RELEASEES SANITIZED I
rnoM : Chief of Station, Oustomnia Subject: Operational
rogram Progress PROM PAGE
I arrived in Guatemala onprilnd innodlatelyat the Panel under an assumed name. It appears worth noting that neither the PAA in Miami who Issued-my tourist card, nor the Immigration officials ln Guatemala City requeated me to produce documentary evidence. citizenship, nor did they check: my immunization record.
Iirst meeting with BANNISTER onpril In which we ranged over matters of co-nmon operational Interest. ystem of meetings affording maximum security has been laid on and all business la. bolng transacted on the promises ofprivate residence. Thia, howewer,emporary arrangement, pending rontal ofquarters both in Guatemala City and at Lake Amatltlan.
CLOVER failed to show up for his appointment, at the Hlpodromo del Norte onpril. eserve judgment whether or not this was due tocircumstancos beyond his control.
The contentsable froai Lincoln, instructing me to atay clear of all entang leraents with ODACID, were conveyed to ne by BANNISTEn. Prom the point of view of maximum operational security it willbe better to leave the Ambsssador uninitiated. As regards Lincoln's admonition to observe roaxiimrn security precautions in meetingrust that the confidence shown me in authorising this mission will also extend to tho application of rules of opcraT-tional
During the initial phaserogram, the case ofnaturally looming largo. Guatemala Station has laid tho groundwork for an operational approach and securo methods of establishingin the immediate future have been taken under advisemont.While it is recognized that our planning will In tho last analysis hav* to be predicated upon the veracity of ESQUIRE'3r othnd myself share the conviction that thereceivep" thus farring of truth to thorn and that what is known here about** ersonal and professional background fits in with the sentiments which he Is alleged to have expressed.
fr PBSUCCESS RYBAT
the basis of all available evidence It appearsto play an active, ifeterminant part, into unseat the regime and that to leave him outistake. Z3 obviously aware ofafoot and certain remarks which he is alleged to havebe construed as evidence that he haa more than an inklingrole played by CALLIGERIS. It further appearsthis stage, is averse to countenancing any invasion offrom contiguous countries and that certain reservationsmay be attributable to the fact that Jisin with an interventionist project, sided and aoetted byStates. All this is of course largely conjectural. preparing for our deliberations withC e shall have to
allow for the contingency that he may not be preparedbuy PBSUCCESS hook line and sinker.
shall hold off any further moves pending the arrival ofis our feeling that in view of the slim factual base uponplanning is currentlytrictly exploratorySOCCER (whowill enbale us toapproach along lines emergingreliminary If SOCCER should gather tho unequivocal Impression that
is definitely opposed to the regime and determined to do
some tnxug about it, we shall be able to proceedreat deal more surety than heretofore. We are confident that SOCCER will be able to elicit pertinent information without straying outside the purview of his cover and to prepare the groundubsequent cold approach to be undertaken by me.
all goes well, it is contemplatedm to contacttho company off ESQUIRE, who appearsogical choiceGuatemalan citizen in good standing and presumably known to
as the individual who issued to him the warning not to
jump ol) precipitately. His presence will furthermore servethe fact that we are representing an indigenousmovement. nticipatewill insist onto some very searching questions regarding CALLIGERIS. he will wont to know whether CALLIGERIS, inAmerican support, has made co-nraitments ln offectsovereignty. He is bouffir to be interested inwhether the United States stands committed tocandidacyeading position in the Ho will wantceive'some Indication what hisIs conceived to beould not be surprised should heon co-equalityis CALLIGERIS. This will bring usthe issue of whether at this advanced stage we are stillto consentroadening of the "Junta."
it la next toble to chart the exact course ofwithit may be advisable for Lincolnhypothetical answersumber of issues which are likely
3sf*fiT pbsuccess ky
to bo broached. nvisage no difficulty In presenting
with an acceptable resistance concept, especially with theIn your position paper, as longanstick to eel ratheross ln advancing aproposition outlining toexactly we have In mind
for him. m therefore wondering wnether It would not bo boatin reserve tho proposalirect meeting betweenwhich an understanding on all technical details
coulo oh eeting could presumably take .place somo secure place noar the Honduran border. Please advise you think of this Idea. Also provide some guidance as to hould follow inshould turn out adamant in
declining truck with CALLIGERIS tan unlikely contingency). eeting wit:-during the first
half of next week.
he assignment of RIGGS has met with great acclaim and her presence here is bound to rolleve some of the extraordinary pressure under which everybody has been laboring. Somereferably after this operation haa been broughtuccessfulhoul like to be told why this station, charged with what is believed to be one of the most Important missions ever entrusted to KUBARK, is being placed ln the position of having to beg for technical and clerical personnol. Failure to provide the stationecond secrotary and tho ovon more conspicuous failure to provide adequate courier service may or may not suggest that a truly cooperative spirit on the part of ODACID (which obviously could resolve these problems by the strokeen) is greatly lacking. Ine allowed to stress the importance of processing requests for the promotion of station personnel as expeditiously as possible?
ll.jmy talks with BANNISTER convince me that it will be necessarythisreat deal moro briefing regarding ourparticularly inso^aras it may bear on the localam convinced Lhat the slSSaWon- can render substantial supportover and beyond satisfying its EEI's. As ano draw your attention to the fact that tho Aero Club maya pivotal role Inasmuch as many ofleading exponents of theown thoir own private planes and aro probably planning to maketheir escape by that means if worst comes to worst. BANNISTERvery interesting Ideas on tho subject which he willyou. o bellovo, however,lear indication as to howproposed to cope with the concentration of military powerCity, will enable tho Station to bring to bear itsthey are most needed. Such briefing will furthermorein determining what lines to pursue in the actual exploitationand SMILEX.
t this writing we have not received word confirming the safe retur: of 3ECANT and SEMANTIC. as promised byaper setting forth certain ideas regarding the future handling of ESCOBILLA. In discussing this and related problems with BANNISTER, we agreod that
gflelflfT pbsu :cess rybat
it may be advisable to establish an Independent channel to ESCOBILLA rather than leaving RAZMAiiA with the chargo of both ESCOBILLA and ESSENCE (he has his hands full with theANNISTER is confident that he can come upandler for ESCOBILLA which would have the additional advantage of" providing usore direct control over tbe activities : of SEMANTIC and particularly of SECANT. The latter should instructed by CALLIOERIS to render detsiled account of hisactivities so as to enable me to give him effective and timely supportriming job need be done. If this ha3 not already been done, SECANT should bo Instructed to keep uslocally on all salient developments in this field of (Please take up with CALLIGERIS).
As regards ray "priming" assignment, BANNISTER is casting aboutuitable indigenous assistant and hasme up with one individualt least ontrikes me no well equipped to do tbe job. He ls the subject ofn whom priority POC has been requested. His backgroundormer Guatemalan officerundoubtedly stand him in good stead. Please be sure that we are kept supplied with up-to-the minute information on the officersm supposed to prime. If we are successful in enlisting tbe full cooperation ofSHILEX, we may of course be able to do this "priming"reat deal more effectively than anticipated. m also considering an oarly approach to SIDERITE which, ln the light of universally favorabfe information on his political leanings, does not seem toajor security hazard.
I trust that the recruitment of the "labor assistant" lsapace. He should be despatchedinimum of dolay. In talking over the labor program BANNISTER advanced strongregarding the wisdom of approaching
j deprecatesassessment of uie man anu xa
loath to read more Into tno aneged differences with the COTGurisdictional Issue.
We should like to see funds channelled Intosoonuitable paymaster baa been found. Pleaseinitial expenditure of f T. 'Also advise what stringsshould be attached to enm subsidy. ncidentallyour station la faced with the rsther irksome problem oflocal currency to meat growing commitments. BANNISTERthat he can lick tho problem locally. You mayconstructive Ideas on the subject.
re agreed that the ESODICS ahould be They are unproductive and their zeal inour representative loavoa something to be deslrod, presumably stay In touch with them. We doubt whether they
are capable of and willing toubstantialc ontrlbutlon to PBSUCCESS, their rather exaggerated standards of personal security militating against any serious production.
Regarding ESPOUSER, about whose loyalty and control BANNISTER haa some serious doubts, the Station deem3 it beat to 3everat least for the time being. gree with BANNISTER that heerious security risk and that it was unwise to put hlra in direct touchUBARK representative in the first instance as was done by GIVLOCH's instructiona.
ESPERANCE is emerging aa one of our major supportsm in full agreement with BANNISTER that he Is much tooan to let go at this stage. To keep him here may involve some adai tional expendituresonsider money well apent.
It may Interest CADICK that BANNISTER considers it possiblean nttemnt at defecting Air Force pilots with theirIt appears, alsorudge against the
regime and particularly against Colonel DIAZ whom hein. If there is any KTJHOOK
Interest in seeing this toat-er pursued, please advise us at your earliest convenience when and where you want the planes to land. The psychological impact of auch defections should not beeven if their military effect ls deemed negligible. If this can be pulled off, you may wish to consider the active Intervention of Guatemalan combat planea on the side of the insurgents. Proman tell, it would be no exaggeration to state that one well-place napalm bomb might nip the attemptommunist-instigatedprising in the bud.
PIsase advise whether KUHOOK's plans allow for the interceptionreinforcements being moved up from the EaculntlaI am raising this issue inasmuch as BANNISTER believes thatitwithin the capabilities of his station to have auchwaylaid. BANNISTER ia convinced that any irregularsmight muster could easily be harrassed and at leastif not put to
iscussed with BANNISTER thpj collection of reliable data onARBENZ' movements and on Jjhe floorplan of his residence. An attempt will be made to procure this information. Presumably the residence and tha Government Palace are linked by an underground tunnel through which ARBENZ will be able to retire into his little fortress. ould not be surprised if the preaidentical residence has been convertedormidable redoubt by now. Adjacent to the residential complex is an evangelical church whose steeplethe roof onnderstand, machine guns are mounted. Without knowing too much abouttheseould hazard the guess that the investment of the presidential residence from the vantage of the'church tower might stand some chance of succcsa.
lease have the attached film developed.
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