REVIEW OF NIE-84: "PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN GUATEMALA"

Created: 4/22/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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MEMORANDUM POR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SITBJECTi Review of NTE-Sui 'Probable Developments in Guatemala"

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Tha Board of Rational Estimates has reviewed ths eonoluslons of NTS-Qli, "Probable Developments inhich was adopted by the IAC on In the course of this review the Board oonsulted with Ambassador Peurlfoy,H (ColoTA (MroColout tbe present memo-rand urn has not been formally Discussion of critical aspects of tbs problem is contained in the Enclosure.

conclosioib

^ 1. We consider tbat tba conclusions of HTE-Qli remain

essentially valid* In particular, wa reaffirm thecclusion,

as follows i

The current political situation in Guatemala is adverse to US interestso The Guatemalan Connunlstsolitical influence far out of proportion to their small numerical strength. Their influence will probably continue to grow as long as President Arbens remains in power0

2o The Co aa unlets now effectively oontrol the political

life of Guatemala. Arbens' decisions on domestic and foreign

policy are reached, not in the official oabinet, but ln a

kitchen cabinet composedCommunists and pro-Comsmnistie

There ls no prospoatreak between Arbens and the CommunistSo

3o There has probably been an increase in popular disillusionment with the Arbens re (finite There is certainly increased dasperation among opposition elementao In present circumstancea, however, the possibility of effeotive internal polltioal action to alter the situation does not exist0 We believe that effective revolutionary action would require the active supportajor portion of the Arnyo

ho The disposition of tbe Army toward the regime la therefore cruel aid We note indications of unrest, even of disaffection, within tbe Army and considerevolutionary potential now exists there^ Ue do not believe, however, that the Guatemalan Army is likely to take spontaneous action against the Arbena regime,,

So The Communists will be concerned to neutralize the revolutionary potential in tho Army, and, with the passage of time, may succeed in doing do0

The solidarity of the othor Central American etatss in opposition to Ouatemala has weakened during the past year and nay further decrease 0

n view of the foregoing considerations, we believe that time is on the aide of the Communists in CJuatemala0 ^

RAROLD R0 BULL Ltd Qeno, USActing Assistant Director National Estimatea

Tha Orovth of CkmronJat Political iBflpenee

flret cepeloslon efeads ae follows I

The current politieal situation in Gaateaala is adverse to IB interests. Tbexcunistsolitical influence for cat of proportion to thoir snail numerical strength. Their influence will probably oontinuo to grow as long os President Arbenz retains In power.

conclusion retains -mlid. under theArbenz, Ccaramict lnfluonce in Guatemala has grownpast year and will probably continue to grow. ia not the result of any innovation, but of adevelopment along lines previously established.

For examplei

a. There has been further development in theof rural workersolitieal force under CoxBunist influence end oontrol (as waa antioipated In the sixth eonoluaion of The CoronnlstB haveapability for the rapid mobilisation and assembly of cccisldexuhle mn&ers of these workers far political deaxanatrations.

The CcBPnciiLata are probably also capable of BoMlielng up0 of those workers aa on onwd ollltla available to support the regiaa in on emergency. Ve cannot eonfirBi reports of tho existence ofera-nllitary force, but would considerogical development in the olrcnmstanoaa. There la good reason to believe that the required qunntities of smallhave been distributed and oacbsd under tho control of Ceanunist. agrarian organisers. It la not apparent that this putative militia baa received any appreciabletraining. Even without such training,ubstantial mrobor of rurnl workera, arced and organised, could exert considerable political and military force.

o. Tbe Ccnnuniots have strengthened their oontrol of the pro-Arbenz political parties. Tbs Ccenunlst Party itself la saall, butcontrol tho other parties In the re^Arbenz ccolltlon end through them effectively control the political life of the country.

jj. There is good reason to believe that Arbens' decisions on Guatemalan doaeatic and foreign policy are reached, not In the offlolal cabinet, butitchen cabinet couponed of four Cqxamlato and six pro-CaaBsmlata.

Arbeng1.to the Cprjauplstp

3. The third conclusion of NTE-S4 reads as followsl

President Arbenz still axaroisas personal ooatrol of the Adrrinigtration and of the Army and tba Police. It la still possible for his to break hia ties with the CVrmnmlata and to moderate tha polloles of his Adadniatration, bat It la highly unlikely that he will

do SO.

/.. Thia conclusion remains valid, but the likelihoodreak between Arbenz and the Cornramiata is ersn more remote than ltear ago. He la too deeply aoncdtted. ecntlosally

and politically, to extricate himself.

The Absence of Effect fre Political. Opposition.

keyof the serenth conclosioo ofas followsi

There ia no likoliboodpposition oould alter tha course of the Government by politieal action. It oould not succeedevolutionary attempt oppoaed by tho Army.

believe that this eonolnalon renains valid. probably been an increase of popular disillusionmentArbenz regime. There is certainly increasedopposition eleaants. In present circumstances,possibility of effective political action does notcontinue to believe that effective revclr&ionary aot Ion

would require the active supportajor portloa of the aray.

The rosltlon of tho Quntnmolnn Aray

7. The eighth conclusion ofeads aa follcwsi

The Army is the only organised eleaant inapable of rapidly and decisively altering the polltloal situation, uick change of attitude la always possible, there Is no present reason to doubt tba continued loyalty of the amy high risad of aoat of tbe Arsy to Irbans. The Aray under its present leaders ooold not be expected to take revolutionary action unless they beoano convinced tbat their personal security and well-being ware threatened by Concmnlet infiltration and doninotion of the Corernaent,..

8. Ve ccnsldar the probable action of the Army to be the critical factor In the altuatlon. In nodlfioation of tbe sseond Bontence of the quoted paragraph, we note certain Indications of unrest, even of disaffection, among Amy officers which suggest tbat tba preeondltion for revolutionary oat Ice specified in tbe third sentenee any be approachingColonelowerer, would roaffira the second sentence, stressing the watchful oontrol which Arbens examinee over tba Any eeeraand, the considerations of personal advantage which bind key of floors to tbe reglse, and the disposition of the rank-and-file to follow their leaders. This differenceattar of fsnphnsls rather tbaa of essential snbatanoe. ill

would agreeorolatlocnry potential new exists In the Onatemalan army, but that the Guatemalan Army la not likely

to take spontaneous action against tba Arbena regime.

9. The Coranndsta will be concerned to rjeutrallBO the revolnt ionary potential in the Amy. With the passage of tins they vary succeed in doing ao byi radual purge ofafTected officers! (b) subr-TaL* of the enlisted personnel|radual reduction of the nilitary capnMlltlea of tha Army by tbe governaant's failure to replace used weapons, equipment, and annunltionj and (d) farther developmento^ramiiat-controllod workers' nilitiaounter-balnnoing foree. There are ourrent lndloaticne of action along these

Republics.

seTeral lines.

10. The ninth ocnoluaioneads aa follovai

Governments of HI Salvador, Honduras, andare fearful that tba trend in Guatemala will lead to Ccexmzalet aubreroion and sooial upheaval in their own territories. They are probably giving aerlous oanoideration to tha possibility ofolltloal ohange in Guatemala throagb clandestine support of revolutionary aot ion there. It Is highly unlikely, howver, that they would or could mount an open military intervention In OnsAectsla.

*

This conclusion remains valid. Prospectiverlli-taxy aid to those eountrlea will take time to become effective end la not likely to alter tba situation substantially. To tbe extent tbat it reassures then regarding their security against Ountezralnn retaliationt itoldan these countries to render clsxxloatlno pupport to revolutionary aetivitlea in Guatemala. Open nilitary intervention wouldoubtfulat best, all tbe core so in view of Latin Americanon tha subject of Intervention as recently demonstrated anew at the Corneas Conference.

The current Imbroglioaragua and Costa Rica has weakened Central American solidarity in relation to Guatemala. If long continued, it nay oanse Costa Rica to look to Guatemala for support. The approaching election in hondnraa proasnts opportunities for Guatemalan Intrigue in that country

and the pcaalbllity of an adverse ohango there.

Original document.

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