VIA:
AIR
orn mot
CLASS FICATX*.
from ( Chief of Stat: SUBJECT; ocwoal- Operational-KUGOlfM
wtarm- Reviow of ESSENCE Operations Reference t ll|.
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INFO: Chief, wil)
1. dvised youin Linooln,elieve it ia necessary for us toompleto assessment of all plans and projects of this station.
Upon my returniscussed in detail with George L. TRAHjER and with RA2.JARA the ESSES'CE operation and oncouragod TRANOER and RAZrfARA toomplete assessment of thia The attached assessment, prepared by TRACER on the basis of his detailed discussions with RAZMARA, was immoaaurably aided by the materialwhioh Lincoln ha3 recently forwarded to this station.
3. It Is my opinion that this report, aa prepared by George L.
TRANGER, faithfully reflects tho aotual situation ofEHCE project and clearly indicstos that we must make substantial chnngei before this project willeal asset to PBStJCCKSS.
^ 3. SAHHISTER
ESSENCE Review as note
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ENB/cmh Distribution:
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HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
PcSUCCESS RVBA1
RE,r
MEH.TKAItDUH
FROM t George L. Tranger SUBJECT: KUCOWK/ESSENCE Activities
The following review of the Essence operation Is based on discussionsRazmara/Tranger and Raznara/Essence. It Is submitted in order that Lincoln will bere of all current operational problems and to present our suggestions for rccodial action which will assure the efficient fulfillment of PBSuccess objectives assigned to the Essence complex. Sonc of the matters discussed in this review have been previously reported in informal memoranda attached to weekly Kugotm operational reports. At this time we wleh toall phases of the operationingle report for study and whatever action may be indicated.
First of all, it is essential that all concerned recognize certain El Rebelde has definite limitationsehicle for Kugown /PBSuccoss purposes; the unfortunate truth ia that the Eseence operation consistsarge degree of Essence the individual; at tills time we do not have the controlled facilities necessary to cany out many of the Kugown tasks frequently assigned by Lincoln as targets of opportunity. We have the impression that somewhere along the line the capabilities of the Essence complex have been oversold to Lincoln. If so we ask that you disregard any previous reports, whatever the source. The facts are contained in this review.
In advance we advise you that none of the recommendations contained in this review are presented as panaceas. Although we feel that we have or can develop facilities to further the Kugown objectives of PBSuccess, we must realistically
RYRAT/PBSUCC
point out that existing conditions may make it impossible to provide theeffective vehicle that might be desired. Everyone concerned with the Essence operation is enthusiastic and eager to exploit our assets to the We will do our best. When we cannot comply with specific requests you will be so informed.
El Rebelde is published by volunteer university and high school students who have no professional skill or experience in newspaper work and are not under any firm control by Essence. At the first sign of danger, or upon receipt oftoropaganda line not personally acceptable to them, they simply
withdraw.
Assuming that professional help could be recruited (highlyhe content of the paper still could not be altered to the full extent desiredof the requirement of law that known persons sign and accept responsibility for all articles. Knowing the retaliatory powers of the government, more and more "authors" have been reluctant to assume such responsibility. ime the printers were willing to accept articles containing Illegible signatures. Recently, however, the police have ordered that all ;articles be signed by clearlysignatures. The printers will not accept them otherwise.
Legally the paper is not required to submit materials to pre-publication censorship, but in practice that has been and is required by the police. The government can and has put pressure on the printer to refuse the printing of the paper. You are aware that the printer informed tie Essence group that he could not print issue No.f the paper "until things calmed down."
BSUXESS/.
As soon as personnel problems (discussed separately) are solved, Essence can and will make suggested changes in tho paper's format, introduce subtle changes in the content, increase circulation tc outlying districts, broaden the base of appeal to the extent possible and transform the publication into anewspaper. However, Essence is convinced (and we agree) that the paper cannot be madeard-hitting outlet for strongly anti-government, anti-comsunlst propaganda without running the risk of being closed down completely.
(1) Keep the paper going and makechanges possible along the
lines suggested by Lincoln. The paper as presently constituted serves apurpose morale-wise as visible, overt evidence that internal resistence to the present regime persists. Also, the paper and its propaganda messages are well received, especially in the provinces where newspaper distribution is sparse, and it obviously servesarrassment device against the government and requires the police to dissipate considerable energy in controlling it.
(2) Do not consider the paper as the principal or best available means of disseminating anti-communist, anti-government propaganda. Under existing conditions we feel that the "hard-hitting" variety of propaganda will have to be covertly produced and distributed (specific recommendations are containedeparate paragraph).
From tine to time Lincoln has asked that we utilize the independent press in the furtherance of certain Kugown objectives, and it is obviously desirable to expand contacts within those circles in ordor to contrive plants. It must be recognized, however, that the independent press here is constantly on the
RY
subject to real and inplied threats of restrictive action by the government. (For your information, the existing press law has been accurately described as "undoubtedly rigorous and perhaps unnecessarilyotential weapon" in the hands of the Tho lair is so worded that almost any act of reprisal can be given an outward appearance of legality.)
Fear of ccrpromise makes it alcost impossible to get cooperation from the independent papers. Principally they are afraid to antagonize the government because of their considerable financial investment in plants and equipment. At times they will accept articles provided they are not too offensive and provided that they can protect themselves by obtaining the signaturos of persons who assumo responsibility for the materials. The lack of courage on the part of the independent press even makes the use of the "refutation" technioue suggested inuO very difficult, if not impossible, becaise they are afraid of being tabbed with the pro-government, pro-coMoonist label. In brief, they Iiavo an opportunistic eye cocked to the present and the future. RECOJJHEIOATIOTE:
(1) Under existing conditions we should not plan on the "use" ofpapersajor device for tho accomplishment of XugowrH-PBSuccess objectives. We will continually be alert to possibilities of using the press along the lines suggested by Lincoln, but we arc not optimistic and request that Lincoln bear the true situation in mind when requesting action involving the independent press. Generally, the best that can be contrived through such papers is the release of relatively Inoffensive USIA type isatorials dealing with international cof-rmmisn but avoiding controversial domestic political natters*
RYBVT/PDSUCCESS/
However, thereossibility (suggested by Essence) that shouldiazaediate attention. Essence believes that we night be able to achieve a
seasure of cooperation froa El Espectador if we are prepared toizable
subsidy or spot payments to the owners to compensate for possible retaliatory action by the governnent. Essence suggested that as much0 per week might be required to obtain the desired cooperation. Our first reaction was that spot payments might prove as offective and certainly more economical. Whatever the form and anthod of reimbursement for risks takon. Essence warned that" the subject paper probably would not accept an uninterrupted flow of plants. An alternating "sugar and vinegar" treatment would have to be devisedfter printing an anti-co:rxranist, antl-jovornaent article the papor would have to lay offew days, perhaps cvoneception articlo flattering to tho government in an unimportant nay). Tho spot payment method has an additional advantago in that Lincoln car. evaluate the inportancQroposed plant or propaganda lino at the time it is submitted to us for action and indicate to us how high we should go in contriving its publication. inal thought, it is suggested that we could probably induce cooperation from El Espectador if, when time permits, the particular propaganda item is first published In an independent or controlled medium outside Guatemala and the resultant clippi-ig(s) rushed to us for delivery to the paper. Then,though the item arroused the ire of tho govornaent, the paper would betrong defense position by being able to argue that in the exercise of press freedom it was merely attempting to acquaint tho public with the nature of international news relating to Guatemala.
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Personnel problems havo boon well covered in previous reports. Briefly in review. Essence has encountered ouch difficulty in recruiting persons willing to taxe the risks and devote the necessary tlae to the work. Fear la the most important consideration; apathyactor. Some potential recruits doubt the efficacy of propaganda, having become somewhat Jaded after several years oi" the same old crud that has not (for them) achieved the desired results. (tOTEr we recognise that It is our job to undo such apathy.) The difficulty of getting
personnel is also explained In part by the fact that the government hasf the effective members of tho opposition. Still another factor has been cited by Essence who wisely observed that he cannot recruit indiscriminatelyof the danger of penetration.TXrtTICSS:
(1) There is only one possible way to overcome fear and apathy at this times Essence is already working on this matter and is prepared to buy personal services. Again you are reminded that roney isanacea. FieDtuch improvement butompleto solution of this problem.
All of the dangors and difficulties relating to El Rebelde apply to tho radio programs. ecent liatraara roomorandum pointed out that the programsponsored by the Comite Obrero foldedne-night stand. Tho station owner was simply told not to sell time to the Comite. This is Indicative of the treatment that can be expected for all such programs in the future, and we feel that the? can never become effective for our purposes. If they should prove effective, they would be stopped by tho government.
ENDATIO!E:
(1) Sustain at least one radio program for poaslble useignal device to alert internal oppositionists. Also, as in the case of theadio progran (even thoughneffective) will have soee valueorale factor and will sorvoarras3aent device to further dissipate tho resources of tho polico charged with control.
bandon any plans for using regular commercial radioajor vehiclo for Eugown/PBSuccoos purposes. Considering the limited value of the radiounder proaent conditions, and in vie* of propaganda methods and medialater in this review, we feel that further attempts to improve the radio coverage would be an unwise dissipation of time and facilities, both human and Written scripts containing relatively mildonrainistwill be required. Locally, wo can adapt some of the El Rebelde material for radio use.
Distribution of "white" propaganda in pamphlet, poster and leaflet form is well organised and is undoubtedly the cost efficient Essence operation. Although we will later propose certain clandestine activities in connection with the production and distribution of propaganda, we intend to retain and exploitfacllitios to tho extent possible under existing police pressure and goon squad harrasomont. Tou are well aware of Essence organisational activity in provincial areas. Such activities will be encouraged and efforts made to employ rural followers in the distribution of propaganda. However, it is extremely doubtful that we will have the tine or human assets needed to organizeunits in the provinces. When and if "black" action is needed in the provinces Essence probably will have to recruit volunteers from existing "white" groups.
jTBAT PBSUCCESS SEXjRE?
e can state that with few exceptions the propaganda lines and guidance offered by Lincoln have been helpful and acceptable to theAZMAfcA and ESSENCE. Tne reasons why such lines and guidance have not been utilized to the satisfaction of all concerned are touched on throughout this review, this point it is necessary to comment on those exceptions that we feel are not useful or pertinent to the existing situation.
andER are particularly hostile to thea strong appeal be made to the intellectuals which you, bychoice of words, refer to as "eggheads." I'ou said thatsiatu of things in the country is largely determined by 1'ie ststeirient Ss entirely correct, also true is tne that the jj:uaL majority' of Intellectuals here are extremists who little or no^ public trust. In order toilitantatio stable opposition leadership we should appeal toreliable- segment of the populace: professional andliberal flnqubros. moderate Army officers. Catholic priestsindependent teachers, anti-Communist students, etc. eggheads have mode their beds, let them lie in
feel that it will be impossible to hitore significant slogan than "Dios, Patria,ogresc" to represent thebase Tor the opposition movement. Those four words are in eTfect conversations of many things that are important to these peopleiatria"ore than country or homeland; it means national sovereignty, independence, etc.).
RY AT PBS'j^CtSS SECfc-T
Ourhe suggestion that we attack the theoretical foundation of the enemy is less categorical than to the previous item, but, some comments are indicated, First, these area- icaliy theoretical peode; they are not analytical; they are 'ne communists recognize this and place their major reliance on bread-and-butter matters and appeals to nationalistic sentiments, while the communists emphasize schools, roads, education, economic and political freeuom,e would be^ni_tne_posltXonissi-
takers tliMs. Dohaveppeals to thera purposes, "out we assume thqt our effortsbe devoted bo short-terra objectives. atppealsemotions (and stomach) are indicated, ^ur purpose is not 'cobut to encourage the pres-(sistlv sv'm^atnetionst the
With regard to the basic purposes of our oropajanda,eel that it should be designedntensify anti-communist, anti-
sentiment andisposition to act;reot dissention, confusion and fr-tiii in the enemy camp (fear instead of
blandishments to be the major device to precipitatefrom theCOriCDJoIOWS
From the foregoing rtvio* it is apparent that the majorproblems are due to:olice controls and the fear engendered by suchack of controlled and dedicated personnel, and
T FBSUCCKS SE-RTI
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Re fisre indicated thst the personnel prob lea and apathy car. be partially solved by bolstering Ideological rr.otivasion with financial inducements.
believe the or.ly way effectively to circumvent policeis te adopt clandestine methods of prcduction and distribution. CLANDESTINE ACTIVITY:
In addition to the overt unizs that will be retained andwithin the limits already described, we desire to establisnxpand clandestine activities. Two units arc under consideration, (see attached1 chart).
One unit will be responsible foroductlonafend distribution of unattribu ted propaganda b; clandestine andmeans, .ve hoperosna can be recruited for* this fork.
secern.: init willlw.t; ntrvocationcons-sting oforeisens if possible). Preliminary work on tneIislMi;ent ofnit has not been satisfactory, butthat he canairly reliable and effective group in the near future.
The followingartial list or reasons Ir.at illustrate our thinking in connection withxyausion of elan-destine activities:
(I) avoidance O- poiice cciU-cl;
ermit us to hit specific targets whim;be reached
witn overt propagandassassination, at-acks on
pro-government personalities, policies, etc.). with overt
propaganda wer.ooae our -vor-isrsuppression; witli black methods we can take off the kic gloves;
rouse curiosity, interact in the uniaiovvn, overcome the apathy now eachibited, activities;
) ew element whicn. will encourage enthusiasm and interest (anions operational personnel tnd this consumers) and possibly inspire greater active parh Lion 'oy fence-sitters;
emonstrate through hard-hitting materials andosition tohe communisisact and thereby engender confiienc
harrass government security forces ano cause them to oissi;aU st".li more moneynergies trying to suppress theseactivities;
ossibly incite complete suppression o. evert anti-communist,ovcrr.inerit units and then ust each suppression tozo the people here and abroad .the nature andf the menace and refute claims of "democratic freedoms." The possibility exists, however, that rolice preoccupation with tne clandestine propagandists may take- some of the pressure off the overt units and permit them totronger position. Above all we feel thatISrnlii'jTIvf: biEalJS will in itselferrific impact oi: the now jaded and somewhat indifferent public. Tiie atere factperson or persons unknown" continually outwit the police with unusual methods will be
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YBAT PBSUCCESS12
enough to spice up the activity and provoke greater1 interest than thai now enjoyed b; the overt units. t only the material but also the operational methods will become the subject of gossip. Jokes and speculation and rrobaulyeeling cf suspense and anticipation. People will find themselves waiting for the next item to apoear, may even start looking for them In unusual places. In other words theaction has unlimited possibilities whereas overt Methods nowore stereotyped.
Attributed materials that are now ignored will arouse curiosity if the attribution is removed and they are placed surreptitiously in restaurants (in napkin holders,hone booths (perhapsin the phonerofessional offices (among the literature in the waiting room;, -ovci-nmcnt of rices, churches (scattered in there they will inevitably be noticed by tho churchhe citi at rush nours by bursting ofilioons releasee from strategic places, tossed in quantity among crowds alcntf busy streets
(the distributor to hit the road quicklyast and naneuverableossed from theater balconies an Instant beforeor the end of the show, places as inserts in otherad infinitum.
Admittedly, distribution will be reduced in terms oC numbers but there will ee greater circulation of single copiesxarnplc; people have been seen to glance quickly at an uvertlyiterr, crumple it end drop St on the street. If, however, they
mcxpootedly found an anti-communist leafletovernment officewould probably pocket it and show it to friends and family.
RYiiftT rBSuTCKSS SBCabT
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comment on where it was found, etc. The net result would be greater impact and ultimately, as it passed from hand toistribution equal to that achieved by saturation methods.
In brief, our future operations will consist of the following:
El Rebelde
Hedlo (at least one program)
White printed materials (attributed to one of the overt anti-coranunist groups and distributed as in the past by overt meansation-wide basis)
Ij.. Black provocation and rumor team (confined largely to capital
city and including telephone team) 5. Black printed materials (produced and largely distributed in the
capital city)
ill be the iiiajor operations for carrying outSUCCESSill be mere orr clandestine activities we intend to emphasize the production of leaflets. They or* easy to prepare and distribute surreptitiously and cannot be defaced (like posters) by communist soon squads. The propaganda messages on such leaflets will be short (two or three Items) and succinct. Ho lofty, lengthy tomes that appeal to the intellectual minority; we intend to aim at the heart, the stomachhe liver (fear). (Hando* example: night distribution; leafier, placed in parked cars or un:ier windshield wipers;r you Catholic or Cojtaaunist 'ou can't be both. Or, are you ready to fight for your religion, ntry. Family, Freedom?)
Wc plan to establish two safene for staff work (editing propaganda nater-Ials, preparing stencils,nd one for production only. The first nas already been selected and weno particular difficulty in establishing the second.
as indicated on the enclosedangerous reliance will be at first placed in ESSEKCE as the principal agent for both white and black activities. Under the circumstances we feel that no other arrangeraentais possible without underlining ESSENCE'S morale, his sense of participation and importance to the movement, etc, Maximum efforts will be made (through the professional use of appropriate tradccraft) to minimize the security dangers. Indirectly, the fact thet ESoEwCS is connecter, with white activities nay provide him with cover for his Sack activities ifcan successfully conceal hiswith personnel of the latter ^rouv>.
Secret
Numbers keyed to activities listed on pagef covering memorandum. Security hazard Involved inor both white and black activities la recognized but unavoidable for reasons stated in memorandum. Reliance on Essenceeoognlzed calculated risk in which we estimate the grdater need for short terra efficiency than long term security.
Original document.
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