnate for the demands of future war. (GtfJF)
Marshal Ogarkov, former Chief of the General Staff, began writing on the
cffccts.of "oderasystems, precision-guided munitions, and automated command and control systems in the. Tbe argument that quality was replacing quantity as the key determinant of military power won wide acceptance and led to significant early military support for President Gorbachev as the leader who could modernize the Soviet economy to match Western technological developments. (CjjSF)
ereJces hosted last year by the National Defense Universityofficcrs Maimed that the Academy
has been charged try the General Staff toew "future war" concept to serveritical planning framework for future Soviet force development. The General Staff Academy reponedly has concluded that new precision-guided weapons and real-time SS^*arC ^o'utiomzing miUtary an. The Chief of the Academy's
S*. arawnt, Major General SUpchenko, remarked thatrtjUe'*being virtuaUy eUminated since advanced
conventional weaponry could detenrjine the outcomear at the very outset. Thisrit^if ra,SeS doubts aboul tic existing structure of the Soviet armed forces which still hold large armored forces as the decisive element.F)
Nuclear War Without Nuclear Weapons?
A world war with conventional weapons would also be fundamentally different from pastuclear power plants, chemical enterprises, ana stockpiles of nuclear ammunition and chemical weapons would also be demolished, which would result in vast areas of contamination and
Minister of Defense7
SECRET
mflitafyalso have focused on ihe ouicome of coalition attacks
on Iraq, nuclear, chemical, and biological installations and stockpiles. Soviet inter"" )
Soviets have been expressing concern that even relatively unsophisticatedhave such destructive capabilities, primarilyaga,nst targets such as nuclea/reaaors,?bernicalSesSov,etquestion, heavily influenced by theirmefforts to understand the nature of moderni war
ucsUoa of whetherain modern war between
commcnlary on attacks on nuclear reactors have focused on two
ri1 Troops. Played down the danger of contamination inhe reaCIOrS werema11'
about^iPS? Probai)|y igh priority on collecting information
IfSSi? field-deployed Colonel General Petrov expressed concern about-dicaled on chemical weapons productionfaahues courtangerous contarnination up toPermissible levels" outilometers. Hew^rnore weapons, warning that "the consequences ofdestruction of their storage sites are
iand thal tie spread of ep.dem.es beyond the borders of Iraq was
Slonel'onKetd b* Petrovy
deputy chief of the Central Military Medical *
SerSew (CJ^T EP,dcrmolo8'cal Department,0 January Krasnaya zvezda
doCShc concentration of nuclear- and
^ge? Sai,wouIdPrescotiUitary operations in Europe.
their3nalysis of Dc5cniencesPwiU improve
t^nderstandmg of the likely consequences of "conventional vvaTin that environment.
OR CON
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Desert Storm:ational Security Debate?
We cannot help but be concerned that the United States isarge jrrouping of non-nuclear strategic offensive arms which do not fall under (START) Treaty and can be stationed anywhere.
Minister of Defense Yazov in the preamblehe Ntitiistry of Defense Draft Military Reform Plan,0
Our armed forces in Europe, which we are reducing in accordance with tbc Treaty on Conventional Arms, have been deployed in order to balance
the superiority of the United Statesan imbalance has
emerged which does not correspond to the prospects for developing the
Pariscan only say onehat at the next stage
the subject, the problem of the navy, will be raised.
President Gorbachev. Supreme Soviet Address,ovember lv90
In the larger nMtary-DOU^cal venue, the Persian Gulf War has been linked toissues and the future general direction of security policy. Chief of thc
superiority of Weslern weapons systems, making thc CFE Trcary--ii; vvhicl thc Soviets will have to remove or destroy more military equipment than any other nation-mote difficult to justify to CFE critics. These critics may play up the threat of non-raiiGcauonto blunt Western complaints over Soviet interpretation and associatedpf8C)
omerence, Moiseyev declared that the Persian Gulf War wasegative effect on the mi [itary-political situation in the world. This required the General Staff to draw "the appropriate conclusions" in order to strengihen "the country's defensee went on to assert that, although rational security is primarily attained through political means, "this certainly does not mean that responsibib'rv fnr rhr> rru. shifted from the armed forces to tbe diplomats."MLjtVrhe military-using its current influence-will doan diplomatic efforts which it feels are detrimental to national security
2 Tbe Soviets have reclassified three divisions is the European USSR as coastal defense units subordinate to the Navy. They claim that since these divisions are now 'naval- tbey are not subject to the treaty Umiiine requirements of Article DX (U)
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Desert Storm and Military Reform: Quality vs. Quantity
In my opinion, the war in the Gulf will end.ran's advantage lies in thc ground troops (and) as soon as the. soldier steps onto Iraqit is then that the war will begin.
General Major Filatov, Chief Editor, The
Historical Journal, in "War In the
Gulf Has Not1
So far it's been impossible to unequivocally assess the military situation. The armedsed up until now are not crucial to the fate of
eitherwhen ground forces are in actiononclusion be
made. But forecasts may be wrong.
General V. Lobov, Warsaw Pact ChiefRadio1
The initial public reactions of senior military officers indicate that militaryhe Gulf War are being viewed in the Ught of the "future war" concept The General Staff Academy's view of future war appeals to military officers who prefer to develop and field high-technology weapons systems even if their cost forces ftirther reductions tn the size of the military. This issue-frameduality vs. quantity debate-has become an important focal point in the debate on military refonixW(*jB-*lF)
Influential moderate military reformer Colonel Ochirov, deputy chairman of the Supremeefense and State Security Committee,ilitary magazine last November wrote that security was dependent on the quality, not quantity of miUtary forces He nirtner noted:
While in the United States (innterested myself in the
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union of specialists. What significance do Americans attach to modern sctromc warfare systemsossible armed conflict with Iraq? And competentery great significance. The electronic warfare systems deployed in Saudi Arabia increase the overall combat potential of the American grouping of forces that faces Iraq. If this additional potential is employed against Iraq,nemy systems of command and control of troops, forces, and weapons (will) beeally, the level of development of these systems is so high that they change the character of armed conflict qualitatively. (U)
Radical military reformers such as reserve Major Lopatin and Lt. Colonel Podziruk bave also argued that more resources need to be allocated towards the research and development of advanced military technologies. However, they have also pressedadical restructuring of the armed forcesmaller structure manned largely by
well-paid and weU-trained professionals, ratherarge standing army comprised of poorly motivated conscripts. They have rejected the primarily anti-NATO thrust of thc Soviet military structure, arguing that thc West is nohreat to the Soviet Union aoa that the real external threat will emanate from the Third)
The0 reform plan of the Ministry of Defense-while noting the need to re-equip the armed forces with advanced weapons-calls for only anercent reduction in ground forces manpower0 and no radical restructuring This suggests that traditionalist officers-primarily those such as the Warsaw Pact Chief of Staff-while agreeing on the need to modernize, believe that the Soviet Union stillestern threat and correspondingly needs toorce capable of conducting large-scale ground operations, continental in scope, with the more traditional types of decisive elements such as armor, artillery, and mass.
officers have taken particular pains to argue thatround war will ultimately decide tbe outcome in the Persian Gulf. They have also argued strenuously against the conclusion that an Iraqi defeat would indicate that Soviet weaponry torce structure, and operational concepts are obsolete. Tbey fear that this conclusion could be used by reformist cntics both inside and outside the military with unpredictable results during uncertain times. Consequently, they blame the poor showing of the primarily
-seemed to align himself with theazOV'
U.S.e asserted that
Iraq had few modern Soviet weapons systems while the coalition had an overwhelming advantage in modern weapons. He went on to claim2 tanks operated by the Synans--not the Iraqis-had performed better in the desert than. Abrams.
Outlook
I,
The allocation of an excessively high share of the gross national product to defense and the uncontrolled race to produce arms and combat equipment to the detriment of quality lead to an intensification ofthe economy's instabUityurtailment of social programs. The diktat of the mdusmal-mihtary complex leads to the imposition of costly equipment with low combat effectiveness on the army.
. Lopauh, Draft Military Reform Proposal,0
. . Desert Storm nuhtary successes could be used by the niih^ to strengthen its band in internal arms control and national security debates. It could be used-as Moiseyev nuited-to justify the Soviet interpretation of the CFE Treaty and influence the treaty ratification debate within the Supreme Soviet. We expect Soviet military commentators Desert Storm to press for talks on naval forces. Elements of Desert Morm-sea-launched ennse missilesarrier aircraft attacks, and amphibious operauons-are precisely the forces often mentioned by Soviet military officials as a
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strategic threal to the Soviett is likely that senior officers will use the initial successes of coalition advanced technology and naval weapons systems to argue that the Gulf War proves that naval strike forces must be included in future conventional arms control talks and that equal force ceilings in the CFE Treaty place the Sovietset disadvantage, given the qualitative superiority of Western weapons systems. They also will probably highlight the effectiveness of cruise missiles against strategic targets in Iraq to underline the importance of limiting conventional cruise missiles in strategic arms control negotiations.
Operation Desert Storm will almost certainly fuel the internal debate on tbe size and makeup of the military budget. Real defense; spending bas almost certainly declined in the past two years, and will probably fall inCommander of the Airar troops, however, already hastrong pitch for increases in resources allocated to his forces in his commentary on Desert Storm-even though tbe draft Ministry of Defense Reform Plan calls forercent reductions in Air Defense personnel by theoih reformers and traditionalists have in the past supported increased funding fornd personnel services such as housing and increased pay. While resources allocated for personnel services have probably been increased in1 budget,esource levels are still being debated after the government proposed cuts ofercent* When asked what worried him most as Minister of Defense in the Pravda interview, Yazov replied that he was most concerned about reduced appropriations for RDT&E. (CpTF)
The fallout from Desert Storm will thus likely further complicate what is alreadyand complicated internal debate over future miliiary budgets. It is likelvwill argue more strongly that resources cannot be cut further, and alongradicals, press for increases rather than cuts in RDT&E. It is also possible theyto reverse the decline in defense spending, using coalition military prowess toclaims that the Westignificant military threat to the motherland.commentators have already claimed that the UN coalition is in reality atesting new weapons and military concepts^thcreby hoping to make concrete the of the military threat from the West
eneral Staff analysis of the course, character, and outcome of
the Persian Gulf War will almost certainlyrofound impact on debate within the Soviet military regarding its future structure. Thc decisive coalition victory will most likely re invigorate proponents of radical military reform and be used as support for their argument that the existing leadership ha* wasted the country's resources to produce an obsolete military machine incapable of protecting vital national interests. They are likely to press their contention that the countryrofessional army made up of volunteers who are well-paid, well-trained, well-educated, and thus highly motivated and able to skilfully employ modern weapons systems. (CMl :
nofor*Jkcon
Opponents of reform will probably counter by pointing out that the Gulf War had unique factors-the extended penod allowed for the coalition buildup, the participants, the correlation of forces, the limited size of the theater of operations, the terrain-which limit the extent to which Hessons learned" can be applied to changes in military doctrine or
rom or
structure. They are likely to claim that the country cannotolunteer army, that conscripts can handle modern weapons systems, and that traditional elements of miliury power-armor, artillery, and mass-will remain decisive factors in the type of wars which are ever likely to involve Soviet forces. Marshal Yazov appears to have initially accepted this view. In his interview he stated that "this isar whose experience can be takenearl (ofhe outcome of the debate will be heavily influenced by the Desert Stora endgame and the overall internal political environment extant in the next few years
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Original document.
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