SiiiTitfTi FrobnbleStrategy ad Tactics at Oeneva
la In ear flaw, tlat CnsanniBta tea in to* fcrthcoeiing nogo-tlstlone at Oeacva abundant ospartunltUa to iaga-ov* their posit lor. both la Asia aad la Buret*, they are alsost certainly confident that their negotiating peel Uon retarding Indochinabe both stronger andunified than tut of Ve tfest. They also are aware tnat the erltlab and Trench attitude toward Co&ittnist China Isflexible than that of the IS end probably consider that this divergence of attitude aaa be exploited, par* lieularly If dlrcuseione ofutosorld power can be tied ti tha possibilitiesettlement ih Indochirs, iliey probably also believe that tin. sstcbllshnente Korean amis ties boseceptivity seong Astern nationseneral far eastern settlcaent end that this fcsaptlvlty broadens their arc* for aaceuver.
2* The child* (flrtsuniet object!tee for the Osneva conference are probably to hccJecb or disrupt the Western alliance end to establish tVecrenlst Chine ss en aeknowlodftedof tne "big
five,* the echlevemrita of eetUeaente in fSoree end Ineine, setsnslbly the chief purpose* of tbe conference, prohably have only esoGrtdsryin the Oeawuntet acal* ofThenUtB probablyno prseelnc neoseeitgr in cither of those locfcl cituattorni faran lav,*diat* settla-ant and ere alaoat certainly net prepared to give up eor of theadrfwrtapof, than- now enjoyabo *tr**e. On the other hand, Uio Coawatnlate alaost eerlslnly dc netar extended, and they' probablyill not wish the eoikforenca to lead to Intervention of th* US la the war, either alone or with alllas.
1. i'io iv.-junict* probably eroclder the Indochina qteistlon pivotalhe Oanevs conference. Theslasst certainly consider that th* keen desire of the Preach ti get out of thsa tJie weakest point in the wastern fsoade and offers isay opr-ortbrd tie* for tactical aanevver, They will there-fore seek to exul-it th* weakness of tho froach regarding tndo-ehinc In order V> test ths valty sad flexibility of the Western bloc. If the weetera blocholen i'XIoxIBintff ragnrding negotiation* for sons kind of settlement in inooetdiis, tbty will probably undertake largely tc creaks di vis loo within the Waetarri bloceries af proposlt'-ors calculatedk* franco'e western partners, perticularly the appear
ictranoireot aad dctcrsttmdil!tar? oolatton la Indochina. ha other hand. If the extern bloc dla?lejedlLbt^raws tov* Communist* aill pa*o'*blj- offor propositione lnvolvin/ jolnoree**iota vnlah could lead toeeaent of narrow pwportloM in Irrfochlne.
It. Specific CoAvacdot tact lea durioa the Indochina dle-enMlone era difficult to eatlelpate. we cocsider it likely* howwar, that the Coaaaatiau wiU either initlat* or be InwtdlateV reoajrUe.re or.cletee-fire in Theink too peeilbiiltveaa* fire tooeeeiona of oo raidertnltjle, each ae tha eetaaUehsamtoalition Vietnam-Victaiah ficrenvwr.t. which would cwbccQ'.iCntXy hold aa election,ifieloe of Indoohir* at tho loth Parallel, theyInclude aa traditions thef ?reach forces iVac Indochira orf tbe ho Oai-iiah* thefa the other hand, th*arelreaseith ao coeditione ether than that farther ocpfcroaooo be hold for nrrifinfolitical wl inn.
5* we believe that the Co^caUate would be wUUac toa indoohlna. although thehe ttt-K, hina, and tea ho
- view IjptotMH In different piriiccUm,fthree voild loeeeeeatioo of the ILrhtii at tho srweent tin. Tho MM would thereby advance IU prvsartt world-wideof lessening torsions and wouldo profit, both lo sale ond furo-.e, byestern viiilaoee andCow unlit China would thereby reduce th* diversion of it* onarwjrIt* primary interest la doaseLlconie and to-dun trial oxvanaion, Also, fro* Xam Cfelnosoeese-flre of Indefinite duration would ellslaate th* poet Ability that the IndoehlD* war *lf.ht beeoas another Korean war, thaa lnvolvlngirenloe of effort, the preeeacea Oiot'i eowthern flash, and tbe rlafc of eapsnslen of the fiant-lac to Cblaa ltealf. rerbi-Onh rearlne, afir* aoiOdhlft lafroa 'ar-ed liberation" tactic* toitlcai warfare taoUoa In fartswirj the Cwvanlet acvanant la Indochina. The Wat ^loh probably consider that they have attained ooralderAhle allitsry prestige awwvi th* :ndochii*oc reojl* durinc the peat two fighting ssesoos and may feel that tn* tine Is now rip* to place heavier reliance) on political tactlo*.
* be Have that ta* Soateanlaia do act eons tear theaselree undsr ijaeadl to preacBT* to ache eoncoseone of so*iifleeace durinc the Indoohlna discussions, MSwever, If the
CoamunSeteocviiired thatarticinatiee In in* Indochinatring libeUbood, their willingness townotaalPBt will ba greater. They Bight, for eaaeple, ve wining to nsk* Urea far awhich weald persdt the >rench to consolidate tfielr position In the Delta. we bell ere they will not, however, waKe ecnoeesiorin repreeentiatf en ahandanaent of the ho Cnl-adnh regime er the ladoohlneee Ccwwdst aovaaset.
?. Uet objective* for the Koreanft cum loss atara are probably nedersta. They probably hare to bring about reductionoat*rn strength in Korsa but rvit ts alter the present political division. They will probably attest to uke Via Screen discussions revolve enund the nusntior. of troop withdrawal, and they alii elaoet certainlyigorously for tba withdrawal of all fereirr, foroaa fro- Korea, Chinese Ooa.iwilct force* included. If sgreeaent en tale pciat Is reached, the Coataatiate wlU probably be prepared actually to withdraw Chinese forces, beUewine that Kortfa Korean allitary atrongtb Batches South Iforean strength and that such withdrawals will bringpolitical advanupes to thee. Theill probably rales or agree to proposals on certain minor matters euoh asexchange, postal service, and Haltedsset
fl. TbroBgheut the CPiiTarsnco, thewill attest to aehlava at Ceneva what they wm unable t* aehlsvo at Cerllniaaknrnrledgeaent ofCnlna aa oneha world's "bl/ five." rhaj willerietj' cf tsetice, an beta aubatfinttra ano pr*>eedurRlo establish that tha Oenera conferenceive pcwer eonfereooe, that China hat eoual atatua at Canava vlth tha IS,ha OX, and franee, and that Chii* haa tha right ta participate also infive- de-elal^ua on nea-aaian questions. Tha nay attaw.pt to anhanaa taa statua of Chine- byess nrorinent rule in thawhile aUoaing tha Chinese to coca to the /or*.
Consistent with their deal*red desire to nek*ig; power conference .in lscsenlng worlds OowAunists will alftoaty introduce issue* oxtranaoue to Korea and Indochina, Such issues ay Include* flt-kest diplomatic relations, expansion oftrade, reduotiaa of aneuBenba, outlawing of thermonuclear waaj ro; osed Asian Securitysiailar to that currently being hawked by th* USfift in Europef and the future status of Fcraoea. More-rsver, theseogether witc issues concerning Indochina, Korea, and tim status of Co^-unist China, say b* packager* by tha Ceivwdatc at Oeweva in anyunber of "attrsctiva* eoaadnablona. nt Uf cTbiaO OF VVtlflKaL mP**TBS|
>UU. Lt.X1ctir^ CosiraanOriginal document.