SELECTION OF SITE FOR SHERWOOD PROGRAM.

Created: 3/5/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

of Site for Sherwood

fnctore involved in the selectionite for the Sherwood program liave beon examined. Basic factors to he considered inite urc technical feasibility, political tenability, and problems of security.

Tbe basic requirement of the Sherwood program Is tohort wave propaganda broadcast to the target area during the hours oflateneraily program of thirty ainutec to one hour in duration when properly written and presented vlll build up the desired llatenlng audience. Curing tbe latter stages of the PBSUCCESS operation it will bo necessary to be able torogran ot any timeivenour period.

ealizingadio broadcast is tho most likely to bemedium for establishing contact with the target audience, lt ls understood that tho following is the proposed utilization of tho program:

conditioning of the target audience inperiod. The programing and/or tenor of thewill be modulated progressively froa said to vara andfinal stages andbort period, to hot inflaaaatory nature.

through complete notional programming of trueduring the attack phase. Phasing out tbe notional intoas circumstances permit inanner that from the houruttack it will appear to the listening target audienceantl-catmaunlBts were completely successful and thatwould be futile. This uopect of the program isto the success of the attack awing to the importance whichto radio news under such cireumotancec as demonstratedsituations In recent history.

control, stimulation and advice andtho partisan forces being organized throughout tbe targettho Stage IV period. It is desired that this mediumto include in its normal clandestine broadcast as loabove such identifying phrases or words which undergroundrecognize as pertaining to then. This aspect of thels considered essential and vital to the paramilitaryno other means will be available to substitute for this and ls

a very pertinent part of any such effort.

:-. Technically, broad caste can be cade from aire it any site in the Western Hemisphere. The number ofayroadcast will be heard In the target area (toe these sites vlll varyew minutes daily to full SU-hour coverage. To"bo able torogram at any time during the day, it is necessary that the site bo locatedadius of0 miles of the target area when using raedium power transmitting equipment. When using high power transmittingthe site can be locatedadius ofiles. The installation of high power trsjuoaltters requires large power generatorselatively extensive antenna system. Using either high or low power transmitting equipnont, the Installation cannot be clandestine in any sense of the word.

etermined.effort in mode by the opposition, the broadcaot site can be located! Thisasic aeBuraptionwhich will"bo true for any site that is selected. The broadcast eito could be located through use of direction finding equipment, local surveillance, local security leaks, and defection and penetration in indigenous groups knowing the location of tbe site. Although the broadcast site can be located and willarget for counter-propaganda, jt_vill be extremely difficult toase that would stand uporld court. Documentary proof couldainedeutral inspection team or through actual capture of equipment, tapes and broadcast engineers.

6. With tho realization tbat any broadcast site can be located, NnjARX must be prepared to protect the selected site by delays, denials, and counter charges.

7- It Bust be realized that the precedent for Jaaaingounter measure to propaganda broadcasts ben been set in Europe and in Asia, particularly by governments under Soviet influence. Further, the Sherwood program is particularly vulnerable bocuuoe the major target is located in one metropolitan area which could be commanded by relatively few low power ground wave Jammers.

wrwSB

he protection disclosed.

by the CALLIGERIS' group and under. Oovernaent interest would not be

the protection ofInstallation could be made

inimum of personnel and activity cover problems.

C aa previously denied HJBARX peraleaion to basein liif"country and even if persuaded to change hie mind, could have complete control over the program and could terminate it at any time.

With the installation known nd his aooociotos and to CALLIGEHIS and his staff, the dangers of the program being blown through security leaks are very great.

The movement of broadcast technicians and equipment into KKFLUSH and tbe installation of SHERWOOD would attract attention with the resultant security dangers.

B. SHIPBOARD

Operatinghip would give complete control of the broadcast installation, thus improving physical security.

Broadcasts. Navy ship wouldnterest.

To maintain the Sherwood program for an operational periodonths, it is necessary to have two ships assigned to the project. Two installations of equipment would be necessary.

The security problems inherent in tbe use of two Navy crews are many. Pact experience indicates that there will be security leaks even though efforts are made to indoctrinate the Bavy crews in the necessity for security.

C. VARIOUS FOREIGN OWHKD ISIAKPS

There are various foreign owned islands in the Caribbean that are suitableite for the Sherwood program. The advantages and disadvantages of each are approxlantcly the same. There are no suitable islands that are uninhabited.

Approval of Sherwood by the country involved would be required prior to the installation of radio station capable of making the desired broadcast.

To make the installation tenable when located by the opposition, the sponsoring country would have to be prepared to weather the propaganda blasts and accusations.

Tne sponsoring country could have complete control over the progran and could terminate at any time.

Tho movement of con and materials on to the island and the

niuni

of the equipment vould attract much attention with tho resultant security dangers.

U.S. Oovernment interest could possibly be concealed but the noceosory use. technicians to operate the station would identify the installation. sponsored, at least in the eyes of the local populace.

, 0. APJACSHT COUrrrRLSS OTHER THAU MffLUSK

Adjacent countries other than KMFLUSH have been considered ac possible sites for the Sherwood program. In each country the local physical security problems are very great and political tcnabllity is impossible or doubtful.

K. SAffEA FE

Although It Is understood that there ore no problems in securing permission for use of islandite, and no political approval would be required, official liaison with tbe Weather Bureau and CAA will be necessary.

Complete control over the Installation with the resultant maximum tenability.

Thereotal ofeople on the. Weather Bureau/CAA personnel andatives. Thierlrrliipim that can be expected for any site. These personnel can be security cleared and controlledertain extent.

Santa Fe is relatively remote and removed from the usual inter-island Ghipping traffic, thus improving physical security and lessoning the chances for local security leaks.

Because therearge radio installation already existent on Santa Fe, the installationew radio does not radically alter the appearance of the location. Onlyareful ccaparison of aerial photographs could the new antenna installation

be detected.

The exact location of Santa Fe can be kept from the CALLIGERIS group, thus dangers of security leaks through penetrations and defections are eliminated.

U. S. Government interest will be disclosed when the broadcast Is located as originating at Santa Fe. There Is some possibility that the opposition will not undertake to locate the broedcaat during the aild early period, if not located during this period tlwre is the possibility that the opposition will be too occupied with other aspects of PBSUCCESo to attempt to locate the broadcast

during the latter stages.

Although the Weather Bureau and CAA personnel at Santa Fc can he security cleared and can be controlledimited extent, there is no adequate control over unintentional security leaks through personal nail and official Weather Bureau and CAA reports, both written and radio.

9- Fee oane ligationr.

After careful consideration of tbe advantages and disadvantages of ull possible sites and of the extreme iDportance you hove attached to the Sherwood program in its support of the PBSUCCESS operation, it is recommended that approval be granted to proceed with the installation of Sherwood at Santa Fe.

It is pointed out that becausehortage of broadcastRUCIDB is unable to make two Installations simultaneously. However, following the completion of tbo Sherwood installation ot Santa Fe, it is recommended that consideration be given to the installationiversionary or secondary broadcast transmitter in KMFLUSH under the protection and sponsorship of t

Project Officer PBSUCCESS

I have reviewed the above paper and concur in the analysis of the factors involved In the selectionite and with the rcconraondatlons contained therein.

Director for Comraunications

Original document.

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