Created: 4/21/1954

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14 Enclosed herewithpanish and English editionewsletter based on nstsrlal fathered la theountry, LIICGL* strenfly urges its see In controlled and other outlets in support of PB3XCESS.

2. The referenced dispatch suggested Ust tsr.rc slfhtlatllar newslsttsr clarrdeetlnoly and *sll it to target individualshis night be one alternative to the tight news outlets now esletlnr 'or STSC/rr


eTK/ egw Attactrsintei

Locadencle del Conunlaao en Ouatsnala


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7). .1

Guatemalaeculiar spectacle this week of Comunist theory and practice gone astrayi retrenchment on the foreign scene and frantic plans for exile and underground activity on the home scene.

At one time it was an axiom of national Integrity that foreign policy be formulated in the home office and then announcedt was your country's policy, to be accepted In the market place and the Congreso as of merit or barn to your own political and economic aims. But thisode of conduct which is out of place In the ana thie al policy of the Communist satelliterworld. Ooillermo TORIELLO, for example, suddondly found himself the Foreign Minister in Guatemala, not because he was able or learned in Guatemalan affairs but because ba had shown at the UN that he was thoroughly indoctrinatedoreign policy favorable to the USSR and as such was invaluable to the Russians who had to have aat the approaching Caracas Conference. TORIELLO went to the Conference and handled his tasks well. And Just recently TORIELLOactions were approved! thia case Indirectly in the formote from the Russian Embassy in Mexico because as yet it has not been thought opportune by the communist strategists to establish open relations with the USSR. The Russian Embassy In Mexico wrote ARBENZ praising TORIELLO and his assooiates for their "valient and courageous action" at the Caracas Conference. It was small comfort to the Arbenclatas who must realise that this action, while it benefitted Russia, only helped to isolate Guatemala still further from her neighbors in the western Hemisphere.

Even such actions as TORIELLO's are ephemeral for although the delegates listened end applauded, they voted with the United States. The Communists know, and none more seriously than ARBENZ and his top advisors that their days in Guatemala are numbered. The group which has benefitted most in money and In power from the heyday of communist rule have been the labor leaders, Carloe Manuel PELLECER, Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ and Alfonso SOLORZANO. Opportunists of the first order, they have also been the first to Sense the change in the course of events: they realize they must lay their plans now to..conserve what thoy can for Uieir personal use and to

prepare for an underground organization. The top echelon net onU, to aake these plane and to drawrocXaaation which said in effect that theys rending tholr activities; realising the possible psychological effects ifUtenant vers made public, the group agreed tc keep this pronuncismlento confidential at this time.

The most telling of the events whichrumbling regime in Guatemala ware tho brave plans for aggression in Nicaragua, oommunist-atyle, and the ridiculous fiasco of Manuel GOMEZ and his complistas. When the Arbencistas formulated their policy they presumedtable and long range regime! under the guidance of their communist taskmasters they set np sndolicy of sggresslon in the neighboring countries of Central Amsrics, the pattern for which had been set in the unfortunate countries of southeastern Europe. Thia policy built upon Oaatemala'Overy real den ires for power through expansion but it was dictated by ths KREMLIN as part of its desire to expand In the Western Bemlsphero. TORIELLO'8 spaech at Caracas was one phase! Guatemalan aggression, another phase.

The Immediate target was Nicaragua and their declaredresident SOMOZAi thoir agenta were professional Niearaguan and Costa Sloan revolutionaries, by which stratagem they avoided an open link with Guatemala. Guatemala's support was agreed uponersonal exchange between President Jacobo ARBENZ and Francisco IBARRAesident of Costa RiOBI ths funds and the plans were handed over to Lois BAE2 Bono in Guatemala City. Tha necessary condition for Guatemala's help was the assasinatlon of SOHOZA and as many other of the high civil snd military officials who were to gatheranquet in SOKOZA'o home onu. The liquidation of key figures would at least paralyse Nicaragua, at best create the chaos nccoBsary for an armed revolution. In support Ouatemala obligated herself to send machine guns, rifles, and the necessary ammunitionioken of good faith she had this equipment prepared end stored In Merida, Mexico, to awaitat the appropriate time.

Aa in the TORIELLO case Guatemala's diplomatic resources were utilisedolicy that was communist rather than daneetlC) this too is the familiar patternation in tho process ofatellite which finds its diplomats utilized for an. cocnunist, policy for control of the foreign ministry ie an early target for eoomranist strategists in Uklngountry.

But as clever and well thought-out as they are, the strategists In Kremlin are nofs oo thand could not foresee the changes which a

few months would bring toCentral America rapidlyto tba menace of communism. Guatemala, bat steadily receded from her original poaitlon of initiative on the Central American ecene aa she baa had to devote more and more of her energiesrantin attempt to retain powor In Guatemala itself, fins oould not seen hope to reooup harlose of prestige at bone through triumphs abroad for aggression, communist et,rla, ia underground and brings no open rewards. The Ifrealin Itself has been increasingly obliged toosta files as an operatin* bass, allowing President PIOOERES to take ths inl tie tire where they had originally planned on ARBENZ action, ESKS agreed toroops frost his scantyhese troops were to be sored to the licaragnan rrontlsr to cooperate In the Mloarsguan revolution once SOKDZA was dead.

But Guatemala, who had masterminded ths plan, could'not give the tlaa sod the arms necssesry for thissuecsssi ths rsrolaUonartse became wild and undirected, the plans had undsrsstiasted ths ability of Nicaragua's satlonal Ouard and ths unscrupulous ness of their Bicarapian agents who were willing to sail out one another if the price war* high or their own role in the plot not great enough, Guatemala watched helplessly while theiree red steadily towards the rocks. The plotters wore discoveredm, without hsringingle thing to

. ^LfTJ^mP* to rally public opinion in Nicaragua to President SOW0ZA and to dash tha last hopes of theonorete success.


The stubborn realsteac* of tha Guatemalan amy accounts in large part for ths ArbeQctstss retrenchment on the foreign scene. The hi story of th* army In the past yearsield, precise example of what happens to an institution which opposes the Communists and an equally vivid example of successful opposition.

Prom the beginning ths Amy had made lt plain that it would be at beet passive accomplices in the Arbena regime as partalt-and-ee* policy, thia has now given wayetermined opposition. Foreseeing thia, the Arbonoistaslr foreign taskmasters systematically set out te isolate the sray froa the people snd to destroy it Internally by setting officer against officer. They sounded out tin weakest of the officers sndigh price of favors and luxuries for their passlce cooperationi theyampaign of distrust so Intense that each officer feared the other officerovernment 'orejal and all officers, those who passively agree and those who are opposacT, realise that they are under constant surveillance. The communist politicos alsokillful and widespread campaign of infamies about the armyit the people and the army in the unusual position of being in opposed camps.

But skill and ruthlossneas have been met by sincerity andthereard core of officera who continue to reiterate their

leek of sympathy with the present government. They have said poblicly and prlvstely that the dignity and the honor of the srmy has been destroyed by those of their fellow or commanding officers who have allowed this mutual distrust to develop within tho srmy. But theirfiplrlt de corps is outmatched by their patriotism despite the increased stlffnesB of the penalties of the arbencLstas growing more fearful of their position, there sre still many officers who continue to reiterate their lack of sympathy vltb the government and their disgust with those of their fellow officers who hsve allowed the Constitution to beelaything of the ooanmists. These officers sre becoming more impatient for the call which will rally them to the serviceoble cause, the call of Lt. Col. Carlos CASTILLO Araas. Despite the urgency snd the necessity for removing the communists from control in Guatemala the finest fruit of CASTILLO'S cell to Guatemalans will be the rebirthiner snd stronger relationship between the army and the majority of people who share the same desiresetterelationship the Communists folly released when they set out upon their fntlle task of dividing the one from the other.

Ouatonala presonta on espeoticulo peculiar esta seBana on one laa prutioa Ccnunlstas ae eneuontran etttravludaci rlnoharenl<into on la or connianos fronotlooe dooUTidadoa anbtorra urns en el nuelo pstrio.

En un tlenpo fufi un axiom de lntogrfdad naolonal cjoe el curso deoxtranjora rem prusentado on el oualo pauogo anmoiado cl extranjeroj fttA la politloa del pain el ser eooptedo en eln el Ckagrooo conoaOo pan run proplos finesaro eats oe un oodigo de canducta one estf fuara do lugnr sn ls politicn uneUoa del nundo de los satfili tes ooscnl^taa. Onillarno TORIELLO, per eJeBplOi se encoctro do pronto slendo ol RLnlstro de Pnlecionea Extxenjcrao en Ouatonala, no porousueraonooodcr da lcc aauntos ds Oncrtsnals slno porcpe domootrfi onua estcba nuy bleu oniootziuado en la pnlft.lns extranjora favorable pare In oao tal ere valloso para loe Itoson culeneo necesltaban un eo-ador pare la ya [ifoslna Conferenoia do Corac&n, TO1IELL0aPa#llfl su taroa ofitlnfact^rlanentea Roaicntenante las oecloiicp ds TOHLULLO fuoron aprovaaesi Tino indirectasanto on fornm do nets de la EBbaJada Rosa en Mexico, porcpe sun no ss ba Jusgadoper loo ostruteges ccounistaa el astnbLooer relaciones ablertao oonS. LaBasa en Aoxloolsus snonlsdoa por suy Talicnte anclfin" on la Ccnfarencia ds Caracas, runoueuo ocnsuelo para los Arbenclstas qulenes dobsn de daroe cuenta qua eata acclon, clontxasasifl, sSlone Ouatenala se aisle boo de sus vcclnos del Ifcuaiaforio Occidental*

Aon saf octes aoclonea de TORI^iO eon efinorns pneeto que sunone loa dalogadoe

rJa.dloron, olios dloron susoo Eetados Unidoo. Los Conunistaalls nagqueun prLncipelos consojoroe, qic bus dies en fttntaaals eaten cootadds. El grupa quo aaa as bo benefioiado onodor dosde el conieneo del control aonunista bn aido el de los lideroa obraroe, Carlos Itanuel rSLL-'X^i, Victor KanoollXonso Opoxujnistas do prinor firden, olios tarpbloh ban Dido loo prlneros en dares cuaota del oaabio do oureo ue los cconteclaientoci se ban dado ousnta cue debar dejer sus pi tub por. el noaanto, oonoorvtr

pusdan para ou lncrorepararse pan on crgsnlsacico aubterracoM principal escaluheunii cle abrll dsan naonx eatosmzar una proclaon la cue! inJloabe que olloo esteban eucpeollsndo ous activloadostumporolooato'i pero dfindceo cuenta do lo? poelblos efectos peioologlcoa el tal nmii-fostacion se hiaiose panlian, ol grupo esturo de saunrao en laaitonsr esto pranunolnoieato oonfldonclel par el nmonto.

itjie LUietrnn el aoanuronsaiofito -cl ricisun do

Jnutaaals. fuoron los ouiaoos plnnucoeldh cnl rldlculo fiasoo do onplintas. Uucolo loa Ju-ocnaietas fcamilnrco

au pulitlcL ulloaon lartdoro* bojo la iiroccifir.ocuLlauoroB do tareac ewMnlstaj aliosQ pjliticoresiuh cn loe palnoG vocinis do lr, tourlcn Umtrol, low siitrwt pstruQoaatcn los InfartunMonel sudoesto do Luropa. uttaaiahits realec ooreece do la oxpeunion, pero laoaoor- ot. i

-J. lilcctroo je rjll.cn Jarcci-'- ijie fnsoi tpioci .

Oa ocjetivo lirjodlato toA0 daalaredo enonlgo, el lYesldonteaeontoe erea reroluoicofirlce pratnalaaBjjse deosta Rice, con leolloo ovltaron ehinrto rclsclcc oon Ouctesaie. Ln oyuda de Qactosalaonntro ol rreeldente Jooolo ARBac yKnyarsa, un retactato do Costa ItLoai lotoa plonoo de occlona Ids BAST. Bono ea la Ctuded do Ctiatemslo. ondlolon neocMric perode OuoteaaU era ol ssednstoe todo equol do loo oltosy olviLao quo so erccntreren preoetite on ol banquet* oa la realdonoUele aixilllojaaeegeal do figures dostacadas par lo MPjaj

xearlB el oace rsjceearlo pera on* rvvoLuctin arana, Cono ayuda, Oxurtenmla sorrriar oaotrellsQaras,as nurJcionee neooeorlaai oomo nuoatro do bunas roluntad elLa* orjjlpo lislnacenndo on Kerioa, floxloo, ooparando aao ol swaento oproplado.

Al igual que on al caso do TOR in JO loo reournondo Cuatensla fueron atUlaadoo para una polltloa goo ara aaa ocaunleta quo dcewSatloa; este tantder.a perto farrtllsrna naolcQ on el proceeo do coovertirso oa uo satallto, ol cue!us dlplaaflUoce utilisadoe par facrses lru^orr^lonflles, por sjonplo corainlstos la polltloa para cantrolar ol nlnleterio extrunjoro os un oujotlvo prloarlo para loe ortrstogss Qonunletsj ol opodereree de un pale*

*or odsreTlaoree on* alios seen, los oatrBtsjao cn el BLHLW do son0 puodon prorar loa oanhloo que uao* ooantos asset puodonna Aafirlcc Control nlB^iptanontoailrrt-. Ouatonola ba ratrocodldo en oa ortglflalrxMtcifia do lrdcUtlva on la eeceno de la Anfirica Control ya que ba tonido qie dedicfiro*is de sus enarglao on un oaruorso desespcrxulo por rotenor el poder en la propln ftistonola, ELLb no puede eaperer slculcrc ol rocunoror su per lido praatlglo en el suelo pa trio por nedlo trlmfoo eo elstllo+cccunLcia, el cud eso ofreoe gran roocapenna. El alano KR*LDf oe ba vistoosta Rio* coco bono de operaolon, perrriUondo ol rroaldonto nODSSa toner la lnicia-tlvc do lo que beMan calgineljsante plarjsado eobro la eccion do ART&MZ. PQUERKS oojrro do aoaordo en prorxoxicnar una tropa blon araeda do hcohres do eu ye osoaao ejercito* oaUs tropes oerfana frontere do Hicsragua para oocvorox en la rcrvol^clon de Sicnrogua una vet auerto SCHGZA.

Pero, Ouctocaila, qulen habla ldeedo el plan, no pudo dor elos erase necoosrloo porn el triunfo de esto projocto* loa revalueionflrioc ee volvicronin dlreccLon, loo pianos no hobLan eantado oon la hnhniiteil do la Ouordls rtacionel dea Ineocxupulcjeldad de loo egentco nlooragucnsoD qulenoa eetabonondcrao lo-os otroa si el preolo era nulicleriteonntei su poelolon en la rvvolncion no era lo eurlcl*ntes*Kxte iaportantc. OuaunaalA eeperahe intpotente nlcntrce sua planes ee oetrelleben lnavltablcocntc cantm Las rocar. oorisplrsdorec rueron dcscuhlGrtosa fibrilL, sin ha toraio heaho elguno par todo elsTuerzo Invortldo ado oxhortar lavoniblcownte la opinion pSblicx. hscln ol rroridonteenuprinlr lor ultimo ospcrcnzcc dol coblerno de rfcirtaajlii para una victoria concrete.

Lc torui rcslcto .cia_uol cjurcito ca^toaaitooo oa jeifc ai .jrui puru cl atrlnchcrc* aiientociru tat la oocona oxtranjert. L& hlotoric <iwjtoda on lot, pesadooprooenui un cjca,locciaoo quo lono institocion quo scos ocan ojocvlorv.rrito vivilo uo la tziuofuitO oposicion.

orLX! cl cad.cn:u3 li.o liiiv>.us on ci

oc oficiulas loc unos contra los otros. Ellasoa ollclcles nasos pognron eu cooporaclon oonujosi ellos fcoentaron una caqpoila oo otasc^nficnna tar. intense que cede oficial tonla que eu ooapaffcro fore una oreja delolos los oflciolce, los qae pi^lvwaento eotoban deoo que ee cpontan, co ctbban cuentc ae qi* estabsn bajo una oonstento vigUanala. Loa politico^ comjalctasaiciaroti unaifusa Oaagjaas' de infr^rtw contra el ej&rclto lo cual coloofi ell puoolo en la ettraflo poaloloO do cstar en Ceagpa opuestos.

^aroo ca^ioldod obocaron oon laa Uetursdnacloni ernorjocia un fucrte nuclso ue oflclalcs continuabon rolUdWij eu antlpatla hacln ol actual goblerno, aice bm dionorlira^ainto que lal honor del ojorolto hen eldopor cquolloscKaandantoa quo hen peroitido quo esta dooccnflnnse nutaa so dcaarrollo cn el aj&rcito. Woro sudo corpe ea sola avontajodo par su petriotlomoi c, posar del inflcxiLle auaonta de penalidadoc por loo Arbciicistas cadu vez als teauxooo uo poroer sus pool clones, todavio hay priohos Oftolales que contlnuan reitorando bu autipatla baclt elu disgusto por eve cccpsiteroB oflPlfllrts que han porndUdo que la Cocutituclon so oonviorta en Jugueto do los ccnanlntas, Eotoo oftoUl'M eatfin cala vtjz ate in^aclcctc'j cn ospora delue los cdiortorS al ecrvioio de una canoe noble, el lloau-io del IA. CcroneliM) Armas. esar do laecosidau dcor coatJiictae del gobiemo ds Ouatorsala. ol fruto mfis fino dol llaaaaieotooe fcpiotaaoltecos serf el renociaiento do una unionuorto entrcl pueblo; que ccqparton los ralomas deseca para una Quatoaala mejor, una union que loc ooanntatoa notaron cuando cosironlicron su fa til tares da eeparar ol uno del otro.

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