CAESAR-9 POLITICS AND THE SOVIET ARMY

Created: 3/12/1954

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POLITICS AND THE SOVIET ARMY

Developments since2 relating to the political status of the Soviet armed forces

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CAESAR-9

Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence*

memo?andum

This paper, the ninth in tbe CAESAR aeries, addresses Itself primarily to developments within the Sorlet armed forces during tbe period Its purpose in chronologically summarizing these developments la to place in perepective the position of the military within the context of the now Soviet leadership. It ahould be regardedorking paper. Valuable contributions have been made by many parts of CIA and other intelligence agencies. Tbe views expressed are the views of the authors, however, and do not represent theviews of tbe Agency. As io the case of the previousIn this series, suggestions and criticisms will be welcomed.

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Summary ill

of tbe Military Prior to Stalin's Death 1

Role of the Military at the XIX Party Congress Tbe Doctors' Plot--Military Victim* Tbe Death of Stalin

of Military Intervention In the

Succession Crisis 8

The historical Tradition

Restrictions on Military Freedom of Action

of the Military after Stalin's 1*

of an Improvement in the Position of

the 25

Promotions and Reasslgnments of Hlgh-Ranklng Personnel

Possible Shift* in Army-MVD Relationships Developments in the Mechanisms of Party Control Morale vs. Security In the Soviet Army3 Tha Greater Influence of the Military Point

of View Summary of the First Year

3 and 39

October Revolution Day

Military Participation on Berla's Trial Board

The Governmental Reorganization of3 The Period of Uncertainty In the Spring3 Tbe Military' and tbe Purge of Berla

Other Recent Developments

Appendix I ilitary Personnel Elected to Central Cosnlttee of tbe Cotnualat Party at the

XIX Party *

Appendix II romotions Since the Death of kQ

Appendixersonnel Changes in the Armed Services

Since the Death of

POLITICS AND THE SOVIET ARMT

Summary nod Conclusions

Toe Sorlet armed forces do notistory of successful Interference In Internal political crisesingle, organised element of power. Their heritageendency towardand inaction during Internal crisis. Military freedom of action Is restricted by the interlocking networks of political officers and security police operating within the ranks, by atoward conformity among officers end men alike,rowing officer caste system, and by tbe presence In the ranksigh percentage of Communists subject to Party discipline. Unless the existing controls break down under drastic circumstances, the armed forceshole must be looked uponelatively passive and non-monollthlc body with regardoviet succession crisis. This study of the post-Stalin period is undertaken to discover what effects recent political changes have had on tho armed forceshole and on individuals or groups among tho high-ranking military leaders, and what Influence these military leaders have exerted within the government. "

During the year from? toheposition of Soviet military leaders progressed through several phases. From tbe XIX Party Congress until Stalin's death, there vere some indications of tbe participation of military leaders In political maneuvering, as evidenced by Govorov'sandidate member of tbe Central Committee and by thoof military officers in tbe Doctors' Plot announcement. The period of tbe post-Stalin struggle between Malenkov and Beria, from March until June,ime of outward passivity on the part of tbe military leaders, with an Increase in political control over them, Indicated primarily by tbe reorganization of the ministry of armed forces and the return of Bulganin as minister. Theof Zhukov, probably considered by the Party leadershipafety measureritical moment, gave increased Influence to an outspoken professional officer.

A shiftassiveore active role of thein politics probably occurred beginning with the East German riots and the Beria purge. The armed forces apparently participated In the removal and denunciation of Beria, and tho present Party leadership probably bought military acquiescence or support bythe professional military men greater freedom within their own establishment. After June, some high officers of the armed forces

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were promoted, professional off leers were placed In importantassignments, and greater consideration vas given to apoint of view regarding questions of morale and security in tbe armed forces. The political position of the Soviet military leaders appeared better than it had for several years previously, and an uneasy alliance vas probably maintained betveen topofficers and Party leaders.

Developments of tbe vinter* have tended to confirm the impression that the political Influence of Soviet militaryhas increased. The prominence of Konev on Berla's trial board in3 and the apparent participation of Vasllevsky lnaffecting tbe MVD inuggest tbe greaterof tbe military leadership in the formulation of Sovietpolicy.

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I. Position of the Military Prior to Stalin'e Death

Role of the Military at the XIX Party Congrcea:

The point of departure of thlo study of recent eventsthe Soviet armed forces' political position la the JJX Congress of the Communist Party, held in Itilestone In Soviet history, tbe first Party Congress to be held for thirteen yeara. The position of the military leadership had been relatively stable for several years prior to tbe time of tbe Congress.

Tbe Congress Itself produced little change in tbe position of the leaders of the Soviet armed forces. Routine speeches were made by Marshal n. a. Bulganin, then Politburo member vith generalfor military affairs. Marshal A. M. Vasllevsky, then Minister of War, and by the heads of the political directorates of tbe Soviet Army and Bevy. Stalin's praise vas loudly proclaimed by these leaders as by all others, and tbe themes of Western aggression and the need for vigilance vere emphasized. Tbe high percentage of Communists in tbe army vaa asserted by Vasllevsky, vho claimedk$ of all officers vere Party or Komsomol members. Theof rommanders as compared vith that of politicalubject on vhlch the Soviet leaders have long been unable to make up their minds, vas mentioned by Vasllevsky, vho announced that, In recent years, the commanders' position had been further1/

Military representation In tbe highest Party body did noteven the enlarged Presidium Included only Bulganin andK. T. Voroshilov. The proportion of military man elected as full members of the second highest Party body, theefinite decrease in comparison to the percentages elected at the XVIII Party Congress9 so* the XVIII Party Conferencelight proportional decrease In military representation on the candidate membership list in contrast to that1 Is also evident.

ot details see Leo Gruliov, ed: Current Soviet Policies, the Documentary Record ofh Party Congress and theAfter Stalin's Death; Hev

Military Officers Elected to tbeam It tee

Meobers

Percentage of Total

Candidate Meobers

Percentage of Total

12 Congress

9

7

w 22

0

and candidate meobers elected at the XIX Party Congressirtually complete roster of the high command of the Soviet armed forces. Including the commanders of certain key allltaryand field forces, such as the Belorussian, Kiev, Moscow and Baltic MO's, the Forces of the Far East and the Group of Occupation Forces, Germany.

Bulganln and Voroshllov, although Included as military men here, are really "political generals." They are "old Bolsheviks" vho were close associates of Stalin and are primarilyof the top political hierarchy. Bulganin's experience prior to World War II vas thatarty trouble-shooter; his military service during the var vasarty representative on theCouncils of tbe various fronts andember of the State Defense Committee. Voroshllovigh military officer during tbe civil war period and later attained tbe positions of Defense Commissar and Politburo member, but bis generalship provedio the Finnish campaign and in th* early stages of World War II; bis subsequent continuance in high military positions isconsidered to be the result of his political connections. Other examples of "political generals" Include A. S. Shcberbakov, wartime bead of the Chief Political Directorate (nownd L. I. Brezhnev, head of tbe Havy'e Political Directorateoth these men rose through the Party ranks rather than the military ranks. | analysis has suggested, however, that,ilitary man, election as candidate member of the CentralIs noteward for intensive Party activity but may be more or less automatic for key commanders.S/ The

omplete listing of military officers elected as full and candidate members of tbe Central Committee lnee Appendix I.

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commanderilitary district in alao quiteember of tbe Party buro in tbe area of hii poet. Ken who roae through the military ranks but who hare been elected to the Party's Central Committee .Include Marshals I. S. Renew, A. K. Vasllevsky and V. D. Sokoloreky.

The firsteries of peculiar events involving military personalities occurred two weeks after the publication of the list of Central Committee members at the close of tbe Party Congress. Onpecial announcement was made by the Party Secretariat to the effect that Marshal L. A. Govorov bad beenandidate meaner taut bad been omitted from tbe list through an oversight. Such an error is almost unheard of in the USSR, In view of tbe Importance of these listings, so that thegiven can scarcely be accepted. It has been suggested tbat Govorov's belated appointment indicates that beaction which bad been side-tracked at tbe Congress but badtrong fight to regain Its position Immediately afterwards. Inspector General of tbe Soviet Army sinces oneery few ex-Czarlst officers now active. 1/ Ee was closely associated with Zhdanov in the defense of Leningrad during World War II and was one of four chief orators at Zhdanov's funeral lnpeaking on behalf of tbe Ministry of Armed Forces. Previous CAESAR studies have presented strong evidence of rivalry and enmity between Zhdanov and Malenkov during the immediateperiod, and it is generally agreed that Haleukov dominated tbe HZ Party Congress. If Govorov,emnant of the Zhdanov group, was passed over at tbe Congress, he must have had exceedinglybackers to have had his name added to tbe list.

The Doctors'Victims:

The announcement of the Doctors' Plot on3 le generally considered to havearning to some Individuals or groups who ware contesting the political status goo in the USSR. Because it cast doubt on the past effectiveness of tbe MOBeriod when Berla held responsibility for security affairs, and since lt attempted to fix blame for Zhdanov's death, tbe Doctors' Plot announcement has bean viewed as an Intended blow at Berla,with Stalin's blessingroup which may have Included Malenkov.

1/ Of the living Soviet officers of marshal or equivalent rank, only Govorov, Rokossovaky and Fleet Admiral Isakov (who Is now retired) are known to have held commissioned rank In theservice. There are many high-ranking Soviet officers, however, tbe record of whose early careers la not available.

The two "victims" listed In theanuary announcemont were former Politburo member A. A. Zhdanov, and A.hcherbakov, vho headed the Army's political administration from iota until his death All five men listed as "Intended victims" of the plottera vere career military officers. It is generally believed that the story of the plot contained very fev, if any, real facts. There must have been aome calculated reason, therefore, for naming Marshals Vasllevsky, Konev and Govorov, General Shtemeoko andLevcbenko as Intended victims, vith the implication that tbe vigilance of tbe nev leadership of the MGB had only Just saved their lives from facing "shortened." At the time of tbeVasllevsky vas Minister of War of the USSR (War and Bevy vere separate ministries). Kooev vas or had been Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces.V Govorov vas probably Inspector General, Shtemeoko vas tbe recent Chief of tbe General Staff, and Levcbenko vas aDeputy Minister of tbe Havy, probably in charge of training. It la possible that tbey vere named simply as representatives of tbe Soviet armedbranch of government known to be popular with tbe Sovietorder to gain the people's sympathy or the sympathy and support of tbe members of the armed forcee. Thie group does not seem to be fully representative of the armed forcee, however: no sir officer was included, the naval officer was not particularly well-known, and several army officers better known than Govorov and Shtemeoko could have been chosen. It seems more probable, therefore, that tbe five potential victims ware selected asaction or factions needing to be warned that thair lives were under the protection of tbe Party and tbe MOB and could bef tbey did not stay in line.

l/ It Is now considered quite likely that Konev was no longerof Ground Forces at the time of the Doctors' Plot announcement. Konev was first suspected to be in Lvov, possibly as commander of the Carpathian Military District, when be was elected to the Central Committee of tbe UkrainianParty in There have been frequent reports of his presence in the western Satellite area; the Importance of the Carpathian MD ia increased because of its proximity to this area. He was nominatadandidate to ths Supreme Soviet from the Lvov Oblast in The formerof tbe Carpathian Military District, Col. Gen. K. B. Oalitskl, was probably transferred in the fall2 to the Odessa Military District, which he currently commands.

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There la little In common among the military leaders named io the Doctors' Plot announcement. Govorov is certainly the mostfigure: ln addition to his connections with Zhdanov,8 he was chairmanilitary hoard that tried Fleet Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, Soviet Navy chief during World War II, on charges of giving secret Information to tbe Western Allies. (Kuznetsov was denoted to Rear Admiral and retired. He returned to hisjpld post after) Admiral Levchenko was one of the other twoof that board. Marshal Vasllevsky, Minister of War prior to3 reorganization. Is believed toighly capable staff officer, who served in tbe Stavka under Zhukov during World War II and therefore had been quite close to Stalin. It has not beento identify Vasllevsky, Shtemenko, or Konev with anypolitical faction within the Soviet hierarchy, although the first two were members of the honor guard at Zhdanov's funeral and all three had been close associates in the military ministry at Moscow

The careers of the military men named In connection with the Doctors' Plot have been followed with some Interest duringmonths. Govorov has continued to receive attention befitting his rank and assignment at Important occasions; be seems never to have suffered any loss in prestige. Vasllevsky was replaced as Minister In connection with tbe governmental reorganization in March; be wasirst Deputy Minister, however, and has shared the honors of this post with Zhukov ever since. Konev was not listed as participant in an official function or signatory to an obituary for some months after servingember of the honor guard at Stalin's bier, but his name reappeared on an Octoberand he was chairman of tbe tribunal which convicted Berla of treason ln December. Levchenko may have suffered temporaryand apparently vas long absent from the Moscow scene,only last fall. During the year froma toe appeared at only one official function In Moscoweception In, whereas previously his appearances had been quite frequent. He has since attended Moscow functions held by the North Koreans, Mongolians, Chinese and Bulgarians, and It is possible that he was in the Far East during his absences from The fiftheneral Shtemenko, had almost certainly been relieved as Chief of the General Staff of the War Ministry prior to the XIX Party Congress, although be was elected amember of the Central Committee at that time. He was seen in Berlin in2 and attended the soviet Army Day reception there onn that date, he stood next to Chuikov, the Soviet commanding general ln Germany, and was saidoviet officer tokind of deputy" to Chuikov. The invitations to

Army Day In Koacov that year vere signed by Marshal Sokolovaky as Chief of the General Staff. Shtemenko has not been Identified Blnce.i/

The Death of Stalin:

The Doctors' Plot announcement usherederiod of extreme tension vlthln the USSR, narkedave of intensified "vigilance propaganda vhlch continued until after Stalin's death. The publlcl ty ay Day on3 took an especially belligerent tone, stressing the liberation role of the Red Army In World War II.

Onebruary, there appeared inrypticvhlch further suggested that all was not veil in the Kremlin. The commandant of the Kremlin Guard announced tbe "untimely death" tvo days previously of Major General P. E. Kosynkin, vho vas not further identified. Tbe only other paper to mention bio death was the Army publication Red Star, vhlchtatementroup vaguely designated asroup ofhis provided the

1/ote on the use and significance of official listings ofmilitary leaders seems in order here. Soviet publications practically never announce the relief of an officer and bisby another. This is similar to the lack ofabout changes of post in other branches of the government vhlch led one vrltcr to complain that, when tbe top brass in tbe Kremlin fall out. It is likeogfightlanket. The Russians seem to inform each other of changes, however, by rearranging names as they appear in variouslistings of celebrations and receptions, and on notices and obituaries. It is believed that this is done to inform those Russians who have learned to read between the lines about the essential facts of Soviet leadership. The absencean's nameist on which lt should appear does notmean that be has been removed from his post. It may indicate that beemporarily away from the town where the list la datelined; but the complete absenceame from any listseriod of months, togetherack of any other Identification during tbe same period,egitimate question as to tbe fate of the individual.

Information that Kosynkin had died suddenly and that he had been In responsible'military Work8 "to the last days of hisractically nothing is known about Kosynkin's background. Hethe Bed Army1 and hadarty memberhe possibility tbat he switched to the MVD or KGB is suggested by his appearancekist of promoted Red Army officers, most of whoa have been identified as MGB or MVD personnel. It seems almost certain that, at the time of his death, he vas aof the Kremlin Guard, an organization subordinate to tbe MGB.

The announcement of Stalin's death3 thus cameeriod of extreme tension in tbe Soviet Union, permeating all walks of life including the armed forces, with evidence of serious infighting among the top leadership. The peculiar incidentsin tbe period after the TJX Party Congress suggested that some persons or groups in the armed forces were Involved in theto an extent not revealed by the available Information.

It is evident that the removal of Stalin from theeriod of deadly struggle among Soviet An uneasy Malcnkov-Beria-Molotov triumvirate emergeddeath. Concentration of power in Malenkov's handsassumed chairmanship of the government was-reduced when heas Secretary of. the Party shortly thereafter,immediate bid for one-man leadership. The government tookto ease International tension anderies ofto relax economic and political pressures on the Soviet Berla apparently attempted to use his police apparatushis own position and possibly to achieve dominancePresidium, This crisis was resolved by his arrest in latehave been indications since that time that stability hasbeen,"*

The remaining sections of this study arc concerned with the effects of tbe Stalin succession crisis on the Soviet armed forces and with tbe part which the armed forces played in tbe crisis

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II. Possibilities of Military Intervention In the Succession

cHiu

Tho Historical Tradition:

Some observations ore appropriate here regarding the nature of the role which the Soviet armed farces might have boon expected to play in internal affairs at this moment of Russian history. Practically ovary available source, with tho exception of some of the more imaginative columnists, warns that we should be very cautious about ascribing any groat political influence or freedom of action to the Soviet armed forces of today.

Historically, the Soviet armed forces havo not Inherited aof auccassful iBtarvwntlnn in internal affairs. [

,nree major succession crises in taw nxsoorj uioffBliri the Time ofollowing the death of Ivan the Terrible; the period of Palace, following the death of Peter the Great; and the Decembrlat RevoltIn these threo crises, Russian autocracy was challenged after tho deathtrong ruler by various elements who sought to share in power and to improve their own living conditions; tho autocracy survived all three challenges and continued to consolidate. eature of the Time of Troubles was the development of fragmentary military power by various groups and temporary coalitions, who attemptodto gain controlling power for themselves. Tho atrong Romanov family was finally able to stabilise the situation after hatred of Polish intervention had goaded the stalemated Cossacks and Russian gentry into Joining forces. The Palace Revolutions ofh Century were dominated by the small but influential Guardsoriginally created by Peter the Great to protect the throne. Well-placed and closely knit, they were able to exert their strength at tho top to influence the selection of four monarchs after tho death of Peter. The remainder of the large army which had been built by Peter was not influential in theso palace

Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technologyi The Vulnerability of the Soviet Onion and Its European Satellitea to Political Warfare;

Vol. II,Succession Crises in Russian History, by Alfred Levin).

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intrigues. The unsuccessful Decembrist revoltutile Guards action, was not, as its predecessors had been, partalace intrigue to attain limited class gains. It was an open revolt, with tbe avowed purpose of overthrowing autocracy. As such, it lacked sufficient organization, planning, and military and popular support to achieve success.

The period of Cccaaunist revolution and civil waras in one respect reminiscent of the Time of Troubles,omplete fragmentation of the nine million-man army and theof separate nuclei of military force in many parts of Russia. The stories of Kolchak and the Czechs, Kornilov, Denikin, ludenich and Wrangel are well known. Even the Communists were surprised at the number of Czarist officers who joined Communist ranksere either drafted or volunteered for the Red Army between6 and; many were forced to join by Trotsky's coercive methods, many others acted purelywhile some were motivated primarily by patriotism,that the Communists were the only grouphance of saving Russia from foreign domination.

The Soviet period itself is devoid of significant independent action on the part of the military in time of internal crisis. The revolt of the sailors at Kronetadt inlthough highly significant as the epitome of widespread popular dissatisfaction with Soviet economic and political policies, was rather isolated, lacked initiative, and, lika the Decembrist revoltuffered from its prematurity. Fedotoff White records that the rebelsa plan to enlarge the base of the rebellion by undertaking military operations on the mainland. They limited themselves to issuing pronouncements and defending Kronstadt. They were quickly overwhelmed.i/ The struggle for power between Trotsky and Stalin, reaching its height after Lenin's deathu, was conductedarge extent according to the personalities of the protagonists. Stalin used all the power available to him as Party Secretary to control appointments and line up votes* Trotsky, although he was People's Commissar for War, made little use of his office in the struggle, relying primarily on the weapons of debate and agitation; he made no attempt to rally the armyoup d' etat. He allowed tbe struggle toolitical one inside the framework of the

}j D. Fedotoff White: The Growth of the Red Army;Uj page US.

Party. The Great Purge of thes also found the armed forcesassive role, even as their own ranks were riddled. An idea of the extent of the purge within the armed forces is provided by Japanese and former Soviet sources, who estimate that, following the execution of Tukhachevsky and other leaders inhe purge removed more than hCO officers in the positions of brigade commanders and higher,er cent of the generals,er cent of the colonels, and0 other officers, totalling about half the entire officer corps. Three of the five Red Army marshals ware purged, as well as all eleven Vice-Commissars of War andf theembers of the Supreme Military Council, including all the military district commanders .j/ Certainly there had developed serious differences between the group around Tukhachovsky and the Stalinist Whether or not an anti-Stalin coup was seriously planned may never be known; if so, it was nipped in the bud, and lt is clear that there was no united effort on the part of the officer corps to strike back.

It can be seen, therefore, that the Soviet armed forcesthe post-Stalin periodistory of successful interference in internal political crises by the militaryingle, organized element of power. Their heritage Insteadendency toward fragmentation, splitting up and taking sides, and failure to act at all under the stimulus of crisis. oncomitant to this generalization, it is noteworthymall, well-placed military group once exercised considerable influence under conditions of palace intrigue.

P.estrictiona on Military Freedom of Action:

Real restrictions are placed on the freedom of theto actnit, the most powerful being theof control operated within the armed services byand the security police, now the MVD. Theseseparate chains of command, paralleling the normalof command up from company or regimental level, butto essentially non-military agencies.

put it, there is triple-control within theinvisible, autonomous political police, the open, brazen power of the Party dictatorship, and the officers, whose knowledge and figure are

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tolerated." Tbe Chief Political Directorate of theof Defense, to whoa the political officers are responsible, is atirectorate of this ainis tryepartment of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. It is rasponsibls for carrying out the will of the Party in the armed forces,this by unceasing indoctrination of the troops, responsibility for the maintenance of morale and discipline, guidance of the activities of Party cells at the various echelons withln_the armed forces, and detailed reporting on the political reliability of all officers and men, regardless of rank. The Chief Directorate for Counterintelligence was officially transforrad from the Ministry of Armed Forcea to the MGBhuse facto situation. Its officers, found throughout the regimental echelon (there are staffs at the higher levels) are tha successors of SMERSU, roaponsible for investigation and surveillance, and for liquidation of countor-revolutionary elements and enemywithin the armed forces. Thus the Soviet armed forces are permeated with informers, monitors and special operatives, many of them under cover, all of them potential enemies of any group or clique soaking to develop an independent line of action on any subject.

A wealth of material attests to tho influence exerted by the Party and MVD in fragmenting the Soviet armed forcea as well as tho population in general. Colonel Ely sums up the position of the political officer, as follows: "The political officer on the commander'a staff is inpy, is generally regarded as such, and is usually thoroughly Ely further states that tho Russian, having accustomed himself to this constantcopes with It byersonal policy of The Khole system of controls and indoctrination severely limits individual initiative throughout the ranks of the armed forces, despite the efforts of the authorities to dovolop the

double standard of flexibility in military matters and conformity

in political matters.^

y Louis B. Ely: Tbe Red Army Today;.

I Undeniably, tiia

-mercery or meao purges ia still ln tha minds-"of the Soviethierarchy, and this maytrong deterrent to anyaction. After World Warendency was shown toward

reassigning officers who had seen combat together, in order-to

destroy the feeling of comradeship which had grown up. |

]hasypically Russian expression to describe the lack of comradely solidarity and indifference to the fate of others that the system has created among military personnelt "One's shirt is nearest to one's body.'*

The Soviot armed forces are also split horizontallyaste system which has developed at least since the re-introduction of military ranks for officers during the period of preparation for World War II. Colonel Ely states that "the marshalsaste of their own and the generals form another, both being as distinct from the officer caste as the latter are from tbe enlisteday and privileges nowreater gulf between higherand troops than exists in many Western armies. The officers owe their privileges and high standard of living to tho regime and its continued existence. In addition, the Suvorov schools, created3 to train young boys from the age of nine or ten to become career officers, annually turnroup of politicallyhighly regimented and class-conscious cadets, who will tend to harden this caste system. stimates that there are nowuvorov schools, each having an average attendance. Most of the students are sons of World War II casualties, high-ranking officers and influential Communist Party members.

Finally, the very presence in the armed forcesighof Communists, subject to Party discipline,actor limiting tho armed forces' freedom of political action as long as Party solidarity ia outwardly maintained at the top. In theyears. Party membership has become essentialuccessful careeroviet military officer, and favoritism is shown to Party stalwarts in promotions and assignments. The question of which cones first. Party membership or professional success, has been raised by many students. It ia generally agreed that, during the war, military competenceuch more Important factor in

1/ Ely: op.age llg.

an officer's career than it is today. Statistics on decorations awarded during the war provide some interesting hints on thisigh percentage, but by no means all, of the recipients of awards were Party members. At the XIX Party Congress, F. F. Kuznetsov stated that, of0 Heroes of the Sovieter cent) were Communists. Other Soviet sourcesthat an additionaler cent crQr cent were Kornrtoaola.

To sum up, there is much in the recent and past history of the Soviet armed forces to limit severely their ability to actnit in time of internal political crisis. Tbe armed forceshole must be looked uponelatively passive body,probably not capable of being "delivered" to anyonenified element of political power unless the existing controls break down under circumstances far more drastic than any yet evidenced. Instead, the post-Stalin era should be studied with an eye toward discovering what effects the political changes have had on the armed forceshole (especially on the controloperating withinhat attitudes the political leaders have displayed toward tho armed forces, what cliques or groups of high-ranking military leaders have profited by the changes in the regime, and what influence these military leaders have hadon-revolutionary fraaework of palace intrigueighlystate.

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TOP-SeGREX

III. Position of the Military after Stalin's Death

The Governmental Reorganization of

The first official move by the Soviet leaders after the death of Stalin vas the complete reorganization of the government's The general effect of the reorganization vas to centralize and streamline the governmental structure at the topj with aof the number of ministries by about one-halfeturn of the old Politburo group to direct control over key ministries. In the reorganizations5 March, the armed forces vere treated in accordance with this general pattern; the War and Kavy Ministries were mergedingle Ministry of Defense, and Bulganlnto direct control as Minister. This actionix-year trend toward relaxation of personal control of the armed forces ministry by tbe Party leaders. During the immediate postwar period, when Stalin was engaged in minimizing the battle-won popularity and independence of Soviet military leaders, he retained his position as People's Commissar of Defense and assumed the title of Inhe services were unified. radual, limited relaxation of control over the ministry may have begun some time during the next year, although not until tbe most popular military leader. Marshal Zhukov, had been packed off to Odessa. Stalinas Minister In7 and appointed In hisoyal "political general" and old comrade. General Bulganln, who wasto marshal shortly thereafter. Bulganln withdrew from the poeto become Politburo member without portfolio (but still reliably reported to have general responsibility for military matters). Marshal Vasllevsky, an able staff officer, replaced Inhe services were again separated, with Vasllevsky becoming Minister of War. The Havy regained statusinistry, and the next year the post of minister was returned to Vice. Kuznetsov, who came out of his enforcedbut did not receive his former rank of Admiral of the Fleet. The reunification of the services In3 returned them to the situation existing under Bulganln, tending tocloser controlop Party leader.

The neutralizing Influence of this step may be related to the personal status of Bulganln himself, who at that time appeared not toerious contender for personal supremacy but, rather, arepresentative of Soviet collective leadership. In the published listings of high Soviet officials since Stalin's death, Bulganln has regularly ranked just behind tbe topmost leaders; he was listed sixth in the Party Presidium on3 and vas

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fifth on? Bbvenber, Iferia having boonpecial;that, within the armed forces,

Bulganin cannot claim either professional or personal popularity but .isapable administrator who acts as watchdog for thet the two major celebrations involving the armed forcesDay and October Revolution Day, Bulganin took the parade and delivered the military speech; except for one year, previous practice had been to honor two different military leaders at theae celebrations.

Tbe March reorganization brought the announcement of thoof Marshal G. K. Zhukov from relative obscurity toirst Deputy Defense Minister, an appointment which could not fail to draw wide notice and would appear to contradict evidence of attempts to tighten political control over the armed forces. Zhukov'sprobably bad both political and military implications; it would help to Insure support for the government by tbe lower ranks of the army, and it represented the return to headquarterstop Sovlet.'milltary strategistime of possible danger to tbe nation. Zhukov, the best known of the Soviet marshals, Isan example of an "idealbe antI-politicalofficer. There is some question as to the truth of various colorful stories regarding Zhukov's past brushes with Presidium members. Including Malenkov, Bulganin, and Voroshilov (all of whom presumably bad to give at least tacit consent to Zhukov*ainut it is known that Zhukov is outspoken, blunt, and not afraid to make enemies In high places. Zhukov's opposition to political Interference in military matters is well confirmed,hla be lief--expressed publicly after the Finnishthe power of the political officers should be strictly limited. An extremely able strategist, Zhukov headed tho wartime general headquarters, the Stavka, daring Its entire existenceZS; in this post and as First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, he was directly under Stalin: It is generally believed that Zhukov's great popularity with the Soviet people was tbe basic cause for bis relegation to command of tbe Odessa Military Districtrobablyesult of the personal decision ofontributing factor may have been his friendly contact withmilitary leaders, including Oashvrml Eisenhower. According to [the immediate cause was Zhukov's clash with Vastly Stalin

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and hie own deputy fox HKVD and URGE matters.*' Zhukov sentreport* fron Germany to Moscow about Vastly, who wasbut the deputy then submitted reports highly favorable to Vastly and unfavorable to Zhukov. Zhukov was recalled lnummoned before the Centralisciplined for various

delinquencies, and sent to Odessa. j

brief assignment as Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Ground Forcesto Juneeclipse, reported

oviet officerthat Zhukov and Govorov

were personal enemies, aim uvvumv, nuviug1 in the capacity ofGeneral, turnedighly unfavorable report on Zhukov. It Is important to note tbat Zhukov was not In disgrace during Stalin's lifetime, even after his removal from tbe Moscow scene. Be appeared with Molotov at tbe Polish Liberation Day celebrations inidely-reported but non-controversial speech; be wasandidate member of the Centralin October lOSgtl

fail name naa appeareauu iTrucui.x BLKuaLmies ma mu-ncary obituaries, suggesting that he had returned to Moscow prior to that date. Since March, Zhukov'0 name has alternated with Vasilcvsky'a ln the top military spot after Bulganln.

Tbe merger of the Bavy Into an armed forces ministry dominated by ground force officers must have disappointed many of the naval officers who bad enjoyed greater independence It must have rankled especially to have Admiral Zakharov, chief of the navy's political directorate, replacedarch by L. I.artime army political officer batarty functionary who had been appointed to Malenkov's enlarged Secretariat at the

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nZtijkov'B deputy

ror security arrairs In Germany was Col. Gen. I. A. Serov. Beeputy Commissar for Internal Affairs16irst Deputy Minister of Internal Affaire7n these positions, he was necessarily in close contact with Berla. Ine received an award lnwith work on the Volga-Don Canal. His present position and whereabouts ore unknown.

time of the XIX Party Congress.*' Even the navy newspaper. Red Fleet, was suspended and merged with Red Starpril, after 1ft years of publication; Red Fleet had continued to publish during the previous period of armeT"services unification,6vidence of efforts to reassure tbe naval leadership subsequent to tbe establishment of increased control may be found in the awarding of medals in Aprilumber of military officers, mostly navy officers, for "long and meritorioushe reportedin June of former Havy Minister Kuznetsovirst Deputy Defense Minister; Kuznetsov'o promotion during the spring to his Worldank of Fleet Admiral; and extensive, favorablegiven In the Soviet press to Bavy Day In July and to the visit of the cruiser Sverdlov to the British coronation in June.

The Period of uncertainty ln tbe Spring

The months following Stalin's deatheversal of Gome of the unpopular policies of the Soviet government, with the iron hand removed from the top, the new leaders vying to Ingratiate themselves with their people, the Satellites, and the world, and Berlatrong bid for personal supremacy. Onarch the amnesty brought pardon to minor civilian and military offenders, ln April the largest price cut in four years was announced, and in the next two months the first indications appeared of an easing of the agricultural and consumer goods situations. The army participated in Soviet efforts to relax international tensions: in mid-March,ritish aircraft, had been shot down by Soviet fightera ln Germany, General Chuikovost conciliatory note, whichin the opening of negotiations on revision of the Berlin air corridor rules (the negotiations have accomplished nothing, although they continued in desultory fashion until The renewed Soviet propaganda theme of cooperation among nations was aided by Bulganin on May Day: after an unusually short military parade, he

1/ Brezhnev was later identifiedeputy to the Chief of the Chief Political Directorate of the Defense Ministry. He probably held the post untilhen he wasby the Party to Kazakhstan. His replacement has not been identified.

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emphasized the defensive role of tbe Soviet araed forcea, lo contrast to tbe belligerent preaa releases of Soviet Amy Day in

The stoat dramatic and moat fantaatlc of these post-Stalin measures was the reversal of the Doctors' Plot, announced by Berla's MVDpril. Tbe accused vere innocent, the accusers vere guilty, tbe varned vere unwarned. There vas no public reaction on tbe part of tbe five military leaders previously named ss Intended victims, vho may veil have vondered whether the danger to their lives bad now increased or decreaaed. Some information is available, however, on reactions within tbe ranks of the armed services. (

reversal of the Doctors' Plot vasreatthe personnel In Germany. Tbey bad accepted the plot atvalue, as tbey did all government announcements, butvas greeted with contempt and exasperation,aeemed to bring the whole system into disrepute. Onethat the reversal made Beria more hated

than iLreveal that, at this

time aa well ao at the death of Stalin and the arrest of Beria, discussion In the ranks was severely limited: officers were authorised only to read the official communiques and to offer no personal opinion or comment, political meetings were conducted with prepared agenda received from higher levels, and political officers were ins true tad to report on anything that was being said. The Illness and death of Stalin were accompanied by the cancellation of leaves and by orders to Increase vigilance.

ne other Interesting feature of May3 was thaabsence of Lt. Gen. Vaslly Stalin,9 commander of tbe Moscow air garrison. Be bad led tbe sir sections of tbe parades until Aviation Dayn that occasionormation which spelled oat "Glory to Stalin." Be was not In evidence at either occasionnd his present whereabouts la unknown. At Aviation Dayhe formation spelled "Glory to tha USSR."

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Following the reversal of tbe Doctors' Plot, emphasis was on respect for legality and willingness toistake on the part of tbe Soviet government, which nobody believed.

Other interesting source material on propaganda fed totroops during this period is found in the programsVolga, which broadcasts to Soviet troops in Eastaboutours daily. Most of this broadcast timeto rebroadcasts of Moscow transmissions, in whichhears exactly the same news and propaganda ascivilian, but three hours dally are devoted toliterary programs and technical.informationfor the troops. It is believed that thiswritten by the Party. The followingtudy of Radio Volga broadcasts

intended for Soviet troopsarch and

A striking continuation of tbe Stalin myth, even though this theme was all but dropped by other propaganda media almost immediately after Stalin's death. Tbe emphasis on the dead leader actually increased throughout April and May, with Radio Volga lecturersurious tendency to continue speaking of Stalin in the present tense, as if he were still alive. Stalin comment had slacked off by July, but It continued to be frequent in comparison with other media.

Continued prominence of the vigilance theme, primarily directed at external enemies, with some stress on the need to safeguard military secrets. In keeping with this "hard" line, the troops heard considerably less of welfare and cons oner goods propaganda than the general public.

mention of Malenkov's name considerably more often than that of any other living leader.

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Inasmuch as these before

DrorraeosTB were nbC" monitored reguj there is no basis of comparison with the period prior toeath.

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Emphasis on loyalty to tbe Party, the Motherland, and the government. There vas constant reference to the role of the Party organization in the Army.

Failure to emphasize present military leaders or toloyalty to military heroes of the Russian past, such as wae the practice during World War II. Bulganln, Voroshilov, and Vasllevsky were the only names mentioned, ond these only rarely. After April, however, considerable broadcast time vas devoted to popularizing the Soviet commander as such, urging "the increased authority of commanders."

This review shows that the material prepared for the troops did not respond significantly to events, remaining notably inflexible during the entire period.

In early June, the Soviet policies of conciliation were Intensified, with the compromise proposal on Koreaune ond the announcement of the "new course" in East Germany on the 9th. The dissolution of the Soviet Control Commissions in Germany and Austria Is now considered to have been preparation for the easing of tensions in East Europe, although at the tine there vas speculation that the Soviet Foreign Ministry vas asserting itself over the Army in the occupied areas. (One article In Taegllsche Rundschau, the Soviet newspaper ln East Germany, placed some of the blame for previous repressive policies on the military chief of the Control Coomiosion, but this was not repeated.) The Control Commission in Germany was abolished onay. Army. Chuikov, its chief, had hisrestricted to military matters, and his former political. Seme nov, was made High Commissioner, Later Ambassador. une Chuikov was transferred from Germany to an unnamed post in the USSR and was replaced as military commander by Col.. Grechko, who had been commander of the Kiev MD. Chuikov's appearanceovember aa commander of tbe Kiev MD revealed that these men bad simply switched Jobs. Also In.areer diplomat, assumed the duties of High Commissioner in Austria, and shortly thereafter Lt.. Svlridov wae replaced as military commander in Austria-Hungary by Col.. Blryuzov, former commander of the Maritime MD at Vladivostok and once Soviet representative on the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria. Svlridov has not subsequently been identified.

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One of the outstanding revelations of the East German riots ofune vas the complete reliance on the povor of the Soviet Army to maintain Communist control in East Germany. Soviet authorities reacted swiftly and efficiently, correctly evaluating the nature of the situation and calling in the troops. Tbe first troops vere actually arriving in East Berlin in the early morning ofh, martial lav waa declared. the same day, and byotal0 Soviet troops vith atanks and self-propelled guns were estimated to be In theeneral alert was maintained by theh Air Army fromoune,r

During this period, net military UfiltS vere returned rrom their' summer training areas to more thanities and towns in Eaat Germany. Zn contrast, unite of the East German Garrisoned People's Police were reportedly alerted but confined to their barracks onane. They were not committed in Berlin until the riots had been brought under control by Soviet forces, and tbey did not begin to replace Soviet units In tbe city until mid-July. Ths firm bat generally calm manner In which the Soviet forces handled the East German disturbanceslear reminder to the Soviet politicalof their capabilitiesecurity force and could not help but enhance the already, high reputation of the Soviet armed forces among the Soviet people.

The Military and the Purge of Beria:

Tbe exact circumstances of the removal of Beria later In June are not known, but strange developments in Moscow on the night ofuno give rise to the strong suspicion that elements of the army were Involved. The first Indication that Beria bad come to grief was his absencearefully staged tableau of Soviet political leaders which presented itself at the opera that evening. (The opera. Incidentally, was "Ihe Decembrist,'1 dealing with the unsuccessful military coop) Reports from western military attaches in Moscow Indicate that there vere unusual military movements in tbe city beginning in the late afternoon ofh. 8ereral dozen tonka andvehicles arrived In Moscow by rail at about five o'clock and apparently proceeded from tbe station into the city and along the boulevard leading past the Kremlin and Berla's residence. Their destination was not discovered. Additional movement of military vehicles was hoard or soon during that night and on subsequent nights throughune. Early onh, tank tracks wore seen on streets in the city. Although much of this activity could have been connected

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with summer training of military units in tbe Moscow area, the presence of the tanks and vehicles in the center of tbe city, highly unusual in itself, was so closely tlaed with tbe staged bint of Berla's downfall as to sake acre coincidence seen doubt-full. This is not to suggest tbat Berla was arrestedank crew. Assuming, however, that he was taken Into custody on or beforehow of military force In Moscow when his demise vas publicly revealed could have served at once as a. sign to Berla's loyal followers tbat resistance was futile andrecaution against any popular disorders-i/

Unfortunately, the tanks in question cannot bethat their

turretsi.ue> instead of the three-digit numbers carried by tanks of the field forces. The possibility has been raised that they were not army tanks at all, since at least one no tori tedo have some organicknown to be stationed ln Moscow. In view of the circumstances, however, and of Berla's position as MVD hood, it is considered most likely that the tanks were army tanks brought ln from outBide the city.

Personnel of the armed forces were prominently used to help signify the completeness of Berla's disgrace and the solidarity of the government. On aboutnly, shortly after theuly announcement of Berla's purge. Army General A. I. Antonov, commander of the Transcaucasus MD (which includes Berla's native Georgia)pecial meeting of the military district at which he denounced Berla and pledged the unity of all army Communists behind the decision of tbe Central Committee.Zj This was one of the first meetings of this type to

lthough there Is conflicting evidence on this point, lt seems most likely that Berla's arrest occurred onune, since the Presidium decree regarding his "anti-state activities,"to tbe Supreme Soviet for ratification in August, wsb datedune.

Zl Antonov, curiously, was not elected either member or candidate nomber of the USSR Central Committee Inlthough beey military district and was active ln the Georgian Communist Party. During World War II, he had been deputy to Marshal Vasllevsky on the general staff. When Antonov was Chief of the General Staffrief period Immediately after the end of tbe war, Shtemenko was his deputy.

be held In the USSR and wuo the first such meetingilitary district to be publicized in Red Star. At the time. It seemed that the denunciation by the military commander In Georgia couldarning to Berla's followers that the army vas maintaining firm control over tbe situation in Berla's native state;events confirmed this impression.

The pledge was taken for all the armed services in a: Moscow meeting which was publicized in Pravda onuly, under the headline "Boundless Devotion to the Coaaauniat Party." According to thiseeting of the Party afctiv of the Defense Ministry had "recently" been held to discuss the decisions of the Central Committee regarding the dismissal of Beria. The speakers included Bulganin,. Kuznetsov, Sokolovsky, Budenny, Govorov, and others, but evidently not Vasllevsky or Konev. The standard resolution was then unanimously adopted, pledging "true and devoted support" to the Party, service to the cause of the Soviet people, and "determined and unconditional' fulfillment of Party and government decisions. No political leaders were specifically mentioned in tbe resolution.

The period of confusion at the time of Berla's purgea spate of rumors in Moscow, supposedlyeen awareness of therole of tbe military among the Sovietwell as among the diplomatic community. It was atthat Zhukov was under arrest, but this wasby his appearanceeception onuly. then reported the rumored arrest of the

commander of the Moscow MD and the commandant of the city One of these men appeared at receptions2 August, but subsequently the replacement of bothtn the Soviet press. also cited rumors that

the governmenteduction in the size of the armed

forces, andrumors that the term

of military service luras to be reduced and deferment policy liberalized. The abaence of both Zhukov and Vasllevsky from official functions and listings fromulyeptember, including absence from Air Force Day celebrations onugust, gave rise to false rumors that they had been removed, but both have appeared often since, and in* were nominated as deputies to the Supreme Soviet. Reports of such rumors in Moscow tapered off after last summer.

Rumors about the Soviet army's role In politics were prevalent all over the world during the summer. Stories under London datelines claimedilitary triumvirate (Voroshilov,

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Bulganln and Zhukov) had assuzned real power in the USSR, that Berla was ln aprison in Moscow, and that Konev had been arrestedupporter of Berla. Italian, Austrian, andewspapers carried various other "inside" stories. Such stories are not believed to have any validity regarding the actual situation in the USSR.

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TV- Evidences of an Improveaent ln tbe Position of the Military

Promotions and ^assignments of High-Ranking Personnel:

Sinceumber of developments have occurred whichreater mobility for top military personnel, somewhat greater freedom fron close control, and some Increase inIn political matters. The general Impression created is onehiftassiveore active role, beginning with the incidents of tbe East German riots and the Berla purge.

The feeling of Increased mobility Is conveyed by tbe number of promotions and reasslgnments of top commanders. The Soviet press has disclosed tbe promotion of two men to tbe rank of marshal, one to fleet admiral, one to admiral, and six to army (four-star)since1 In general, those promoted are noted more for their professional abilities than for their political For several years previously, ranks had apparently been frozen for top Soviet Army officers. The only promotions to army general between the end of World War II3 occurred8 (in tbat year four officers received the rank) and the onlyto marshal were Sokolovsky's6 and Bulganln's

The turnover in top jobs In tbe Defense Ministry was also greater3 than for several years past. There Is now firm or probable evidence of the assignment of nev persons to nine key mlli-tary poets since Stalin's death, with seven of these changessince last May Day. ough comparison with recent years shows that, iney Jobs in the ministry, there were nine known changes3 out only twohree1 and nonen years priorhe known turnover was more nearly comparable to that Xn addition to the Moscow MD, eleven other military districts probably havehange in command since Stalin's death, partlydirect result of the changes ln the top Jobs ln the ministry.?/

1/ etailed listing of these promotions, see Appendix II.

ZJ The top posts considered In this comparison are those ofFirst DeputiesninC Ground Forces, CinC Naval Forces, CinC Military Air Forces, CinC Long RangeCinC Airborne Forces, CinC Rear Services, CinC Artillery,

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Hoet of tbe changes and proaotloos have been In tbe ground forces; naval and air offleera hold fewer of the top poaltlona In tbe Soviet armed forcea, and there doea not appear to have been any freeze In rank In these two services Within ths Nary, one of tbe more interesting appointments was that of Vice Admiral V. A. Fokin as Navy Chief of Staff, revealed in semi-official Soviet announcements in February andnd hl6 promotion to admiral during the summer. ONI has noted that Fokin was for ton years closely associated with Admiraloctors'nd mayrotege of Levcbenko. Admiral A.olovko, whom 'okIn replaced as Chief of Staff, has probably taken command of the South Baltic Fleet. Hone of these menember or candidateof the Central Committee.

Within the air forces, where there has been considerableIn top positions since the end of World War II, there vasknown change The announcements of Aviation Day in August revealed that Col. Oea. P. F. Zhigarev, CinC of Military Aviation, bad beenarshal of Aviation,ove similar to tbe elevation of the Navy's chief to Fleet Admiral. In addition, lt has been noted that, since July, Marshal of Aviation K. A. Ver-shlnln has been signing obituaries directly after Zhigarev. In in, former Air Force chief, had been replaced by Zhlgarev9 and had been in obscurity since that time, although he waaandidate member of tbe Central Committee ine is reported totrong opponent of ground force domination among tbe services.

Among the more significant ^assignments are changes In three key commands In tbe Moscow area:

- As commander of the Moscow MD and chief of the MoscowCol. Gen. P. A. Artemev was replaced by Col. Gen. K. S. Moskalenko. Soviet press material indicates that the change

CinC Armored Forcea, Inspector General, Chief of the General Staff, head of ths Chief Political Directorate, Chairman of DOSAAF, commanders in Germany and, commander In the Far East, and commanders In tbe Moscow. (Changes In Job designations caused only by reorganizations of the armed forces were not counted when tho individual's duties did not

probably occurred boojo time betweenayommandeeponelble for all Soviet Army troopsMoscow area, with at least one rifle division and They are primarily show troops, with speciallypersonnel, tho best equipment, andreliable officers.

-As commandant of the city of Moscow, Lt. Gen. K. B. Stnllov was replaced by MaJ. Gen. Iy S. Kolesnlkov, probably betweenugusteptember.!/ ThlB command controlsand medical elements of tbe Soviet Army in tbe Moscow area. Although tbe commander has no tactical units of his own, be acts ot timeseputy to tbe commander of the Moscow garrison and Is regularly charged with maintaining order during Important Soviet anniversaries and celebrations.

-As commander of the Kremlin Guard, Lt. Gen. of MVD K. K. 8plridooov was replaced by Maj. Geo. A. I. Vedenln, probablyayovember. This position, in the past held by an MVD officer, bears overt responsibility for the physical security of the Kremlin. Tbe commander reportedly controls one picked MVD division andubordinate to tbe Government Guard Directorate, which waa presumablyfrom the MGB to the MVD In the governmentalof Maj. Gen. Koaynkln, whose death was announced in mid-February, was an officer of tbe Kremlin Guard.

As can be seen from the description of these commands, their locum-bents areosition to exert considerable influence at tbeof Soviet government during times of crisis or tension. In Borne respects, they are as strategically placed as were the Guards regiments created by Peter tbe Great.

Tbe replaced officers had all held their positions for many years, encompassing tho period from at least early ln World War II until after Stalin's death. Of the three, only Splrldonov Isas an MVD man. Artemev had seme MVD experience, his last known security assignment being command of an MKVD rifle division Slnilov bad been charged with preservation of order ln

i/ Aa mentionedumor was current In Moscow during3 that both Slnilov and Artemev had been relieved of their commands and arrested.

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Moscow when tbe Germans were at tbe gates of tbe city InSince their replacement, tbe whereabouts of these three men has not been determined.

Biographic records show that tbe new appointees in tbe Moscow area are primarily professional military men, all three of whom held combat commands during World War U. Moskalenko, an ex-cavalry officer, had commanded an army which was on the Fourth Ukrainian Front35 and was in the Carpathian MO after tbe war. Ine became FVO (air defense) commander in tbe Moscow area. Inbe Soviet press revealed histo army general. Little is known concerning tbe careers of Kolesnikov and Vedenin. ieutenant colonel, Kolesni-kov received the award of Hero of the Soviet Union for biscrossing of tbe Dnieper. Vedeninifle division commander in World War IIifle corps commander in Germanyone of these three men was elected member or candidate member of the Central Committee inlthough Moskalenko attended the Party Congress as delegate from the Moscow Party Committee and both he and Vedenin have participated in Ukrainian Party affairs.

The unusual number of recent promotions to high rank Inarmed forceB has

theorize that the promotions arc connected vitn anuxuvnas First Deputy Minister, whichwas for

tbe purpose of revising Soviet war plans lh line with the post-Stalln governmental reorganization. The promotions, he believes, are consistent with tbe creation of nev commands and the possible organization of large subordinate planning headquarters. Thiswould appear to hinge primarily on tbe inclusion among those promoted to army general of Biryuzov, tbe new commander in Austria, and M. M. Popov, commander of the Tauric m) in the Crimea. So far, however, there has been no other evidence to support tbe theory of enlarged commands. No known Increases in size orof function have occurred In the commands In Germany, Austria, or the Crimea. Also, although Svirldov had beenieutenant

1/ Tbe pertinent extract from Stalin's order of1 provides an instructive sidelight on tbe relationship between the array and the security forces io that time of crisis. Aftertate of siege and martial law in Moscow, Stalinthat "the maintenance of strictest order in the.city and adjacent raiona has been assigned to the commandant of the city of Moscow, Haj. Gen. Slnilov, for which purpose the commandant haa at his disposal the troops of internal security of the NKVD, the militia, and volunteer workers' detachments." Thus the army commander was temporarily given control over the security forces.

general, hie predecessor la Austria bad been promoted tohile In the command. For some years. Westernhas been watching for the establishment. In key Orbit border areas, of strategic command ochelons above the Military District or Occupation Group level. Thus far, tbe only identified coamandwith the WorldFront" has been Mellnovsky's bead-quarters, organized Inith operational andcontrol over the three Military Districts of the. Soviet Far East. It appears logical, however, tbat Zhukov's responsibilities should include review and re visIon of strategy, and tbe promotion of professional officers mightesult of his influence.

wiis xior, The" acontion of auditing groups

the Ministry of State Control at two major military headquarters In tbe Soviet Far East Is Interpreted as part of the general military reorganization ln the area. The net effect of the reorganization Is further to concentrate army authority at Khabarovsk and navy authority at Vladivostok. The purpose of the reorganization Is still not understood; lt could be an economy move or could reflect soee revision of strategy.

Possible Shifts in Army-MVD Relationships:

The changes in the three Moscow commands have been"tokens of rising military as-

cendancy over theertainly, the appointmentombatto conaaod tbe Kremlin Guard raises the question whetherfor Kremlin security has been transferred fromArmy control. ThlB question might be clarified Ifshould become available on tbe present status ofGuard Directorate, to which tbe Kremlin Guard Isand of its chief,o be Lt.MVD H. S. Vlaslk. The other two key Moecov commands wereofficers all along, but now their long-entrenchedbeen replaced by persons known primarily as professionalmen.

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An army man hao encroached upon the MVD tn at least one other Instance; here again, tbe location adds to tbe significance; of the change. 3 the Georgian press announced theof A. I. Icaurl as Minister of Internal Affairs (MVD) la the Georgian SSR, succeeding V. G. Dekanozov, vho bad been dismissed from tbe Georgian Communist Partyupporter of Berla. Inaurlrofessional army officer,ajor general, vho commanded Soviet troops In Iran5 and i'jkG andechanised division ln Germany& until at This is tbe first known instance lo recent years of tbe appointmentlah MVD positionan who Isember of the MVDarty careerist. Later, ln aid-September, tbe Georgian Party buro was reorganized to remove tbe last of Berla's followers, and Inaurl and Amy General Antonov, who bad node the initial army denunciation of Berla, were appointed members of the ten-man buro.

Tbe question of Aray-MVD relationships is also raisedIndicating tbat, during tbe summer and early fall ofSoviet espionage systemrocess ofpersonnel replacement. The Defense Ministry and the MVDmost of the Soviet foreign Intelligence functions. The directly concerned are the foreign anddirectorates of tbe MVD and tbe Intelligence directorateDefense Ministry. The first two are primarily concernedintelligence, psychological varfare andwhile tbe last gathers chiefly military, scientific,intelligence. During the summerany of tbeSoviet representatives abroad believed to be associateddirectorates were withdrawn. The foreign intelligenceof tbe Defense Ministry bad returned to Its formermid-November, but lt appears tbatmall number ofreturned to foreign assignments. This may of courseroutine reorientation, security measure, or economy move. state that. In the amy, Intel-

ligence has been reducedhief Directorate of tbe General Staffirectorate. There Is no positive evidence to show any recent change ln tbe activities of the Chief Directorate ofof tbe MVD within the armed services;

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In addition to the several events since3 tending to Increase the influence of Array leaders at the direct expense of the MVD, developments of that year reduced the position and authority of tbe MVD with respect to all other agencies of the Sovietincluding the Array. These developments included Jhe Doctors' Plot fiasco, the purge of Beria, and the appointmentewwithout Presidium status. Tbe scope of MVD activity wasat least temporarily. Tbe awareness of this decline among Soviet rank-and-file is illustrated by evidence of consternation. MVD officials in occupied Europe in June and by the attitude

[He commented that

the discomfiture of the" was not disagreeable to the military.

Developments In the Mechanisms of Party Control:

With regard to relations between tbe Party and the armed forces, perhaps tbe most significant appointment3 was the appointment of Col. Gen. A. S. Zheltov as head of the ChiefDirectorate of the Ministry of Defense. This appointment was revealed onuly in the public notice of the meeting of theMinistry's Party aktlv, at which Zbeltov reported on tbeCommittee's decision to purge Beria. (The exact date of tbe appointment is notev York Times release cleared by tbe Moscow censor onuly stated that Zbeltov bad held this position "for some time.") Little is known regarding Zheltov's career,that he was once champion wrestler of the Red Army. eneral officere served during World War IIember of military councils In the Par East and the Ukraine. 5e was Deputy Chairman of the Soviet element of the Allied

urious but entirely unconfirmed report alleges that theof Beriahift in army-security relationshipsthat, in late July, all

Bulgarian military intelligence activities, Including those of the Bulgarian SMERSH, were returned to military control. of tbe Soviet MVD working in tbe Intelligence section of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense were allegedly replaced by Soviet military personnel. In addition, there have beenreports of widespread replacement of MVD personnel in the Satellites.

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Control Council for Austria and was also reportedly chief of the Political Directorate of the Central Group of Forces In Austria and Hungary- In Septemberhe returned to Moscow for "other duties." After that time, his name appeared frequently onbut lt is noteworthy that be was noteaber of the Central Committee ln Zheltov appears to have been appointed over tbe beads of at least two logical candidates whose Party status was higher than his. One of these men, Col. Gen. F. F. Kuznetsov, bad been the bead of the Chief Political Directorate of the Ministry of War prior to Stalin's death. Kuznetsov'sIs of some Interest: he was active in the Army's ChiefDirectorate beginning8 and headed lt6nbe had served on tbe military council of thefront under Zhdanov and Govorov; be nay have been somethingrotege of L. Z. Mekhlie, who had taken over the Army's political administration ln tbe midst of the Great Purge ofs, and beember of Suslov's committee to arrange the funeral of Mekhlie ln Kuznetsov had beenandidate member of the Central Committee at the XIX Party Congress and had spoken on Party affairs ln the Army at the Congress. =j The other logical candidate passed over by Zbeltov was MaJ. Gen. L. I. Brezhnev, the Party leader who bad become political chief of the Bavy early ln March. It Is likely tbat, even after Zheltov'sKuznetsov and Brezhnev still beaded tbe political of the army and navy. Kuznetsov signed an obituary after Zbeltov onctober, and Brezhnev opened tbe Aviationugust, at which time his promotion to lieutenantwas revealed. Even Admiral Zakbarov, replaced as navychief ina apparently not In real disfavor, sinceovember be was decorated for long service.

Changes in tbe Chief Political Directorate are of tbe utmost significance because of its responsibility for Party affairs and morale within tbe armed services and Its direct control over the thousands of political officers within their ranks. The proper function of this whole organization hasroblem about which Communist leaders have exhibited considerable vacillation over tbe years. The position of Red Army Commissar was created by Trotsky's

l/ F. F. Kuznetsov should not be confused with Col. Gen. T. I. Kuznetsov, former chairman of DOSAAF, the Soviet paramilitary and civil defense organization. V. I. Kuznetsov wae apparently replaced as DOSAAF chairman on or before3 by Lt. Gen. K. F.artime air defense specialist.

order In lylB, primarily toechanism for establishing close surveillance by Party stalwarts over the ex-Ozarlst officers who were desperately needed to win battles but whose loyalty waa suspect. esolution of the Congress of Soviets that yearthat commander and commissar should exercise dual command of tbe unit, with tbe commissar holding veto power over sll decisions. Inhe Political Directorate was created, to direct the work of the commissars and to serve under tbe Party's Central After the end of the civil war, the commander's single authority was established In the spheres of combat, supply andand In thes, as the size of the armyand the percentage of Ccanonist commanders increased, the responsibilities of ecaaaoder and political officer were combined in moat units. The Great Purgeomplete reversal of this trend. ecree ofwo months after the execution of the Tukhachevsky group, re-established the equality ofand commanders In both the military and political phases of army life; Voroshilov is quoted as saying some time thereafter, "both tbe commander and the military commissar will Lead their unit Intobe undeniable shortcomings displayed by the army in the rIonian campaign were blamed in large part on tbe commissars; both Zhukov and Marshal K. A. Me re taker, who commanded tha troops in tho later stages of the Finnleh war, publicly criticized tbe eyatea. Inew months after Timoabenko replaced Voroahilov as People's Commissar of Defense, tbe system of dual command was abolished and the political commissars became deputy commanders for political affairs (called "zaapollts"). In the disastrous first days after the German attackowever, tbe commissars and dual command were once again revived, to curb desertions and low morale. This was the period in which commissars were ordered to shoot commanders whose loyalty or determination showed any sign of flagging; one student has commented that the response of the Party to the crisis was to strengthen its "moBt loyal phalanx" within the he system reverted to the pattern of political officers subordinate to militaryattern which baa been maintained at least on paper ever since. Tbeof the ccmnrissars2 occurred two months after Gen. A. S. Shchcrbakov became head of the Chief Political Directorate. The timing of this action Indicates that it probably represented anto Increase military efficiency and moralerucial moment

hite: op..

2/ Merle Falnsod: How Russia Is Ruled;.

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top-segrei

at tbe end of the long retreat prior to the first major Soviet One source states that Zhukov demanded curtailment of the power of the political officers for tbe defense of Stalingrad.

Morale vs. Security In tbe Soviet Army:

As World War II drewlose, the political apparatussome of its former power. The encroachment of politicalon the position, of commanders became so flagrant tbat,to

decree was Issued In Augustthe "undivided authority" of mil itary commandersthe political officers for their arrogant attemptsauthority. The XIX Party Congress speech by Vasllevskyjrecent measures to strengthen the authority of commanders,Volga's.flubBeouejit emphasis on unity of command, lendto

added that the same order demanded stricter compliance with army regulations andof military discipline; ln effect, therefore, it toldofficers to get out of the ccssnanders' business and to crack down ln their own field. In Germany, this directive reportedlya series of bulletins and orders tightening regulations,political indoctrination of personnel, restricting the sale of liquor to military personnel, and re-emphasising tbe order forbidding fraternization with tbe local population. Tbeof this new policy is well confirmed; beginning Inntensive measures were taken throughout occupied Europe to isolate Soviet military personnel and installations. Including tbe movement of headquarters from urban to rural areas, building of fences around Installations, replacement of local civilian employees with Soviet nationals, and strict enforcement of tbe ban on fraternization. The general effect of this policy was to make barracks life for tbe troops ln occupied Europe seem very like being In prison. Troops were scarcely allowed out of their compounds except lo escorted groups, fraternization was forbidden, and what little free time there bad been was filled with more political lectures. Most sources agree tbat,lthough desertions bad been cut down, morale among the men and officers In occupied Europe was low;bad been sacrificed for security.

Following Berla's purge, many of the oppressive restrictions on Soviet troops in East Europe began to be lifted. On twoIn July, Soviet officers In Berlin attended receptions inclothes; when questioned about this, they replied tbat they were now permitted to wear civilian clothes when off duty. ugust, German Innkeepers reported that Soviet troops could leave their quarters during off-duty hours and that many were

making excursions Into towns near the training areas toand visit the taverns. One report stated tbaterthe troops were being given passes each evening,. curfew and officers allowed outbecame prevalent In Germany during August andaftereptember. Several reports of earlyindicated that local civilians would again be employed at In late October, the families of Soviet officersrank of lieutenant and above began to arrive intbe USSR, and it was rumored tbat teachers would soonset up schools for their children. In mid-November,of Interior Eelmer stated that Soviet militaryrenting additional housing for dependents,ovietln Austria reportedly said tbe dependents would arrive inand January; the field commented tbat all Sovietto be permitted to bring their families to Austria. only high-ranking officers and security personnelpermitted to have their families In occupied Europe, andwas made for schooling.) At tbe same time,vas evidence that Soviet officer* would have to gerveof duty in the occupied

ports that, onoviet linwi iu Hamu suiu nis scheduled return to the USSR had been cancelledev hours before his departure and tbat he would have to remain for three more years. It was suggested tbat lengthened tours of duty were an economy measure, but the saving would not seem to outweigh the cost of transporting families and providing bousing for them, whichoviet expense ln Austria now tbat tbe USSR has assumed the cost of maintaining Its occupation forces.

There Is also some evidenceore liberal attitude was adopted toward tbe problem of military security ln tbe summer Onune travel restrictions in tbe USSR were relaxed slightly and many areas previously closed to foreigners wereopen; this relaxation was partially rescinded ln November,ev areas were closed again. eptember the Ministry of Defense published the annual order for the routine call-up and demobilisation of conscript classes, the first such public noticeass announcement ofctober referred to tbe demobilisation of soldierspecific Soviet tank division.ovember speech revealed tbe completion of autumn These developmentsore realistic securityallowing the revelation of non-sensitive military Information.

Tha Greater Inf luence of too Military Point of View:

Obviously tbe measures relaxing security controls over the troops were not tbe sole responsibility of the Army or of tbe Chief Political Directorate. Tbey are consistent with the general effort to improve living conditions for tbe Soviet people, followed since Stalin's death by the new regime; but lt Is pertinent to our problem tbat tbe relaxation of controls on tbe troops bears directly oo the ability of the political officers and the MVD agents to keep close tabs on all personnel and to press their political Indoctrination. Although there has been no evidence of any change in the political officers' responsibility for detailed reporting on politicala man with free time, in civilian clothes and allowed to go where he pleases. Is hardly susceptible to close surveillance. It seems clear tbat this Isilitary man's solution to the problem of armysoldiers were to be treated like soldiers Instead of being cloisteredunch of children, and tbe power of the political officer and the MVD man over them was reduced. Likewise, the more realistic approach to matters of security would appear toilitary man's point of view toward that problem. Several appointments of past months also suggestilitary point of view was taken Into consideration, particularly those appointments ln which professional army officers were placed ln positions formerly held by Party or MVD personnel.

Is there support for the Inferenceilitary man's point of view can exist io the USSR, shared by some members of the professional officer caste and possibly even by some political officers? It was cautioned earlier that the armed services should not beonolithic unit and probably do not constitute an autonomous source of political power. In spite of the tendency toward fragmentation and lack of Initiative, can at least some persons within the servicesilitary point of view in competition with other branches of government, especially tbe Party and the MVD, within the limits imposed by tbe prevailing system? It lo not believed that Party membership is ineterrent to the existenceilitary point of view; ln fact, H. J. Barman, ln commenting on the high percentage of Party members In thecorps, has raised the cogent point tbat, while this coyhreat to the military tradition, "It may equally constitute an Infiltration of the military mentality Into the Party Military terminology was of course commonly used by Party leaders to describe their political and economic "campaigns"

1/ In bis article, "The Basic Facts about Russia'shestar,

-

since- before the Revolution. Fedotoff White studied tbe history of the political commissars in the civil var period, commenting that the "ancient rhythm of armyhe planning of strategicand tbe administrative detailsetachment,trong attraction for these energetic young Communists, vho therefore often tended to neglect their own officialPolitical work among tbe greenhorn Communists in tbe ranks, vho were fumbling with the basic tenets of Marxism,ame pastime in comparison with the 'glory' of the battlefield and the exercise of authority in the everyday life of tbe camp." Even Gen. Jan Gamarnlk, who headed the army's political directorate and whosuicide inas implicated in the Tukhachevsky

Strong ties presumably developed among top military commanders out of the experience of World War II, when the privilege of rank was great and professional military men had great influence onpolicies. The roster of Zhukov'somradeB-ln-aroE, for example. Includes Konev, Rokossovsky, Timosbenko, Govorov, MalluovBky, Voronov, Vasllevsky, Chulkov, Kurasov, Sokolovsky and Popov. Men who were directly subordinate to some of the topleaders during tbe wartime and immediate postwar years have In some caseB emerged in key positions more recently. For example. Army General V. V. Kurasov, head of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy (roughly comparable to tbe US Army Warol. Gen. A. S. Zhadov, head of tbe Frunze Military Academy (comparable to the US Command and General Staffnd Zbeltov, new head of the Chief Political Directorate, all served under Marshal Konev tn Austria. The present positions of these three generals arein the molding of Soviet military thought.

As has been suggested, those individuals whoilitary point of view might be expected to be less rigid in their thinking than doctrinaire Party officials, and less reliant onand surveillanceolution to their problems. Likewise, they might be less morbidly concerned with security and secrecy than those whose thinking had been conditioned by years of training and service in the MVD and its predecessor organizations. Like the members of any professional group, those holding the military point of view might be impatient with interference and meddling byin what they considered vital problems affecting Soviet defenses. Their attitudes regarding such problems might be "non-political" or evens very probably in the case

1/ White: op.

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top-5egrei

tu11

of Zhukov. Tbe non-political or aoti-political officers nightore realistic, hard-headed approach to certain national problems and might display more Independence of thought regarding solutions than would "political generals" such as Bulganin. Such an attitude in tbe field of national defense affairs might carry over into the field of Soviet International relations. It thus could bethat tbe somewhat Increased flexibility in foreign policy shown by the Soviet regime since Stalin's death has been fullyby the military point of view In tbe USSR. It cunt-behowever, that there Is no really useful current Information on the formulation of Soviet foreign policy and that most opinions regarding tbe attitudes of top Soviet military men toward the West are mere suppositions. In the absence of reliable Information, lt would be extremely dangerous to assume that the military point of view lo the USSR is more friendly toward the West than are other Soviet points of view today, or, conversely, that the military mind is any more determined to seek war with the West.

Summary of the First Year:

A review of the significant developments of tbe period from2 through3 affecting tbe political position of tbe Soviet armed forcesrogression through severalphases. In the months preceding Stalin's death, there was evidence of tbe participation of certain army leaders or factions In political maneuvering. The period of the post-Stalin struggle between Malenkov and Beria, from March until June,ime of outward passivity on tbe part of the Soviet military leaders, with an Increase in political control over them. After June, however, high officers of the armed forces enjoyed somewhat greater mobility, professional officers were placed in important security assignments, and greater consideration was givenilitary point of viewquestions of morale and security within the armed forces. It seems quite likely that these changes resulted tn part from the Increased Influence of Zhukov and others of an "aotl-political" frame of mind. The armed forces leadership participated to some extent, possibly only verbal, in tbe removal of Beria, and it seems reasonable to conclude that tbe present Party leadership bought military acquiescence or support for its control by giving themilitary men greater freedom within their own There was no clear evidence, however, of any drastic change in the formal relationships between the armed forcea and any other branch of the Soviet government. Tbe alliance between top army and Party leaders waa probably an uneasy one; Zhukov and the military point of view vere hardly on what would be called cloae terms with Malenkov and the other top Soviet leaders.

v- Toward3 and After

October Revolution Dayi

The last anniversary of significance to all the Soviet armed forces3 was the October Revolution celebration. -The press build-up describedn language noticeably sharper than that of the previous few months, although the speeches by Voro-shilov and Bulganln were comparatively low in antl-Aneriean Tho military portion of the paradeovember took only aboutinutes, and as on May Day3 no armor was displayed. Military men appearing at tho parade wore shownravda picture ln the following order, reading away fromGovorov (slightly to theasllevsky, Sokolovsky, H.uznetsov, Zhigarev (also to theudanny. oticeip* lomatlc reception on the sane day listed Vasllevsky immediately after Bulganln. The notices ofovember festivities, as well as other official releases of the fall and wintereveal that recent appearances have been made by all the military officers listed as potential Doctors' Plot "victims" with the exooption of Shtemenko,.

descriptioneception given onjuvmoBr-DT-Ti reign Minister Molotovaaci-

- , ' suiuwu* yruviaes a. lasci-

na-ing tidbit, possibly indicative of the uneasiness of the present allisnce between army and Party leaders. The hand-picked group at Molotov's table included Soviet Presidium members.

Communist Chinese and East German representatives, and the US, British and French Ambassadors. Numerous toasts were proposed to "petes'1 by tbe Russians, after which Ambassador Bonionoast tohich "seemed to animate tbe Soviet officials." At about this time, Bulganln had to leave the table. Molotov then sent for Zhukov to take Bulganln's place, ignoring Vasllevsky, who was having buffet supper in the sane room. Whan asked tooast, Zhukov stated that he wished to support the toast to justice, despite Mikoyan's "irritated" urging that he think uptoast of hla own. Later, Molotov proposed tbe healths of the military, who had arranged the day's parade,the hope that they would confine themselves to parados. Ambassador Bohlen reports that, although Molotov was obviously speaking of parades in contrast to war, this toast "did not seem to please Zhukov especially." Zhukov vas clearly not on intimate terms with the Presidium members at the table and took little pleasure in the proceedings.

TOf-^fiGREL

Millp.jt ioniL"*rln'al Board:

Onecexber, Itvestla announcedpecial session of the Supreme Court, under the chairmanship of Marshal I. S. Konev, had tried and convicted Beria and six accomplices on chargesreason and that the death sentence had been carried out. On the face of it, the appointmentigh military man as chairman of this court is another indication that Army leaders oro now active participants in, and supporters of, the policies of the present Soviet regime. Membership on the courtoviet Army marshal may be partially explained by reasons of protocol, since Beria had held the rank of marshal The sentence specified that the defendants were stripped of "all their Military titles and awards." This vas notilitary tribunal, howevorj for this reason it seems that, as chairman, Konev was givenprecedenceigh Party figure, alternate Presidium member N. M. Shvernik, whoember of the court.

Regarding Konev, the moat obvious point of Interest that comes to mind is the fact that he waa namedoctors' Plotlthough he had boonoyal, personal friend of Stalin- He was one of seven top military loaders chosen to guardoffin but was absent from official functions covored in ths Soviet press from that time until September. Using the hypothesis that Malenkov was behind the Doctors' Plotthat it was inarning to Konev and others, and that Beria later reversed it, it can be speculated that Konev'son tho trial board reflects his shift from opposition to support of Malenkov. On the other hand, membership in the group convicting Boria may have been considered an undesirablefor any military or civilian loader, because of thethat it might backfire later, and Konev may havo accepted it only reluctantly.

oe notes

Se

unions, the MVD and the Georgian branch of the Ccmnuniat Party,

nvolve representativesumber of institutions in the decisions.

A curious note regarding the present influence of the armed

Another member of the court was Army General K.oskalenko, who became commander of the Moacow MD at about the time of Boria's arrest. His membership is another hint that military forces in the Moscow area participated in tho arrest and imprisonment of Beria. If the presence of Konev and Moskalenko on the court indicatss active military participation in theof tha present, it must also ba noted that T

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forces is found in an omission from the court's report. The State Prosecutor's indictment ofecember specifically accused Beria, among other thanes, of weakening the defensive capacity of the USSR. The Court's report of 2b, December said that all preliminary investigations and accusations had been "completelyut, in the do tailed listing of Berla's criminal acts whichthis statement, Soviet defenses were not mentioned.

Other Rocent Developaentsi

As pointed out earlier, the relaxation of controls over the troops ln occupied Europe was consistent with the general effort to improve Soviet living conditions. An illustration of the close relationship between seme policies of the government and tho Armyeasure adopted by the Supreme Soviet onhich will Influence both civilians and military personnel. ecree of that date7 decree which made marriages between Soviet citizens and foreigners illegal)7 decree was thought to haveartlved at Soviet military personnel abroad.

commented that the action ofovember seemed dmuicuieu wim eiruria to liquidate some of the mostand damaging as peats of Stalin's policy, the advantages of which were not commensurate with the losses involved. In Januaryit was reportedecree penrdttlng marriage to Austrlans was read to Soviet troops in the Vienna area.

It la noteworthy, however, that some of the liberalInitiated during the summer were partially reversed byof tbe year. On lu November, five new areas of the USSRtohis action reversed the trend towardrestrictions which had appeared in June. During thoinstances of tho abuse of increased privileges werefrom the East European aroas occupied byand crimes were reported, and

the unfavorable reaction of the German population to the Soviet soldiers' attempts at fraternisation. Curfews, off-limits areas, escorts for enlisted men on passes, and in soma cases restrictions to barracks were imposed, and by late December it was apparent that restrictions on the troops had boon partially re-instituted in both Germany and Austria. The impression conveyed by the reports,was that increased freedom for the troops was still thorule, with exceptions where security required it, whereas before tbe summer tight controls over the troops had been the rule.

Dependents of Soviet officers arrived in Oormany daily during

tof-SEGRgE.

December, and byh they bad occupied at leastdwelling units there. The influx continued despitediscontent on the part of German drill ana in areas wherewere requisitioned. USAREUR estimated that, by the0 dependent groups had arrived in East In Austria, where housing was apparently requested andrather than requisitioned, few dependents had arrived Their arrival was suspended temporarily aboutof the year. The explanation given to the officers wastohortage of housing,thatof apartments for dependents was Under wayustria,U the scheduled completion date for Preparations for the arrival of Soviet officers'have also been reported under way in Poland and same time, an accumulation of information

pas lsd[ accept reports that the touruty ror ffj

soviet officers in occupied Europe has been lengthened fromfiveexplanation for this has not been learned

The question of the Army-MVD relationship remains open,relationship itself may still betate of flux within Various rumors have had it that the Army has takenof the police functions of the MVD, particularly in thearea, but these stm-iray thethisMoscow. *

Stated in January that, in

army personnel were supervising the checking of visitors1

unction normally performed by the MVD; this could Ue in wath thejincrqase in importance of high military men in (worrit last summer.

APPENDIX I

KTLITART PERSONNEL ELECTED TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE OP THE CCMMONIST PARTY AT TOE XIX PARTT CONGRESS,2

NOTE: These lists include only those actively associated with military affairs) they do not include the following men who hold military rank and who held the following positions inha ministers and first deputy ministers of the armaments, aviation, and shipbuilding industries; tha minister of..machine and instrument making industry; and the head of the First Chief Directorate of the Council of Ministers (atonic research).

e-elected ln same statusromoted to full membership from candidate statusenoted from full nemborahio to candidate status

- elected as full or candidate

member for the first time at the XTX Party Congress

Position nt tine of election

Dpty Chairman, Council of Ministers; Member, Politburo, CC, CPSU

x. Voroshilov Dpty Chairman, Council of Ministers;

Member, Politburo, CC, CPSU

f Navy

Dpty Minister of War; CinC, Ground

xx.. Vasllevsky Minister of War

Present Position

Minister of Defense; 1st Dpty Chairman, Council of Ministers; Member, Presidium, CC, CPSU

Chairman, Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet; Member, Presidium. CC. CPSU

CinC, Naval Forces) 1st Dpty Minister of Defense

Dpty Minister of Defense; CinC. Ground

1st Dpty Minister of Defense

Id. -

Ii -i ..

KEMBERS

x... Yumaahev

xxx. Budonny

xxx. Timoehenko xxx. Zakharov

/ Col. Artamev

/ Army.

Bagramyan

/. Baslsti

/. Bogdanov

/ Karahai ol. Vershinln

f Col. Gorbatov

* Col. Zhigarev

Position at tame of election

Commander, Oral

Cannander, White Sea MD

unknown; released as Minister of Navy,at ownprobably retired

CinC, Cavalry Troops, Soviet Army

Commander, Beloruaslan MD

Chief, Chief Political Directorate, Soviet Navy

Commander, Moscow MD

Commander, Baltic MD 1st Dpty Minister, Navy Commander, Armored Troops unknown

Commander, Airborne Troops CinC, Military Air6 -

Present Position 1st Dpty Minister of Defense Commander, White Sea MD unknown, probably retired

CinC, Cavalry Troops, Soviet Army

Ccemandar, Bolorussian MD

relievedresent position unknown

relieved; present position unknown

Commander, Baltic MD Dpty CinC, Naval Forces

Commander, Airborne Troops CinC, Military Air Forces

1

. ZhigareT

M.I......... Brezhnev

H.I. Krylov

PKCMCTIONS

Rank

Marshal of Aviation

Marshal of Artillery

Admiral of Fleet

Army General

Army General

Army Oeneral

Army Oeneral

Army Oeneral

Admiral

Lt Oonorol

Army General

H

SINCE DEATH OF STALIN

Present Position

CinC, Military Air Forces; Dpty Minister of Defense

Dpty Minister of Defense;ead CinC, Naval Forces; 1st Dpty Minister of Defense Corsunder, Tauric MD Commander, Moscow MD and Garrison Commander, Central Oroup of Forces (Austria) Dpty Chief-of Gen Staff, Ministry of Defense Commander, Group of Occupation Forces, Germany Chief of Naval Staff

Probably ex-Chief, Political Directorate, Naval Forcea; ex-Dpty Chief, Chief PoliticalDefense Ministry; now 2nd Secretary, Kazakh CC

Commander, Far East MD

Kuznetsov's promotion was revealed in the Soviet press in All others were revealed subsequent to Peria's arrest.

]

sfirprr

APPESDIX III

PERSONNEL CHANGES TH THE ARMED SERVICES SINCE THE DEATH OF STALIN

of Defense

Dpty Ministers of Defense

Chief Political Directorate, Ministry of Defense

Present Tncuir.bent

. Bulganln V

.. Zhukov Admiral of. Kuznetsov

Col. Zheltov

Former TncuTihent

jj

3/

Col. Kuznetsov

of Change

3

33 Identified3

Identified3

Politicalof Naval Forces

Tank andTroops

Lt. Brezhnev

Col Gen of.

e. Zakharov

Marshal of Tanks

5.T. Bogdancv

3

a. Considered top military posts in text.

v Had been Presidium member with general supervision over military matters prior to

he posts of Minister and Deputy Minister of Defense were newly created in I

y Vasllevsky had been Minister of War and Kuznetsov Minister of the Navy prior toheir appointments as First Deputies therefore cannot be considered major'changes and are not included in the totalop appointments since Stalin's dsath.

ORE

tte (now Chairman,'Central Committee, DOSAAF)

Moscow MD and Garrison

City of Moscow

Comander, Kremlin Guard

Commander, Air Forces of Moscow MD

OrouD ofForcea, Germany

Central Group of Forces (Austria)

Commander, Tranabaikal MD

Commander, Kiev MD Commander, Oral MD Commander, Turkestan MD

Present Incumbent Lt. Qritchin

Army. Moskalenko MaJ. Kolesnlkov MaJ. Vedenin Lt. Rubanov Army. Grechko Army. Blryuzov Lt. Trotsenko

Army. Chulkov unknown

Col. Luchlnski

Torr.proluznetsov

Col. Artoner Lt. Sinllov Lt. Spiridonov

Lt. Stalin Amy. Chulkov Lt. Sviridov Col Qen D. Lelyasbenko(?)

Col. Grechko. Ihukov Col. Susaikov(?)

cf_ Change

Identified3

Between3

Between3

3

Identified3

3

3

IdentifiedU

Commander, Leningrad md Coriander, Marl tine KD CoiTBiandar, Caucasus MD

Commander, Ural md Co-mander, Volga MD

Commander, Don MD

Ccrrisnder, Vest Siberian YD

Present Incumbent Armyv. Zakharov unknown unknown

Former Incumbent

Col. Luchinskl

Col. Biryucov

Col. Trofimenko (died

Date of Change3

3

prior

between

prior

Identified1

Original document.

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